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in Li Yuanhong's government, Wu tried to play the role of mediator and peacemaker between the different factions that comprised the coalition. The first government failed in 1920 when Wu threw his support to Sun Yixian, who had left the coalition in 1918. The second government derived from a coalition between Sun Yixian and Chen Jiongming, an enlightened militarist based in northern Guangdong. Wu died in June 1922, as the second coalition collapsed, before being able to see any of his efforts to establish a viable political structure achieve success.
In his work Peking Politics, 1918-1923, Andrew Nathan has argued that the politics of the period were primarily characterized by strong factionalism. Nathan's research indicates that political figures shared broadly similar views and formed political cliques that fought over control of the state and its resources. Ideological differences, while often used as rationalizations for political behavior, were in fact secondary to power considerations.'
Much can be said for using the “factionalism” model or framework to view the events of the early Republic. In Wu Tingfang's case we see a person strongly committed to the constitutionalist program but who nonetheless faced the question of how it was to be implemented. And how else but through dependence upon strong leaders: first Yuan Shikai, then Li Yuanhong, then Cen Chunxuan and finally Sun Yixian. In each of these people Wu sought the type of leader who could exert political and military power to establish the type of state that could implement Wu's broad national goals. This perspective led Wu down the path to factionalism as the inevitable mode of politics from 1917 until his death in 1922.
In Retirement, 1912–1916
As soon as the Yuan Shikai government was established with the cabinet in place under Tang Shaoyi's premiership, Wu Tingfang retired from political life. In his home at 3 Gordon Road in the International Settlement (a residence sometimes described as “palatial”), Wu settled down to the life of the retired official and civic leader. In fact, there was quite a community of such people in Shanghai in the early Republican period, including a number of prominent ones such as Tang Shaoyi, with whom Wu was closely associated during this period, Sheng Xuanhuai, Qu Hongji, Wen Zongyao, Li Jingfang, Cen Chunxuan, and Wang Chonghui.
A good part of Wu's time in 1912–14 was spent writing. In 1912 his Gonghe guanjian lu (Record of the turning point in the establishment of the republic) was published. The year 1914 saw the publication of his America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat, and a Chinese edition of this work as well. In 1915 his Minguo tuzhi chuyi saw publication. He completed work on his
1. Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918–1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
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Yanshou xinfa which was published in 1918. During his period he also completed a work on spiritualism entitled Linghun xue (The study of the soul). This work was never published as the manuscript was destroyed in the fire in the Governor's mansion in Guangzhou in 1922 just before Wu's death.2
Several of these works have been discussed in earlier chapters. Taken as a group, they reveal three major preoccupations. The first was the form and functions of the state, the second was westernization, and the third was spirituality.
The issue of political structure was dealt with most fully in Minguo tuzhi chuyi and has been discussed in Chapter 7. Wu hoped to see a strong, fairly centralized state to promote China's equality in the world and to develop China's economy and raise the standard of living of the nation. At the same time, he promoted the concept of rule by law rather than personal fiat, extolled the independence of the judiciary and the importance of liberal press laws, advocated the separation of church and state, and hoped to see the concept of legislative power expanded as the Chinese people became more educated. Increasingly, he believed the hope for China's future lay with education, especially with overseas education, in creating an enlightened citizenry.
The issue of westernization has been discussed earlier in Chapters 4 and 7. While advocating the introduction of British liberal political structures, Wu hoped to preserve a core of Chinese values and institutions in interpersonal relationships and daily life. The Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society, vegetarianism and promotion of Chinese dress styles reflected this concern. In America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat Wu discussed these issues at great length and upheld the superiority of Chinese customs of social organization and daily life over those of the United States.
As Wu aged, he became increasingly preoccupied with spiritual issues. His concepts of diet and hygiene, developed soon after the turn of the century, reflected his view that proper life-style could nurture and improve the moral qualities of an individual's qi, and that cumulatively, this could improve the moral climate of a nation or even the entire earth. Many of these ideas can be found in his works Spectacles and Yanshou xinfa. In his seventies, Wu came to believe in the immortality of the soul. He experimented with "sand writing” to communicate with the dead and believed that they visited with him in his sleep. He urged his contemporaries (Yuan Shikai and Huang Xing among them) to read Buddhist classics, nurture their souls and prepare for their afterlives."
In addition to his writing, Wu participated in the sometimes ceremonial functions called for by his status as an ex-official and ex-diplomat. These included speech-making, presence at important social events such as formal receptions for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, ground-breaking of the
2. Please see these items in the Bibliography.
3. On Huang, see Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, p. 28; on Yuan, see Wu's letter to him in English translation, in North China Daily News (hereafter cited as NCDN), 28 May 1916, p. 8.
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Chinese YMCA, the opening of the Bank of Territorial Development, ceremonies at the Shanghai Commercial College, and receptions for the Ladies' International Club.*
Wu had been active in the International Club formed by missionary Gilbert Reid but dropped away from the Club as Reid's overbearing presence became offensive." Wu then participated in the Saturday Club, an association formed to facilitate communication between prominent Westerners and members of the Shanghai Chinese elite. In one ironic turn, he introduced a talk by W. W. Rockhill, with whom he had crossed swords over the Chinese boycott of American goods in 1905.6 Wu was also honorary president of the World's Chinese Students' Federation and hosted several receptions for departing students at his home."
As one of the leaders of the Canton Guild (Guangzhou Gongsuo) of Shanghai, Wu was frequently called upon to engage in ceremonial and philanthropic activities on behalf of the Guild. These activities included organizing contributions for flood relief in 1914 and 1915, urging the national government to prohibit the gambling monopoly in Guangdong, negotiating repayment of the loan the Guild had advanced the Provisional Government early in 1912, and hosting receptions for famous Cantonese visitors to Shanghai such as Kang Youwei.
These varied activities were undertaken in addition to Wu's continuing the work of the Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society and his Hygiene Society, and in addition to business activities, such as the forming, with Tang Shaoyi and others, of the Venus Life Assurance Company in 1914.9
Other activities that Wu undertook during this period of retirement, while considered "non-political,” nonetheless had political implications, reflecting in part the upsurge of political interest that occurred in China during World War I. Shortly after the war's outbreak in 1914, Wu was joined by other public figures in Shanghai, and later in Hankou, in forming the World Peace Association. The Association made a public appeal to the leaders of the combatant nations to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, perhaps through the offices of The Hague Tribunal, so as to avoid the world-wide catastrophe they envisioned if the war were to be prolonged.10
4. See NCDN, 2 Feb., p. 9; 3 Feb., p. 7; 9 Mar., p. 10; 27 Apr., p. 14; 8 Dec. 1914, p. 5; 13 July 1915, p. 8; 18 Mar. 1916, p. 10.
5. NCDN, 19 Mar., p. 8; 20 Mar. 1914, p. 8.
6. NCDN, 13 May, p. 10; 5 Feb., p. 8; 16 Apr. 1914, p. 7.
7. NCDN, 2 June 1913, p.7; 29 July, p. 5; 16 Oct. 1916, p. 7; Hu Guangbiao, Po ju liushi nian (Taibei: Xinwen tiandi she, 1968), p. 78.
8. On flood relief, see NCDN, 9 July 1912, p. 10; 9 July 1915, p. 7; 23 May 1916, p. 8; on gambling see NCDN, 20 June 1914, p. 10; 13 May 1915m p. 10; on the loan, see NCDN, 19 May 1915, p. 7; on receptions see NCDN, 20 Nov. 1914, p. 5; 10 Dec. 1912.
9. NCDN, 31 Mar., p. 7; 3 Apr., p. 7; 16 Sept. 1914, p. 8; as a shareholder in the Commercial Press, 2 June 1915, p. 5; on the Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society, see 16 Jan. 1915, p. 10.
10. NCDN, 16 Nov. 1914, p. 10; 9 Apr. 1915, p. 10.
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Also in 1914 Wu organized a society to stimulate Chinese industry and trade. Known variously in English as the “Chinese Product Protection Society” and the "Society to Encourage Use of National Goods,” the Society prepared an exhibit of Chinese goods in Shanghai and sought ways to promote the export of Chinese products. Yuan Shikai was petitioned by Wu to find means of ending the hated transit tax (lijin) and raising the tariff on imported goods to 12.5% so as to stimulate trade in Chinese goods. In 1915 the society helped to organize a national exhibition of Chinese products in Beijing."1
An activity reflecting these concerns was Wu's attendance at the Philippine Exhibit in February 1915 at the request of Chinese merchants in the Islands. As the official representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Industry at the Exhibit, Wu was also helping to fulfill the objectives of the Society by promoting Chinese products abroad.12
Along similar lines, Wu, Tang Shaoyi and other prominent Chinese in Shanghai organized the Mutual Help Society in 1915, a "non-political” organization similar to the National Salvation Fund that had emerged in 1914 to collect funds for national development. The Mutual Help Society had as its objectives the promotion of national unity, national education and national industry, so that "the people of China [could] help each other and work out their own salvation instead of depending upon others... "13
Finally, during this period Wu was the President of the Far Eastern Athletic Association and helped to organize the Far Eastern Olympic Games in Shanghai in May 1915. These games, lasting one week, were widely attended, with participation of about 230 athletes from China, Japan, and the Philippines. They featured track and field events, swimming, tennis, basketball, soccer, and an exhibition baseball game performed by a Honolulu baseball team.14
This list of Wu Tingfang's activities should suffice to show that retirement, in his case, meant only that he was not holding public office; it did not mean that he had truly retired from public life. Wu also was involved to some degree in the political life of the early Republic. During and in the immediate aftermath of the 1911 revolution, Wu's name was associated with at least nine political parties or associations. Two of these merged with three others in May 1912 to form the Gonghedang (Republican Party), which supported Yuan Shikai in the Provisional Parliament that began meeting in Beijing in fall 1912. In spring 1913 the Republican Party became part of a new amalgam called the Jinbudang (Progressive Party), which similarly supported Yuan
11. NCDN, 13 May, p. 10; 14 Dec. 1914, p. 5; 18 Jan., p. 5; 9 Apr., p. 10; 20 Apr., p. 8; 7 July, p. 10; 4 Aug., p. 10; 26 Aug., p. 10; 4 Sept., p. 10; 7 Sept., p. 5; 20 Sept. 1915, p. 10; Li Yuanhong made reference to the society's good works in NCDN, 9 Oct. 1916, p. 8.
12. NCDN, 2 Mar., p. 5; 12 Mar., p. 5; 23 Mar. 1915, p. 8.
13. NCDN, 11 June, p. 10; 12 June 1915, p. 7.
14. Dongfang zazhi 12, no. 4, “nei-wei shiping,” p. 14; NCDN, 29 Mar., p. 5; 22 Apr., p. 7; 28 Apr. 1915, p. 7; and daily coverage of the events, 17–22 Apr. 1915.
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Shikai against the Guomindang (Nationalist Party), in the Legislature. Wu was a member of the Jinbudang's nine-person executive committee, along with Li Yuanhong, its chairman, Liang Qichao and other notables, but Wu did not play an active role in party politics and viewed these functions as purely honorary.15
Although Wu was involved in early republican political associations, he left the office-holding to his son Wu Chaoshu, known to foreigners as C. C. Wu, who had returned from his studies in England in May 1911. Born in 1886, C. C. had attended high school in the United States, graduating in 1904 from Atlantic City High School. Upon returning to China he held a post in the Guangdong Provincial Board of Works at Guangzhou and briefly, in 1907, in the Guangdong Provincial Board of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. In 1908 he went to England and studied law at the University of London. Following in his father's footsteps, he was called to the Bar and graduated first in his class in 1911.16
At the time that Wu Tingfang was retiring from political life, C. C., now twenty-six years old, was about to enter it. In May 1912 he took a post as head of the Hubei Province Office of Foreign Affairs." It seems likely that this appointment reflected a combination of C. C.'s own obvious abilities and Li Yuanhong's desire to show respect to Wu Tingfang. C. C. authored a pamphlet entitled "A Plea for the Recognition of the Chinese Republic,” and it is tempting to speculate that C. C. hoped to use his association with Li Yuanhong as a springboard to national level foreign affairs work. The pamphlet was distributed by Wu Tingfang to a number of prominent Americans in hopes that the United States would lead the other nations in speedy recognition.18
C. C. held this post until September 1912, when he was selected member of the House of Representatives (Zhongyiyuan) of the Provisional Parliament from Guangdong Province as a Guomindang representative. In Beijing, C. C. was elected by his peers to serve on the Committee to Draft the Constitution
15. According to Zhang Yufa, Wu was involved with eleven political associations in the early Republic. I have been able to link him to nine. Wu was listed as an organizer of five political organizations in 1911–12. They were, with date of founding in parenthesis, Gonghe Tongyi Hui (21-23 December 1911); Zhonghua Gonghe Cuijin Hui (23 December 1911); Zhengjian Shanghui (25 April 1912); Gonghedang (9 May 1912); and Guomin Gongdang (17 May 1912). He was listed as a supporter of four others: Zhonghua Minguo Jianhe Hui (19 November 1911); Zhonghua Minguo Xianzheng Dang (4 December 1911); Datong Gongji Danghui (22 February 1912); and Guomindang (28 February 1912). See Shanghai shiliao, pp. 765–66, 793, 797–803; 806–7, 811-12, 834-40, 860, 871–74, 879–86. See also Zhang Yufa, “Minchu zhengdang diaocha yu fenxi,” in Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji (Taibei: Lianjing, 1980), 4:33–41. The reference to Wu in p. 38. On these early parties, see also George T. Yu, Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912–1924 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), chap. 4; Li Shoukong, Minchu zhi guohui (Taibei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo qiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1964), pp. 43–70; Xie Bin, Minguo zhengdang shi (Shanghai, 1928; reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1962), pp. 42-47, 53.
16. On C. C. see Wu Tiyun boshi aisi lu.
17. Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1966), p. 359.
18. Austin P. Brown to William Sulzer, 23 Aug. 1912, encl., U.S. National Archives (hereafter cited as USNA), 893.00/634.
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along with twenty-four other Representatives and thirty Senators from the Upper House (Canyiyuan).
While serving as Representative, C. C. came to the attention of Yuan Shikai and Yuan's adviser Dr. G. E. Morrison. This eventually led to C. C.'s appointment as Councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and adviser to the President, posts he held until Yuan Shikai's death in 1916.20
As is apparent from the above, the relations between Yuan Shikai and the Wu father and son were good. Yuan's communications with Wu Tingfang were of the most courteous nature. In 1912 Wu was awarded honors by Yuan along with others who had played an important role in negotiating the revolution.21 On at least two occasions he cabled Wu requesting that he come to Beijing and take part in the government; each time Wu declined but did come to Beijing and meet with Yuan on more than one occasion.22
Enjoying good relations with Yuan Shikai, Wu nonetheless was linked with many members of the Guomindang (including, of course, his son). This put him in a good position in trying to mediate disputes between Yuan and the Guomindang or southern forces during the crisis that started with the murder of Song Jiaoren in March 1913 and culminated in the abortive "second revolution" in July and August of that year. Shortly after the assassination, when it became known that the assassins were linked to Yuan's inner circle of associates, Wu joined with Cen Chunxuan and several other notables in South and Central China calling upon Yuan to compromise with the Guomindang forces in order to keep the confidence of the nation. Then and later Wu's name came up often as a possible “moderate” foreign minister in Yuan's cabinet, and as a possible mediator between Yuan and his enemies.2
23
In an effort to defuse the opposition, Yuan's cabinet appointed Wu to join with Dr. Morrison in a commission to investigate the possible connection of Zhao Bingjun, Yuan's Premier, with Song's murderer. This had the effect of being an in-house investigation. Morrison, after a cursory discussion with Wu, declared that there was nothing to investigate.24
Wu himself arrived in Beijing on 14 June. Zhao had requested resignation on grounds of illness in the aftermath of the revelations following Song's murder; Wu was one of those discussed as Zhao's successor, but Wu firmly
19. Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao, p. 508; list of committee members in Li Shoukong, Minchu zhi guohui, pp. 159–60.
20. Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao, pp. 508, 514, 546, 25, 26, 2; for G. B. Morrison's views see Ernest P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 295.
21. Yuan Shikai, “Shou qian Sifa zongzhang Wu Tingfang xun yi wei zhengshu," in his Yuan dazongtong shudu huibian (Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), chap. 3.
22. Ibid., “Fu Wu Tingfang," chap. 5.; Huazi Ribao, 9 July 1912; 9 Feb. 1913. I am indebted to Honming Yip for these references.
23. Edward Friedman, "The Center Cannot Hold: The Failure of Parliamentary Democracy in China from 1911 to the World War in 1914" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1966), pp. 418-22, 424–25; NCDN, 10 June 1913, p. 7.
24. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 284.
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dismissed this or any other post. On 28 June the North China Daily News reported that "reliable sources" indicated that Zhao had asked Wu's advice about whether to obey the summons to attend the tribunal in Jiangsu or not; Wu advised him to do so. 25
Yuan courted Wu during this period. Shanghai Chinese newspapers reported that Wu was invited daily by Yuan to give advice on important matters of state and that Yuan had asked him to move into the presidential palace so as not to cause him fatigue from traveling back and forth from C. C.'s residence. He was offered the post of Chinese Minister to the United States, or to head a special delegation upon U.S. recognition of the Republic, but Wu declined these as well.2
26
In an interview given to a correspondent from the Hong Kong newspaper Huazi Ribao at this time, Wu refrained from any criticism of Yuan's government, counseling patience and forbearance, and attributing criticism of the government to a small minority.27 Wu permitted his name to be used in one of Yuan's counterattacks against the Guomindang in mid-July as the anti-Yuan uprising starting in Jiangxi. This took the form of charges that Huang Xing had juggled election funds in order to provide monies to armies in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui. Supposedly, these facts were revealed in the documents that Wu and Morrison were said to be examining in connection with the Song murder.28
Wu returned to Shanghai from North China on 24 July and was soon called upon by the business community to negotiate a compromise to the conflict in Shanghai. The "second revolution" in Shanghai took the form of a battle for control of the Shanghai Arsenal in which Chen Qimei was defeated. During the battle, Wu arranged a cease-fire while he attempted to negotiate between Chen and Yuan. From Chen he received a set of conditions under which peace could be restored, but these were unacceptable to Yuan, who was determined to press for complete victory. Wu appealed to Yuan to show forbearance and generosity to the rebels so as to avoid further bloodshed. But Yuan was not inclined to magnanimity towards Chen and the revolutionaries, then or later. 29
As a man in the middle Wu found plenty to blame on both sides. He was queasy about Yuan's ruthlessness in suppressing the rebellion. As he told a reporter from the New York Times, he viewed Yuan's course of action as "dangerous." But he refrained from going as far as Tang Shaoyi, for example,
25. NCDN, 28 June 1913, p. 11; also 16 June, p. 9; 19 June, p. 7; 20 June 1913, p. 7. 26. NCDN, 3 July, p. 7; 20 June, p. 7; 27 June, p. 7; 3 July, p. 7; 10 July 1913, p. 7. 27. Huazi Ribao, 1 July 1913. I am indebted to Honming Yip for this reference. 28. NCDN, 15 July 1913, p. 7.
