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alpears
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F. Fleming's Despatch to Secretary of State No. 91 of 7th. April 1890, paragraph 6), and that he abandoned the right to private practice as a Barrister before the Courts of Law. It is submitt- ed that the latter ground can afford no reason for the ruling because it is obvious that the Attorney-General is not engaging in private practice when appearing for the Crown and accordingly that condition of his appointment need not be further consider-
ed.
With respect to the 6th. paragraph of Sir E. Fleming's Despatch it is respectfully submitted that when con- sidering the assumption upon which the Attorney-General accepted his appointment the word "fees" can only properly be construed as meaning "fees receivable by the Attorney-General virtute officii", (see Sir F. Pleming's Despatch No. 91 of 1890 para- graphs 6 and 7) that is to say as meaning such fees as can only be received by the person for the time being filling the office
of Attorney-General; such for example as fees paid under the
Patent and Trade Mark Laws.
But the Counsel's fees allowed on taxation of costs
between parties to a suit if received by the Attorney-General
would not be received by him "virtute officii", that is to say,
would not be received by him because he was the Attorney-
General, but because he happened to be the Barrister who ap-
peared as Counsel in the cause. The allowance of "Counsel's
fees" in such case is made altogether independently of, and
irrespective of, the fact that the Barrister happens to fill
the office of Attorney-General. Such a fee is in no sense a fee to "the Attorney-General" and is not within the meaning of the
word "fees" as used in that condition of the Attorney- General's appointment which requires him to relinquish the right to receive "fees". "Counsel's fees"are solely and purely
the