2
With reference to the above, and to your despatch re a communication made to you by M. Sazonoff, the purport of what I have recently heard in conversation may be of interest, more particularly as regards the Japanese military attaché.
2. My American colleague told me that lately when he was in Sweden an officer of the German general staff said that the general staff in Berlin was much concerned by the reports it was receiving from its officers in Japan who described the preparations for war there as "feverish." He then led the conversation to a discussion as to what Japan's possible action might be in a war either against Russia or the United States. My colleague thought little of this until on arriving here he found the Russian press discussing Japan's attitude.
3. The following is the gist of remarks made by the Japanese military attaché here in private conversation :----
The thought of Japan initiating a war with Russia is absurd, and that of her attacking America absolutely ridiculous. At the same time it is perfectly true that Japan is exerting herself to prepare for war as quickly as possible, and these pre- parations are mainly directed against Russia. Japan does not want war and has not the least intention of bringing one on. At present she is perfectly satisfied that Russia's intentions are also peaceful, and that at present her condition does not allow her to contemplate another war in the Far East. On the other hand Japan thinks that Russia is serious in her intention of a thorough reorganization of her forces for defence, but this reorganization may also strengthen her offensively. It is thought that this reorganization may soon be decided in principle, but that the carrying it out in its entirety may take eight years. The same period may see the completion of the Amur railway. If by that time the social and other conditions of Russia have largely improved, Japan thinks that possibly Russia might not resist the temptation of aggression with a view to regaining Manchuria.
Japan does not mean to get a bad start. Her preparations now are with the view of being as strong as possible to meet such a contingency. If Russia takes any steps that appear to Japan as aggressive rather than purely defensive preparation, then Japan will strike at once, and, as before, not allow Russia to complete her preparations or choose her own time. The characteristic of such an attack as com- pared with the last war would be the rapidity of its execution in full strength. Dence any improvements in communication made by Russia will be answered or forestalled by better communications made by Japan, so that ultimately the Port Arthur line, a railway from Fusan via Antung to Mukden, and a Gensan-Kirin railway, with a branch line connecting it to the central of the three lines, would give Japan three bases on the mainland, and these she would consider to be sufficient.
No doubt Vladivostock was now very strong, but Japan would not sacrifice there the same number of men as she did at Port Arthur. She would be provided with the most up-to-date equipment for a siege. An electrical machine for making approaches rapidly was especially mentioned. I did not gather the precise nature of the machine, but understood it to be in use in America for the purpose of tunnelling.
As regards the Russian scheme of reorganization, it was thought in Japan that Russia contemplated increasing her forces in the Far East by two corps so as to have:
The equivalent of two corps about Vladivostock.
One corps at Blagovyeshchensk.
One corps about Manchuria station.
One corps at Chita.
One corps at Irkutsk.
These corps would form the screen to cover the advance of her main
reinforcements.
Any proposal to connect the Amur railway with Tsitsikar by a branch ling would meet with a protest.
I could not elicit whether the placing of the two additional corps at Blago- vyeshchensk and Manchuria station would be considered as aggressive preparation.
I have, &c.
GUY WYNDHAM, Colonel,
Military Attaché.
C.0.
mayat 92
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Governantz
TRESS [October 18.15 NOVOY
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[38454]
No. 1.
SECTION 1.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received October 18.) (No. 355.) Sir,
Peking, September 28, 1909. THE question of the improvement of the navigability of the Liao River, to which you allude in your despatch No. 241 of the 16th ultimo, has, as you are aware, been the subject of several exchanges of views between the Chinese local authorities and the consular body at Newchwang, and has also been urged by myself upon the attention of the Central Government. In my despatch No. 148 of the 9th April last I reported upon the scheme of improvement of this waterway drawn up by Mr. Hughes, On the the civil engineer in the employment of the Manchurian Government. 6th May last I took advantage of the presence here of Hsi Liang, the then new Viceroy of Manchuria, to impress upon his Excellency at a personal interview the importance of the question, and the unwisdom in China's own interests of allowing trade to be diverted to Dalny, which would in the natural course of events go to Newchwang. I also instructed His Majesty's consul-general at Mukden and the consul at Newch wang to continue their efforts locally. Finally, on the 19th May last, I joined with my American, German, and Japanese colleagues in addressing a note to Prince Ch'ing (copy of which was transmitted to you in my despatch No. 198 of the 27th May last), in which his Highness's attention was drawn to the urgent needs of the situation. To this note no reply has been received from the Chinese Govern- ment, but negotiations have been procceding locally and a certain amount of progress has been made, the full details of which are contained in the enclosed despatch from His Majesty's consul at Newchwang, which sums up the latest information on the subject.
As usual, the great difficulty in the way has been the provision of funds. A sum of some 500,000 dollars to 600,000 dollars is needed for the works which are indispen- sable. Of this sum 100,000 dollars have already been raised by the taotai by means of a loan from a native bank secured by a tax of 5 dollars per annum on native boats, and the question remaining is where to apply for the balance required. The finances of Manchuria are not in a condition to make it reasonable to apply to the local authorities. On the other hand, the Central Government are finding increasing difficulty in providing funds for the numerous projects which they are attempting, and the claim of the Huangpu Conservancy to a graut to carry on important schemes of improvement, which the diplomatic body are at present pressing upon the acceptance of the Wai-wn Pu, is likely to exhaust any resources at their disposal. It is consequently not from official sources that the necessary aid would seem to be forthcoming, and I think that the solution will eventually be found in the adoption of some scheme of taxation at Newchwang as foreshadowed in Mr. Wilkinson's enclosed despatch. It is not unfair to expect the foreign shipping and the foreign community at Newchwang, in the circumstances, to bear some part of the cost of an undertaking from which they will derive so much benefit, and I shall do my best to get such a scheme finally adopted, when its details have been worked out locally, in spite of the opposition of the Japanese.
As I have already pointed out in several of my preceding despatches, Nowchwang is the natural outlet for British trade in Manchuria, and the great development in export of beans which forms the subject of my despatch No. 351 of the 27th instant makes it increasingly important that no effort should be spared to preserve treaty rights in Manchuria, and to keep open a trade route on which British commerce is not handicapped. The privileged position of the Japanese, owing to their control of the principal means of communication, is a frequent subject of complaint on the part of British merchants, and it would be little less than a disaster to our interests if we allowed Newchwang to decay, which is the one Manchurian port where the principle of commercial equality still obtains, not in theory merely, but in actual practice.
I have, &e.
J. N. JORDAN.
[2462 &-1]
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