29. The exchange of letters is in Zhongguo Guomindang, Zhongyang weiyuanhui, Dangshi shiliao bianji weiyuanhui, ed., Geming wenxian, vol. 44, Erci geming shiliao (Taibei, 1968), pp. 258–—– 60; Yuan Shikai, Yuan dazongtong shudu huibian, chap. 7; see also NCDN, 25 July, p. 7; 28 July, p. 7; 30 July 1913, p.
7.
30. NYT, 30 July 1913, p. 3.
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in calling for Yuan's resignation. He did speak with some foreigners of liberal persuasion about his concerns. In October 1913 he told the newly-arrived U.S. Minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, about Yuan's antipathy to liberalism:
Yuan Shih-kai's sole aim is to get rid of parliament. He has no conception of free government, is entirely a man of personal authority. The air of absolutism surrounds him.31
Still, Wu refrained from public criticism of Yuan's person or policies for nearly two more years. These two years saw Yuan's outlawing of the Guomindang and abolishing the Parliament, followed by the measured effort to manipulate the traditional symbols of authority. Through all of this, Wu sought to maintain a middle of the road stance, urging balance and moderation. For example, in presiding over opening ceremonies for the government-sponsored Bank of Territorial Development in December 1914, Wu was reported to have characterized China as
in a state of transition. There were many things for her to do. On the one hand, people urged them to go on, but what was called the Young China party wanted to go too far. On the other hand, they [the audience] were warned not to go too fast; they had to be cautious in everything they did. Some of the "old fogies" wanted to stop the Young China party from going any further. They must not repeat . . . the mistakes which had been made previously. Since China had become a Republic many things had been done, but he was sorry to say that some had not been done in a very cautious way. But they must profit by their mistakes. 32
The fact that C. C. Wu was serving as Yuan's adviser and councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs probably helped to induce Wu Tingfang to maintain what was referred to as his “golden silence” about those policies he found objectionable. It was rumored that he remained silent because he did not want to harm C. C.'s chances for advancement.
33
Certainly he did not approve of the growing authoritarianism of Yuan's government. His Minguo tuzhi chuyi, published in 1915, reads as a brief for the constitutionalist ideal. He was also strongly opposed to the concept of Confucianism as a state religion just as Yuan Shikai was experimenting with this very idea.34 But Wu maintained a discreet silence and continued to allow himself to be linked to the government in a quasi-official way, as in February
31. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China, p. 9.
32. NCDN, 8 Dec. 1914.
33. NYT, 19 July 1916, 5:15.
34. See Wu's Introduction to Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes: A Study in the Tendencies of Asiatic Mentality, by B. K. Sarkar (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1916), p. xxiii. Sarkar visited Shanghai in 1916.
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1915 when he attended the Philippine Exhibit as the Chinese Government's representative and upon his return indicated his desire to go to the capital and exert his influence on Yuan Shikai to implement his ideas for trade protection, industrial development and the advancement of higher education.3
35
Wu also maintained his silence during the negotiations over Japan's infamous Twenty-One Demands, presented in January and accepted by Yuan in May 1915. In sharp contrast to Wu's promotion of the boycott of American goods in 1905, ostensibly to strengthen the Qing Government's hand in negotiations with the U.S., no such publicly organized movement emerged in 1915 with Wu at its helm. It is ironic that at the very time public outrage against Japan and Yuan were mounting in China, Wu was hosting the Far Eastern Olympics, an enterprise that suggests a kind of Pan-Asian ideology.
Wu was a guest at a meeting hosted by Yuan's governmental representatives in Shanghai, Daoyin Yang Cheng and Admiral Zheng Rucheng, to explain the government's role in the Sino-Japanese negotiations that had just transpired. Wu gave a talk in which he spoke of the need to practice endurance and patience in fulfilling China's desire to become strong. He advised his countrymen to follow Japan's "splendid example" in persistence of national goals, citing as examples Japan's being forced to give up the Liaodong Peninsula in 1895 only to obtain it in 1905, and similarly obtaining its objectives in Qingdao.36 What a contrast to the Wu of a decade earlier!
Only when Yuan made efforts to become emperor did Wu become roused to public opposition. In September 1915, with the formation of the Chou'an Hui and the orchestrated chorus of support for Yuan's assumption of the throne in the background, Wu chose not to go to Beijing and officiate at a national exhibit of Chinese products. This was an event sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce under Zhou Ziqi, who had personally invited We to officiate at the exhibit. Wu's organization, the Society for the Protection of Chinese Trade, had promoted such an exhibit, and Wu had at first accepted Zhou's invitation but then declined to attend because, he let it be known, he did not want to be associated with the pro-monarchist movement.37
According to one source, Wu was several times approached by Yuan's representatives with flattering requests to be associated with the monarchist movement. Wu is said to have scornfully rejected an overture from Frank J. Goodnow, Yuan's American adviser whose pro-monarchist advice to Yuan was used as justification for the movement, and then Wu later rejected an emissary who used every trick in the book to get to see Wu with the President's appeal to come to Beijing. He is said to have characterized the monarchist
38
35. NCDN, 12 Mar., p. 5; 16 Aug. 1915, p. 10.
36. NCDN, 1 June 1915, p. 10.
37. NCDN, 26 Aug., p. 10; 4 Sept., p. 10; 7 Sept., p. 5; 20 Sept., p. 10; 23 Sept. 1915, p. 4.
38. Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, pp. 20–21.
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movement as a “staged play.” “It is all right for us to watch the play, but it would be foolish for us to believe what the players have to tell us.'
939
Meanwhile, efforts were being made to rope C. C. Wu into the monarchist net. In December he was invited to be an adviser to the Bureau for the Preparation of Ceremonies. It would appear that the only way to advance in Yuan's administration was to become another sycophant of the would-be emperor. Earlier, in spring 1915, C. C. had been considered as a candidate for Minister to the United States but had been turned down in favor of Gu Weijun (V. K. Wellington Koo), who was certainly an able candidate for the post. But C. C. was turned down because Cao Rulin, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and an intimate associate of Yuan Shikai's, told Yuan that although C. C. was qualified for the post in terms of training and experience, he was too ill with tuberculosis to take up the position! As C. C. did not suffer from tuberculosis, one can only assume that Cao Rulin was deliberately undermining C. C.'s position in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Clearly, C. C.'s career was not going to advance further under Cao, and Yuan. As Wu Tingfang told the New York Times shortly before Yuan's death, there were many foreign-educated Chinese serving in Yuan's Government, “but the majority of them are conservative and an unsurmountable obstacle to reform.” Perhaps that was why the Yuan administration was, he said, “going too slow" and was “swinging back to the other extreme" away from the revolution.41
40
C. C. got out of the monarchist dilemma by asking for sick leave. According to one source, this was the act of a “filial son” following his father's request, as Wu's friends began suggesting that it was unseemly for his son to be affiliated with Yuan at this time. C. C. remained in seclusion at his Beijing residence for the remainder of the Yuan Shikai's presidency, emerging only after Yuan died in June 1916.42
As is well known, Yuan's effort to make himself emperor led to his loss of power. Starting with the uprising in the Southwest in December 1915, Yuan continued to lose his grip on politics. Yuan renounced his plan to be emperor in March while Xu Shichang as Prime Minister attempted to salvage the situation for Yuan. Wu, along with Kang. Youwei, Tang Shaoyi, Tang Hualong and others were called upon to be mediators between the southern provinces and Yuan. But in spring 1916 the pressure began to mount for Yuan to resign and prominent people began to publicly call for his resignation.
43
On 20 April Wu did so as well. In a lengthy letter to Yuan, Wu called upon him, as an old colleague and friend, to resign for his own and the nation's good. He stated that the Republic was endangered by misgovernment, and
39. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
40. Cao Rulin, Yisheng zhi huiyi, p. 114.
41. NYT, 9 July 1916, 5:5.
42. Wu Tiyun boshi aisi lu; Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, pp. 22–23.
43. Li Chien-nung [Li Jiannong], The Political History of China, 1840–1928, trans. and ed. Teng Ssu- yu and Jeremy Ingalis. East-West Student ed. (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963), p. 335.
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that the costs, financially and politically, of suppressing the anti-Yuan movement were too great. In order to end the chaos, he should resign and allow Vice-President Li Yuanhong to reconstitute the government. He closed his letter by urging Yuan to think about doing good deeds (i.e., resigning) so as to ensure a good afterlife for his soul!44
Apparently Yuan was not sufficiently worried about his soul, for he continued to flounder in indecision through May, while many of his subordinates met in Nanjing at a meeting called by Feng Guozhang. Wu took this occasion for further public statements. To a correspondent from the English-language North China Daily News, Wu said that all were agreed that Yuan must resign, and that there were several capable people who could be called upon to serve as president after Li Yuanhong convened the government. He concluded:
I bear no malice toward Yuan; I still count him as a friend. But in my opinion the longer he remains in office the worse it will be for China and himself, the sooner he leaves the better it will be for China and for him. Yuan is a capable man, but he has never been abroad, has never left China, and he has much to learn about government. He has made the mistake of surrounding himself with partisans many of whom are corrupt and incapable, and is unable to free himself of them.45
Yuan's death on 6 June brought an end to the stalemate, ushering in a new period in which the constitutionalist dream was given one more chance to become fulfilled, but which ended once again in disaster. Wu Tingfang, while philosophically opposing Yuan's autocratism, nonetheless found himself constrained from public criticism until Yuan began to lose power. The constraints were due to personalist ties, with Yuan of course, but more importantly, with his son C. C. Wu, for whom Tingfang entertained high hopes for official advancement.
Beijing Politics, 1916-1917
With Yuan Shikai's passing from the scene, Wu Tingfang came back into public life at the age of seventy-four. In November 1916 he agreed to serve as Foreign Minister in the newly constituted government that had been formed with Li Yuanhong as President and Duan Qirui as Premier. This government was marked by strong factional conflict between the President and Premier. Struggles occurred over which constitution should be used to constitute the government and who should be appointed to the cabinet posts, and finally
44. NCDN, 29 Apr. 1916, p. 4; Bai Qiao, Yuan Shikai yu Zhonghua Minguo (reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1962), pp. 349–50.
45. NCDN, 28 May 1916, p. 8.
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culminated in the conflict over whether China should enter World War I. These conflicts resulted in the fall of the government on 1 July 1917.46
Although Andrew Nathan's work deals with the period following the one we are viewing in this section, his perspectives on factionalism are helpful in understanding these events. This is especially so for the conflict between Li and Duan, which eventually merged into the conflict between the Anfu clique, dominated by Duan Qirui, and the Zhili clique, dominated by Feng Guozhang, Cao Kun and Wu Peifu.47
The first issue between Li and Duan was whether the government should be based on the Provisional Constitution of 1912 or the 1914 constitution that had granted Yuan Shikai such sweeping executive powers. In this issue Duan and the Beiyang militarists he led showed themselves to be the auto- cratic successors to Yuan Shikai, and Li Yuanhong showed himself to be a figurehead both for constitutionalism as an ideal and also for the Guomindang in its second chance to play a national political role since 1913. Wu Tingfang joined with Tang Shaoyi, Liang Qichao and others in upholding the Provi- sional Constitution of 1912. The conflict was resolved when the Navy joined in support of the Li-Guomindang position and Duan was forced to yield.48
Having lost the battle over the Constitution, Duan then sought to minimize the role of the Guomindang in the Cabinet. At issue were the appointments of Tang Shaoyi as Foreign Minister and Sun Hongyi as Minister of the Interior. As the struggle developed in summer 1916, Tang found himself ousted before he had even taken up the post. En route to Beijing he received threats against his life from Duan's subordinates; in the face of this opposition he withdrew and returned to Shanghai.49
Duan then proposed Lu Zhengxiang as Foreign Minister, but the Guomindang members of Parliament refused to confirm the appointment of the grounds that Lu had been in Yuan Shikai's "Imperial” cabinet. Duan would have liked to propose Cao Rulin for the post, but knew that Cao would be rejected on similar grounds. Next he proposed Wang Daxie, but Wang was rejected because of his association with Yuan's monarchical plans.50
Summer drifted into fall as Duan was unable to form a cabinet. Pressing foreign affairs issues arose, in particular the Zhengjiadun Affair with Japan and the Laoxikai Affair with France. The first involved a clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers over an extension of Japanese police stations in Manchuria. The second involved a clash with France over its unapproved
46. These events are described in detail in Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan (Taibei: Wenhai, 1971). See also Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 351–73; Shen Yunlong, Li Yuanhong pingzhuan (Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 86–122.
47. Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 28–58.
48. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 354–355.
49. Tao Juyin, Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi shihua (Beijing: Shenghuo, Tushu, Xinshi, Sanlian, 1957), 3:62–63; Shen Yunlong, Li Yuanhong pingzhuan, pp. 92–93.
50. Tao Juyin, Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi shihua 3:66.
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expansion of the French concession in Tianjin. Both issues were arousing strong nationalist reactions among the Chinese urban public and calls for boycott against Japan and France.
In November Li Yuanhong proposed Wu Tingfang as Foreign Minister. Duan agreed, his defeat mitigated by the fact that Wu was a political figure who had been closely associated with Yuan and who had many ties with Beiyang political circles. His son C. C. had served as counsellor in the Foreign Ministry through the Yuan Shikai years and continued to do so. Although Wu was not intimately tied with the Beiyang groups, he was not associated with the radical faction of the Guomindang either, and he made a point about being above factional politics. Nor was he politically ambitious for higher posts. Thus, from Duan's point of view Wu did not pose the same threat as had Tang Shaoyi. And, certainly not the least important, he was known to be a very capable diplomat in handling foreign affairs. For all of these reasons, we may speculate, Duan chose to agree with Li's suggestion to use Wu.
On Wu's part, he was not particularly eager to assume the office; he did so only because of Li Yuanhong's strong personal appeal. During the 1911-12 negotiations that established the Republic, Li's communications with Wu had been very courteous. After settling the issue of where to hold the North- South peace talks, they had been allies in helping to facilitate the peace settlement. Wu's son C. C. had been hired by Li to handle Hubei provincial foreign affairs in 1912. While the Li-Wu relationship was not intimate or deep, it was of some significance. It was strong enough to bring Wu out of his retirement and studies of the “mystery of the ‘afterlife.””51
After ascertaining that Duan would not oppose him, Wu accepted the post. The House of Representatives approved the appointment by a vote of 390 to 28; in the Senate the vote was 179 to 8. This was certainly an indication that Wu had the support of the most Parliamentary factions.52
Having agreed to come to Beijing, Wu hoped that his presence would facilitate the government's effective functioning. In an interview with Shanghai reporters, he said that with regard to foreign affairs, his policy would be
hostility to none, and sincere friendship to all. By this I do not mean an aggressive policy, by no means, but a defensive one.
The foreign affairs of China are in a difficult state, but I shall be consistent, and hope to have some measure of success.
With regard to domestic policy, he said:
I shall steer clear of all party strife, and shall belong to no party. On the contrary, I shall always try to conciliate them and smooth matters. I am a peaceful man both in domestic and international politics.53
51. NCDN, 25 Dec. 1916, p. 8.
52. NCDN, 9 Nov., p. 7; 13 Nov. 1916, p. 7.
53. Shanghai Times, 13 Nov. 1916, encl. in Sammons to Secretary of State, 24 Nov. 1916, USNA, 893.00/2552.
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Wu's high hopes were apparently shared by others. The Shanghai Xinwen Bao (Sinwanpao) commented that congratulations were in order in that such a “universally admired man” had been found for the post:
But we cannot possibly remain silent as to our hopes and expectations of Dr. Wu. Generally speaking the people hope to see him accomplish something in two respects only, namely, to restore a spirit of harmony in the Cabinet and to settle quickly all outstanding diplomatic questions, while at the same time maintaining our national rights. But what we hope of him goes a step further.
The disease of inertia, if not eradicated, will do far greater harm than jealousy and squabbles between three or four men. We hope Dr. Wu, apart from restoring harmony, will take action to impart some energy and life to the machine of our Government so that some appreciable progress may
be made. As Dr. Wu commands respect from all parties, we expect him soon to instil a new life in the officialdom of Peking."
54
Against this set of expectations, Wu set out for Beijing, first consulting with newly-confirmed Vice-President Feng Guozhang in Nanjing, and then proceeding north by special train. At Xuzhou he was wined and dined by Dujun Zhang Xun. According to one account Zhang, whose pro-Qing loyalist sympathies were well known, admired Wu because he had been a high official under the Qing. Zhang reportedly told him of his plans to restore the Qing Emperor to power. Wu listened but said nothing in response and continued on the next morning to Beijing.55
55
In Beijing Wu took over the administration of the Foreign Ministry. In consulting with the Vice-Minister, Xia Yiting, he quickly set his priorities. First, negotiations to settle the disputes with Japan and France; then negotiations with Russia over several outstanding issues; then with Britain over border issues in Tibet; and finally, with Portugal over the re-demarcation of the Macau boundary.
