THE TIMES, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1904.
LANSDOWNE'S declaration. Year by year the imperative need of a definite policy, and, we think, the broad principles on which it should be based, become more manifest. The time has come when it is hopeless for private enterprise, without the assurance of State support, to compete successfully in the prosecution of large undertakings in China. Its rivals are no longer private individuals or associations of individuals; in one form or another they represent powerful European Governments, and against the resources of each Government, which are firmly directed to fixed aims upon consistent and intelligent principles, it is in vain for private Englishmen to struggle. They too must enjoy State support, if they are to be on even terms with their competitors. It need not necessarily take the form of pecuniary support, though the brilliant financial and political success achieved by the genius of LORD BEACONSFIELD, in the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, and the political results accomplished by the construction of the Sudan and Uganda railways demonstrate that, on occasion, a bold departure from the hide-bound traditions of the Treasury may prove of the highest advantage to the Empire. It need not often take the form of guarantees—which are only pecuniary support in the second degree of under...
In the years before the outbreak of the South African war there were few questions of foreign politics in which the public took a deeper interest than in the railway problem in China. Our Correspondents at Peking and Shanghai carefully laid the main factors of the problem before the nation and explained their political and commercial importance. They realized, as most intelligent Europeans in the East do realize, how intimately policy and commerce are of necessity knit in Oriental lands, and they exerted themselves with great ability to bring this fundamental truth home to their fellow-countrymen. Their efforts were attended with a large measure of success, and, under the pressure of the opinion which they did much to create, British Ministers reluctantly discarded some of their most comfortable illusions and awoke to the revelation that in half-civilized lands railways under foreign control are powerful political weapons. Under the same pressure our diplomacy was authorized to take part in what was called the "battle of concessions" in China, and at the end of 1898 our Minister at Peking officially recorded the results. These made a good show on paper, but unfortunately most of them have remained mere paper ever since. Two years ago our Shanghai Correspondent reviewed the then condition of the nine concessions, embracing more than 2,800 miles of railway, which our Government paraded with so much self-gratulation in 1898. The other day he repeated that salutary survey. The result is practically the same. We have completed 570 miles out of the 2,800 allotted to us, and there is a prospect of our building another 180 this year. The lines which we have finished are the Northern railway from Peking to Tien-tsin and Niu-chwang and the Pekin Syndicate's short line from the Shan-si mines to Wei-hui. The line which we are about to begin is the line from Shanghai to Nanking through Su-chau. The other concessions are either concessions and nothing more, in 1904, as they were in 1898, or they have altogether evaporated into mere interesting reminiscences. Other nations in the meantime have been actively developing the concessions made to them; Germany, France, and Russia have all displayed energy and enterprise in making the railways which our Foreign Office used to disparage as very dubious speculations. These nations appreciate the principle, recognized by CAPTAIN MAHAN, that in China, as in Persia, "local commercial interests now underlie political and military control." Even Belgium, as we have recently seen, which cannot be suspected of this kind of ambition on her own account in China, has fearlessly embarked in railway construction across the British sphere, with a shrewd appreciation of the fact that the political and military "value of her concessions will always enable her to find champions to protect them, or purchasers to take them off her hands upon terms to her advantage.
There has been one object-lesson, our Correspondent points out, which might have been expected to enlarge the views of the Government on railway policy in China. In January, 1899, they screwed their courage to the sticking-place and officially "took note" of the promise given by the Tsung-li-Yamên to the Hong-kong and Shanghai Bank that China would not alienate any of the Northern Railway lines to any foreign Power. "The far-reaching and fortunate results of this 'undemonstrative support have been,' he declares, "sufficiently conspicuous." They include, in a great measure, not only the maintenance of our own position in North China, but also that of the independence of the Chinese Government. The guarantee saved the railway from remaining in Russian hands after the Boxer troubles, and with the railway in Russian hands the subjugation of the Palace to Russian influence would have been complete. But, in spite of this lesson, the Foreign Office seems to have relapsed into its traditional attitude. When SIR ERNEST SATOW went back to Peking, more than twelve months ago, Lord LANSDOWNE declared that he went back with fuller powers and with a definite policy on the railway question. We are unable to believe that it is the fault of so able a diplomatist as SIR ERNEST SATOW that so little has been done to justify Lord LANSDOWNE's declaration.
...undertakings in foreign lands. But, if Englishmen are to engage in such undertakings, as they must do if we are to maintain our place in the remoter markets of the world, our Government must back them up with the zeal and the perseverance which other Governments display in encouraging their countrymen. When British concession is as sure of diplomatic support as a Russian or a German concession or even as a Belgian concession—British capital will be forthcoming in plenty for opening the Chinese markets to British trade and manufactures. It is the plentiful lack of that support which is largely responsible for the undeveloped condition of so many of the concessions we have obtained, and which is leading foreigners to hint, and Chinamen to suspect, that we do not intend to develop them at all.
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The necessity of doing something with our concessions may be illustrated by the case of the Hang-chau line. This is to be an extension of the Shanghai-Nanking line. The latter is described as the most valuable concession of its kind in China, while its control in British hands is indispensable to the protection of our interests at Shanghai and in the Yang-tze valley. We have had the preliminary contract since 1898, but the work has not yet been begun, and it is only after a strong remonstrance from our Minister that the obstructive attitude of SHENG TA-JÊN has been at last overcome and authority given for the issue of the bonds. But, though SHENG has done his best to retard the construction of the Nanking line, China has alleged this delay as a reason for refusing to discuss the final agreement for the Hang-chau extension. The gentry of Che-kiang have displayed an unexpected interest in the railway question. They have witnessed with concern the prospect of a British "monopoly" of concessions in that region, and they thought out—or adopted—an ingenious proposal to defeat it. It appears from the documents which our correspondent "YANG-TSZE" supplies this morning, that, in order to "balance the power" which we might ultimately acquire, they proposed to build a second line from Shanghai to Hang-chau. They offered to subscribe half the capital themselves, and they made an agreement with a German firm to provide the other half. They do not seem to have placed implicit reliance in their German associates. They applied for and obtained a guarantee for the 2,000,000 taels which were to be provided by the German firm from Dr. KNAPPE, the German Consul-General at Shanghai. The project, we understand, has fallen through. Its history survives as an instructive warning of the dangers of delay in carrying out our concessions, and as a practical reminder that, while Germany claims for herself a special position in Shan-tung, she also adheres to the contention—which LORD SALISBURY repudiated in 1898—that the Yang-tsze region is still "unreservedly open" to her enterprise.
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