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the ship. If the Treaty Powers had at once intervened unanimously, they might have, perhaps, got the transfer deferred, but they would not have been likely to secure either the cancellation of the Edict or the disestablishment of the Ch'u; further, unanimity was evidently impossible at the outset, and, while some expressed the opinion that there was nothing to be objected to, others rather chuckled over the possible clipping of the Inspector-General's wings. What I did was to accept the change, ask help from nobody, and set about making the best of it in the interests of the Service and China, revenue and trade and that is what I continue to do.
Critics also find that the new office, and the manner of its introduction, constitute an affront to myself, belittle my position, damage loan guarantees, and threaten the Customs Service generally. My optimistic nature prevents my viewing all these things in the same lurid light. The new Ch'u might work mischief, but the old Pu could have done the same, and, as for evils that may come out of it, we simply have to guard against them under new chiefs just as we had to under old ones. It is quite true that I was not consulted, and that I knew nothing till the Edict was communicated to me. But it appeared to me that the Government had treated me even considerately in not inviting my opinion on what it had decided to do, and, if affront there was, I felt it more by proxy than in person; further, I think it was wiser to act while I was still here than to wait for my departure, seeing that my way of doing things might ease the situation, and be of use to both Chinese Government and Customs Service.
The general status of the Service will seem to many to have been lowered by the transfer, but, in point of fact, it was the good work it did, rather than simple questions with the Chinese Foreign Office, that won for it, its status, and, if it continues to do good work, it will rank just as high under the new Customs bureau. At the outset the Chinese Foreign Office was the natural office for such an anomalous service—with its cosmopolitan composition, its extraterritorialized elements, and its curiously mixed international duties—to be attached to, but, evidently, sooner or later the employment of foreigners would end and Chinese revenue work be located in a Chinese revenue office. The transfer at this date is quite an orderly development, and I, for one, am not at all surprised at or shocked by it; for some reasons it might, perhaps, have been better to develop a little later, and, for others, the present may be said to have been the best and most natural time. Thus the feeling of belittlement is more sentimental than real, and is, in fact, felt more by others than by myself.
The loans and their guarantees will be just as safe under the Ch'u as under the Pu. Their real security is the Edict which sanctioned them, and any such Edict pledges the resources of the Empire to prevent default.
That foreign employés would some day disappear was always a certainty, and what caused and prolonged their employment has been China's own feeling of want for their assistance and profit derived from it. The result of the recent agitation has been to fix a term for such employment, and the probability now is that it will cease when loans and indemnities are paid off. Without the agitation employment would simply continue so long as called for, ceasing, perhaps, before, perhaps long after, the loans, &c.
Various causes have been assigned by the newspapers for the creation of the Ch'u, notably the Viceroy Yuan's need of funds, and many possible lines of action mapped out for the Directors-General Tieh and T'ang, notably a desire to manipulate revenue improperly. I question both interpretation of fact and prophecy for future. Yuan may want funds, but he would not find them in that way; and Tieh and T'ang may have revenue views, but the established system has too many checks to admit of wholesale speculation. The working of the Inspectorate has been found convenient and useful, and it is quite possible that the Ch'u has been created to continue that working when it being also likely that the Chinese Government and its native advisers will not favour the same amount of power and independence enjoyed as a natural growth by myself being transferred or transmitted to any succeeding Inspector-General. The new Directors-General will be steadied by three or four considerations. They will continue the working procedure at the ports, fearing to evoke mercantile outcry and Legation intervention should they initiate any mischievous departures from that procedure; the Inspectorate has annually reported increased, and the new chiefs will certainly not seek to report decreased, collection; on fixed dates fixed amounts have to be provided and paid as a loan and indemnity account, and such an obligation will force Tieh and Tang, even if otherwise inclined, to avoid such a manipulation of revenue as would entail temporary default and consequent trouble; and the spirit of progress which is certainly at work in this Far Eastern land, will affect the Ch'u too, and force it on in the direction of betterness. All these causes and reasons will have a steadying effect and prevent the new Ch'u and its chiefs from doing what would either hurt the careers
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of foreign employés now in the Service, spoil the established and fairly good procedure of the Treaty Port Customs, weaken the guarantees of bondholders, or do the mischief generally the press has been forecasting.