56
The Laoxikai Affair with France had occurred on 20 October, when French consular troops occupied the area adjacent to the French concession in Tianjin, resulting in a clash with Chinese police. France had requested the extension much earlier, but China had never formally agreed to it. In frustration at their inability to reach a negotiated agreement, French authorities simply occupied the area. Negotiations began with Xia Yiting as Acting Foreign Minister but soon broke down, and British Minister Sir John Jordan stepped in with an offer to arbitrate the dispute. Jordan's settlement was rejected by China soon after Wu was appointed in the belief that Wu's negotiations would have more support in Parliament.5
57
54. NCDN, 1 Dec. 1916, p.
8.
55. Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, pp. 32–33; Jamieson to Reinsch, 28 Nov. 1916, encl. in Jamieson to Secretary of State, 7 Dec. 1916, USNA, 893.00/2556.
56. NCDN, 6 Dec. 1916, p. 8.
57. NCDN, 4 Nov., p. 5; 10 Nov., p. 7; 17 Nov. 1916, p. 8.
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Meanwhile, a spontaneous movement to boycott French goods had sprung up in Tianjin, and Shanghai merchants had informally declared their support in spite of the Government's telegram to provincial officials ordering them to suppress any boycott movements. A run on a French bank in Tianjin had also occurred in November. While still in Shanghai, Wu had been visited by a delegation of Tianjin businessmen who told him the "true state of affairs” and pressed him about his plan of action. Another group of Tianjin businessmen called upon him in Beijing shortly after he had opened talks with the French Chargé, the Count de Martel, to inquire about the negotiations.
58
The French Chargé refused to negotiate until the boycott agitation was suppressed. In mid-December the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce publicly declared that it would not support a boycott and would trust Wu to negotiate an equitable solution. In a public statement issued at the same time, the French Consul in Shanghai wrote to the French Minister reporting that good understanding existed between French and Chinese merchants in Shanghai, and expressing his hope that a settlement agreeable to the “cordial friendship” between China and France could be reached.59
In the agreement reached between Wu and the Count de Martel, France agreed to restore the disputed territory to China and to return the Chinese policemen who were being held by the French. In turn, China agreed to make the district into an international settlement, open to all foreign nations for trade and residence. At the end of December, however, the French Government refused to ratify this agreement, and the discussions stalemated. The French Minister to France, Hu Weide, was instructed to resume negotiations in Paris. But other pressing issues, domestic and foreign, soon diverted the public's attention from the Laoxikai matter.60
More successfully resolved was the dispute between China and Japan over the clash that had occurred in Zhengjiadun, Fengtian, in March 1916. The principal issue was that Japan insisted on the right to establish its own police stations and police patrols on Chinese territory, claiming the need to protect Japanese nationals and their property. It also demanded the right to have Japanese soldiers and commanders in the Chinese forces stationed in the region. These demands were part of the Group V of the infamous Twenty- One Demands of 1915 that Japan had been earlier forced to withdraw and which were the most objectionable to nationalistic Chinese.
Sino-Japanese negotiations were the object of parliamentary scrutiny caused by fears that Duan was engaged in secret diplomacy in order to obtain Japanese funds. In early December Duan had appointed Cao Rulin, his notoriously
58. NCDN, 24 Nov., p. 8; 8 Dec. 1916, p. 8.
59. NCDN, 18 Dec. 1916, p. 7.
60. NYT, 30 Dec. 1916, p. 2; NCDN, 28 Dec. 1916, p. 5. According to Paul Reinsch, the French Minister hated Wu Tingfang. See Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China, p.
279.
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pro-Japanese intimate, as special envoy to present the Grand Order of Merit to the Japanese Emperor. Anti-Duan forces in Parliament objected that Parliament had not consented to the appointment as called for in the constitution. Cao's appointment was rescinded. Eventually Wang Daxian was appointed in his place and successfully received parliamentary endorsement, but only after the Zhengjiadun event was resolved through Wu's negotiations with Count Hayashi in Beijing.
61
62
Wu opened negotiations with Hayashi in mid-December, with Hayashi joking that Wu's proficiency in English was causing the Japanese diplomat some hardship. The final agreement was reached by mid-January with an exchange of notes. China agreed to formally apologize to Japan for the clash and to punish the officers in command of the troops that fought with the Japanese. Chinese citizens were to be warned to act properly towards Japanese. In turn, Japan was to fix a date for withdrawal of its troops from the region.“
Japan dropped its demand to have Japanese officers in the Chinese constabulary, and China informally agreed to hire some Japanese military advisers so long as they were subordinate to the Chinese army and police constabulary. On the question of Japanese police rights in the area, a compromise of sorts was reached. China refused to concede the right to Japan; Japan continued to insist upon its right formally as a matter of principle.63
Hayashi's relatively conciliatory approach reflected the moderate line towards China of the Terauchi cabinet that had replaced Okuma's cabinet in October 1916. Part of the moderate line was to advance generous funds to Duan's faction in the so-called Nishihara loans. In fact, Cao Rulin was then engaged in secret financial negotiations on Duan's behalf, and in mid-January the first Nishihara loan was negotiated through the Bank of Communications, of which Cao was governor. Thus the Wu-Hayashi compromise was facilitated by the shift in Japanese policy. While the compromise reflected in the exchange of notes between Wu and Hayashi may not have been fully satisfactory for China, enough confidence existed in Wu to enable a consensus to emerge in support of his diplomacy.
While Wu was engaged in these various negotiations, the conflict between the President and Premier continued to intensify. Duan pressed Li to dismiss Sun Hongyi as Minister of the Interior. In a compromise arranged by Xu Shichang, Li agreed to Sun's dismissal with the understanding that Xu Shuzheng, Duan's secretary and leading Beiyang military figure, would be replaced. Xu Shuzheng was dismissed, but then Duan pressed for the dismissal of Li's secretary, Ding Shijie.
64
61. NCDN, 7 Dec., p. 8; 28 Dec. 1916, p. 4; 17 Mar. 1917, p. 7. See also Cao Rulin, Yisheng zhi huiyi, pp. 124-25.
62. NCDN, 23 Dec. 1916, p. 7; 23 Jan. 1917, p. 6.
63. NCDN, 29 Jan. 1917, P. 7.
64. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 360–61; Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan, pp. 45–50.
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The delivery of the U.S. note to China of 3 February 1917 inviting it and other neutral nations to sever relations with Germany brought the Li-Duan conflict to a head and precipitated the crisis that brought down the government. Duan became converted to the view that it would best suit China's (and his faction's) interests to speedily declare war on the Axis powers because he believed that it would further cement relations with Japan and provide increased Japanese funds for the government and army. This in turn would strengthen his faction's control over the state. The U.S. Minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, also exerted great personal pressure on China to enter the war on the side of the Allies, even to the point of misrepresenting the U.S. Government's position about assistance to China, in the mistaken belief that this would decrease China's dependence upon Japan.65
Wu Tingfang was placed in the center of the dispute. Personally disposed to follow the U.S. lead, he nonetheless came to believe that a declaration of war would be harmful domestically in that it would too greatly strengthen Duan's hand over that of the President. The conflict with Duan over the war issue brought Wu closer to Li Yuanhong than ever before and also brought him into closer contact with the Guomindang members of Parliament.66
China responded to the U.S. note on 8 February by directing a protest to Germany over the policy of unlimited submarine warfare that had provoked the U.S. to break relations with Germany. But following this action Wu refused to go along with Duan's desire for a rapid declaration of war. In mid-February Duan began to organize a separate body to mobilize support for the declaration of war. Composed of representatives of the parliamentary factions that supported him, Duan added foreign affairs personnel such as Lu Zhengxiang and Cao Rulin, who shared his views and could be counted upon to support him.67
The Diplomatic Affairs Discussion Commission, as it came to be called, unsurprisingly came to the conclusion that China should declare war on the Axis powers. According to Cao Rulin's reminiscences, Wu was willing to go as far as breaking relations with Germany but would not agree to the declaration of war. When Duan asked Cao his views, Cao replied that he felt it would make a better impression on the Allied powers to declare war. Duan, agreeing, said that he could understand that the Cabinet, under the influence of Li and the Parliament, would disagree, but why should Wu, an old foreign affairs official (who presumably should know better) take this position? Cao replied that probably Wu was following the traditional American view in which declarations of war should only follow direct provocation.68 C. C. Wu also
65. Analyzed in Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1970), p. 115ff.
66. Wu had been working closely with Zou Lu and other Cantonese members of Parliament over the issues of prohibiting opium and opposition to the gambling monopoly in Guangdong Province. See Zou Lu, Huigu lu (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), 1:81–89.
67. On the composition of the body see NCDN, 21 Feb. 1917, p. 7.
68. Cao Rulin, Yisheng zhi huiyi, p. 124.
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indicated that he personally favored a declaration of war as better suiting China's interests but stated that China should follow U.S. policy at present. This was similar to Gu Weijun's view that China should follow America's lead with respect to the war. Wu used the excuse of following America's lead as a way of resisting Duan's pressure.69
When Duan continued to press for the immediate declaration of war, Wu Tingfang simply resigned as Foreign Minister on 1 March, claiming illness as his reason. In fact, he had been ill with a severe cold, but this was not the real reason for his resignation. The Vice-Minister, Liu Shixun, also attempted to resign at this time, but Li Yuanhong refused to accept their resignations. In consequence, Duan, with some of his followers in the cabinet, left for Tianjin on 5 March. Li was forced to back down. Vice-President Feng Guozhang went to Tianjin and persuaded Duan to return, apparently with the understanding that Li would not “interfere” with the administration of the government."
70
Upon his return to Beijing, Duan used the Diplomatic Affairs Discussion Commission to supersede the Foreign Ministry as the effective policy-making agency with respect to the European War. Headed by Duan, with Wu as the vice-chairman, the Commission was loaded with Duan's supporters and representatives of other factions who supported his policy, such as Lu Zhengxiang, Wang Shizhen, Xiong Xiling, Cao Rulin, Lu Zongyu, Sun Baoqi and Wang Daxie. It also included two Guomindang members of the Parliament who supported the declaration of war, Wang Zhengting and Wang Chonghui. The commission became Duan's de facto Foreign Ministry, organized to do an end run around the real Foreign Ministry, which was too subordinate to the President for Duan's liking."
On 14 March, China formally severed relations with Germany. Henceforth, the commission took over full control over foreign relations, with Lu Zhengxiang, Sun Baoqi, Cao Rulin and Lu Zongyu assuming full authority in its daily meetings and organizational structure.72 Again Wu and his Vice- Minister Liu Shixun submitted their resignations on 23 March, protesting against their powerlessness. To show that he meant it, Liu left the capital. Duan immediately proposed Lu Zhengxiang as Wu's successor. But once again, Wu was persuaded by President Li to withdraw his resignation.73
Following the severing of relations with Germany and Austro-Hungary, public opinion was largely against China's entrance into the war, with the exception of Liang Qichao, who publicly supported Duan's policy. Sun Yixian and most other prominent Guomindang political figures opposed entry;
69. NCDN, 23 Feb. 1917, p. 5; Gu Weijun, Huiyilu (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 1:151–56. 70. Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, pp. 120–21.
71. List from NCDN, 14 Mar. 1917, p. 7.
72. NCDN, 17 Mar. 1917, p. 5 lists the division of responsibility within the body.
73. NCDN, 21 Mar., p. 8; 23 Mar., p. 8; 29 Mar., p. 8; 2 Apr. 1917, p. 8.
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business and commercial interests in the large cities were also against it. A majority of the Parliament similarly opposed it.74
With the U.S. declaration of war in April, Duan intensified his drive for China's declaration of war. As Wu had all along recommended following U.S. policy, Duan thought that now he and the new Vice-Minister Gao Erjian would consent. But Duan's overbearing methods alienated Wu and made him even more than ever President Li Yuanhong's ally against Duan. In late April Duan convened a meeting of the military commanders, or dujuns, in Beijing. This was obviously meant by Duan as a show of force to Li and the Parliament. The dujuns came through on 25 April when they issued a statement supporting Duan's policy.75
Duan was now ready to bring the question before Parliament on 10 May. Although it was likely that Parliament would have gone along with Duan, he nonetheless arranged for several thousand troops to surround the Parliament in a supposedly spontaneous demonstration of citizens' groups demanding China's entrance into the war. These were, of course, the same tactics Yuan Shikai had employed in his war against the Guomindang. Several Guomindang representatives were beaten by the soldiers. There was an immediate outcry against Duan. At this time Duan arrested Eugene Chen (Chen Youren), editor of the English-language Peking Daily, for printing a story asserting that Duan had signed a secret agreement with Japan for massive funding. On the following day, 11 May, Wu and three other cabinet ministers resigned, leaving only Duan as Premier and Fan Yuanlian as concurrently Minister of Education and the Interior.76
Once again Li refused to accept Wu's resignation and that of the Minister of the Navy, Cheng Biguang, who along with Wu had drawn closer to the Guomindang during this conflict with Duan." Duan, with the support of the dujuns, demanded that Li dismiss the Parliament, a demand that Li refused.
Duan submitted his resignation on 23 May. But this time Li's response was to dismiss Duan from his post. Wu as Foreign Minister countersigned the mandate, following a 1913 precedent when Lu Zhengxiang as Foreign Minister had countersigned a Presidential order instead of Prime Minister Zhao Bingjun. Wu was then appointed Acting Premier in Duan's place. On 29 May Li Jingxi was appointed Premier but as he delayed in taking up the appointment, Wu continued to serve as Acting Premier through the disastrous events that occurred in June.
The following events are well known. Li's actions were predicated on the belief that he had ample military support. But when Dujun Ni Sizhong declared his independence of the government Li's position became
74. Zou Lu, Huigu lu, p. 89.
75. Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan, pp. 57–62.
76. Ibid., PP. 63-65.
77. Zou Lu, Huigu lu, pp. 89–90.
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increasingly precarious. Attempted mediation through Xu Shichang and others proved impossible this time, and Li chose to ally with Dujun Zhang Xun. Zhang's price, it turned out, was the dismissal of Parliament, and by the time the conditions were made known publicly by Zhang, Li had no alternatives but to comply if he were to try to maintain the presidency.
But Wu as Acting Prime Minister refused to countersign the order to dismiss the Parliament, much to Li's consternation. To Guomindang parliamentarian Zou Lu, who came to see Wu to persuade him not to sign, Wu said that he had already determined not to sign. Placing his hand on Zou's shoulder, Wu told him, “Even with a knife to my head I will not sign one word."78
Li called Wu for a meeting; Wu refused to come, claiming illness. According to one account, Li's subordinate tried to bribe Wu by offering C. C. Wu high position and money, but this only made Wu angrier.79 According to some accounts, Li sent Jiang Chaozong, commander of troops in Beijing, and Wang Shizhen, Li's new Minister of War, to persuade Wu, but Wu refused to give in. In a statement that may be apocryphal but was widely repeated, Wu told them: “Offices can be resigned but names not signed; heads can be cut off but the law cannot be disobeyed.” To the possibility of threats to his life he replied that since he believed in the immortality of the soul, death did not frighten him.80
Whether or not Wu actually said these words cannot be known. But he did resist great pressure to countersign the order. As he later wrote, “I would have sooner died than be laughed at by my people and my friends abroad.”81 In the words of Guomindang moderate Wang Zhengting, Wu was "begged, pleaded [with], cajoled, threatened [and] promised great sums” for over four hours.82 His courage made him the hero of the hour in the South.83
Wu made a last minute, futile personal appeal to U.S. President Wilson to indicate in some way his support for Li's presidency and for the concept of parliamentary rule. Even if such an appeal had been forthcoming it is difficult to speculate about what its impact would have been; as it is, the U.S. State Department decided to defer any action on Wu's note.8
84
Faced with Zhang Xun's ultimatum, Li finally dismissed Wu as Acting Premier on 13 June. Chief of the Beijing Commandery Jiang Chaozong was appointed in Wu's place and he promptly signed the mandate. As Zhang
78. Zou Lu, Huigu lu, p. 91; see also Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 368–69.
79. Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan, p. 82.
80. Xu Jincheng, Minguo waishi (Hong Kong, n.d.), pp. 34–35.
81. Millard's Review 1, no. 6: 154–55 (14 July 1917).
82. NCDN, 30 June 1917, P. 6.
83. NCDN, 13 June, p. 8; 15 June 1917, p. 6.
84. Reinsch to Secretary of State, 5 June 1917, USNA, 893.00/2584 and 893.00/2587; Wellington Koo to Wu Tingfang, 9 June 1917, 893.00/2603.
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Xun and his "pigtailed" troops neared the capital, Wu and C. C. left Beijing for a "vacation" at Shanhaiguan. Since he was still legally Foreign Minister, he took the precaution of taking the seal of the ministry with him.85
On 1 July Zhang Xun declared the restoration of the Xuantong Emperor. The news arrived as Wu was dining with G. E. Morrison. Wu later said he had been shocked and found it difficult to believe. He told Morrison that the telegraphic service must have mistranslated "Hsuan Tung [Xuantong] ascended Throne” for “Hsuan Tung ascended Heaven." Upon hearing of the restoration, Wu and C. C. made immediate plans to leave North China as soon as possible. They arrived in Shanghai on 7 July, still with the seal of the Foreign Ministry.86
Zhang's restoration lasted one week before Duan's forces drove his troops out of Beijing. Duan declared that Wu had no legal authority to act as Foreign Minister as he had earlier submitted his resignation. When Duan appointed Wu's replacement on 9 July, Wu gave in, announcing that he had only meant to safeguard the seal so as to prevent the "Imperial" Foreign Minister, Liang Dunyan, from being able to act on behalf of what was, for Wu, an illegal government.
87
This mess had a profound impact on Wu. Earlier he had followed Yuan Shikai; Yuan had proven unworthy of support in the end. Li Yuanhong was surely not Yuan's equal in ability, charisma or military might, but he became a symbol for the constitutionalist program. In the end he too proved unworthy of support. Although Wu had functioned as a part of Li's faction in Beijing politics, he deserted Li when the latter acted in a manner too far removed from the publicly articulated rationale for their behavior.
Publicly Wu maintained his faith in the constitutionalist program, insisting that there was nothing wrong with the vision, only with the people who attempted to implement it. For example, at a reception in Shanghai on 9 July given him by members of Parliament, he gave a speech in which he said:
One cannot blame the form of government because it did not work right but the men who participated in the working of it. They say we had six years of republicanism and accomplished nothing but what did the Manchus accomplish in the 260 years they had? Moreover, during the five of the six years of its existence, the Republic was coping with a dictator...
