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made between China and Japan, which was communicated to the Powers, must have made it clear that Japan contemplated a third railway, which, like the other two, was meant to make her position in Manchuria secure, and so render any attempt on Corea, over which she has now established a definite protectorate, practically impossible. This has been her definite policy since Russia, with the assistance of France and Germany, made her relinquish her hold on Port Arthur in 1904; this was her first set-back and humiliation. Were she now forced to consent to internationalise the South Manchurian Railway, which she has gained at the expense of a war from the effect of which she has not yet recovered, and the two other railways, all designed to keep her powerful western neighbour at a respectful distance, it would be a second set-back even greater than the first.
As to the western neighbour above mentioned, it is, I think, sometimes forgotten to what extent, and how thoroughly had Russia, the world looking on and saying nothing, converted Manchuria into a province of her own, and there is little doubt that Japan would have acquiesced in this arrangement, much as she disliked it, had Russia kept her hands off Korea. Is it therefore to be wondered at that she should now strain every nerve to make her position secure in Manchuria, and prevent a repetition of the history of the last fifteen years in this corner of the Far East. As to the policy of the open door and equal commercial opportunity for all in Manchuria, here whatever may have been her intentious Japan has been so carefully watched that the opportunity has gone to those who have known best how to use it, and the door has been kept opeu. It has, even in these few years since the war, been conclusively proved that the Japanese, commercially and industrially, are no match whatever for the Chinese, and even European undertakings have prospered, where, notwithstanding advantages geographical and otherwise, Japanese have not.
But politically and in the matter of these strategic railways the door is not open and Japan is not going to allow it to be opened by internationalisation or any other means. You were good enough to cause Sir John Jordan to forward to me a telegram he had received from you, No. 205 of 1909, repeating a telegram, No. 513, from His Majesty's representative in St. Petersburgh; in this Sir Arthur Nicolson reported that M. Isvolsky had spoken to him regarding the internationalisation memorandum he had received from the American representative, which was practically identical with the one Ilis Majesty's Government had received on the 9th November. M. Isvolsky stated that he would be curious to know what views the Japanese Government would take of the scheme which he thought was a vast one and one which would require very careful study on the part of the Russian Government.
If I am not mistaken M. Isvolsky has by now received from the Russian representative here a very clear indication of the views held by the Japanese Government, for in the course of a long conversation I had this morning with M. Malewsky, His Excellency showed very clearly that he was fully alive to the strategical importance to Japan of these three railways, and had also sounded Couut Komura on the subject of the American memorandum the gist of which had been telegraphed from St. Petersburgh; the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave the Russian Ambassador to understand that the Japanese would not view the national- isation with favour. M. Malewsky spoko very openly on the subject and I should say the Russian Government would not give the American memorandum any real support, though they might approve in "principle." In this connection it must be remembered that by a secret convention signed in July 1907 Japan and Russia have agreed upon their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and the three railways lie well within the Japanese sphere. Sir Arthur Nicolson in the telegrams above quoted mentions that M. Isvolsky also spoke on the subject of the Chinchow- Tsitsihar-Aigun railway which he regarded in a serious light, in that China was also under obligations to Russia which would be effected by the construction of such a railway.
M. Malewsky seemed much more perturbed about the construction of this railway than with regard to the American memorandum; he pointed out that for a considerable part of its course it would run through desert, and could under no circumstances repay the cost of construction. His Excellency asked somewhat anxiously, "What was this l'aulings" and required some reassuring that they were bond fide contractors, and not a political association; he could not understand why they were so anxious to build a railway which would not pay if there was not some arrière-pensée in the matter. I said that so long as they got their pay, and I presume they would exact sufficient guarantee to this end, it was a matter of indifference to them whether the railway paid or not. I do not think my Russian colleague was quite
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satisfied, and I shall not be surprised if the Russian Government raise objections to the construction of this line.
The conduct of the sovereign Power, China, in these railway questions, as indeed in others regarding Manchuria, is neither dignified nor altogether casy to understand. The Chinese have signed agreements and conventions with Japan regarding certain railways in Manchuria. granting them special treatment, but according to the chargé d'affaires in Peking (Sir John Jordan's telegram to you, No. 198), the proposal to internationalise these same railways, that is, subject them to a totally different form of treatment, meets with the cordial approval of the Chinese Government.
It is also worthy of note that the said Government are aware that one of the objections to the Tsin-min-ting-Fakumen Railway was that it might be extended to Tsitsihar, and thereby compete seriously with the South Manchurian Railway by diverting traffic of all kinds from the west on to the Chinese line; having by a convention signed last September with Japan agreed not to construct the railway, they almost immediately sign an agreement with an Anglo-American combination to construct a line also tapping the Siberian Railway at Tsitsihar to bring the western traffic away from the South Manchurian and so containing the same objection which attached to the other project, though perhaps in not so marked a degree.
I have, &c.
CLAUDE M. MacDONALD.
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