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past. We spoke of my journey and of other things before we discussed the question of Macao.
I told him that I was sorry that China declined arbitration; that such procedure was an honourable way of solving the dispute; that all friends of China were anxious to see the dispute settled, and that refusal to refer the question to arbitration placod China in what seemed to many of us to be a regrettable position. I said that I thought arbitration would be advantageous in every way to China, removing, as it would, the danger of trouble.
He said that China would not consent to arbitration; that so long as the Central Government showed itself strong there would be no trouble; but should she show herself weak there would be trouble, for the provincial people were excited in the matter. They believed Portugal to have acted like a robber, taking advantage of China's laxity, or good nature, gradually to encroach upon China's territory. Portugal did not acquire Macao by force of arms, as Formosa was acquired by Japan. She was granted a footing there as a friendly act, and she has little by little extended from there into Chinese territory. It is not a fortified place, and therefore she does not need forts to protect it. She only wants forts in order to be able to tax passing junks.
There is no fear of trouble, he repeated. The question has been going on for twenty years, and there is no need for fear. Campbell's vaguely worded protocol of 1887 is the cause of the dispute. Macao is simply a place for gambling or smuggling, especially opium smuggling. The Portuguese simply want to be able to tax more Chinese junks. In reply to my question why, if China has so strong a case, she should fear arbitration, he replied that delay would be advantageous. There was no hurry. Kao Erb-ch'ien would be here in a few days and would then state the case more clearly than it could be done in writing. I suggested that if China objected to referring the matter to The Hague, she could ask the President of the United States to be arbitrator; that a large number of the Cantonese had been resident in America and they would surely regard him as more acceptable than any other Chief of State. To this Liang replied: "We propose to wait and hear Kao Erh-cl'ien, then perhaps we will send a mission to Portugal to make an attempt at settlement, and then, if that fails, we can see what we can do.
""
I judged from further conversation that the real trouble is the weakness of the Central Government, who fear the provincial clamour which has been growing ever since the "Tatsu Maru case. I judged that the refusal of Japan to arbitrate in the case of Manchuria has been a factor in determining China's refusal in this question. I judged also that China is certain finally to accept arbitration when she can do so without fear of having her acceptance interpreted by the Cantonese as surrender of China's rights.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government. 1810
[B]
CHINA RAILWAYS.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[1696]
No. 1.
Reco
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[January 11.]
SECTION 4.
Memorandum communicated by M, Cambon January 11, 1910.
L'AMBASSADEUR de France a pris connaissance du mémorandum anglais du 28 décembre dernier, qui propose une division de la ligne du Setchouen en quatre parts égales entre les groupes anglais, français, allemand, et américain.
Cette division, répondant aux droits du groupe français du Chinese Central, parait acceptable au Gouvernement français (qui, en échange de l'abandon de la deuxième section aux Américains, demande la quatrième, raccordable ultérieurement au Yunnan), sous la réserve que le principe d'égalité, base des ententes pour des chemins de fer chinois entro Londres et Paris, reste convenu entre nous pour le Hankéou-Canton par l'attribution d'un ingénieur français on second, conforméinent à la proposition française remise le 8 décembre.
Le Gouvernement de la République, qui avait proposé, par un mémorandum de 21 octobre, d'agir d'abord à Pékin en vue d'obtenir un contrat positif pour que les quatre Puissances partagent quelque chose de réel, estime, aujourd'hui, que l'accord préalable entre les Puissances, préféré par le Gouvernement anglais, exige une eutente non seulement sur l'hypothèse où le Gouvernement chinois accorderait la ligne entière du Setchouen, mais aussi suf l'éventualité d'un contrat ne portant que sur les premières sections du Hankéon-Canton et du Hankéou-Tchentou.
Quelle sera dans ce cas la part de chacun ? A défaut d'entente préalable à cet égard, l'accord entre les quatre groupes est vain et l'on se retrouvera à Pékin dans la même impasse qu'au moment de l'intervention américaine.
Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 janvier, 1910.
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