Under President Li, we had but a year. He is very considerate to all men. But the majority of his officers were not educated to handle a republican form of government and there was considerable friction between the old and the new faces. . . . 88
85. Tao Juyin, Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi shihua 3:216–17.
86. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 338.
87. Millard's Review 1, no. 6 (14 July 1917): 154–55.
88. Ibid.
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The solution was time. It would take time for the Chinese people to become educated as modern citizens, time for political figures to be responsible to the stated goals of the nation. In a theme that many Guomindang political figures were to repeat during the summer of 1917, Wu drew the analogy between the situation in China and the European conflagration. At a tiffin given in his honor by the American University Club in Shanghai on 13 July he stated:
The war in Europe is being fought to put an end to Prussian militarism; and I want the Americans here to understand that China's troubles are due to exactly the same causes. We are engaged in a struggle between democracy and militarism. Between fifty-five and sixty percent of the taxes of China are now going to support militarism in China. This must be changed, but the change must be gradual. I ask Americans to be patient and give China a chance. Democracy will triumph.89
It would be a mistake to dismiss the sentiments expressed by Wu as mere propagandistic covering for a factional struggle for power. Struggle for power there was, and factionalism there was as well, but the events of spring 1917 suggest that the struggle and factionalism were at least partially motivated by genuine differences between the Beiyang military political groups and the southern civilian political groups about how China should be governed, not only about who should govern it.
At the same time, Wu's faith was clearly shaken by the debacle in Beijing. In Shanghai during summer 1917 as Sun Yixian and others were preparing to establish a separate government in Guangzhou, he told foreign diplomats that he was thinking of two separate governments or two separate parliaments for China, or perhaps two separate governing bodies with one central authority for purposes of foreign relations, or perhaps a federal form of government such as existed in the United States.90
In the years that followed his departure from Beijing, Wu was drawn deeper into the morass of factional politics. In his last five years, factional struggle became the dominant form of political life in China, and it was to prove impossible to escape participating in it if one was to remain a politically active person.
Establishing the Military Government, July 1917–May 1918
With the collapse of Li Yuanhong's presidency in the North, Chinese liberals formed an alliance to establish a base in South China. The so-called Guangzhou Governments from 1917 to 1922 were characterized by the
89. Ibid.
90. Sammons to Reinsch, 11 July 1917, encl. in Reinsch to Secretary of State, 10 Aug. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2704.
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weakness of political structures, the pre-eminence of factional politics and their dependence upon military support from the armies of the region.
The dominant military power in Guangdong was the Guangxi Army under Lu Rongting, who had been appointed Commissioner to Oversee Affairs of Guangdong and Guangxi during Li Yuanhong's presidency in view of his role in defeating Long Jiguang, Yuan Shikai's appointee as Military Governor of Guangdong. Together with the Guangxi Army, Guangdong also “hosted" part of Tang Jiyao's Yunnan Army. The Yunnan Army played a relatively "progressive" role during this period, in that leading figures in it, such as Li Liejun, were far more supportive of the constitutionalist cause than was the Guangxi Army under Lu.
In addition to these two armies, there was a Guangdong army in northern Guangdong under Chen Jiongming. Its forces were numerically inferior to those of the Guangxi Army, but it was inclined to support the constitutionalist movement and was an important ally of Sun Yixian during this period. Also supporting the constitutionalists was the naval power of the ten ships of the First Naval Squadron under former Minister of the Navy, Cheng Biguang, and the fleet's commander Lin Baoyi.91
The major political organization involved in the Guangzhou Governments was the Guomindang, which was split into three main factions. These were characterized by Li Jiannong as first, the "extreme right wing," composed of members of the Political Study Group who had been frozen out of Duan's Government in the North and led by Li Genyuan and Gu Zhongxiu. Li supported Cen Chunxuan as head of the military government because Cen could control Lu Rongting, the leader of the Guangxi military clique. Gu hoped to use the Zhili clique of northern warlords and Feng Guozhang to defeat Duan. The "extreme left wing," according to Li Jiannong, was composed of members of the Association of Friends of the People, including former cadres of Sun Yixian's China Revolutionary Party. The balance in Parliament was held by the “moderate” faction, the Good Friends Association.92
In part the political history of the Guangzhou Governments may be seen as the political split between the political figures who decided to support the Guangxi Army and pursue a negotiated peace with the Zhili clique in the North, on the one hand, and on the other, Sun Yixian and his supporters and allies who sought to use the Yunnan Army and Chen Jiongming's forces
91. The political events that are described below await monographic treatment. Especially helpful has been Luo Jialun, Guofu nianpu (Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1958), 2 vols. (hereafter cited as Luo, GFNP). A general overview may be found in Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 373-400. On the role of the Yunnan Army in Guangdong see Donald S. Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905–25 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980), pp. 238-61. On the Guangxi military clique in Guangdong during this period see Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925–1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 30–33, 42–48. The events in this section are described in Li Shoukong, “Guofu hufa yu Guangzhou junzhengfu zhi chengli," in Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji (Taibei: Lianjing, 1982), 7: 167– 212.
92. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 385.
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to establish a stronger territorial base from which to ultimately defeat all the northern forces. As both tactics and goals of the two political groups differed, the coalition was not destined to survive very long.
Wu Tingfang spent the summer of 1917 in Shanghai. The events of June and Li Yuanhong's departure from politics left him confused about future directions for China, as noted above. He had, however, been instrumental in urging Naval Minister Cheng Biguang to unite with Sun Yixian, Tang Shaoyi and Cen Chunxuan in Shanghai. On 5 June Cheng had secretly visited Wu at night in Beijing to ask his advice. According to a contemporary account of Cheng's life, Wu advised him to join Sun, Tang and Cen in Shanghai. Cheng left Beijing the next day and met with Sun, Tang, Zhang Binglin and others in Shanghai in early July. Cheng and Zhang hoped to use the navy to rescue Li and bring him south, but they were unable to secure the help of the Japanese Legation in Beijing to implement this plan. Also, Li had decided to retire from public life.93
Assured of Cheng's support, Sun, Zhang and others departed for Guangdong on 12 July, the day Duan Qirui's troops ended the Zhang Xun Restoration in Beijing. They arrived in Guangzhou on 17 July and shortly announced their intention to establish a "Constitution Protection" government. The Navy responded by declaring itself independent of Beijing and in support of the Constitution Protection Movement. Members of the Parliament who had fled Beijing were invited to reconvene in Guangzhou, and Sun cabled Wu Tingfang, Tang Shaoyi and Cen Chunxuan to come south and join the movement.94
Wu waited until Feng Guochang's assumption of the presidency before reentering political life. He came to believe that he might help to mediate between North and South and thereby help to defeat Duan and the Anfu clique, which was attacking the southern provinces in the civil war that had erupted in summer 1917. The war broke out when Duan violated his understanding with Lu Rongting and moved his subordinate into Hunan while moving to curtail the influence of the Yunnan Army in Sichuan.95
Duan's moves in Sichuan brought Tang Jiyao into the fold of the Constitution Protection Movement and provided the impetus for the speedy establishment of the military government. This was also facilitated by the arrival of Cheng Biguang and his fleet on 5 August. In August the Parliament met in “extraordinary session”; on 3 September Sun Yixian was elected Grand Marshal of the military government, with Lu Rongting and Tang Jiyao Marshals.9
96
93. Zhang Binglin, Taiyan xiansheng ziding nianpu (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 30–31; Cheng Shenxiutang, ed., Cheng Biguang xunguo ji (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 39–46.
94. Luo, GFNP, pp. 424–28; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:302. According to Ma Fengchi, Wu Tingfang was sending coded telegrams most likely on behalf of Cheng Biguang. See Ma, “Ma Fengchi midian,” arranged by Zhang Bofeng, Jindaishi ziliao 36, no. 1 (1978): 42.
95. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 378–80.
96. Luo, GFNP, pp. 431–32; Zhang Binglin, Ziding nianpu, p. 31; Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 57-59.
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The new government was inaugurated on 10 September, with Wu Tingfang appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Two members of Parliament were deputed to go to Shanghai and escort Wu and the appointee for the Ministry of the Interior, Sun Hongyi, to Guangzhou. Earlier in August Wu had replied to Sun's request by declining to come to Guangzhou, giving his advanced age as the reason, and offering to send his son C. C. in his place. Now Wu continued to evade the invitation to come to Guangzhou, with C. C. cabling Guangzhou on 14 September that his father was "old and weak" and therefore could not fix a date to come south. On 3 October Wu again cabled that he was unable to come south. Thus while Wu did not exactly refuse to assume the post, he was not eager to take an active part in the government. Most likely this is because he hoped that he could serve as a mediator should a settlement between Feng and the Guomindang prove likely and did not want to personally assume a post in the southern government. However, Wu did send his son C. C. to Guangzhou in October, and C. C. agreed to serve as an interim foreign minister.97
Another reason for Wu's reluctance to commit himself to the southern government may have been unwillingness to work too closely with Sun Yixian at this time. Although the sources are not clear on the subject, it seems that C. C. was loosely aligned with the Good Friends Association (Yiyou She) faction of the Guomindang, whose leader was the Speaker of the Senate, Wu Jinglian. Wu Jinglian reportedly had a bitter dispute with Sun Yixian in August about the role of the Parliament in decision-making, with Sun reluctant to grant too large a decision-making capacity to it. In any case, Wu favored an accommodation with the Guangxi military to secure a negotiated settlement of the civil war and saw that as preferable to establishing a government under Sun's domination that was not firmly committed to that goal.
98
In October and November behind the scenes feelers were going between Feng Guochang's faction and the Guangxi faction on possible peace terms, and it appears that C. C. was in support of these efforts. On 1 November C. C. reportedly left Guangzhou to personally persuade his father to come south; meanwhile Lu Rongting personally invited Cen Chunxuan, Wu Tingfang and Tang Shaoyi, none of whom had come to Guangzhou, to visit him at his headquarters in Wuzhou.99
By mid-November it was reported that the terms the South (i.e., Lu, Wu, Tang, and Cen) would insist upon included restoring the "old" Parliament and restoring Li Yuanhong as President until Parliament had reconvened and could elect Feng Guozhang or another person president. Wu Tingfang was to be Premier to form a permanent cabinet in which Sun Hongyi would
97. SCMP, 18 Aug., p. 6; 15 Sept., p. 7; 3 Oct. 1917, p. 6; Reinsch to Secretary of State, 27 Oct. 1916 [sic], USNA, 893.00/2733.
98. Zhang Binglin, Ziding nianpu, p. 31; on C. C. and the Yiyou She, see Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 257-61.
99. Heintzleman to Reinsch and Secretary of State, 1 Nov. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2742.
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serve as Minister of the Interior. Punishment of Duan Qirui was insisted upon, and southern forces would control the provinces of Hunan, Sichuan, Anhui, Fujian and Jiangxi.'
100
Having come to this understanding with Lu Rongting, Tang Shaoyi and Wu Tingfang now agreed to come to Guangzhou. Wu arrived on 30 November via Hong Kong to a large reception including Admiral Cheng Biguang, Sun Yixian's representative Hu Hanmin, and the new Guangdong Dujun Mo Rongxin representing Lu Rongting. Tang Shaoyi arrived soon thereafter.101
Wu's first act was to cable Feng Guozhang asking him to send representatives south to negotiate a cessation of the civil war. Meeting Lu Rongting at Wuzhou on 1-2 December, Wu discussed the conditions for negotiations with Feng's representatives. Following this meeting, Wu sent another cable to Feng offering to be a mediator between the North and South. He indicated that he had not yet taken up the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, "considering that arrangements are being made to settle the trouble peacefully."
"102
Through December 1917 the situation seesawed back and forth. In mid- December it was reported that Wu planned to return to Shanghai because he had been unable to negotiate a settlement, but he was finally persuaded to remain in Guangzhou by Wu Jinglian, Wang Zhengting, Vice-Speaker of the Senate and a member of the Yiyou She faction, and Mo Rongxin, representing the Guangxi Army and its commander Lu Rongting. On 25 December Feng Guozhang proclaimed a cease-fire, and Wu declared himself willing to return to Shanghai and join Cen Chunxuan in going to Beijing to discuss the matter. But these efforts were to lead to nought as Feng was unable to achieve supremacy over Duan's faction and the war in Hunan continued in spite of Feng. As the situation in Beijing and in the Hunan battlefield remained fluid, Cen decided not to go to Beijing, and Wu Tingfang remained in Guangzhou, 103
As Wu, Tang and Cen pursued this course of action, the differences between them and the revolutionary wing of the Guomindang became more acute and reflected the growing tension emerging between Sun Yixian's forces and the Guangxi Army. In December Lu and Mo were uneasy at Sun's efforts to recruit soldiers to serve under him. According to the report of Ma Fengchi, a spy for Duan's forces, Sun had set up a recruitment office to hire retired soldiers and bandits and had even had flyers posted in Xinhui to recruit men. Mo viewed this activity as interference in the military affairs of the
100. SCMP, 26 Nov. 1917, p. 6; see also below, and Peking Evening Times, 1 Dec. 1917, encl. in Reinsch to Secretary of State, 3 Dec. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2750.
101. Heintzleman to Reinsch and Secretary of State, 4 Dec. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2753; SCMP, 3 Dec. 1917,
6.
p.
102. SCMP, 8 Dec. 1917, p. 3; Reinsch to Secretary of State, 1 Dec. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2750; Ma Fengchi, "Ma Fengchi midian,” p. 65.
103. SCMP, 17 Dec., p. 6; 29 Dec. 1917, p. 6; Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 113–18.
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province and as military governor or dujun, he protested to Lu Rongting. Wu and Tang Shaoyi mediated this dispute by getting Sun to agree to dismantle the recruiting office, and then they sought to reassure the powerful business interests of Guangzhou. 104
In January 1918 further conflict between Sun and Mo occurred. Mo's troops surrounded the military government building, arresting and then executing a number of troops whom Sun called "bodyguards" and Mo called "bandits." In retaliation, Sun ordered naval officers to bombard Mo's headquarters at Guanyinshan. Mo again complained to Lu. Once again an open split was prevented by intervention. On the military side, Li Liejun persuaded the naval commander Lin Hu to desist from further action, while Wu Tingfang, Wu Jinglian and Wang Zhengting met with representatives of the various factions. Characterizing the attack on Mo as "rash and foolhardy," an agreement was reached whereby the military government was to be informed before any one of its members could be convicted on a political charge. Later Wu Tingfang, Cheng Biguang and Zhu Zhixin, the latter representing Sun, held an open tea at the Chamber of Commerce in an effort to reassure the Guangzhou public about the political state of affairs.105
Meanwhile, under Cheng Biguang's leadership, efforts were being made to reorganize the military government so as to give the Guangxi military a larger role in it and facilitate the prospects of a negotiated North-South settlement. In December Cheng sponsored a series of meetings to draft the charter of the new structure, a confederation of constitutionalist provinces. After some difficulties, Lu Rongting's support was obtained, and on 31 December the articles of the new entity were made public. The governing council was to consist of representatives from each independent province, the navy, appropriate military units, and an unspecified group of “elder statesmen." Based in Guangzhou, the provinces would coordinate their military affairs and foreign relations. Cen Chunxuan was to be appointed chief delegate to North-South peace talks, Wu Tingfang was to handle foreign affairs and Tang Shaoyi finances, while Tang Jiyao, Lu Rongting and Cheng Biguang were to be the military representatives.106
The announcement of this development caused much distress to Sun Yixian and his revolutionary followers. In a famous telegram to Wu, Tang and Cheng, Zhang Binglin urged them not to proceed with the planned reorganization. Charging that it constituted splitting and capitulation, Zhang wrote that seeking peace at that juncture was a suicidal policy that undermined Li Yuanhong, the cause of constitutionalism and degraded its authors as well, 107
104. Ma Fengchi, “Ma Fengchi midian,” p. 65; SCMP, 19 Dec., p. 6; 20 Dec. 1917, p. 6.
105. Luo, GFNP, p. 444; Li Liejun, Li Liejun jiangjun zizhuan (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 58–59; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2778; SCMP, 18 Jan. 1918, p. 6.
106. Text in Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 79–81; Luo, GFNP, p. 444. 107. Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 82–83.
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On 2 February 1918 Cheng, Wu, Tang Shaoyi and Mo Rongxin announced their plan to go ahead with the reorganization of the military government. With the support of many members of Parliament assured through Wu Jinglian's backing, Wu and Tang were made the key persons to handle the reorganization. Sun Yixian, while not openly opposing the plan, was clearly displeased as it resulted in a diminution of his power and influence in the southern government. Also, Lu Rongting was reported to be not enthusiastic about the reorganization plan as he was independently working out an accommodation with the Zhili militarists in the North.108
The tensions were exacerbated when, on 26 February, Cheng Biguang was assassinated. This remains one of the more mysterious events to have occurred in the Guangzhou Government period. Pro-Guomindang histories place the blame for his death on the Guangxi military clique. Some assert that Cheng's desire to expand his military and political influence in Guangdong brought him into conflict with Mo Rongxin and Lu Rongting. Yet the sources do not indicate any overt antagonism between Cheng and the Guangxi group; if anything Cheng's reorganization plan would have given them more formal power in the governing structure than they had earlier had. Another hypothesis has been advanced that Cheng was assassinated at the command of Zhu Zhixin, Sun Yixian's follower, for reasons that remain unclear but perhaps as a means of forestalling the reorganization. But this remains speculative and is not supported by any documentation that I have examined.109
Wu and his son had worked closely with Cheng Biguang and had been staying with him on board his ship since arriving in Guangzhou. Whatever Wu's personal knowledge or understanding of the circumstances of Cheng's assassination may have been is not known. In the long run, Cheng's death had little impact beyond perhaps delaying the implementation of the reorganization plan for a short while. In March Wu and C. C. met with Lu Rongting at the latter's headquarters in Wuzhou. They obtained his support for the plan so long as the new entity did not use the term "government” and thereby jeopardize the chances of negotiating with Feng Guozhang.110
In April the reorganization plan was debated in Parliament and on 4 May received majority support. Sun Yixian resigned his position as Grand Marshal on the same day but was persuaded by Parliament to remain in Guangzhou until the reorganization took place. Through the revolutionary Tan Renfeng, Sun let Wu know that he would instruct his followers not to resist the change although he felt it would lead to further misfortunes for Guangdong."
