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in delaying negotiations in various matters between Japan and China, and that, therefore, if Yuan's disappearance led to a relaxation of this policy and did not lead to events which would disturb the peace of the Far East, it was a matter which might be viewed by Japan with indifference not altogether untinged with satisfaction.
cor-
On the 12th instant I received Sir John Jordan's telegram No. 20 of the 11th. instant to you, stating that a general opinion prevailed in Peking that Yuan's removal would facilitate Japan's Manchurian negotiations with China, and that therefore Japan was not altogether displeased with the turn events had taken. As I have stated above, this opinion prevailed, not only in Peking, but in Tokiô. Sir John Jordan went on to say that he had been confidentially informed by Liang-tun-yen, Yuan's successor in the Wai-wn Pu, that the latter's downfall was due to Japanese intrigue, and that Japan did not want a reformed or powerful China. I saw Count Komura on the following day, and, as a telegram had appeared in the local press to say that the "Times" respondent in Peking had wired to his paper that the downfall of Yuan would facilitate the policy of Russia and Japan in Manchuria, and consequently that such dismissal would be welcomed by these two Powers, I was able to introduce the subject of possible Japanese intrigues without reference in any way to Sir John Jordan. Count Komura, speaking with much more than usual earnestness, stated substantially as follows: The one thing absolutely necessary to Japan's existence as a nation was peace.
Her war with Russia had disorganized her finances and delayed her commercial development; peace was, therefore, absolutely necessary to her existence. The Japanese Government ever since the death of the Emperor and that of the Empress-Dowager had watched matters in Peking with grave anxiety, and Mr. Ijuin had been instructed, after these tragic events, to do all in his power to persuade, quietly and informally, but in the name of his Government, the various parties in the Government to settle their differences for the common good of the country, and it had been a source of great satisfaction to the Japanese Government that matters had gone so smoothly. When Yan's dismissal took place it came as a very great surprise. His Excellency here reminded me of what he had said, when we met at the Palace, to the effect that he always thought it possible that in the future trouble might arise from the struggle of various factions to obtain the mastery, but Yuan's dismissal so soon after the accession of the Prince Regent had caused very great anxiety. The Japanese Minister at Peking had been instructed to endeavour to get assurances that Yuan-shi-kai's personal safety would be assured, and that no dismissal of his various nominees in the Government, after the usual manner of Chinese procedure on such occasions, would take place. As he had told me at our last meeting, Mr. Ijuin had also been instructed to join his colleagues in any concerted action they might take in the matter. He was not surprised that concerted action of all the Powers had failed; personally, he thought that as matters had quieted down it was just as well, though he thought advice separately tendered in general terms might have a beneficial effect.
With regard to the statement that the dismissal of Yuan and the possible dismissal of Tong (which latter he did not think would take place) would have a beneficial effect on the negotiations now proceeding between China and Japan regarding Manchuria, he believed that the contrary would be the case, because, though undoubtedly both Yuan and Tong were advocates of the "rights recovery policy," as negotiators he had always found them hard at driving a bargain, nevertheless essentially men of business and possessed of common sense, and, therefore, much pleasanter to deal with in business matters than other Chinese officials, who opposed simply for the sake of opposing. Much progress had been made when Yuan was in power in Manchurian negotiations, and now this crisis had for the time being stopped all negotiations. His Excellency here added that he did not think that Yuan's absence would be of long duration.
As to the "rights recovery policy," which, so far as he understood it, meant that China could build and finance her own railways and be absolutely independent of outside assistance in all her undertakings, he did not think that she was in a fit state to do this. Japan had served a long apprenticeship and owed a great deal of her development. to foreign aid, assistance, and instruction; China must also serve this apprenticeship.
(Very confidential.)
Liang-tun-yen's statement that Yuan's downfall was due to Japanese intrigue, and that Japan does not want a strong and reformed China.
I share the incredulity with which Sir John Jordan received the said statement. At the time that the present Prince Regent went to Germany to apologize for the murder of the German Minister in 1900, his Excellency Na-Tung was sent to Tokið to perform a similar office for the murder of a Japanese Secretary of Legation. Hs
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Excellency, instead of being requested to perform the kowtow, was received and treated with the utmost courtesy. Ever since then the friendship established has been maintained. I think it therefore very likely that the Man-chu party, with Na-Tung as their spokesman and go-between, have close relations with the Japanese Government, but I do not think it likely that they would intrigue with this party for Yuan's removal; the game would hardly appear to be worth the candle.
As to Japan not wishing a strong and reformed China, nearly all the disturbances, the wars and rumours of wars, which have taken place in the Far East, producing a most disquieting and retarding effect on Japan's development, have arisen from the fact that China has been the reverse of strong and reformed. It would therefore seem to be to Japan's advantage to assist, and not retard, this reformation.
I have, &c. (Signed) CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.
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