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## Details of Length, &c.
The distance between the two ends is some 800 yards, and the soundings up to September, 1907, as shown in a map of Antung, prepared by Mr. A. Morrison, Acting Tide-Surveyor, who at present does the duties of Harbour-master, and who has made a careful survey of the river at this point, make the depth from the Korean side to the centre of the river to range from 10 to 15 feet, and from the centre of the river to the Chinese side to vary from 2 to 7 feet. Soundings show the low-water spring tide level,
## Choice of Site.
The Japanese Vice-Consul, Mr. Miho, informs me that he understands that the engineers concerned have, after examination of the river at various points, come to the conclusion that this site is the best, though it is contended by others that a far more convenient site exists some little way up the river.
## Effect of Bridge on Harbourage.
The present steamer anchorage stretches from immediately above the proposed site of bridge for some 500 yards up stream on the Korean or left side of the river, and the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs are situated above the site indicated for the bridge on the Chinese side at the south-west corner of the proposed site for a foreign Settlement.
The lower harbour limit at present corresponds with the line of the proposed bridge, but should a fixed bridge be constructed, the bridge will become the upper harbour limit, and the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs will probably be moved below the bridge.
The facilities for steamers, so far as harbourage is concerned, will be just as good below the bridge as they at present are above in respect of depth of water.
## Advantages of the Bridge to the Japanese.
So far as the advantage of the bridge to the Japanese is concerned, it is explained by the Japanese Vice-Consul that it will be of service both strategically and commercially.
There is a season of uncertain duration, but sometimes continuing for two or three weeks, both at the beginning and at the end of the winter, when the passage of the river is at present entirely impossible, as the ice does not bear, and yet the crossing of boats is stopped. During this season a bridge would be of great value.
It must be remembered, however, that at present the line on the Korean side is broad gauge, while that on the Chinese side is narrow gauge, and therefore, until the gauge of the Mukden-Antung line is changed, the bridge will lack much of its utility. Mr. Miho said that it was intended to convert the latter line to the gauge of the former within the next two or three years.
After the bridge is completed, and the railway line converted to a uniform gauge, the Japanese position will be strategically much strengthened, and the mobilization of troops will be very much facilitated.
Commercially also, the Japanese will be in such advantageous circumstances as to be able to defy all competition in many directions in this part of Manchuria, more especially if the bridge is a fixed one.
In connection with the scheme it is contemplated to build a railway from Yongampo to connect with the through line from Seoul to Mukden, and goods carried by rail from Yongampo, and so into China, will, it is held, be liable to only one-third duty as railway-borne.
## Relative Merits of a Fixed or Drawbridge
From the Japanese point of view, Strategically considered, the Japanese are of opinion that a fixed bridge would be of greater advantage than a drawbridge, for the following reasons:
A fixed bridge is less easily damaged by an enemy in time of war.
In time of war there might be serious opposition to the permanent closing of the bridge rendered necessary by mobilization, but such objections would have been cleared away beforehand by the construction of a fixed bridge,
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Commercially considered, a fixed bridge would put Japan in a stronger position than a drawbridge, for, owning as she at present does all land fronting on the river on the Chinese side for a considerable distance below the bridge, she could, if she so chose, do great damage to the shipping of other countries, or even preclude the other countries from competing entirely.
The more the trade is developed the greater will be their share.
The Japanese, however, would do well to consider that they are likely to profit more largely by offering inducements to foreigners to share in the trade.
Mr. Miho says that the question of a fixed bridge or a drawbridge is at present not finally decided, and that the final decision as to this question, or as to a possible change of the site of the bridge, rests with the Railway Department of the Japanese Government at Seoul, and he believes that the final decision will be very shortly made, and that work is likely to commence in the spring.
## General Effect of Fixed Bridge on Waterway.
The Yalu River is a constantly shifting volume of water and soundings require to be taken frequently, owing to the incessant changes of the shoals and sandbanks. Though steamers drawing 9 feet and junks of a similar draught reach Antung, it is not possible for craft of this size to venture much further, and smaller junks or launches could, no doubt, pass under the bridge by lowering their masts or funnels. The timber-rafts for Antung are broken up above the Chinese city, but the larger number of rafts go down river below the proposed bridge, and account would have to be taken of these in the plan of building the bridge, as otherwise the rafts might suffer much inconvenience and the bridge much damage.
## American View of Question.
The American Vice-Consul-General Mr. Arnell informs me that he has represented to the Consul General at Mukden the danger of a fixed bridge to the interests of international trade and especially the import trade of the United States in oil and flour, which might be driven out by the Japanese. Though no action has been taken, so far as he is aware, to make the Japanese Government cognizant of the fact that the United States' Government would view with disfavour the construction of a fixed bridge, he believes that his Government might be ready to raise objections should any chance of success appear.
The American name is, however, at present not in great favour among the Japanese, and it is doubtful whether their objections would carry much weight, and it seems probable that the American Government would prefer to wait for others to make the first move.
Even then it is not at all certain that the matter would be pursued by them.
## The Chinese View.
The Chinese are, of course, most seriously affected by the proposal to construct a fixed bridge, but here again it does not appear that they have voiced their views officially to the Japanese, and the Japanese are not at all likely to consider unofficial expressions of opinion.
The large Chinese junk traffic will be ruined by the fixed bridge. The junk anchorage is at present above the bridge, and as junks of a large size will not be able to pass under a fixed bridge, they will have to discharge their cargo below, at a distance from the native city, instead of as now at a point conveniently near.
## British Shipping will be seriously affected by Fixed Bridge.
Considered from the point of view of British trade, the very serious objection to a bridge which is fixed is that British shipping may, in the future, become permanently hampered by lack of wharfage accommodation.
The whole river front for a distance of over 2,000 yards below the bridge on the Chinese side is now appropriated by the Japanese Railway. In addition to this, other land, extending further down river, is also marked as Japanese-owned.
British shipping firms would therefore be compelled either to acquire by purchase or to lease from Japanese subject to Japanese conditions such wharfage as they may require, and Japanese conditions might well be hard ones in view of the keen competition which is likely to arise regarding shipping interests.
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