[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government]
CHINA RAILWAYS. ·
CONFIDENTIAL.
[39338]
No. 1.
546
[November 360
127
ادا کر
SECTION 1. RECO Heat 2 JAN 08
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received November 30.)
Peking, October 15, 1907.
(No. 497.) Sir,
I REGRET to report that the negotiations for the Soochow-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway have taken an unfavourable turn during the last few days. As indicated in previous despatches, Mr. Bland, the British negotiator, had received an assurance from the Chinese Representative, his Excellency Liang, that the Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze Agree- ment would serve as a model for the Soochow-Ningpo contract, and that when the terms were settled its provisions would be copied out mutatis mutandis and applied to the latter arrangement. Proceeding on this assumption, Mr. Bland had deferred furnishing Liang Ta-jên with any separate draft for the Soochow-Ningpo line, and it was only on the 8th instant, after I had expressed some misgiving on the subject, that he finally prepared and submitted the draft, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.*
A few days previously reports reached me of a recrudescence of opposition on the part of the Chekiang gentry, and a conversation with Mr. Liang at the Wai-wn Pu confirmed my suspicions that some difficulty was likely to arise from that quarter. I accordingly saw Wang Ta-jên, the former negotiator, and explained to him that I should be obliged to ask that he should be detained in Peking until the question was settled, unless he took immediate steps to stop the agitation amongst his fellow provincials. Wang Ta-jên admitted his responsibility in the matter, and professed to have no objection to remaining, in case I obtained the issue of instructions to him in that sense.
On the 8th instant I visited the Wai-wu Pu, and ascertained that the strength of the opposition was on the increase, and the attitude of the Board apparently weakening in face of the growing resistance.
I reminded them that Wang Ta-jên had been originally appointed to deal with the question on account of his influence with the Chekiangese; that we had waited two months for his arrival in Peking; that during the time he had been charged with the negotiations the opposition had not made itself seriously felt; and that, having accepted Liang Ta-jên in all good faith as bis successor, I must look to the Chinese Government to make good the assurance I had so often received that the Soochow-Ningpo Agree- ment would be signed, if not before, at least simultaneously with, the Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze one. The rapid progress which the latter negotiations were now making rendered it a matter of urgency that the Chekiang opposition should be firmly dealt with.
Liang Ta-jên conveyed the impression that his predecessor had minimized the force of the public sentiment in the province, and he considered this a factor which could not be ignored. The Government preferred not to override the province, but to obtain its eventual co-operation. I reminded him that, when taking over the negotiations, he had informed me that the Chinese Government would itself deal with the Chekiang people and not allow their attitude to hamper his action. This he admitted, but explained that the statement was made on the faith of what Wang Ta-jên had told him. I then formally asked that the latter should be detained in Peking until the Agreement was signed, and received an assurance that the request would be considered.
Two days later I had an interview with the Grand Secretary Na, who informed me that Wang Ta-jên would remain here for the present, and that every effort would be made to expedite matters so as to admit of the simultaneous signature of the two Agreements.
This morning the German Minister paid me a visit, and said that he understood I was insisting upon the Soochow--Ningpo Agreement being signed at the same time as the Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze one, and added that this attitude appeared to him to be unreasonable. I reminded him that our co-operation was accorded in the first instance on the understanding that the Soochow-Ningpo negotiations should have precedence; that, as he knew, I had insisted upon this from the outset, and that it had been accepted as a principle of procedure by the Chinese Government, from whom I had repeatedly
• Not printed.
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