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and that finding that he could not keep pace with the infantry
over the broken ground and believing that his presence in the
Fanling Valley would lend effectual aid to the Camp and cover
Berger's retirement, if necessary, he took up the best available
position and bivouacked for the night. He had a company of the
Hong Kong-Singapore Batt R. A. and a strong escort from the Hong-
Kong Regiment, so his safety was assured.
In a tactical sense it was unfortunate that Simonds
had not kept touch with Berger; his guns would have been very
effective in dislodging the enemy from some very strong posi-
tions they took up on crests of hills in the Lan ts'un Valley.
As events however turned out, the guns were not required, for
the Hong Kong Regiment Soldiers drove back the enemy from hill
to hill and working admirably, like true Indian Frontier Fight-
ing men, they took full advantage of cover while continuing
hotly the pursuit of the foe.
Had this advance not been conducted with great care
the loss to our troops must have been heavy.
The Chinese fired almost incessantly for 11 hours,
pouring in round shot 3 inches in diameter from muzzle loaders
and dropping musketry fire all about our men. Fortunately the
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