2
manufacture, benefit by a preference which, even without taking into consideration the strong parti pris evinced by the authorities against the German firm, now renders competition on the part of Kunst and Albers next to impossible. To set off these unfavourable conditions can only be mentioned the recent success of Kunst and Albers in securing the sole agency for the sale of the Novorossisk cement in this district-an agency which, though, is a most profitable one, inasmuch as the sale of foreign cement here has, on account of the duty, become very difficult, while the use of Russian cement is insisted upon for the important public works now in course of execution.
The firm of Kunst and Albers stands for the German commercial ascendancy in the Russian Far East, and the passing of its predominance, though due in part to entirely natural causes, is intimately connected with the growing antipathy to Germany in the country. This antipathy has manifested itself in various manners, but the clearest sign has been the attempted boycotting of German firms, not only in Kharbin, but also in several Russian centres, such as Iman, Posyet, and Nikolsk. The movement has not been carried on with any general cohesion, and its success has certainly only been of a very partial nature, but in Kharbin, especially, it took a considerable hold over the Russian population at large; in other cases, such as Iman, it was mainly supported by the regiments; in Vladivostock itself it has quite lately been taken up by the Jews, who complain of the wrongful dismissal of a girl clerk.
The Germanophobe attitude is not confined to commercial operations; it is also that of the local officials. In July last two German cruisers, the "Scharnborst" and the "Leipzig," visited Vladivostock under Admiral von Ingersoll. The Admiral commanding the Russian Naval Forces in the Pacific, though fully aware of the intended visit, and though personally acquainted with the Gerinan admiral, left with his flag-ship, the "Askold," a few days before the arrival of the squadron, and only returned after it had left. It is admitted in naval circles that the admiral's absence was designed. It was particularly remarked, as the governor of the province was also absent, and the commandant of the fortress only returned during the course of the German visit.
The touchy nature of the Russo-German relations is indicated by the exaggerated importance attached to incidents which would appear to have no real intrinsic value. For instance, when the Grand Duke Constantine Constantinovitch was in Vladivostock last summer, M. Dattan attended at the station on his arrival, not with the consular corps as German consul, but in the uniform of a warden of the Oriental Institute. This small matter was made much of, and interpreted as an attempt by M. Dattan to identify himself with Russia and curry favour with the local authorities. Again, when the Minister of Finance was recently in Vladivostock, M. Dattan left for Japan a few days before his arrival; his absence was read here as a protest against the attitude of Russia in the incidents of Kharbin, where the consul is known to be a protégé of M. Dattan's, and is believed to have been appointed owing to the latter's influence.
Without attaching an undue importance to the facts mentioned above, I have thought it expedient to put them before your Excellency, as they are indicative of a state of feeling which is most undoubtedly prevalent among population and officials, and which appears rather to be gaining in intensity.
I have, &c.
R. M. HODGSON.
D
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government}
[B]
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[158]
No. 1.
106
2765
RECE Rrof 28 JAN 10) [January 3.]
SECTION 6.
Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received January 3, 1910.)
(No. 682. Confidential.) Sir,
St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1909. I CALLED on M. Isvolsky to-day. I met in the ante-room the United States Ambassador, who had just left his Excellency. Mr. Rockhill, in a hurried conversation, told me that he had had a somewhat lively interview with M. Isvolsky, as the latter had stated that the recent attitude of the United States in Far Eastern matters had not been of a friendly character towards Russia. He had instanced the Chenchow- Aigun Railway, and what he termed the "unbending attitude" of the United States in respect to Harbin. M. Isvolsky had spoken in warm tones, but had said that his observations were not official and were merely of a general character. Mr. Rockbill had told him that he was glad that the remarks were not official, as it would have pained him to have had to report them as such to his Government. My American colleague added that the tone of M. Isvolsky during the last occasion or two ou which he had seen him would almost make him believe that he was ready to push matters to an extremity, but that he knew that of course such was not his intention. When I saw M. Isvolsky a few minutes subsequently, I found him quite caim; and after discussing one or two questions, he spoke on the Aigun Railway. He said that Mr. Rockhill had left him a memorandum in which, inter alia, it was stated that an agreement had been arrived at for the construction of the railway from Chenchow to Aigun, in which Russian participation with that of others would be welcomed, and that this project would receive the diplomatic support of the British and American Governments. He was desirous of knowing whether this was a fact, and whether the agreement meant that a concession had been definitely granted. I replied that, so far as knew, only a preliminary agreement had been reached, and that I was not aware whether the diplomatic support of His Majesty's Government had been definitely promised. I would inake enquiry on these two points. M. Isvolsky said that he was anxious to have them cleared up, as he would then be able to know what position to adopt. There were not only the engagements between Great Britain and Russia of 1899, but also China had given the Russian Government assurances, I enquired of what nature. He replied that China had engaged to give to Russia the first offer of any concessions in those regions. It was true that Russia had declared in the Portsmouth Treaty that she was in possession of no special privileges, but he did not regard the promise of one Government to another as a special privilege. It seemed to me that here M. Isvolsky was getting on to rather thin ice-but I did not interrupt. If China, he continued, did not observe her engagements, and, without a word to Russia, granted to third parties concession of a line of the highest strategical import- It could not be tolerated that ance, Russia would have to take steps to remind her. Russia's position should be weakened in such a manner. In respect to the southern section of the Bagdad Railway, Great Britain had taken up a firm attitude with respect to her interests in the Persian Gulf. The interests of Russia, as affected by the proposed line, were of equal importance. He then took up a map. It was clear, he said, that the projected line would run parallel for some distance with the eastern Chinese line, which it crossed, and then run straight up to the Russian frontier on the Amoor. He could not understand why Russia had been kept in the dark on this most important question, and was only informed of it when it was apparently a fait accompli. He could not fathom as yet the policy of the United States Government. They appeared to wish to run counter to all Russian interests. There was this railway, and again their attitude in respect to Harbin. Then they communicated to him a memorandum on the general question of the Manchurian railways, and omitted the most essential particular, which they had nevertheless communicated to all the other interested Governments. I interposed with a remark that Mr. Rockhill had rectified and explained the omission. M. Isvolsky replied that the rectification had been a curious one, as all that Mr. Rockhill had said was that he took the responsibility for the omission upon himself. I observed that I was quite sure that the United
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