unjustifiable at any time, but particularly so when the Fakumen Railway question is being carefully studied all over the world,
The present statement does not profess to be authoritative. It claims, however, to be truthful; to examine impartially the facts, without suppression or special pleading, from the standpoint of a student of the situation, and one who sees in the undisturbed maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance the best guarantee for China's territorial integrity and peaceful development.
To deal with this lengthy document in full detail would be tedious and serve no good purpose.
The important question raised in the Resolutions adopted by the Newchwang Chamber of Commerce on the 15th March is herein so confused by side-issues and the recital of irrelevant facts that it becomes most necessary to confine the controversy within the limits of essentials. Nevertheless, certain statements require attention.
Its most significant feature lies in the fact that the position herein assumed by the Japanese Government is frankly based on ante bellum precedents, implying recognition of that very "sphere of influence" policy which it was the avowed object of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to replace by "the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and equal opportunities therein for the commerce and industry of all nations."
That the Japanese Government, in the face of the unmistakable declaration contained in the preamble to the Treaty of Alliance, should now permit the justification of the position assumed in regard to the Fakumen line by reference to the position occupied by Germany in Shantung, is somewhat disturbing.
The Japanese Government, however, goes further, and, claiming the reversion of all the "rights and privileges" heretofore owned by Russia in the South Manchurian Railway, proceeds to quote the Russian Manchurian Convention of April 1902, whereby Russia extracted from China an undertaking that any extension of the Chinese Railway system from Hsinmiutun northwards should be a matter for arrangement between the Russian and Chinese Governments. Ignoring the important fact that Russian diplomacy was herein chiefly concerned with the restriction of British influence in general and the extension of an important British enterprise in particular, the Tokio Memorandum proceeds to the astonishing statement that "this measure of reasonable precaution did not provoke any hostile criticism: the silence on the part of British subjects may, however, be explained by the fact that they were at the time practically excluded from railway exploitation, in regions north of the Great Wall, by the Anglo-Russian understanding of the 28th April, 1899."
Here we have the misstatement of one important fact, followed by the suppression of another. The Japanese Government is well aware, in the first place, that the self-denying undertaking imposed upon British subjects in regard to railway exploitation in regions beyond the Great Wall was a direct consequence of the "sphere of influence" régime at that time predominant; and, in the second place, that Russia on her side undertook (which Japan has never done or been asked to do) to abstain from all competition with British railway enterprises in the Yang-tze. Furthermore, as disproving the statement that Russia's Convention with China in regard to Manchuria produced no hostile criticism, the following question from an authoritative Japanese writer is sufficiently convincing.
* "The Russo-Japanese Conflict," by K. Asakawa, p. 220. † British Blue Book, No. 2 of 1901, despatch No. 52.
Thus the explicit terms of the Convention were constructed so as to be greatly neutralized, as it would seem, by what was implied, and could only be inferred by analysis. In the same light, also, one may read the statement made by Sir Ernest Satow to Prince Ching, that the Convention did not appear to His Majesty's Government to be entirely satisfactory, and also the pungent remark of Lord Lansdowne to M. de Staal, that there were several points in the Agreement, which had caused much criticism in England, particularly those provisions which limited China's right to dispose of her own military forces, and to construct railway extensions within her own territory.
"L'histoire se répète." In 1902, Lord Lansdowne did not wish to examine the provisions of the Manchurian Convention too microscopically, sharing the Russian Ambassador's hope that the Agreement would be loyally and considerately interpreted on both sides."
A similar hope, no doubt, inspires the friendly representations which His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio has been instructed to lay before the Japanese Government on behalf of the British capitalists and contractors interested in the Fakumen Railway, and the British traders interested in the development of Manchuria for the commerce of the world.
Nevertheless, the Japanese Government is unable specifically to deny that the supplementary clause of the Peking Agreement of December 1905 (upon which rests the veto which restricts China from extending her railway system into North-Western Manchuria) does, in fact, violate a plain declaration of the Treaty of Portsmouth. On this important point the argument adduced in the Memorandum under review is illuminating. It reads as follows:-
"If Japan has concluded arrangements with other Powers inconsistent with that Act, it is for Russia to call her to account." Moreover, it continues, "The Peking Agreement was concluded with China, and the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had the Treaty of Portsmouth before them when negotiating that Agreement," from which premise is deduced the ingenious but entirely gratuitous conclusion that "China, no less than Japan, considered that Agreement as entirely reconcilable with the Portsmouth Compact."
Here we come to the crux of the matter. It is precisely because the Chinese Plenipotentiaries were assured during these negotiations that the supplementary clause upon which Baron Komura insisted would naturally and necessarily be interpreted in the light of the Portsmouth Treaty (which guarantees to China the unrestricted development of her Manchurian territories) that they now take exception to the restrictive interpretation which the Japanese Government is placing upon that clause. This point is made unmistakably clear in the despatch which the Chinese Government addressed to the Japanese Minister at Peking on the 6th May last, from which the following extract is translated:-
"In referring to the Conference negotiations, and stating that China is now disregarding her Treaty engagements by taking action prejudicial to the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, your Excellency is apparently unaware of the fact that at the time this Agreement was concluded between the Japanese and Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the latter maintained that the word 'parallel' was too comprehensive, and that the Agreement should state definitely in miles the distance within which no parallel line should be built. To this request the Japanese Plenipotentiaries replied that, if the number of miles were fixed, it might create the impression in other countries that Japan intended to restrict Chinese railway enterprise. They were subsequently asked to agree that the distance should be understood to be such as would be usual in England or America, but objected to this proposal on the ground that no general rule exists on the subject. Moreover, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries declared that, under no circumstances, would Japan do anything to restrict China in future from any steps she might desire to take for the extension of means of communication in Manchuria. These declarations were made in all sincerity and at a time when the most friendly relations existed between the two countries, and should therefore be observed by both parties."
We are therefore not concerned with the actual wording of the clause attached to the Peking Agreement, but rather with its present interpretation, which the Japanese Government apparently desires to extend to arbitrary prohibition of all Chinese (and British) railway enterprises over an undefined region. Reserving for further consideration the technical grounds upon which the Japanese Government bases its objections to the Fakumen line as a competitor with the South Manchurian Railway, it is pertinent here to recapitulate the avowed objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. They are thus fittingly described by the Japanese author above quoted (Professor Asakawa):-
The alliance exists solely for the purpose of safeguarding effectively the interests already acquired by the two Powers on the common ground, and it is implied in an unmistakable manner that those interests may be maintained by the total abstention, in any event, from all aggressive or exclusive tendencies in China and Corea, and, what is equally important, that the observation of these principles would forcibly tend to preserve the general peace in the Far East. Owing to the covert violation of these principles by another Power, however, peace has been broken, but the Anglo-Japanese Agreement has not expired. The latter would, however, fall to the ground the moment one of the parties, either as a result of a war or otherwise, should attempt to depart from the principles of the open door and the territorial integrity of the neighbouring Empire.
Page 389