As I said in the beginning of this long letter, the creation of the Shui-wu Ch'u is itself a change, but, while transfer from the Wai-wu Pu to it may be thought to affect the status of the Inspectorate or Customs Service, it is quite possible that revenue work generally will benefit, in the interests of all, both collecting officials and trading public, and that this special office, with revenue work for its special work, will prove a better public servant than the Wai-wu Pu with so much other business to attend to and so little time to direct native attention to the details of Customs work.
That I have felt sympathy with the foreign members of the Service in their fears for what might follow, and also satisfaction at the complimentary way in which the world speaks of the status and work of the Inspectorate and Service generally, goes without saying, but when asked to formulate advice as to what is the best thing now to be done, I am at a loss. If I were younger and staying on here another decade or two, I should prefer being allowed to work, or worry through, in my own way, but, having reached the end of my tether, it is others that have to be thought about and not myself. As already said, it is too late to aim at cancellation of the Edict or disestablishment of the Ch'u, while the third alternative to require the return of the Inspectorate to the Wai-wu Pu—would not only be difficult to effect, but also, probably blocked at first by want of unanimity on the part of the Treaty Powers, would, if eventually successful, not only set Chinese officials by the ears, so to speak, but would procure for the Inspectorate such antagonism, on all sides and at every place where it functions, as an enforced and protected foreign intrusion on Chinese ground, that work would never again proceed smoothly, and foreign employés would be in discomfort perpetually and perhaps in danger too; if these views—and they are mine—are correct, and seeing that criticism, suggestion, and intervention, if not carried out to the very end and given full effect to, only irritate Chinese officialdom and make foreign employés hateful in their eyes, it would seemingly be better to drop the matter, and merely take care for the future to intervene with specific complaint and specific demand when any interference with port procedure or Inspector-General's service management threatens to damage mercantile duty-paying interests or service duty-collecting practice. In making up your minds what further steps to take, just leave me out of the question my day being about ended and do what you think will best serve general interests. Can you get the Powers to be unanimous and combine, and can you intervene in such a way as to make China value the Inspectorate more instead of less? These are questions worth considering, and you people who know China, or who think you know China, would do well to have clear ideas on both points before going further. Without united action, nothing will be effected, and with it the result might possibly be an International Board on objectionable conditions; how would that suit you? And how would China take it? And, beyond keeping up the uncertainty and irritation, what real good will result? The Ch'u certainly has much power, and Tang is an active man, and the various disagreeable things the Association points to in its Memorandum of the 23rd August last are not impossibilities. On the other hand, I do not regard them as immediately probable, or as likely to be introduced either rashly or harmfully, while it is possible that opposition to them before they are attempted may fail to prevent or may even hasten their appearance. You may see the situation more clearly at a distance than I do close at hand, but I can at least claim an equal desire to have right action taken and wrong avoided. Sooner or later, Inspectorate, as composed of foreigners, must disappear, but its disappearance is more likely to be the substitution of the Ch'u to continue than to discontinue its practice and procedure. The right to issue the Edict, or create the Ch'u, cannot be questioned, but, although it may mean that the eventual disappearance of foreign employés is foreshadowed if not intended, its object may also be to preserve and perpetuate the procedure which the foreign Inspectorate introduced fifty years ago, and continued till now in the general interest. Other men's views and other men's advice may be better than mine, and those who decide the action to be taken must choose. Meanwhile, I am sitting tight, and work goes on just as before, though, of course, we have to allow that we have lost various advantages that connection with the Wai-wu Pu gave us, and have to face possible difficulties on the new ground we stand on under the Shui-wu Ch'u. The foreign employés are naturally anxious, fearing their employment may be of uncertain duration and the conditions of work under more active Chinese Chiefs less agreeable than heretofore, to say nothing of unwillingness to be connected with work that might possibly show a falling off in quality and character. This is quite natural, and I sympathize