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to encumber the case with questions as to the relative functions of Judge and jury. However in order to bring myself within the rule I told the jury that the statement that the plaintiffs were partners in the Cheong Loong was in the circumstances capable of the meaning ascribed to it in the action; this was in effect treating the 2nd and 3rd facts allege as the innuendo or consequence of the first statement-that they were partners. I then left it to the jury to say whether the words had in fact that meaning. The jury auswered the question ananimously in negative.
the
I confess to having some doubt what this verdict means. But I interpret it in this way: that as the verdict was that the 3 men were partners, there was no libel in fact, and therefore the alleged consequence did not follow. But I had directed them that the debt was not $50,000. Therefore the statement that the 3 men as partners were liable to pay $50,000 was false in fact. I think the verdict is somewhat incomprehensible, even in its simplest form: but giving it the meaning suggested above, it must fall if the answer to the second question cannot stand: for if they were not in fact partners the statement is necessarily libellous in law. Therefore the verdict on the 4th question cannot stand,
And this being so, clearly the refusal to give damages, in answer to the 5th question--is also wrong. But unless we were to grant a new trial this error could not be re- dressed, and the plaintiffs have not asked for a new trial as they are not desirous of pressing for damages.
Ou the whole, therefore, I think, for the reasons I have stated, that, putting the rule as to setting aside verdicts in its most rigorous form, the answers to the questions are not such as reasonable men ought to have given, and I am of opinion that the verdict on these points should be set aside.
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I now come to the motion of the defendant, which raises a great number of separate points covering a wide field of international law. They were raised at the trial and argued with much force and ability by Sir Henry Berkeley,
I was compelled to deal with them at the trial somewhat cursorily, but feeling that I could give a definite opinion upon them I indicated in my summning-up what my view of the law on the different points raised, was. But they are questions of considerable importance, some of them travel. ling beyond the domain of familiar law, and it is proper that they should be submitted a second time to the Court.
Before examining them it will be convenient to state the facts out of which the international questions arise, in order that the somewhat novel nature of this action may the more clearly appear.
A German firm, whose principal place of business is Hamburg, carries on business both in Hongkong and Cauton. They have as they conceive a cause of complaint against a firm of Chinese in Canton: this arises out of a transaction concluded with another firm in Hongkong. The complaint against the Canton firm depends on the supposition that the firm or some of the members of it are partners in the Hongkong firm. Whereupon the Hong- kong branch instructed the Canton branch to lay the matter before the German Consul-General, with a request that he should set the Chinese authorities in motion against these persons by means of arrest and seizure of their property. The Consul so acted and the Chinese authority seized the property. Assuming that the facts are not as stated to the Consul, there being no connexion in fact between the Canton and Hongkong Chinese firms, will an action lie in an English Court? The further well-known fact must be referred to in order to have all the facts necessary to the case stated in this judgment: Germany, like many other Powers, has a treaty with China establishing consular jurisdiction, and this treaty contains special clauses regulating the method of dealing with claims by German subjects against Chinese. The question which this case. raises is clearly one of immense importance, and is one which I do not approach without considerable anxiety.