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in motion, which set the Chinese authorities in motion, preci-sely in the way in which it was intended they should move: you cannot by interposing a number of agents avoid the consequences of your act so long as they act within your instructions and the legitimate chain of cause and consequence connected by intention is unbroken. That the intention of the defendant was to obtain the arrest of the plaintiffs and seizure of their store is clear from the correspondence. The test of continuing intention is abundantly satisfied, so far as the seizure of the store is concerned: the plaintiffs were not in fact arrested. If we take the law to be that the wrongful act occurs as well at the place it is started as at the place where it takes effect, then unless Castrique v. Behrens() and Taylor v. Ford() were wrongly decided, either the rule of double wrongfulness does not arise, or this is an exception to it: or it is assumed to be wrongful by the foreign law. These three positions cover the whole legal field. The last one was much debated during the argument and it is necessary that I should deal with it. I shall not go deeply into the questions to which the rule of double wrong-fulness gives rise; but these facts seem to me fairly clear that it first took definite shape in the case of the Halley:() that there was a decision in a case of assault abroad—Secto v. Seymour(:)which was well-known, but in which this rule was not discussed: and that the only explanation is that given
() 2 Moo. P. C. N. S. 161.
by Wright J. in the Mozambique Co.'s.() case, that in simple cases the Court may and will assume the act to be wrongful by the foreign law. If this is an accurate view of a rather troublesome branch of the law, as I think it is, then it applies in this case, and I shall assume that it is wrongful by the law of Germany to make false statements to an official in order to get him to act to the detriment of another person: unless it is privileged. But this privilege would depend on the law of Germany which was not proved. It was useless to refer to the absolute privilege of proceed-ings in the English Courts, even if it were analogous; for that is essentially a doctrine appertaining to English administration of justice. I was disposed to give the defendant the benefit of the principle of Blackham v. Pugh(); that the occasion is privileged if the speaker has a personal interest in the subject matter of the communication, and even to assume that this was the law of Germany. But even transferring the locus of the act complained of to England, I am satisfied that the privilege would be rebutted. There is quite enough motive to establish malice in fact. Any one of the known tests of malice is satisfied: Did they believe in the case? There was on their own showing not the slightest ground for belief and they did not believe in it, only hoped it might be true. Was there an indirect motive? Yes, to get this sum paid in priority to the other creditors of the sugar shop.
One other point has been raised to the competence of the Court. It is said that as the wrong complained of is a trespass to realty in a foreign country, the case falls within the well-known rule that an action will not lie. The rule was laid down in Donlson v. Matthews(); and as was said in the Mozambique Co.'s. case() that case has never been dissented from or even doubted. I am of opinion that even if the rule is applicable to such a case as the present it does not cover the whole ground of the claim; for there was a seizure of the goods, by imposition of seals and taking an inventory, as well as a seizure of the store; and although the two acts were practically combined in one, there is nothing in the rule which prevents this Court from taking cognizance of the lawfulness of the seizure of the goods. I do not think that Doulson v. Matthews() goes to the extent of saying that because an action cannot be brought for ejectment from land abroad, therefore no action can be brought for the seizure or detention of cattle on the land. The case of Skinner v. East India Co.() which laid the foundation for the doctrine expressly discriminates between the transitory and the local part of a claim. The company had assaulted the plaintiff, taken his ship and goods, and dispossessed him of his land in the Indies. I do not see why a different principle should prevail because in this case the
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