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weight of merchandize is ascertained directly by the tonnage booked in and out of the joint station, plus that interchanged between the two lines. As regards the coaching traffic, the number of passengers carried is reduced to weight by the employment of a conventional scale. On all Indian railways the figures given in the margin are used.* The plan described above presupposes that each railway uses the junction as one of its termini.
Where the junction is at an inconvenient point it is customary to give the foreign line certain running powers over the home or owning line, so as to give access to a larger station or a more important terminus. The charge for such admission and use of the road is based on tonnage moved or preferably on a vehicle-mile rate, as may be mutually agreed.
To deal directly with the contemplated joint arrangements between the British and Chinese sections of the Canton-Kowloon Railway, one of three plans is possible--
1. To provide a junction station at the frontier to be used as a terminal station; 2. To place one section under the working management of the other; or 3. To give the Chinese section running powers into Kowloon.
Plan (1) would of course avoid all difficulty in respect of dual control or foreign jurisdiction. But it is questionable whether it would be wise administrative policy to burden the revenues of the Colony with a recurring annual working deficit, in addition to the interest charged on the railway loan. The 20 miles of the British section, if worked as a separate undertaking would require a full complement of staff. For effective supervision the irreducible minimum, would suffice to work five times the mileage. And in actual practice it would he found that the working expenses, under this arrangement would equal if they did not exceed the traffic receipts, contributed by the mileage of the British section itself.
There may, perhaps, be political or administrative reasons why the British section should be self-contained and self-controlled, but such reasons will doubtless outweigh any considerations of mere profit or loss in railway working.
If governmental reasons do not militate against the adoption of Plan (2) it is quite possible to work the two sections as one line. In such cases no joint works whatever would be required at the frontier. Kowloon and Canton would become the two termini. The advantage of this plan would be---
(a.) Economy in management;
(b.) Uniformity of procedure;
(c.) Absence of dual control; and
(d.) A larger return on the capital invested.
The supervising staff of one section could be dispensed with. The large outlay on coutingent works such as locomotive work-shops, general offices, stores, &c., need not be duplicated. Disagreement and friction begotten of dual control will not come to the birth and lastly the way will be open to secure economical working by the avoidance of all unnecessary or surplus expenditure.
Under this plan the jurisdiction and other interests of both contracting parties could be duly provided for and properly safeguarded. Offences against law and order on British or Chinese territory would be dealt with by the competent authorities of either Government, while adequate provision for watch and ward purposes could be made by the railway management.
There would then only remain the question of--
(o.) Rates and fares, and
(b.) Division of working expenses.
In regard to tariff rates and fares it is probable that a higher charge per mile would have to be levied for the short British section than on the Chinese section. It would, of course, be simpler to have a uniform charge per mile and effect a division of receipts and expenditure in mileage proportion, but the heavier cost of construction on the British section justifies a higher mileage rate and fare. What this increased charge should be is a matter for careful consideration. It is idle to assume that the respective mileage rates on the two sections will be in ratio of the construction cost per mile, or anything approaching it. The utmost that will be
* Class 1 unit 10 tons; class 2 unit 08 tons; class 3 unit 06 tons.
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possible would be to make the charge for the British section as for 40 instead of 20 miles. The whole question, however, must eventually be governed by what the rail-borne trade will stand and the influence thereon of river competition.
It may be, of course, that the Chinese section should be prepared to surrender something for the manifest advantage of coming into direct touch with the sea in the free port of Hong Kong. But on the other hand, it has to be remembered that the original conception of Hong Kong as the future service seaport for the railway systems of South-Western China did not, adınittedly, originate in the idea of a profitable business enterprise, and that, therefore, the Colony having secured a strategic advantage cannot reasonably expect to obtain in addition a full monetary return on capital it was prepared to spend as commercially infructuous expenditure.
It is customary in railway working to obtain some return on special capital expenditure such as on large works at a terminus, by the levy of a special charge, called a terminal. It would be quite reasonable to impose a terminal on all bookings in and out of Kowloon Station, the whole of which would of course be credited to the British section.
The division of working expenses could be effected in ratio of the mileage opened for traffic or more equitably on the train or vehicle mileage basis. All three methods are adopted in India with its 30,000 miles of railway open to public traffic and its scores of junction stations, many of which connect railways owned by native States with British lines proper.
The last-mentioned method of division, viz., on the basis of vehicle mileage, is the fairest, and may commend itself to the contracting parties.
In this connection it is perhaps well to mention that according to the provisions of the Loan Agreement between the British and Chinese Corporation and the Chinese Government, the Engineer-in-chief and the Chief Accountant must be British subjects, a probable guarantee that British interests would be adequately safeguarded.
The third plan, viz., that of giving the Chinese section running powers over the line from Kowloon to the frontier would be workable, but would involve either a reciprocal obligation as far as the Chinese railway was concerned or the provision of a junction station at the frontier. It would, however, call for some adjustment of staff charges at Kowloon where provision would have to be made for all traffic requirements.
It will be quite easy to determine the Chinese tonnage hauled over British metals vehicle run for purposes of calculating the haulage cost, or a toll might be levied as is sometimes done.
per
Under any plan the separate equipment of the two lines in respect of engines and rolling-stock is essential, and rules regarding the employment of vehicles beyond the limits of the home line would need to be laid down. In this connection the Indian Railway Conference Rules for the adjustment of through traffic operations will be found quite appropriate and useful. There is little doubt that these Conference Rules will sufficiently meet all possible contingencies arising from the joint working of the two sections of the Canton-Kowloon Railway.
The general conditions in the case under present consideration are roughly similar to those attaching to the joint Agreement entered into between the west of India Portuguese Railway and the adjoining railway system in British India. The facts are familiar to me, as I drafted the original working Agreements. The Portuguese Colony of Goa, in Western India, extends from the sea to about 50 miles inland. Fired with the ambition to possess an Indian railway of its own, the Portuguese Government raised a London loan of some 2,000,000), at 6 per cent. interest guaranteed by Lisbon. The frontiers incet on the slope of the Western Ghauts, where no station could be located, and the Portuguese railway trains had to run over the British line for a few miles to the nearest station, Castle Rock.
Despite the fact that the railway did not pay, and, moreover, that the interest on capital invested exceeded the whole of the revenues of the Portuguese Colony, the Goa Government for several years persisted in working its own railway as a separate undertaking, prompted, doubtless, by the feeling that it would be undignified to submit to foreign interference or management. The insistence on bigh tariff rates and the friction arising from dual interests resulted in such a diversion of traffic that the Portuguese line was starved, and after several years of annual deficit, when the gross receipts did not cover working expenses, an agreement was come to by which the Goa Railway was handed to the British line, with, as proved, the happiest results.
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