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dure had been put in force by the defendants to the damage of the plaintiffs, I do not think any action could have been brought. But the allegation here is that the representation was wrongful as being made without reasonable and probable cause, and if that can be established and the Court is competent I think that that cuts away any defences which might possibly have been raised in connexion with the action of the Chinese authorities: because if a man acts wrongfully he must take the consequences if damage result, even though those consequences might otherwise have given rise to no cause of action.
These points cleared away I come back to the question, is the Court competent to entertain this action? Is it not an interference with the privileges which a Sovereign State has acquired for, and conferred on its subjects? The importance of this question is emphasised by the considerations I referred to on the first motion, as to the conflict with the bankruptcy law of the colony to which their privilege may give rise.
The case seems to me to resemble the actions which are admittedly allowed to be brought in the English Courts, for maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause setting foreign legal process in motion. There are two standard examples of this-Castrique v. Behrens () and Taylor v. Ford (). In the former case Crompton J. delivering the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench said: "There is no doubt on principle and on the authorities that an action lies for maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause setting the law of this country in motion to the damage of the plaintiff." And it was held that the same principle applied with regard to the law of a foreign country and that it was subject to the same rules.
The analogy between those cases and this is, I think, complete, because the action traced out by the Treaty is essentially judicial; it creates a board of reconciliation which is directed to examine into the merits of a complaint and decide it equitably: therefore it is described with strict accuracy as legal process, for it is the legal process provided for disputes between foreigners and natives in a country where Consular jurisdiction prevails. And this once admitted, many other points fall in: the consular privilege, the right of the Chinese authorities to exercise power arbitrarily over Chinese subjects; and all the matters raised in paras. (c) (d) (f) and (g) become irrelevant, in so far as they are not included in the law as to the form of action.
As to the application of the principle that the proceedings must have terminated in favour of the plaintiff, if they are capable of so doing, it is manifestly satisfied here, for the defendants wrote to the Consul-General asking that the seizure should be withdrawn, and it was withdrawn. I really cannot assume that the Chinese authorities did that on their own motion. But it was argued that even after withdrawal the defendants might have a good cause of action: so they might; but that is quite irrelevant, the question relating only to their proceedings, and to whether there was reasonable and probable cause in starting them. The only point about which I feel doubt is how far that rule which requires the act to be wrongful both by the law of the place where it was committed and by English law is satisfied.
There are two ways of looking at this question. Was the act committed in Hongkong or Canton? I told the jury that it was in Canton. But I think the more accurate view is that it took place in both places: for the facts are strictly analogous with the point discussed in R. v. Keyn (), where the wrongful act is committed by a man who fires a gun from one ship and kills a man on another. The opinion of Cockburn C. J. is, I think, very clear: he says that where there is a deliberate act committed in one place, and it takes effect in another, it is committed in both places so long as there is a continuing intention linking the act with its consequences. Now let us see how this applies to this case: whichever way we look at this action, whether as one for words spoken to the Consul producing these consequences: or as setting the Chinese authorities in motion, the starting point was the instructions of the Hongkong branch which set the Canton branch in motion, which set the Consul
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