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By the new reforms only the 2nd and 4th Divisions will be directly under the Viceroy, and that in only such questions as training and recruiting, all the other divisions will be directly under the War Office. Furthermore they hope to abolish the Tu-lien-Ch'n, which is nominally a junior Army Council at Tien-tsin under the higher Army Council (Lien-ping Chu) at Peking. As a matter of fact, whilst the Lien-ping-Ch'u was more or less a nominal Council, the Tu-lien hu, which had its office in the Viceroy's Yamên and was his advisatory Council, really controlled the army and had most of the young men of talent (chiefly students from Japan).
The reformers also hope in the spring to divide the provinces-at present organized in military matters-into military commands, for instance the Provinces of Chih-li, Shan-tung, and Ho-nan might be put in military matters under Viceroy Yuan, with some such rank as Inspector-General, Hu-nan and lu-pei under Chang-chih-Tung, An-bui, Kiang-su, and Kiang-si under Tuan-fang. Their powers might be extended, or fresh Inspector-Generals made, as other provinces become qualified for the Lu Chún. A. scheme also is on foot for starting a clothing department for the whole army.
His Excellency Tang Shao-yi said that the Viceroy pays for two divisions. He gets the money partly from profits on the Imperial Railways of North China, salt, and wine duties, and the rest from provincial sources. By the new War Office reforms the Viceroy is out of the army in name, but his influence will remain, and things will go on as before,
Mr. Gardner, of the Hong Kong and Shanghae Bank, says that the money received by the Grand Council comes from the profits on the North China Imperial Railway, and not from the mints, whose profits have fallen considerably. It is quite a mistaken idea to believe that China is very poor; in fact, there is any amount of money in the country. All revenues, &c., are regularly paid in, but the money thus received is not expended on the objects for which it was intended, but finds its way into the pockets of greedy officials. In addition, all the Boards bave large reserve funds at the banks, and it is correct that the Lien-ping Ch'u reserve is about 3,000,000 taels. The Viceroy is personally hard up for funds, and it is is important that he should be backed up in his efforts to raise money. Last summer 4,000,000 facls of arrears of pay were owing to the Lu Chun, and at one time there was nearly a mutiny on the subject.
Experience shows that all Chinese statements must be accepted with caution, because of the national passion for inaccuracy; but pending the acquisition of future data one must be cautious in expressing an opinion as to how the new changes in the War Office will affect the army. It may only be a change in name, and affairs may be continued as before. On the other hand, the Viceroy, in name at any rate, is out of the army, and this may change everything.
It is all important for its success that the army should have a strong man at its head, and also that it should not ran short of funds.
In the new War Office the Manchu influence, which is usually conservative, and therefore detrimental to the interests of the ariny, is predominant. The President of the Board of Revenue is also a Manchu.
The Tu-lien Ch'u contained the greater part of whatever brains there are in Chinese Army Councils. If it is abolished the influence of its members will be transferred from the service of the Viceroy to that of the War Office, and his authority in the Lu Chün will thereby probably be considerably weakened.
Amongst other reforms the duties of paying the army will be taken from the Tu- lien Ch'u and assumed by the War Office, and this would probably weaken to some extent the Viceroy's authority.
The Viceroy, according to Colonel Ting, was offered the post of Secretary of War; but as this would have entailed his giving up the somewhat independent post of Viceroy, he had to refuse. A difficulty, it appears to me, will arise if Viceroy Yuan and other Viceroys are made Inspector-Generals of military commands, as in that case they must in a certain sense in military matters be subordinate to Tieh Liang.
Many Chinese object to Viceroy Yüan's influence over the Ln Chin, and say that it is nothing more than a provincial army under the Viceroy of Chilli. This in a sense is true, but this is necessary, as the army cau never be reformed unless it has the support of the strongest men available, and the process of reform has to be started in a small way in one province and to be gradually spread out so as to absorb the whole Empire. This, of course, arouses the hostility of Viceroys and Governors of other
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provinces, who will gradually lose the control of their armies, and there is always the possibility of their getting the upper hand and retrograding to the old state of chaos, as represented by effete provincial armies. Perpetual army changes are bound to be detrimental to the interests of the army; unluckily the Chinese are always eager to plunge into them before they know what they really want.
was not by any means an enthusiastic admirer of the Lien-ping Ch'u; never- theless, that moribund institution had the advantage of being directed chiefly by Viceroy Yuan, and he was thus able to be recognized both de jure and de facto as the moving spirit of the Lu Chün, His absence therefore, though it may only be nominal, causes me to look upon the new War Office with some misgiving.
(Signed) G. PEREIRA, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Grenadier Guards, Military Attaché.
Peking, November 24, 1906.
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