108. Ibid., pp. 84–87; Luo, GFNP, p. 446; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 10 Feb. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2786; SCMP, 23 Feb. 1918, p. 3.
109. For the Guomindang view see Luo, GFNP, p. 446; for the view suggesting Zhu Zhixin as the culprit see biographical sketch of Cheng by Guo Luo, in Minguo renwu zhuan (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981), 3:33-40.
110. Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 99–107; SCMP, 21 Mar., P. 6; 26 Mar. 1918, p. 6; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 29 Mar. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2828.
111. Luo, GFNP, pp. 451–52.
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On 20 May the reorganized government was formally announced. Parliament elected Sun, Cen Chunxuan, Lu Rongting, Tang Jiyao, Tang Shaoyi, Wu Tingfang and Lin Baoyi (Cheng Biguang's successor as Naval Commander) as directors (zongcai) of the military government. On the following day Sun formally resigned and shortly thereafter left Guangzhou with about thirty followers. Sun Yixian's departure effectively ended the first phase of the history of the Guangzhou Military Government. With Sun gone, the way was now clear for Wu, Tang and Cen to pursue their plan to seek a negotiated peace with the North.112
The reorganization was a great blow to many revolutionary followers and associates of Sun Yixian. It symbolized for some the end to all hopes of using the Guangzhou base to implement their goals of national unification and development. Wu did not make any efforts to placate them, nor find any need to be especially courteous either. Indeed, his well-known enfant terrible style seems to have intensified as age provided him with the excuse to be as ill-mannered as he pleased to those younger and lower in status.
The diary of Zhang Nanxian serves to illustrate these observations.113 Zhang was a Hubei scholar who had participated in the 1911 revolution. In winter 1917 the civil war in Hunan caused him much distress and he decided to visit Guangdong himself. He wrote to Wang Jingwei in Shanghai asking him to arrange an introduction to Wu Tingfang, as one of the few truly eminent political figures of the day, the other two being Zhang Binglin and Wang Jingwei himself. Wu was very fond of Wang. Wang wrote a letter of introduction and asked Zhang to bring an old book from him to Wu.
Upon seeing Wu, Zhang wrote, Wu's bureaucratic air was so offensive that "it made one want to throw up.” The conversation started off badly and went from bad to worse, with Wu sizing up his humble dress and speaking to him very rudely:
Wu: What do you do at home?
Zhang: Teach and farm.
Wu: Why aren't you home teaching and farming?
Zhang: With the situation like this, it's not peaceful at home
and so I came out for a look.
Wu: Have you been to Beijing?
Zhang (hurt but still wanting to show respect to an elder): No.
Wu: Ha! Never been to Beijing!
Zhang (firmly): I've been there but was so ill at ease I didn't stay
long.
Wu (more softly): Why have you come here?
112. Ibid., p. 452; SCMP, 22 May, p. 6; 24 May 1918, P. 7.
113. Zhang Nanxian, “Yichi liushi zishu,” in Xinhai Geming shi congkan, arr. Modern History Group
of Wuhan University (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), 1: 178–202.
Elder Statesman 1912–1922
Zhang (politely): Not to look for a position. The situation is so unsettled and the lives of the people so difficult, and you are one of the elders of the nation, so I have come to request some news for the people.
Wu (uneasily): How could I; I'm only handling some negotiations. Zhang (angrily): You have such a heavy responsibility, not like ordinary people, so how can you talk of “negotiation”?
Wu (sudden outburst): Without negotiations there will be much more fighting!
Zhang: And the fighting will end through negotiation? You have been negotiating since the 1911 revolution, and what have you accomplished?
Wu (very angry): What are you saying? What are you saying?
Zhang (firmly): You shouldn't be this way; you have great responsibilities but never advocate anything or have your own opinion.
261
After leaving Guangzhou, Zhang Nanxian wrote to Wang Jingwei and told him what happened, and Wang wrote back apologetically for having failed to warn Zhang about Wu's peculiarities but still not condemning him: "Old Zhi[yong] has bad [bureaucratic] habits and recently uses his old age as an excuse [yi lao mai lao], so he is even worse.'
Aside from Wu's arrogance, which even those close to him, such as Fu Bingchang and Wang Jingwei acknowledged, Zhang Nanxian called into question Wu's entire enterprise of the "Peacemaker" who was above politics. It is perhaps a sad commentary that Wu, who had tried to bring a new spirit to officialdom in 1903 when he began to organize the new Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, was now a veritable symbol of an old and decadent style of political administration for people such as Zhang Nanxian. And it is suggestive of factional politics that a major amount of Wu's energies went into unsuccessful, fruitless efforts at mediation. Administering and mediating, what else was there to do?
The Unification Effort, May 1918–May 1919
With Sun's departure in May, Cen Chunxuan now declared his intention of taking part in the reorganized government, arriving in Guangzhou on 3 July. On 5 July Wu announced the formal establishment of the government and immediate convening of the directors' council (often called Administrative Council or Political Council). This latter did not occur until 19 August, apparently the earliest that Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting could decide on their representatives, Li Liejun and Mo Rongxin respectively.114
114. SCMP, 5 July, p. 6; 6 July, p. 6; 9 July, p. 3; 22 Aug. 1918, p. 6.
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Cen and Wu were the key figures in the reorganized government. Cen was chosen the head of the government, and Wu served as Foreign Minister. As Tang Shaoyi, the Finance Minister, was in Shanghai, Wu served jointly as Finance Minister for much of the period. Sun Yixian, of course, declined to participate, although he did send a representative. Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting's representatives similarly were not involved in the administration, although Cen consulted regularly with Lu in person and by cable. Tang Shaoyi never really participated in the government. From April to early July he was in Japan as Cen's representative in an effort to secure the Japanese Government's approval for a negotiated settlement. He also tried to get the Japanese Government to stop the Nishihara loans to the Beijing Government. Thus Wu and Cen, and to some extent the Naval Commander, Lin Baoyi, were the mainstays of the reorganized government.115
In April Wu had drafted a long statement in English for publication in the foreign newspapers in China. In this statement he deplored the “military autocracy" of the Beijing Government, unleashing of Long Jiguang's "undisciplined hordes” to burn and plunder Guangdong, and violation of constitutional and legal principles:
They [the militarists] treat the Constitution as a scrap of paper; they dissolve Parliament, not only the Lower House but the Upper House as well, and propose to assemble a new one at their own pleasure; they force one President to vacate office [Li Yuanhong] and reduce another to the position of an impotent figurehead [Feng Guochang].
Wu set forth what were to remain the firm negotiating terms maintained by the South: reconvening the Parliament that had been dissolved by Li Yuanhong and maintenance of the Provisional Constitution until a permanent one could be drafted by Parliament. He wrote that President Feng's inability to open negotiations, in spite of numerous invitations to do so, constituted a refusal by the northern militarists to abide by the legitimizing principles of the Republic. Wu concluded by lauding the efforts of E. S. Little to facilitate a negotiated settlement.116
From the start Wu was pessimistic about the prospects for negotiating an acceptable settlement. He had observed Feng Guochang's inability to constrain Duan Qirui in Duan's war against the South and was well aware of Feng's weaknesses, personal and political. None of the leading figures in the North would accept the South's demand that the old Parliament be reconvened,
115. Wu had made a ten-day visit to Lu at Wuzhou when he had first arrived. SCMP, 18 Oct., p. 3; 5 Nov., p. 6; 22 Nov. 1917, p. 6. On relations with Lu after the reorganization see SCMP, 15 July, p. 6; 24 July, p. 6; 9 Aug. 1918, p. 6. Tang Shaoyi's Japan trip requires research beyond the scope of this study, but see SCMP, 3 Apr., p. 6; 16 Apr., p. 6; 31 May, p. 6; 24 July 1918, p. 6; for protests on the loans: see SCMP, 17 Jan., p. 6; 13 May 1918, p. 5; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 21 Jan. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2773.
116. NCDN, 9 Apr. 1918, encl. in Sammons to Secretary of State, 9 Apr. 1918, 893.00/2827, USNA; see also SCMP, 5 Apr. 1918, p. 6.
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Duan because of his deep seated hostility to the Guomindang-dominated body, and Feng because he feared it would not confirm him as President due to an earlier scandal. As the two factions in the North appeared deadlocked, Xu Shichang was emerging as the “dark horse" presidential candidate, but Wu characterized him as a "stubborn reactionary" at heart, still loyal to the Qing cause and hostile to the principles of constitutionalism that the South represented. 117
In view of Wu's pessimism one must ask why he continued to serve in the military government. He had come south only in the expectation that he might help to facilitate a North-South agreement; by the end of 1917 it was clear that such an agreement would not occur and that the reorganization freezing Sun Yixian out of the military government would not appease the northern military factions either. The sources do not help in revealing Wu's motivations, but he apparently could not assume an independent stance in the way that Tang Shaoyi did. Much like his experiences under the Qing, he had great staying power. As long as there was a shred of hope, he would
persevere.
Given Wu's pessimistic view of the situation in Beijing, he began a campaign to seek foreign recognition for the military government as a belligerent state; in particular to use the United States as an ally for the southern cause. In summer 1918 he drafted a manifesto to the foreign powers on behalf of the southern government in which the constitutionalist case was eloquently made. The purpose of this drive for recognition was, as he wrote in a personal note to U.S. Secretary of State Lansing, to make Duan and his faction "see the error of their policy and come to to reasonable terms.'
"118 This manifesto was followed by the dispatching of a delegation, composed of Wang Zhengting, Guo Taiqi and Chen Youren (Eugene Chen) to the U.S. in September 1918 to seek international recognition as a belligerent state. The thrust of U.S. policy emphasized the unification of China, as formulated by officials in the State Department and reflecting the views of financial interests in the U.S. and Britain. Given this situation, Wu's efforts were not destined for success, although Lansing did respond courteously to Wu's note.119
By summer 1918 Duan had failed in his effort to pursue the civil war in Hunan because Wu Peifu refused to engage in battle. In August, Feng Guozhang agreed to support Xu Shichang as the new president. On 12 August the newly-organized Parliament, dominated by Duan's Anfu clique, was convened in Beijing and soon voted to hold the presidential election on 4 September. 120
117. Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2778.
118. Wu to Lansing, 5 Aug. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2874; SCMP, 22 Aug. 1918, p. 6.
119. Materials on these events may be found in USNA materials numbered 893.00/2869, 2892, 2893, 2896 1/2. See also Roberta A. Dayer, Bankers and Diplomats in China, 1917–1925: The Anglo- American Relationship (London: F. Cass, 1981), chap. 2.
120. Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 114–19.
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The response of the Guangzhou Government was to consistently denounce the "new" Parliament as illegal and to refuse to recognize the election of Xu Shichang as legitimate. On 3 August Wu and the other members of the Political Council issued a circular telegram declaring that the "new" Parliament was illegal. The "old" Parliament meeting in Guangzhou attained a quorum on 6 August and declared that it would not recognize any of the activities of the body meeting in Beijing, including the presidential election or any laws, mandates or agreements made.121
On 16 September Cen and Wu sent a private telegram to Xu urging him not to take office. On 8 October the “old” Parliament passed a resolution declaring that it would not recognize Xu's election as legal, and on 11 October Wu cabled the foreign diplomatic corps in Beijing announcing that the South did not recognize Xu as President.122
In spite of these public pronouncements, the various factions of the military government split over politics towards Beijing. While Wu and the Parliament were denouncing the election as illegal, Cen Chunxuan and Lu Rongting were engaged in secret negotiations with Xu through the person of Liang Shiyi, Cantonese member of the “new” Parliament and head of the powerful Communications clique. Liang had previously supported Duan's policies but starting in summer 1918 Liang was helping Feng and then Xu to come to terms with the South. Tang Shaoyi, who had never come to Guangzhou after returning to Shanghai from Japan, was waiting in the wings. As an old colleague of Xu's from the Qing days of Yuan Shikai's mufu, he was viewed as the logical choice to lead the negotiations on Cen's behalf.123
By fall Xu's intelligence indicated that Cen and Lu were the people to deal with in the South. Wu and Sun were viewed as hard-liners, while the smaller warlords and non-Guomindang political figures did not hold fixed positions. Whatever was discussed via Liang and other private mediators with Cun and Tang Shaoyi is not known, but rumors indicated that possible political settlements would include Cen, Tang and possibly Wu in a reorganized cabinet under Xu as President. 124
The drive for a negotiated settlement attained new urgency in November and December 1918 due to events in Europe. On 11 November armistice was reached, and the issue of representation at the Paris Peace Conference attained new significance, becoming intertwined with the domestic issue of the North- South talks. On 2 December the foreign powers issued an aide-mémoire both to
121. Ibid., p. 126; See also Cen Xuelu, Sanshui Liang Yansun xiansheng nianpu (reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1962), 1:430; SCMP, 7 Aug., p. 6; 8 Aug., p. 6; 6 Sept., p. 6; 7 Sept. 1918, p. 6.
122. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 126; Cen Xuelu, Sanshui Liang Yansun xiansheng nianpu, 1:433–34; Reinsch to Secretary of State, 9 Nov. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2916.
123. On Liang's movements during this period see Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 122–24.
124. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 133 n. 15, citing a report by Zhou Tingli; on Tang Shaoyi, see remarks by the counselor of the Chinese Legation in Washington, Yung Kwei, reported in E. T. Williams "Memo of a Conversation with Mr. Yung Kwei. . . ." 9 Aug. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2873 1/ 2.
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the Beijing and Guangzhou foreign ministries urging both sides to reach a peaceful settlement. This was followed by Japan's announcement that it would not proceed with further loans to the Beijing Government. Open resistance to Xu's peace policy from the militarists in the North immediately ceased.125
But Wu continued to seek to use foreign pressure, particularly arbitration by the U.S., to improve the South's position in negotiating with the North. There were two major issues: the first concerned the cease-fires in Shaanxi and Fujian, control of which was seen as vital to a strong Southern position. The second issue was the fundamental one of the “old” versus the "new" Parliament. The Southern Parliament took a hard-line in refusing to confirm the appointees to the talks, and it took further pressure from the foreign powers to force the South to the table. Under a foreign threat to withhold the South's share of the Customs surplus funds, Wu and the Parliament agreed to set a date for the talks. At the end of December 1918 the list of delegates' names was released, and on 20 February the conference opened.126
As a result of the deadlock among the Southern political factions, the issue of the South's representation at the Paris Peace Conference was complex. On 13 November the Political Council of the military government appointed Wu Tingfang, Sun Yixian, Wang Zhengting, Wang Jingwei and C. C. Wu to represent it at Versailles, pending parliamentary approval. But foreign diplomatic pressure was employed to create a unified delegation with representation from both governments.
127
Finally it was decided to send C. C. Wu as special envoy to Beijing to discuss question of a joint delegation to Paris. These discussions resulted in an agreement for a united delegation composed of three northern representatives and two from the South, Wang Zhengting and C. C. Wu. But the Southern Parliament refused to confirm this agreement. Sun and Wu declined to be appointed, and Sun Yixian viewed it as an error to appoint a separate delegation in view of the fact that the military government had not received foreign diplomatic recognition. He thought it better to send observers.128
In the end, Wang Zhengting did end up as part of the Chinese delegation to Paris, C. C. did not, and the sources suggest that many were upset with Wang's decision to join the delegation and viewed him as opportunistic. According to an account by Gu Weijun, C. C. presented the head of the delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, with a long statement reiterating the position of
125. Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 143-44; text of aide-mémoire in Pontius to Secretary of State, 2 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2927.
126. On efforts to get U.S. arbitration, see Sammons to Secretary of State, 4 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2910; on the Customs surplus issue see Pontius to Reinsch, 20 Jan. 1919 and Reinsch to Secretary of State, 25 Jan. 1919, 893.00/2974; 893.00/2976. See also SCMP 16 Jan., p. 6; 19 Jan., p. 6; 22 Jan. 1919, p. 6; Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 148–49.
127. Pontius to Secretary of State, 14 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2936.
128. Sammons to Secretary of State, 27 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2942; SCMP, 20 Dec. 1918, p. 6; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:404; Pontius to Secretary of State, 22 and 30 Jan. 1919, 893.00/2972; 893.00/2975.
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the military government about the Beijing government. This was interpreted by Lu as declining to be part of the delegation and Wei Chengzu was appointed in his place.129
On 4 February C. C. left for Paris as an observer with three secretaries. According to Gu, he attended much of the conference but did not participate. In addition to C. C., Chen Youren and Guo Taiqi, who had earlier been to the United States to present the Southern case there, were official observers representing the Southern Military Government at the Conference. In addition, Wang Jingwei was an observer as well. When Wang Zhengting spread a rumor that Gu Weijun was pro-Japanese and engaged to Cao Rulin's daughter, C. C. and Wang Jingwei denounced Wang Zhengting to Gu and Wang emphatically denied that Wang Zhengting represented the Southern government.130 These events illustrate the diversity within the Southern camp about its role in China's politics.
As the events in Paris were unfolding, the Shanghai peace conference was taking place in a manner of speaking. Having started on 20 February, Tang Shaoyi broke off negotiations on 2 March in protest over the violations of the truce in Shaanxi. This was the doing of Duan's clique, which viewed Shaanxi as essential to the maintenance of its power, and they also wanted to undermine Xu's peace efforts. The chief Northern delegate, Zhu Qiqian, submitted his resignation. On the Southern side, Tang's breaking off negotiations caused Lu Rongting and Cen Chunxuan some dissatisfaction. Lu threatened to resign from the Political Council of the military government, and Li Liejun threatened to resign as a delegate to the conference. Cen appeared caught in the middle between Lu on the one hand, and Tang and Wu on the other. In late March the conference reconvened when Xu was able to arrange for a face-saving truce in Shaanxi, but the Anfu resistance to the Southern demand for the restoration of the "old" Parliament, when coupled with the insistence of the "two Suns,” Sun Yixian and Sun Hongyi, and their supporters that this be done, made it impossible to come to an agreement.131 Events in Paris and Shanghai culminated in early May. As the news of the sell-out at Versailles reached China, giving rise to widespread public resistance, it was apparent that the Shanghai peace talks could not resolve the differences between the Northern militarists and the Southern constitutionalists. Both Tang and Zhu submitted their resignations on 13 May, to the great disappointment of Xu Shichang and Cen Chunxuan alike. A major phase in the history of the Southern Military Government was now over.
