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(Confidential.)
Inclosure 6 in No. 1.
Acting Consul Litton to Government of Burmah.
Tengyueh, February 12, 1904.
I HAVE the honour to forward a Confidential Memorandum on the relations between Burmah and West Yunnan, containing certain suggestions for which I venture to claim the careful consideration of your Government.
I am transmitting copies to the Foreign Office and to His Majesty's Minister, through the Consul-General.
Memorandum on Relations between Burmah and Yünnan with reference to Proposed Improvements of Communications.
(Confidential.)
The Imperial custom-house has now been opened at Têngyüel for nearly two years; Consulates have been established in Yunnan; British relations with Yünnan officials have much increased; the French have been spending large sums on railway I think it is time for operations and seem at last in a fair way to get their line started. the Government of Burmah to take stock of its general position and prospects with regard to Yünnan.
" and seek new up Although the British Government is constantly advised to "wake markets, I am bound to say that, viewed in the most favourable light (and I have always thought that a very considerable development of our trans-frontier trade may and ought to be attained), the commercial value of West Yünnan is not so great that, merely on this score, any very vigorous or expensive action would seem to be imperatively called for. But, on the other band, the position of the French on the south of the province and their "It is not worth action over its border, wholly alters the situation, and for us to say: while spending (a) in order to secure a trade that at the most is only value (y) by no means goes to the root of the matter."
It is, I think, clear that for the French to be in possession of Yunnan up to, or any- where at all near to, the present frontier of Burmah would be a disaster of the first magnitude for India, entailing enorious expense and trouble. I do not for a moment suggest that the French, with the exception of a few Chauvinists and colonial journalists, at present entertain the ambition of annexing Yunnan, or any part of it. The French Government is probably strongly opposed to any such schemes of adventure, for the Republic would stand to lose far more than she could hope to gain. I feel little doubt that the French were rushed into their railway scheme by the energy and influence of M. Doumer, without knowing how much they were going to spend, or seeing clearly whither their course was tending; but, however this may be, there they are, and they have gone too far to retrace their steps. Then their Russian friends have been operating in a drastic fashion upon the northern limbs of the Chinese carcase, and it is quite likely that this may arouse dormant ambitions in Tonquin. True, Indo-China is not now in a position to undertake any big enterprise. The European troops in the country have, I believe, been considerably reduced; yet it has always seemed to me that circumstances may at any time prove too strong for the French Government, and that having put one foot over the border of Yunnan they may have to follow with the other. The chief danger is the condition of the Chinese Government itself, which, so far from showing the least symptom of reform, seems to me to be positively retrogressing. If last summer after the capture by the rebels of Lin An-fü the Yunnan Viceroy had bolted, as he was preparing to do, and Yunnan-fu had become the prey of an insurrection, it is more than possible that French troops would have come to Yunnan-fu. Where should we have been then? Should we have been ready to make the only effective reply, i.e., to send British troops to Ta Li? And if French troops ever reach Yünnan-fu, is it likely that they will leave it in a hurry? French public opinion would be stirred, and the demand would be for the "rivière," which French writers are fond of talking about-i.e., the whole of Yunnan east of and including the Mekong Basin. The recognition of any such claim would be contrary to the vital interests of Burmah.
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There is Treaty by which, I believe, equal advantages are secured to the two Powers in Yunnan, but such documents are hardly of much practical value.
In South Yunnan the Frenchman is the man in possession, or rather in prospective possession,
waiting for the tottering bankrupt to fall into his clutches. I submit that in West Yünnan the Government of India ought to, but does not, occupy a similar position.
If British influence could be strengthened and extended in West Yunnan, so that it could fairly be said that our Government had ear-marked the country, it might then be not impossible to come to some practical arrangement with the French by which they As to what would agree in certain eventualities to leave our portion of Yunnan alone. our portion would be, it has always seemed to me that, at any rate down as far south as the latitude of Pu Erh, the whole basin of the Mekong falls properly within the British sphere, as do those portions of the Ta Li Prefecture situated on the Burmah side of the Yangtsei.e., Li Chiang, Ho Ching, Wei Hsi, &c. After the completion of the French railway to Yunnan-fo it seems hardly probable that, unless active measures are speedily taken, the Burmah trade will to any considerable extent pass the Yangtse.
The question of what means can be employed to extend our influence in such a manner that, if any movement from the French side precipitates a crisis, the British Government will be in a position to act as the predominant Power in West Yunnan is not perhaps very easy to answer.
Although the line is by no means a satisfactory one, to advance the present frontier east would be quite out of the question, and contrary to the general policy of the British Government in China, a measure only to be thought of if forced upon us by the action of The other Powers in other places, or by the total collapse of the Chinese Government. constant occurence of cattle thefts, &c., in British territory by trans-frontier Chinese subjects is a source of irritation, but not of serious danger, and ought to be arranged locally. Raids in force have ceased; if they are renewed they should be very severely dealt with.
The question of the undelimited frontier to the north is to be settled in the only way practicable if the interests of India are to be secured, namely, by informing the Chinese that the Irrawaddy-Salween water divide is the frontier, and that they must not trespass over it. It is earnestly to be hoped that the British Government will not retreat an inch from this position.
I think that attention may be turned to the increase of influence likely to accrue to us through the development of communications and trade with West Yünnan. These two matters are of course closely connected. We already have one great advantage over Gur rivals in the fact that a number of Yunnanese merchants and labourers have been in Burmah; many of them proceed there for trade or work every season. The name of the British Government is known and esteemed all over the country, while in South Yunnan the people rarely or never go down into Tonquin; little is popularly known of the French, and what is known has certainly not awakened feelings of deep respect. I do not think that any well-considered scheme for improving communications with Burmah would meet with anything but support from the more influential classes in West Yunnan, and this is an important advantage-e.g., I think that a British railway operating in the Taiping Valley would have no difficulty in getting labour such as the French have had in South Yünnan.
I now only wish to discuss the question of relations between Burmah and Yüunan; to do more than refer to the proposed railway extension via Kuulong, even if that scheme had not been ruled for the present out of practical politics, would appear to be irrelevant. If the Kuulong scheme is ever really taken up, it can only be when the British Govern- ment is prepared to go right through with it, and take the line to the centre of Szechuan. This is, in fact, an Imperial scheme, the object of which would be to plant British influence in the Upper Yangtse Valley, and must therefore be considered on totally different principles from a local scheme "designed merely to extend the influence of the Government of India in West Yünnan. I still think that the way to approach Szechuan is by an all British railway up the Yangtse from Hankow; if the "trans-Yünnan" ever materializes it ought at least to wait till we have got to Szechuan, coming from the east, the direction from which the Empire Province is naturally approached. To construct a line merely from Lashio to the Mekong without any immediate idea of proceeding further would, 1 venture to assert, be a great mistake. It would take us through a barren, difficult, and sparsely populated section of Yunnan, without any prospect of increasing the trade, for I doubt exceedingly whether either Ta Li or Yung Chang caravans would desert the present route to go to a railway on the west bank of the Mekong near Yun Chou. If such a railway were carried on to Ta Li the expense would be enormous, and a good balf of the present Têngy üch-Blamo trade would continue to pass by the present Taiping Valley route.
It seems to me, therefore, that to improve our communications we should, in the first instance, devote our attention to improving the present trans-frontier trade route along