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The opinion is gaining ground here that unless representations are made to Japan she will gradually be drawn into a position which will lead to complications. The policy of silence regarding all Japanese acts of aggression in China appears to have been adopted by some of the leading English papers, but there are indications which cannot be mistaken that people here have lost confidence in the sincerity of the Japanese professions of friendship, that she is mistrusted by foreigners and Chinese alike, and that it will be impossible to maintain silence indefinitely about her aggressive attitude towards foreign trade.
I am, &c.
(Signed)
Inclosure in No. 1.
F. ANDERSON, Chairman,
Memorandum by Mr. Anderson respecting an Informal Interview with Mr. Rockhill.
Trade-marks.-Mr. Rockhill did not think that any advantage to foreigners commensurate with the trouble and expense of registration was likely to be gained by the conclusion of a Trade-mark Convention with China. He thought we could get all the protection that was necessary through the Chinese Courts or Consular action, and in any case it was advisable to wait and see what terms would be finally agreed to by Great Britain and Japan in the Convention now under negotiation. He asked if much real harm was done by Japanese pirating trade-marks. The answer was trade-marks were valuable property, and if they could be imitated with impunity their value would cease to exist.
Japanese Action in Manchuria.-Mr. Rockhill said that he had discussed this question with the Secretary of State at Washington, and was of opinion that, if sufficient reliable evidence could be produced that Japan was discriminating against American goods, there would be little doubt that the State Department would lose no time in making representations on the subject.
He personally could not say to the Secretary that he had proof to lay before the Department. When he passed through New York he saw the Chairman and Secretary of the American Asiatic Association, neither of whom laid any clear evidence which would justify making representations to Japan. He found on his arrival here a general feeling amongst Americans more or less antagonistic to Japan; but when he asked for proof of their contention that the open-door policy was not being carried out nothing definite was forthcoming.
It was pointed out to Mr. Rockhill that, if he meant by proof evidence from eye-witnesses that there had been specific cases of discrimination against American goods en route from Dalny to Northern Manchuria, it was clear that nothing of this nature could be produced; but if he had an open mind to judge from the facts which could be put before him, there was a probability that he would feel that our case was not an imaginary one.
Mr. Rockhill said that when he passed through Shanghae some years ago every one here was then complaining of German competition. Those complaints had died out and were only indications that British merchants did not like to see the monopoly which formerly belonged to them partially transferred to others. In answer to the above it was pointed out that complaints against Germans in former years were justified by the aggressive action of the German Government in China, but that there had been a total change in German policy since the war. If a similar change took place in Japanese policy the agitation against them would soon cease.
Mr. Rockhill then said that residents at Shanghae were apt to take a limited view of questions which involved large issues-they were not disposed to look beyond what affected their trade for the time being. It was pointed out to him that we had a fair number of British subjects here who took a much wider view of affairs than he appeared to give them credit for; that a large portion of the American trade with China was done by British subjects; that the policy advocated by British subjects here had always been to uphold the integrity of China on the basis of the open door; that we had opposed Russian aggression because it was antagonistic to that policy, and were now averse to Japanese procedure in the north because the inevitable consequences of its development would be a return to the sphere-of-influence policy and the eventual partition of China.
Mr. Rockhill said that if the American Government were convinced that there were solid grounds for believing that there was any prospect of that it would without delay enter a protest; but what was the foundation for believing that to be the case? It was pointed out that Japan was only now beginning to feel the full financial effects of the late war, that up to now the burden had been alleviated by loans, and that Japan, feeling that she had derived little material advantage from the war, was apparently trying to get something solid out of China in Manchuria. To this end she discouraged foreign trade and enterprise there; we had definite charges of obstruction to British shipping at Dalny-such as delay in furnishing berths for ships, preference to Japanese ships on the plea that they carried mails, obstruction to prompt discharge and loading of cargo, limiting hours of working as compared with Japanese vessels-all tending towards making competition unprofitable. If foreign cargo was treated in that way at the initial point of entry, there was no reasonable doubt that the process was continued, and probably intensified, when the cargo passed into Chinese hands for distribution in the interior. Then there were Government advances to Syndicates at lower rates than the Government itself could borrow, "certain advantages" in railway traffic, to quote the term used by a Japanese paper, and reason to believe that the shipping lines between Japan and Dalny had advantages not obtainable by foreigners.
There were measures adopted to discourage Chinese from settling at Dalny and elsewhere. The Russian Settlements for so-called protection of the railway were considerably extended and claimed as Japanese Concessions under Japanese rule, which of itself was a virtual occupation of the country and control of its foreign trade.
There was the action of Japanese in regard to post offices and the telegraph system, which was in both cases opposed to Chinese control. Not content with having the country traversed by the South Manchuria Railway under their control, they raised objections to the development of the country west of the Liao River, although the region had been by mutual agreement placed outside the sphere of hostilities in the later war.
If America placed any value on her trade with China-it was mainly centred in Manchuria; instead of being expanding trade, it was declining-the Chinese had no confidence in the future; if the American Government could see nothing to object to in the preliminary action of the Japanese referred to above and still relied upon paper promises about the open door, believing that American trade would eventually revive, it was very sanguine.
Mr. Rockhill said that Japan had an exceedingly difficult time in front of her for the next eighteen months, especially in financial affairs, and that we need not be apprehensive that she was likely to indulge in great enterprises like the absorption of Manchuria, which might lead to complications. It was suggested in reply that it would probably be easier to deal with the question under present conditions than to wait until Japan had gone too far to retrace her steps and until she had surmounted her financial and other difficulties.
Mr. Rockhill said that many of the points raised looked as if there were some grounds for consideration of the matter, but that the Fakumen question, for instance, was one between England and Japan. It was now under discussion, and he of course could not interfere.
It was pointed out to him that Sir John Jordan had had many difficult matters to deal with since his arrival in China, and had been very successful in handling them, but in a great question like this, in which American trade was interested as much as British, that it was rather hard that Sir John Jordan should have to bear the whole burden of maintaining established foreign rights, and that our feeling here was that he ought to have the support of others, especially America.
Mr. Rockhill said that no help need be expected from Russia in the direction of opposition to Japanese interference with foreign trade-indeed, he believed that the more trouble we experienced with the Japanese the better pleased the Russians would be. According to the views held in Russia at the present time it would be about ten years before they were prepared to take active steps in the Far East.
Mr. Rockhill said that he always acted in cordial co-operation with the British Minister, and would continue to do so. He added that some allowances ought to be made for Japan; that she had no outlet for her surplus population; that she could not colonize Manchuria, as the Chinese could underbid Japanese in the labour market; that Corea was a mountainous country in which there was little scope for surplus population; and that, therefore, it was only natural that Japan should make great efforts to establish her export trade.
The answer to that was that no one objected to her developing her trade; our objections were to the pretence of maintaining the open door in Manchuria while she was doing all she could to smother our trade by unfair means; that, as regards expansion, she had Formosa, which she did not develop very rapidly; but that perhaps Japan...
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