132
As the conferences ended, the strains in the southern alliance were apparent to many
observers. Relations between Wu and Cen were strained to the
129. Gu Weijun, Huiyilu, p. 179.
130. Ibid., pp. 193–95.
131. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 151ff.; SCMP, 13 Mar. 1919, p. 3; Pontius to Secretary of State, 28 Mar. 1919, USNA, 893.00/3091. For Sun's views see Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:418–19.
132. Sammons to Secretary of State, 13 May 1919, USNA, 893.00/3099; there were many rumors of Tang and others having sold out to Japan, e.g., 893.00/3018; 3106; 3117.
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breaking point over Wu's hard-line towards the North. In this, Wu and Tang Shaoyi had been responsive to Sun Yixian and the members of the "old" Parliament who bitterly opposed Xu. In late March U.S. officials in Guangzhou reported that Cen Chunxuan was dissatisfied with Wu Tingfang's failure to press the Southern case before the diplomatic body in Beijing. Cen was said to have pressed Wu to resign but proved unable to get the other directors of the Political Council to agree with him. Certainly this reflects in part Cen's inability to achieve his political goals through the failed negotiations. And as journalist David Fraser assessed the situation at the end of May, the military leaders of the South agreed to form a military government when they thought Wu Tingfang could achieve foreign recognition and a steady flow of foreign funds; since Wu was unable to bring them this, they had no use for the military government.133
Wu Tingfang and Cen Chunxuan, June 1919–March 1920
As noted above, strains between Wu and Cen began to be apparent in the course of the abortive peace negotiations in spring 1919. These strains burst into the open in June 1919 as a result of two interrelated developments: the student movement in protest against the Versailles treaty and the movement to install Wu Tingfang as Governor of Guangdong Province. These converged in a genuine mass movement in July 1919. Over a month's activity, however, failed to unseat Cen and his Guangxi military backers from their domination of the military government. His bid for the governorship thwarted, Wu continued to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance Minister in spite of the continuing deterioration of administrative authority. Finally in March 1920, he switched his support from Cen Chunxuan to Sun Yixian.
Students in Guangzhou responded to the student movement in Beijing almost immediately. By 20 May it was reported that a boycott of Japanese goods was in full swing in Guangzhou, and on 29 May over eight thousand students paraded through the city to spread the word about the boycott. These demonstrations continued through 31 May, when an incident occurred between the students and Japanese residents. Under the threat of the deployment of Japanese warships to Guangzhou, Mo Rongxin decided the student movement had gone far enough and tried to suppress it.134
Earlier, in response to the national and local student movement, the military government had expressed its support for the movement initially and had demanded the release of the students arrested in Beijing. On 24 May the Parliament meeting in joint session had resolved to instruct the Chinese delegates in France not to sign the treaty.'
135
133. NCDN, 31 May 1919, encl. in Sammons to Secretary of State, 31 May 1919, USNA, 893.00/ 3155. See also Pontius to Secretary of State, 28 Mar. 1919, USNA, 893.00/3091.
134. SCMP, 20 May, p. 6; 23 May, p. 6; 26 May, p. 6; 29 May, p. 6; 31 May, p. 6; 2 June, p. 6; 3 June 1919, p. 6.
135. SCMP, 10 May, p. 6; 13 May, p. 6; 29 May 1919, p. 6.
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In spite of Mo's opposition, Wu and the major Guomindang figures in Parliament continued to support the students. At a large student rally on 9 June the student leaders made an appeal to the military government to aid in bringing the "national traitors" (Lu Chengyu, Cao Rulin and Zhang Zongxiang) to justice and help in arranging the release of the students arrested on 4 June in Beijing. Wu spoke with the students, commending them for their patriotism and reporting that he had already cabled Beijing demanding the same things.136
In the midst of the growing student movement, the Acting Governor of Guangdong, Qu Wang, resigned on 12 June, apparently reflecting an internal conflict between Lu Rongting and Mo Rongxin. The governorship of the province had been the object of struggle between the Guomindang and the Guangxi military ever since the establishment of the military government. In July 1917 Lu Rongting had forced the resignation of Zhu Qinglan as Governor. Zhu had been Duan's appointee but had acted too independently for Lu's liking, forming ties with the Yunnan forces in Guangdong and with the Guomindang upon the latter's arrival in July. With Zhu's departure, Lu and his subordinate, Mo Rongxin, sought to keep the governorship firmly within their grasp. In 1918 the post was held temporarily by Lu's subordinate Chen Bingkun, then by Li Yuehan, and then upon Li's resignation in September 1919 it was given to Qu Wang. Qu held it as Acting Governor until his resignation in June. Both Li and Qu were natives of Guangdong; both had served as military commanders in Zhaoyang district and were Mo's subordinates; their only qualification for the office was loyalty to Mo.137
Various accounts indicate that control of the provincial administration by the Guangxi military was a source of much dissatisfaction in Guangzhou. In part this dissatisfaction may be viewed as a form of provincialism, for even though Li and Qu were natives of Guangdong, they were figureheads for the Guangxi military commanders. But partly the opposition reflected the educated, propertied civic elite's disgust with the nature of the provincial administration under Guangxi rule. In addition to maintaining strict press censorship, the Guangxi military leaders also milked the province dry in a variety of ways, including reinstituting the lottery monopoly that Wu Tingfang and others had vigorously opposed. They had, it was charged, illegally exported rice, moved the provincial library, with its rare books, to Guangxi, and sold mining rights to the highest bidders. They had also incurred loans on the domestic and foreign loan market.138
As Wu Tingfang had become something of a figurehead for the opposition to Cen and the Guangxi military through his support of the students, it was perhaps logical that on 18 June a meeting of "political, social and commercial"
136. SCMP, 12 June 1919, p. 6.
137. Sutton, Provincial Militarism, pp. 238–48; Li Peisheng, Guixi ju Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), p. 3; Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao, pp. 418– 19, 555, 610.
138. Li Peisheng, Guixi, pp.
9-57.
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groups in Guangzhou unanimously decided that Wu Tingfang should be Governor.139 On 21 June a mass meeting, probably organized by the Guomindang, was held at East Garden in Guangzhou. Those present decided to petition the military government to appoint Wu Tingfang as the "most popular Cantonese for the post." Three groups were dispatched to present the petition to the military government.
140
A second mass meeting on 23 June presented another petition calling for Wu's appointment, but on 25 June it was announced that Zhang Jinfang had been appointed Governor. Zhang, a native of Henan, was understood to be Mo Rongxin's choice for the post. Mo chose to ignore the two petitions, and received the support of Cen Chunxuan and Lu Rongting, the key figures in the military government. He took further precautions by deploying his forces in and around Guangzhou, as Wei Bangping, chief of police for Guangzhou and Li Fulin, defense commissioner of Guangwai, cabled their support for Wu. Zhang Jinfang dared not take up his post yet.141
Indignation at the high-handedness of the Guangxi military gave rise to a general strike. At a mass meeting on 10 July called to discuss the international situation and the continuing boycott of Japanese goods, the crowd demanded that the military government promulgate a mandate to punish the national traitors, cancel all secret treaties with foreign powers, and issue a statement about its diplomatic policy. Criticizing the military government for its appointment of Zhang Jinfang as Governor, several thousands marched to the offices of the military government where they were met by Wu and Cen, who made speeches reported to be "sympathetic" to the marchers' patriotic views. The crowd then went on to the office of the Chamber of Commerce demanding that a notice calling for a general strike on the 11th be posted. The purpose of the strike was to protest over the governorship as well as to demand the punishment of the traitors in Beijing and the cancellation of the secret treaties. The militancy of the crowd was a startling phenomenon. 142
The general strike was in full force from 11 July to 21 July. On 11 July many large department stores, as well as smaller shops, closed their doors, while students circulated notices about the strike to encourage other merchants to join. The engineers and workers of the Canton Electric Supply Company stopped work, and they were joined by the waterworks engineers and workers as well. With a few days, workers of the Guangzhou-Sanshui Railway, the Yue-Han Railway and the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Railway had also joined the strike.143
139. SCMP, 19 June 1919, p.
6.
140. SCMP, 20 June, p. 6; 23 June, p. 6; 24 June 1919, p. 6.
141. SCMP, 24 June, p. 6; 25 June, p. 3; 26 June, p. 3; 27 June, p. 6; 2 July, p. 6; 3 July, p. 3; 5 July 1919, p. 6.
142. Pontius to Secretary of State, 11 July 1919, USNA, 893.00/3204; SCMP, 11 July 1919, p. 6. 143. SCMP, 14 July, p. 6; 15 July, p. 6; 16 July 1919, p. 7; Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927, trans. H. M. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 165–
66.
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By 13 July Cen decided to take strong action against the movement. Armed soldiers were dispatched to patrol the streets while shops were ordered to open; meanwhile representatives of several public organizations were invited to a meeting at Mo's headquarters to discuss the strike's settlement. On the 14th an incident occurred when the Guangdong Provincial Assembly, split between Cen's supporters and opponents, met to determine whether to support the general strike. Mo dispatched a battalion of troops to the Provincial Assembly building. They dispersed the meeting by firing about one hundred shots in the air. 144
While the Government succeeded in getting railways working and the electricity and water back on by using troops and strikebreakers from Hong Kong, the strike was by no means over. Telegrams poured into the military government from overseas Chinese in Singapore, Penang, Batavia, Haiphong and the Philippines in support of Wu. Cantonese in Shanghai joined them, as did the Chinese press of Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Journalists from the colony were barred from Guangzhou because of their sympathy for the strike. 145
A student meeting on 15 July was surrounded by troops carrying machine guns and dispersed. Two student leaders were arrested, but on the next day the students held a parade. Again they were stopped and four more arrested. Now the military government forbade all meetings. Amidst many protests about police interference, the students held another parade on 21 July, but the show of force on the part of the military greatly curtailed the movement. By 22 July it was reported that the strike was almost over. The students, in exchange for the release of those who had been arrested, agreed to hold orderly meetings. But on 2 August another mass meeting declared support for Wu Tingfang and the intention of all to carry on until their object was obtained.146
On 2 August Wu submitted his resignation as member of the Political Council, telling a delegation of four Cantonese from the Shanghai Cantonese community who had come to Guangzhou in an effort to mediate the dispute that if the people really wanted him to take the post, he would be compelled to take it. On 7 August Sun Yixian joined Wu in a show of support by submitting his resignation as member of the Political Council. Tang Jiyao cabled his support for Wu's appointment as well. But Cen and the Guangxi military refused to give in. Cen told the delegation from Shanghai that the military government was waiting to obtain the "real opinions" of the people before making any further decisions, and then later told them that the issue. could not be settled until the approval of all parties had been obtained. In
144. SCMP, 15 July, p. 6; 16 July 1919, p. 7.
145. SCMP, 16 July, p. 7; 19 July, p. 6; 21 July, p. 6; 29 July 1919, p. 6.
146. SCMP, 23 July, p. 6; 1 Aug., p. 3; 5 Aug. 1919, p. 6. On Wu's efforts to intercede on behalf of the students and inability to do so, see Deng Cengxiang, “Guangzhou xuesheng Wu-Si Yundong ji," in Wu-Si Yundong huiyilu, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1979), 2:826–34, especially p. 834.
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the face of the intransigence of Lu, Mo and Cen, Wu was unable to secure the appointment and the mass movement dissipated. 147
On 9 August Sun Yixian extended an invitation through his son Sun Fo (Sun Ke) to Wu Tingfang and C. C. to leave the military government and come to Shanghai to plan strategies with him, but Wu was not able to leave Guangzhou for nearly eight months.148 He continued to serve as one of the directors of the military government's Political Council, Foreign Minister and Acting Finance Minister.
Wu's persistence is puzzling. We may speculate that several factors were involved: his continued distrust of Sun Yixian, stubbornness in refusing to admit he had erred, and perhaps hope that he could still mitigate some of the Guangxi military's excesses. At some point Wu did decide to leave but his departure was delayed for two reasons, according to his nephew Fu Bingchang. The first was that he and C. C. were closely guarded by Mo's troops; the second was that he wanted to find a way to bring the Customs surplus funds out with him.'
149
In September the Parliament, now considerably reduced in numbers, voted to further reorganize the military government. This was generally understood as a public statement of no confidence in Cen Chunxuan's leadership, and he resigned at the end of October. But as in the case of Wu's earlier effort to resign, it was not implemented. In reality Cen continued to wield administrative power on behalf of the Political Study clique and its Guangxi military backers. The morale of the military government declined even further as the military dominated it and the Guangdong countryside. Meanwhile, Cen and Lu were engaged in backstage negotiations with a variety of military and civil figures of the Northern government. At the same time, in the Parliament, struggle occurred over the issue of revising the Constitution, which was blocked by the Political Study Group and its Guangxi backers.150
In December 1919 the newly-arrived U.S. Consul in Guangzhou, who had known Wu for some time, could only report that "although Dr. Wu was quite eloquent in discussing the evils which exist in China, he was unable to suggest a remedy."151
The last straw for Wu occurred in February and March 1920, when the Guangxi clique moved to wrest control of the Yunnan Army in Guangdong from Tang Jiyao. This took the form of a struggle between Li Genyuan, supported by the Guangxi faction, and Li Liejun, supported by Tang Jiyao and the Guomindang. At one point both Lis were commander-in-chief of the Yunnan Army in the province, each claiming a different authority for the appointment. When negotiation proved fruitless, war broke out in eastern
147. Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:426–29; SCMP, 6 Aug., p. 6; 8 Aug., p. 6; 16 Aug, 1919, p. 3. 148. Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:429.
149. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, pp. 8–9.
150. Luo, GFNP, p. 472; Meinhardt to Secretary of State, 26 Nov. 1919, USNA, 893.00/3281. 151. Bergholz to Secretary of State, 1 Sept. 1920, USNA, 893.00/3516.
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Guangdong between the "two Lis," amidst reports of staggering military expenditures and an empty treasury.'
152
The Parliamentarians began leaving Guangzhou, many to join Sun Yixian's supporter Chen Jiongming in northern Guangdong. By mid-March the list of departed figures included Wu Jinglian, the speaker of the Senate, and Lin Sen, the speaker of the House of Representatives, as well as Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and Li Shizeng. Wu had also decided to leave, but found it difficult to evade Mo's guards and arrange to bring the Customs surplus funds with him. By 29 March the arrangements were complete. The funds were deposited in his name, as Minister of Finance in the military government, in accounts in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation both in its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches. Another smaller sum was deposited with the Sincere Company in Guangzhou. On 29 March, using a ruse, Wu Tingfang and C. C. separately slipped past Mo's guards. Meeting at a site a short distance from his residence, they departed for Hong Kong and thence to Shanghai.153
Wu's sudden departure apparently caught Cen by surprise; hurrying back from northern Guangdong where he was said to have been negotiating with Li Liejun, he dispatched representatives to Hong Kong in an effort to persuade Wu to return. Instead, Wu issued statements denouncing the military government. Cen retaliated by spreading the story that Wu had absconded with the Customs surplus funds to pay off C. C. Wu's gambling debts. 154
From Shanghai on 9 April, Wu issued a circular telegram explaining his reasons for leaving Guangzhou. He wrote that he had come to Guangzhou originally because the military government represented the legitimate continuation of the republican government based on the Provisional Constitution. The seven directors were elected by Parliament and were to have operated as a coordinated, democratic council. He cited five reasons for his most recent actions.
The first was the destruction of the Parliament. The Guangxi militarists had hindered the passage of a permanent constitution, squandered the Par- liament's funds on local armies, and had swept the spirit of constitutionalism into the dirt.
Wu's second reason was his dissatisfaction with Cen's leadership. Wu wrote that the chairman of the Political Council was to have been only one among seven, with no more power than the rest. But ample documentation existed that Cen had engaged in separate negotiations with many northern warlords and had come to an understanding with them that maintained warlordism, sacrificed the Parliament, and showed indifference toward foreign relations.
152. For background to the conflict see Luo, GFNP, pp. 479–80; on financial difficulties see SCMP, 12 Mar. 1920, p. 3; on attemted compromises see SCMP, 6 Mar. 1920, p. 3.
153. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 8; SCMP, 17 Mar. 1920, p. 7; Luo, GFNP, p. 482.
154. SCMP, 2 Apr. 1920, p. 7; George E. Sokolsky, “Confidential Memorandum on Conditions in Canton,” 18 May 1920, encl. in Cunningham to Secretary of State, 26 May 1920, USNA, 893.00/3376.
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As his third point, Wu claimed that in over ten months as Finance Minister, it proved impossible to hold the military accountable for funds disbursed to it. In particular, funds disbursed for the Yunnan troops seemed to mysteriously disappear, presumably into the pockets of Guangxi commanders. Fourth was Mo Rongxin's brazen effort to diminish Tang Jiyao's influence among the Yunnan troops by supporting Li Genyuan over Tang's objections. Finally, all of this had transformed the military government of the Southwest into the private clique of a few people, still claiming to govern under the high-sounding name of "protecting the constitution.”155
Having come to Guangzhou in 1917 in the belief that he could be a mediator and a peacemaker, Wu found that severe factionalism dominated all spheres of political life by 1920. He initially was willing to support Feng Guozhang against Duan's Anfu clique, but compromise with all factions in the North was precluded by the members of the "old" Parliament over the issue over the "new" Parliament's legitimacy. Wu's support for the members of Parliament led to a split with Cen Chunxuan. After Wu's unsuccessful bid for the Guangdong governorship, Wu's position became increasingly untenable. Given the factionalized nature of politics, an independent political role was no longer possible. His decision to join with Sun Yixian marked the last major political choice of his life. Having committed himself to Sun, Wu would find himself completely submerged in factionalism.
