represented to him that if Chinese were allowed to reside under fair conditions the numerical superiority he feared would disappear in a very short space of time.
His Excellency, however, seemed to think that the Chinese Government could find a solution at Harbin by a gradual repurchase of the land. The place was not a success financially and he thought that private owners in considerable numbers would jump at an opportunity to get out if fair terms were offered.
This suggestion seems to me impracticable.
As far as Russian local opinion is concerned, as I suggested in my despatch No.61 of the 26th ultimo, the prevailing sentiment seems to be fear of Japanese commercial aggression, and I do not think it at all improbable that the idea of an international settlement might be welcomed locally as a bulwark against Japan's advance northwards, provided that the Russians could be convinced that such a settlement would not be flooded by Japanese, a contingency that appears very improbable for some time to come.
That an international settlement would, in all probability, become an important factor in the development of Northern Manchuria is in my opinion undoubted, always provided that the Chinese Eastern Railway can be induced to quote reasonable rates and grant real equality of treatment. If British and American capitalists could once feel assured of this, the financial difficulties against which the place is now apparently hopelessly struggling, would, I am convinced, be successfully overcome. On the other hand judging from experience and the exceptional opportunities the Russian merchants have enjoyed since the construction of the railway, there seems but little prospect of any considerable future development if the Russian Government continues its present protectionist policy.
In fact from the point of view of the commercial nations, excepting, of course, Russia and Japan, an international settlement seems the only possible satisfactory solution of the present impasse at Harbin, and a settlement of the question on these lines would further constitute a precedent that would be invaluable in support of the doctrine of equality of commercial opportunity in the three eastern Provinces.
I have, &c. (Signed) B. WILLIS.
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government]
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[41501]
No. 1.
677
[November 28.]
SECTION 4.
C.0
47047
REC REG 23 DEC 08
*.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey-(Received November 28.) (No.458.) Sir,
Peking, October 15, 1908. WITH reference to my telegram No.149 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires has notified the Wai-wu Pu that Japan will, before winter, withdraw more than half of her troops at present quartered in North China. These troops, which according to the latest returns number 69 officers and 1,171 men, are divided into seven companies, of which two form the Legation guard, four are stationed at Tien-tsin, and one is quartered at Shanhaikuan.
The whole force is under the command of a General who will not, however, be retained after the reductions have taken place. All the cavalry will be withdrawn, but it is uncertain in what proportion the garrisons will be reduced in the three places at present occupied.
I have the honour to inclose copy of an article in the "Chinese Public Opinion' on this subject,* which points out that the very strong position of Japan in this country, from a military point of view, makes it much more possible for her to reduce her garrison in Chibli than it would be for other nations not so advantageously situated. Motives of economy, in connection with the retrenchments at present being made in Japan, are also understood to have influenced the decision reported in this despatch.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
J. N. JORDAN.
* Not printed.
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