With Sun Yixian, 1920–1922
From April 1920 until his death in June 1922, Wu Tingfang worked closely with Sun Yixian to pursue the latter's plan of securing Guangdong as a stable base and then launching a northern expedition to unify China under his leadership. Sun's plan placed him at odds with Chen Jiongming, Sun's chief military backer based in Guangdong Province, and Tang Jiyao, whose main interest was in regaining his military base in Yunnan. Sun's plan also necessitated allying with his former archenemy, Duan Qirui of the Anfu clique and Duan's ally, the warlord Zhang Zuolin, so as to counter the Zhili clique and its military allies in Guangxi. From having previously denounced the Anfu clique repeatedly from 1917 on, Wu now found himself allied with it in order to attempt to implement Sun's vision of national unification. This turnabout made a mockery of previous statements in defense of constitutionalism and illustrates the way factional coalitions dominated political process. Increasingly isolated from public opinion, which wanted compromise and peace, Wu's death came as Sun's plan collapsed.
Shortly after arriving in Shanghai, Wu entered a legal battle with Zhang Shizhao, Cen Chunxuan's representative, over custody of the Tls 1,123,400 (approximately $2 million) of the Customs surplus funds that he had had
155. Li Peisheng, Guixi, pp. 131–33.
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deposited in his name in the Shanghai branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Another sum reported to be $1.8 million had been deposited in the Hong Kong branch of this bank. In Shanghai, Zhang Shizhao was able to obtain an injunction against Wu. Wu challenged the injunction on the grounds that Zhang did not represent a legal entity, that the Court had no jurisdiction over him, Wu, as Minister of Finance of a legal government, and that the issue was a purely political matter. The Court ruled that it was a political issue but upheld the injunction, which remained in effect until January 1921, when Wu succeeded in getting the injunction lifted. The funds in Hong Kong were similarly frozen by the courts. Another $300,000 was deposited in the Guangzhou branch of the Sincere Company, whose manager refused to release them to Cen's government. 156
According to George Sokolsky, who was acting as public relations officer for Cen during this period, Wu brought $400,000 in cash of the Customs surplus funds to Shanghai and gave to Sun Yixian. Sun used $100,000 to pay the Parliament members, who were planning to reconvene in Yunnan. Another $300,000 went to Li Liejun, presumably for the Yunnan troops, although some of this was probably used to help Chen Jiongming's forces.157
According to Fu Bingchang's reminiscences, Sun Yixian was less than pleased that Wu was not able to free up more funds initially. At a meeting with Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, Liao Zhongkai, Tang Shaoyi and others at Sun's home in the French Concession, Sun spoke in a disparaging way to Wu. Wu became very angry and left the meeting. He instructed C. C. to remain in his place while he went to a spiritualist meeting. Later, however, Sun and Wu did manage to work smoothly together. Wu told Fu how much he respected Sun for his spirit of public service and selflessness, and Wu's respect appears to have been matched by Sun's for the old man who became the administrative mainstay for his regime in Guangzhou,158
Barred from withdrawing funds from accounts in his name in the Shanghai International Settlement, Wu took the opportunity to rest and travel. He and his nephew Fu Bingchang traveled to Hangzhou, where they paid a call on Kang Youwei, then they visited Japan. In Japan they visited often with Liao Zhongkai's brother Fengshu, who had a post in the Chinese embassy. Wu took this occasion to revisit Shimonoseki, where he had gone as Li Hongzhang's assistant in 1895. This Japan sojourn came to an abrupt end in Hakone in June, when Wu received a threatening letter from a pro-Japanese Chinese student accusing Wu of being too pro-American and too anti-Japanese."
156. A. M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council (Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald, 1925), pp. 243–44; Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 8; SCMP, 19 Apr., p. 6; 20 Apr., p. 6; 24 Apr., p. 6; 3 June 1920, p. 6. On the $300,000 deposited with the Sincere Co., see SCMP, 6 May, p. 2; 25 May, p. 2; 9 July, p. 2; 28 July, p. 2; 14 Aug., p. 3; 18 Aug. 1920, p. 7. 157. Sokolsky, "Confidential Memorandum."
158. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 21a.
159. Ibid., pp. 9, 16b; on the threats see SCMP, 8 July, p. 3; 27 July, p. 3; 29 July 1920, p. 2.
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While Wu was thus engaged, Sun and his followers, including C. C., were planning their next moves. In May members of "old" Parliament who had remained in Guangzhou elected Xiong Kewu of Sichuan, Liu Xianshi of Guizhou and Wen Zongyao to take the places of Sun, Wu and Tang Shaoyi. Wen had earlier worked closely with Wu Tingfang but according to Fu Bingchang, owed his political start to Cen Chunxuan. Even though Wen opposed him, Wu was said to sympathize with him as he understood the nature of Wen's relationship with Cen,160
On 3 June Sun Yixian, Wu Tingfang, Tang Shaoyi and Tang Jiyao issued a manifesto declaring that the military government in Guangzhou was not a legal entity because it did not have a quorum either among the directors of the Political Council or within the Parliament. They maintained that Wu still held the Foreign and Finance Ministerships, Tang Shaoyi was to be in charge of peace negotiations, which should be public and take place in Shanghai, and that Sun and Tang Jiyao were still military commanders in the government, 161 At this stage, Sun began negotiations with a secret emissary from Duan Qirui. Duan was then facing attack from the Zhili clique, under Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, which had begun making tentative alliances with Cen Chunxuan and Lu Rongting in the South. As the Guangxi clique was moving into alignment with the Zhili militarists, Sun joined forces with their mutual enemy, the Anfu clique. On 23 June Duan Qirui sent Sun a cable expressing regrets for past misdeeds and support for the 3 June proclamation. Duan ordered his commander in Fujian, Li Houji, to provide logistical support for Chen Jiongming's forces in southern Fujian if they launched an attack upon the Guangxi forces, 162
This policy was certainly controversial. Tang Jiyao disapproved of Sun's arrangements with Duan and rejected a similar overture from Duan's emissary. Still Tang joined with Sun, Wu and Tang Shaoyi in manifestos issued during the civil war between the Anfu and Zhili warlords calling for the winning faction to cancel the military agreements reached with Japan in recent years. Unfortunately, Wu Tingfang's views are not known, as he did not comment publicly on the accommodation with Duan. In any case, this was not a full blown alliance by any stretch of the imagination, being a side current removed from the main torrent of civil war in Central China.163
All this notwithstanding, Cen Chunxuan was able to make hay denouncing the Anfu clique for the same things that Wu had just a short time ago attacked it for: traitorous loans from Japan and thwarting the Shanghai peace conference. In response, Sun, Wu and the two Tangs issued a second manifesto in mid-July declaring that whoever wins the civil war in North China must
160. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 64 [31].
161. Luo, GFNP, p. 484; China Press, 20.6.4, encl. in Cunningham to Secretary of State, 5 June 1920, USNA, 893.00/3378.
162. Luo, GFNP, pp. 484, 488–89.
163. Ibid., pp. 484–85.
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cancel all Sino-Japanese agreements made in the past few years. This was clarified in a later statement to include the Sino-Japanese military cooperation agreement and the Twenty-One Demands as well,164
It was clear that Tang Jiyao was not a firm ally. He disapproved of a plan to have the Parliament reconvene in Yunnan, although many parliamentarians had already left Shanghai for that destination. In early August Lu Zhao in Sichuan invited the Parliament to convene in Chongqing, and the Parliament decided on 16 September to move to that site. But on 14 October the Parliament was forced to disperse when Lu Zhao lost Chongqing to the forces of Xiong Kewu, who was allied to the Guangxi and Zhili factions.165
Given the remoteness of Yunnan and Sichuan and the uncertainty of Tang Jiyao's attitude towards the Guomindang, recovery of Guangzhou became an absolute necessity for Sun. By mid-August a somewhat reluctant Chen Jiongming was prodded to leave his southern Fujian-eastern Guangdong stronghold and begin an offensive to retake Guangzhou from the Guangxi militarists. Fighting began at the end of August, and Guangzhou was taken by Chen Jiongming's troops on 27 October. This victory was greatly facilitated by the fact that Wei Bangping, chief of police in Guangzhou, and Li Fulin, a local commander, cast their lot with Chen Jiongming and Sun Yixian on 26 September. As Chen's forces drew near, Cen Chunxuan and his associates were on the verge of coming to an agreement with the Beijing government for the unification of China. Cen proclaimed that the military government was abolished and then sought asylum at foreign legations rather than risk capture by Chen Jiongming's forces. Until the very end Mo Rongxin was haggling with the Guangzhou merchant community over funds (at first $10 million and finally less than $2 million) before he and his troops would depart. In the end he was forced to leave without these monies as he could not provide Chen Jiongming assurances that they would not be used for further fighting.166
With Guangzhou secured by Chen's troops, Sun, Wu, Tang Shaoyi and Tang Jiyao proclaimed that the military government was still functioning under their leadership. On 23 October, just before Chen entered Guangzhou, they had issued a third manifesto opposing any secret agreements for settlement with the Beijing government. Thus Cen's plan to unify with the Zhili group, by now victorious in the civil war, was aborted.'
167
On 10 November Chen Jiongming was declared Governor of Guangdong. The title of Military Governor, or Dujun, was abolished, although Chen remained commander of the Guangdong Army. On 25 November, Wu departed
164. Ibid., p. 485; China Press, 20.7.29, encl. in Cunningham to Crane, 31 July 1920, encl. in Ruddock to Secretary of State, 5 Aug. 1920, USNA, 893.00/3479.
165. Luo, GFNP, pp. 485, 486–87, 490.
166. Ibid.; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:507. On Mo's effort to raise funds from the Guangzhou merchants see SCMP, 29 Sept., p. 7; 5 Oct., p. 7; 8 Oct., pp. 6–7; 9 Oct., p. 8; 12 Oct., p. 7; 14 Oct., p. 6; 16 Oct., p. 7; 18 Oct. 1920, p. 6.
167. Luo, GFNP, p. 491; SCMP, 2 Nov. 1920, p. 6.
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from Shanghai with Sun Yixian, Tang Shaoyi and Sun's followers. Stopping briefly in Fujian so that Sun could pay a call on Duan's supporter Li Houji, the party arrived at Guangzhou on 29 November and set up offices for the military government at Guanyinshan, the former headquarters of Mo Rongxin.168
The new administration began on an elevated note. The provincial gambling monopoly, long hated by enlightened Cantonese, was abolished. On 1 December Sun and Wu issued an announcement that the military government would promote provincial autonomy, universal education, the stimulation of commerce and orderly finances, and the main personnel were announced. Plans for various fiscal reforms were announced.169
The new government was marked by sharp differences between Chen Jiongming and Sun Yixian. Chen Jiongming wanted to establish a model province under his authority as Governor. He was interested in federalism as a political structure for China, as were many intellectuals during that period (1919-20). Hunan had been influenced by federalism and had implemented a federalist constitution; apparently Chen had similar ideas for Guangdong. Whether federalism as a doctrine meshed well with the realities of provincial militarism is an open question. It should be noted that Chen Jiongming certainly did not fit the warlord stereotype. He was genuinely interested in liberal and radical ideas to the point of hiring Chen Duxiu, the noted communist, in his provincial administration, and encouraging the young communist Peng Pai to organize the peasantry in eastern Guangdong. There is no reason to doubt that he wanted Guangdong to become a model province and that he was inspired by elevated motives in his acts during this period.170 Sun Yixian, on the other hand, stood for a centralized national government. Guangdong was to be a secure base for the unification of China under his authority so as to establish Guomindang power nationwide. Sun's views, needless to say, were fundamentally at odds with Chen's. Sun believed that Chen was supportive of his broad goals, but as the actual political events evolved, Chen became less and less tolerant of Sun's leadership, leading to the split between them of June 1922.
Wu Tingfang was firmly with Sun Yixian in his national orientation, as opposed to Chen Jiongming's provincial orientation. Even when he disagreed with specific acts, or the timing of those acts, he remained loyal to Sun in the belief that he was China's only hope for a genuine national unification, Towards this end, he and the younger men like C. C. and Liao Zhongkai who assisted him kept the Guangzhou government functioning and did their best to aid Sun and the Guomindang achieve national power.
168. Ma Xiang, “Gensui Sun Zhongshan xiansheng shi you nian de huiyi,” in Huiyi Xinhai Geming, p. 100.
169. On the goals of the military government, see Luo, GFNP, p. 496. On gambling, see SCMP, 2 Dec. 1920, p. 3.
170. On Chen Jiongming see Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 1:173–80. On federalism, see Jean Chesneaux, "The Federalist Movement in China, 1920–3,” in Modern China's Search for a Political Form, ed. Jack Gray (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 96–137.
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Foremost on Sun Yixian's agenda was to abandon the structure of the military government and to establish in its place a "formal" (zhengshi) government. On New Year's Day 1921, Sun gave a speech advocating this change. Later in January the newly reconvened Parliament met in Guangzhou. In spite of the fact that Chen Jiongming and others were not too enthusiastic about the plan, Sun's supporters in Parliament brought the issue before it for consideration in early April. On 7 April the Parliament voted in the change with Sun Yixian as the new President. This government was formally established on 5 May 1921, the inauguration ceremonies inauspiciously dampened by pouring rain. 171
In part Sun's plan was a response to the national political situation. In summer 1920 the brief civil war between Duan's Anfu faction and Wu Peifu's Zhili faction had resulted in a complete victory for the latter. Upon taking office in Guangdong, Sun and Wu cabled the Beijing government their stated desire to reopen the long dissolved peace conference in Shanghai, and again on 6 January they repeated this intent. But it seems clear that Sun had abandoned the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Zhili faction.172 These events created great strain between Sun and Chen Jiongming. Chen made clear his desire to see the eventual establishment of a federalist structure in China. Chen was also uneasy about Sun's plan to recruit a certain number of troops to form a military force under his own authority so as to reduce his dependence upon Chen. In addition to Chen's disapproval, Tang Jiyao was similarly unenthusiastic about the plan and had to be wooed into lending his name by supporting his subordinate in Yunnan.173
Chen and Tang's opposition were cause for concern for Wu and Tang Shaoyi. Following Sun's election as president by the Parliament, Tang retired to his home in Xiangshan and henceforth refused to have anything to do with the Guangzhou Government. Sun made efforts to bring him back, but he remained adamant. Subsequent remarks to foreign diplomats were disparaging of Sun's efforts. 174
Wu was also opposed to the election initially and advised postponing it, but after it was held and Sun was elected, he split with Tang Shaoyi and continued to support Sun in spite of his misgivings. In an interview with journalists from the Hong Kong South China Morning Post, Wu declared that Sun represented democracy and was good for China. He renewed his support by declaring: "We are now in this fight and we will not cease until this fight is
over.
"175
171. Luo, GFNP, pp. 501–5; on the inauguration see SCMP, 6 May 1921, p. 6.
172. Luo, GFNP, pp. 494, 499.
173. SCMP, 4 Feb., p. 7; 23 Feb. 1921, p. 7; Crane to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3772.
174. SCMP, 19 Apr., p. 3; 21 Apr., p. 3; 28 Apr., p. 5; 18 May 1921, p. 7; Huston to Secretary of State, 24 Apr. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4393.
175. SCMP, 15 Apr., p. 5; 30 Apr. 1921, p. 7.
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The advantage of establishing a “formal" government, if it succeeded in obtaining foreign recognition, was in that it could open the door to loans and other forms of financial assistance as well. Pressed for funds, in spite of the lifting of the injunction on the Customs surplus funds in Shanghai, the Guangzhou Government sought to obtain recognition from the foreign diplomatic corps in Beijing. This body had refused to release the 13.7% of the Customs surplus which had been formerly allocated to the military government in Guangzhou. Wu and Sun sent Guo Taiqi to Beijing in January 1921 in an effort to obtain the Guangzhou share; the diplomats refused to release it. Wu then announced that the Guangzhou Government would take over customs collection in the area under its control beginning 1 February. A diplomatic crisis was narrowly averted. But because of a decline in customs receipts and a fall in the price of silver, there were no surplus funds available for use in any case.
176
The unpredictability of this source of funding may well have convinced Wu of the necessity of seeking foreign recognition as a state, even though he certainly knew that it would be difficult if not impossible to achieve this goal. Wu immediately began a campaign to seek diplomatic recognition from the United States, hopeful that supportive American public opinion and positive reports from U.S. consular officials would facilitate this task. For example, journalist Rodney Gilbert had recommended that the U.S. withdraw recognition of the Beijing government in favor of Guangzhou, prompting a protest by W. W. Yen (Yan Huiqing) who was then serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Beijing government.177
On 3 March Wu had sent a cable to newly inaugurated U.S. President Warren G. Harding congratulating him upon his inauguration. But the U.S. State Department decided not to acknowledge Wu's cable. Soon after the establishment of the “formal” government, Wu drafted a manifesto of the government and an appeal for recognition. This was conveyed to the U.S. Government by Ma Soo, but Ma was unable to obtain an audience in Washington, and the manifesto was similarly not acknowledged.178
176. SCMP, 28 Jan. 1921, p. 6; Ruddock to Secretary of State, 9 Sept. 1921, USNA, 893.00/4111. On the role of bankers in setting British and American policy in this issue see Dayer, Bankers and Diplomats in China, pp. 88–89.
177. Price to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3772; Bergholz to Secretary of State, 7 May 1921, 893.00/3902; “Letter of Executive Committee of American Association of South China to Secretary of State Hughes," 19 May 1921, encl. in Ester to Hughes, 13 July 1921, 893.00/3962. On Gilbert's reportage see NCDN, 23 Feb. 1921, encl. in Perkins to Secretary of State, 28 Feb. 1921, 893.00/3844; and NCH, 9 July 1921, in Ruddock to Secretary of State, 4 Aug. 1921, 893.00/4033. The NCH commented editorially in February: “As for Dr. Wu Ting-fang he is surely one of the wonders of modern China; and if he does not ultimately achieve her regeneration, no one will blame the vegetarianism to which his hale and hearty four scores so nearly convert us.” For a detailed description of Sun's policies towards the U.S. see Li Yunhan, “Zhongshan xiansheng hufa shiqi de dui-Mei jianshe (1917–1923),” in Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji (Taibei: Lianjing, 1982), 7:213– 48.
178. Memo, 9 Mar. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3794, and telegram, 3 Mar. 1921, 903.00/3797; Ma Soo to Secretary of State, 14 May 1921, 893.00/3855; Christian to Fletcher, 27 July 1921, 893.00/3998; Luo, GFNP, p. 510.
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The U.S. intransigence was certainly a blow for Wu's hopes. The formal government established in May was diplomatically as well as politically isolated. It proved impossible for Wu to send a recognized representative to the Washington Conference in fall 1921, and efforts to create a unified delegation with nominal representation from the South failed because of Wu and Sun's intransigence, based on their bitter memories of the situation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. The South refused to acknowledge as legitimate the delegation selected by Beijing and rejected an overture to have C. C. Wu join the delegation. Instead, Wu prepared a manifesto opposing Japanese aggression in Shandong, which he hoped would be unofficially presented to the Conference. The U.S. sources reveal that it was carefully read and well received by American officials.179
In spite of the inability to secure foreign recognition, Sun pressed ahead with his plans. In late May the war against Lu Rongting in Guangxi had begun immediately following the establishment of the "formal" government, with a reluctant Chen Jiongming pressed into action. By the end of July Lu's forces had been defeated, and this was followed by the capture of Guilin on 21 August.180
Before Guangxi had been fully secured, however, Sun was pushing ahead with his plans for a northern expedition into Central China. On 10 August Parliament passed a resolution introduced by Sun's supporters urging the Government to launch a northern expedition. But for Chen Jiongming, the Guangxi campaign was not seen as the first phase of the northern expedition, but rather as a defensive move to help secure Guangdong Province against further attacks from the Guangxi militarists. 181
By early October Sun Yixian presented his plan for a northern expedition to the Parliament, calling for a thrust into Hubei. In spite of Chen Jiongming's lack of support and rumors that the Cantonese public was grumbling, Sun was determined to implement his drive north. Wu Tingfang agreed to serve as Acting President while Sun Yixian was personally leading the military campaign.
182
Sun's plan of national unification by military force led him to seek understandings with the Zhili clique's opponents. The arrangement with Duan Qirui of summer 1920 served as precedent for the arrangements of 1921–22. The shifting constellation of factional forces had brought the Anfu clique in alignment with Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian clique. In October 1921 a representative from Zhang Zuolin met with Sun in Guangzhou, and in December Xu Shuzheng arrived in Guangzhou for talks with Sun's people. Xu was a leading member of the Anfu military faction. He had been the
179. Luo, GFNP, p. 510; SCMP, 5 Aug., p. 6; 17 Aug., p. 7; 29 Aug., p. 3; 7 Sept., p. 7; 7 Oct., p. 8; 28 Nov., p. 3; 1 Dec. 1921, p. 7.
180. Luo, GFNP, pp. 507-10.
181. Ibid., p. 509; SCMP, 12 Aug. 1921, p. 6.
182. Luo, GFNP, p. 511; SCMP, 15 Sept., p. 6; 14 Oct. 1921, p. 7; Bergholz to Secretary of State, 17 and 26 Oct. 1921, USNA, 893.00/4135; 893.00/4140.
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secretary to the cabinet and Duan's confidant under Li Yuanhong's presidency, when Wu was Foreign Minister. As Sun was in Guilin making preparations for the northern expedition, he deputed Liao Zhongkai, Wang Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi to negotiate with Xu on strategy to defeat the Zhili clique. 189
In spite of having obtained the Parliament's approval, it was several months before Sun's northern expedition could be mobilized. On 4 December Sun arrived in Guilin to lead the expedition, and on 6 December Tang Jiyao finally declared his decision to join the campaign. But Sun had no funds, and Chen Jiongming refused to release Guangdong provincial revenues for the expedition, declaring his intention to scale back provincial expenditures. This included a retrenchment in military expenditures necessitating demobilization of one-third of the Guangdong Army under his control. Finally in mid-January Wu was able to raise $200,000 from various revenues for Sun Yixian. 184
On 2 February Sun Yixian was able to give the order for the northern expedition to begin. There were to be two thrusts northward, one under Li Liejun to attack Jiangxi and one under Xu Chongzhi to enter Hunan. Again, Duan Qirui's representative came to Guangzhou to discuss cooperation with Sun, and soon after this Zhang Zuolin sent another emissary to Sun in Guilin for further discussions. 185
Sun followed up Zhang's initiative by dispatching C. C. Wu to visit Zhang in Shenyang. C. C. was in Manchuria for ten days engaged in discussions. Although C. C. was tight-mouthed about the substance of his discussions, according to a report by U.S. Naval Intelligence, Zhang Zuolin was said to have agreed to advance $2 million in gold to help Sun's northern expedition. Other sources gave the sum as $300,000 with another comparable sum to follow. 186
The agreement was said to be the following: Sun would agree to attack Wu Peifu and Zhang would not come to Wu's aid, while both would help Duan Qirui to take Henan and Shandong. In April C. C. told the U.S. Consul in Guangzhou that the political understanding reached with Zhang Zuolin was to result in the following political arrangement: Sun Yixian was to be President, Duan Qirui Vice-President of a newly constituted government. Liang Shiyi was to be Premier. Duan's cooperation was said to be obtained without that of the “undesirable” element of the former Anfu clique. The old Parliament was acknowledged as “unfit” and would be disbanded with a public statement that it had been illegally disbanded by force. The new government was to be
183. Luo, GFNP, p. 518; SCMP, 14 Oct. 1921, p. 7.
184. On Sun in Guilin see SCMP, 5 Dec. 1921, p. 6; on Tang Jiyao, see SCMP, 6 Dec., p. 7; 12 Dec. 1921, p. 3; on Chen's withholding funds, see SCMP, 17 Dec., p. 7; 23 Dec., p. 13; 31 Dec. 1921, p. 6; Bergholz to Secretary of State, 3 Jan. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4209. On Wu's obtaining the funds see SCMP, 24 Jan., p. 2; 18 Feb. 1922, p. 7.
185. Luo, GFNP, pp. 523-24.
186. Navy intelligence, 29 Mar. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4259; SCMP, 22 Mar. 1922, p. 5.
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organized along federal lines after a new parliament had been formed. But Duan's forces declared that after the war, Sun Yixian would travel abroad, leaving Duan Qirui as head of state. This was not acceptable to Sun, however, according to Eugene Chen, who was based in Shanghai writing pro-Sun publicity pieces for the press. Later, C. C. also denied that he had brought any funds from Zhang Zuolin. 187
Pressed for funds, Sun also began holding discussions with representatives of the Soviet Union and the Comintern about possible Soviet assistance. According to U.S. sources, the first contact was in February 1921 when a Mr. Alexieff arrived in Guangzhou to discuss recognition of the Soviet Union. In December of that year the Comintern representative Maring (M. Sneevliet) met with Sun Yixian in Guilin for several days, and Sun also met with Serge Dalin at different times during this period. Although these talks bore no concrete results at that time, they paved the way for future Soviet-Guomindang cooperation. Sun realized that the policy of pursuing a Soviet alliance would be controversial and arouse a great deal of opposition. He told Dalin that Wu Tingfang would be opposed to it.188
Indeed, one of Wu's English language "propaganda” pieces on behalf of the Guangzhou government written in 1922 was entitled "Bolshevism Has No Chance in China.” In this article he characterized fears that the Constitutionalist Government could harbor communist ideas as "sheer nonsense." While among the nearly one million members of the Guomindang there were some youngsters who were influenced by Marxian ideas, Wu claimed that they would become “more moderate in their views as they come in contact with their senior members." He characterized Sun Yixian as "progressive" but denied that he was a Bolshevik. “I can guarantee that he holds no such views; if he did I could no longer associate myself with him.”189 In addition to raising funds to send to Sun for the Northern Expedition (and no doubt crossing swords with Chen Jiongming to do so), Wu had his hands full as Acting President in Sun's absence. On 13 January 1922, the Hong Kong Seamen's Strike began, and in the weeks to come, Guangzhou was the temporary home of about eight to ten thousand strikers. They needed food and lodging, which was provided by the government in the form of a long-range loan. While sympathetic to the strikers, the government urged a compromise after the strike flowered into a full-scale general strike in February. During this entire period until the settlement of the strike on 8 March, affairs in Guangzhou were dominated by its concerns.
190
187. Bergholz to Secretary of State, 4 Apr. 1922 and Huston to Secretary of State, 12 Apr.1922, USNA, 893.00/4336 and 893.00/4361; SCMP, 3 Apr., p. 7; 3 June 1922, p. 6.
188. On Alexieff, see Crane to Secretary of State, 10 Feb. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3835; on Dalin, see C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 121-23; Luo, GFNP, pp. 518–20.
189. Wu Tingfang, “Bolshevism Has No Chance in China,” China Review, June 1922: 269–70. 190. Chesneaux, Chinese Labor Movement, pp. 180–86.
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Meanwhile, by mid-March Chen Jiongming's opposition to the northern expedition was open. The rupture between Chen and Sun may have been hastened by the assassination on 21 March of General Deng Keng, Chen's chief of staff and commander of the First Division of the Guangdong Army. Deng was reported to be enthusiastic about the northern expedition and was assassinated while returning from a mission to Hong Kong to purchase arms for it. Although Chen denied any responsibility for Deng's death, it was widely believed that he had had a hand in it.191
Against a background of stalemate on the battlefield, on 26 March Sun ordered Chen to meet with him amidst rumors that Chen had agreed with Wu Peifu to help hinder the northern expedition's thrust into Hunan. Meanwhile the situation in Yunnan turned against Sun as well. Earlier Tang's subordinate Gu Pinzhen had driven Tang out and indicated his support for Sun's policies, but by the end of March, Tang Jiyao had the upper hand, Gu was killed, and Tang ordered his troops out of Guizhou and back to Yunnan. Tang was abandoning the northern expedition.192
It appears as though Sun Yixian slighted the significance of Chen Jiongming's opposition to his plans. Up until the eve of the coup launched against him, Sun refused to believe the numerous rumors circulating and a stream of reports indicating what was happening. Although Chen's army was fifty thousand strong, many of its commanders and junior officers were Guomindang stalwarts and loyal to Sun. Sun believed his relationship with Chen was secure; in fact it was not. When Sun ordered Chen to meet with him, Chen refused and Sun on 20 April forced his resignation from the posts of Minister of the Interior, Commander-in-Chief of the Guangdong Army, and Governor of Guangdong. Chen left Guangzhou with a number of his troops
for his base in Huizhou.193
Returning to Guangzhou on 22 April, Sun countered a week later with a successful surprise attack on the naval flotilla stationed at Guangzhou and Huangpu (Whampoa). Said to have been the brainstorm of Hu Hanmin, it placed the navy in Sun's hands. With this effort to secure his position in Guangzhou, Sun once again turned his attention to the task of continuing the northern expedition.194
Wu Tingfang was appointed to fill the post of Governor of Guangdong following Chen's forced resignation. He assumed office on 22 April and moved into the Governor's mansion as a great fire had largely destroyed the building housing the Foreign Ministry in March.195
191. On C. C. Wu's view of Chen, see Huston to Secretary of State, 12 Apr. 1922, USNA, 893.00/ 4361; on Deng Keng's assassination, see Luo, GFNP, pp. 525–26; SCMP, 25 Mar., p. 7; 27 Mar., p. 6; 28 Mar. 1922, p. 8.
192. Sutton, Provincial Militarism, pp. 254–56.
193. Luo, GFNP, pp. 526–27.
194. Ibid., p. 529; Huston to Secretary of State, 24 Apr. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4393.
195. Luo, GFNP, pp. 530–31. On the first see SCMP, 11 Mar., p. 1; 15 Mar. 1922, p. 8.
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Wu's duties were added to in May when Sun formally launched the northern expedition and appointed Wu to serve, once again, as Acting President in his absence. It is obvious that Wu was personally unable to attend to these offices in addition to those of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance. Several accounts indicate that Liao Zhongkai, a trusted subordinate of Sun's who was appointed Vice-Minister of Finance, handled virtually all the work of that agency, while C. C. Wu, as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with Guo Taiqi, were entrusted with much of the ministry's administrative work. When Wu assumed the governorship, C. C. and Guo took on much of his administrative work as well. C. C. was publicly acknowledged as the “power behind the throne" of the Governor's Office.196
From Shaoguan, Sun issued the order on 13 May to attack southern Jiangxi, but on 23 May ten thousand of Chen's troops from the Guangxi campaign surrounded Guangzhou demanding their commander's reinstatement. In response, Sun offered Chen the position of duban, or overseer, of Guangdong and Guangxi, but Chen refused to take this post. Sun returned from Shaoguan to Guangzhou on 1 June, leaving Hu Hanmin in charge of affairs in the North, where the northern expeditionary forces scored a significant victory on 13 June. 197
These events coincided with another change in the national situation. In the Zhili-Fengtian war of spring 1922, Wu Peifu and the Zhili clique emerged victorious, dashing Sun's hopes for national power. The Zhili victory was followed by a peace initiative that was China's first genuine opportunity for unification since 1917. On 14 May Wu Peifu issued a circular telegram calling for the restoration of the "old" Parliament, the issue which, it may be recalled, more than any other was responsible for the failure of Xu Shichang's peace initiative in 1919. At the end of May, Sun Chuanfang, warlord of Jiangsu, called for both Xu Shichang and Sun Yixian to resign. Xu responded immediately by so doing, and a groundswell was underway for Li Yuanhong to reassume the Presidency so as to enable unification to proceed. This was supported by a number of members of the “old” Parliament meeting in Tianjin. Chen Jiongming joined in by calling for Xu and Sun's resignation; as Xu already had resigned, this was a call for Sun's resignation. 198
Sun's public response was to denounce Wu Peifu's move as a trap set by the Zhili clique, and to reject unification on these terms. Wu publicly supported Sun's position and called upon the foreign powers not to interfere in China's internal affairs (as they had earlier in coercing both sides to engage in the 1919 talks).199
196. Huston to Secretary of State, 2 May 1922, USNA, 893.00/4402. On Liao Zhongkai, see He Xiangning, "Wo de huiyi,” in Huiyi Xinhai Geming, p. 31ff.
197. Luo, GFNP, PP. 529-33.
198. Ibid., pp. 536–37; Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 420–21.
199. Luo, GFNP, pp. 534–35; transmitted to the U.S. President by Ma Soo, 12 June 1922, USNA, 893.00/4449.
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Wu maintained this stance publicly although Li Yuanhong indicated that he would like Wu Tingfang to serve as his first formal premier, and Wu Peifu followed suit by inviting Wu Tingfang to take up the premiership and work towards reconstruction. Warlord Yan Xishan of Shanxi Province similarly cabled Wu urging him to take up this offer. This was an important gesture to the southern forces and a way of attempting to reestablish the continuity of legitimacy. There is no question that the offer to Wu was made in good faith and was genuine. Whether Wu would have continued in his firm support of Sun and opposition to the Zhili position is difficult to assess, because Chen's coup against Sun and Wu's death occurred before the situation was resolved.2
Following Chen's coup on 16 June, Sun was forced to take refuge upon one of the Navy's ships when Chen's troops attacked his residence; Wu and C. C. similarly had to take refuge elsewhere as C. C.'s home, where both had been staying, was seized and looted by Chen's troops.
201
200
In a meeting on board Sun's warship on 17 June, Wu pleaded with Sun to retire. But Sun was determined to launch a counter-attack against Chen in the belief that he would have no political credibility in China or abroad unless he stood and fought. In dismay, Wu resigned from the governorship on 21 June in what should be viewed as a gesture of disapproval of Sun. He died two days later, on 23 June, after a short bout with pneumonia, extremely despondent about the current situation.202
One is tempted to speculate that in spite of his age, Wu Tingfang might yet have lived further had the last three months of his life not been so emotionally stressful. Having reentered political life in 1917 with the hope that he could have something to contribute to China's future, he had played his cards to the bitter end. Having backed Sun as the leader to unify China, he had to face the fact that Sun's program could not succeed at that time. Would Wu have split with Sun at that point and return to Beijing to take part in yet further warlord-dominated cabinets? Or would he have continued to cast his lot with Sun and Soviet assistance for the unification of China under the Guomindang? Unfortunately we shall not be able to answer these questions but must content ourselves with the mere phrasing of them.
200. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 191; SCMP, 12 June, p. 6; 14 June, p. 6; 17 June, p. 7; 19 June 1922,
p. 7.
201. Huston to Secretary of State, 22 June 1922, USNA, 893.00/4576. Wu's last interview was probably given with U.S. journalist Edna Lee Booker on 15 June. See her News is My Job: A Correspondent in War-Torn China (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 122.
202. He Xiangning was in the hospital with Wu. See He, “Wo de huiyi,” p. 34; Luo, GFNP, p. 542; Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], Sun dazongtong Guangzhou mengnan riji (Shanghai: Minzhi, 1927), pp. 6-8.
Conclusion
Wu Tingfang's death in June 1922 occurred at the time the Chinese nationalist dream-a dream of a powerful, united and modern Chinese nation-appeared more ephemeral than at any time since the 1911 revolution. The timing of Wu's death was coincidental to the lowest ebb in the nationalist tide of modern China's history. Within a short time after Wu's death, however, Sun Yixian and the nationalist movement appeared reborn, a phoenix risen from the ashes of a factionalized and warlord-ridden China. Newly armed with Soviet weapons, Leninist organizational techniques and a dynamic reshaping of nationalist ideology, Sun emerged at the helm of a revitalized movement that ultimately swept Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party into power in 1949 on a revolutionary flood tide of peasant nationalism.
The early nationalist movement of which Wu Tingfang was part may be viewed as a catalyst in the revolutionary process described above. Based in the urban bourgeoisie rather than the peasantry, inclined towards gradual reform rather than revolution, and preferring liberal Anglo-American models for institutional change rather than Leninist ones, the early nationalist movement failed to create successful structures to implement the nationalist program. This failure, in turn, reflects the weakness of the modern bourgeoisie—since the early nationalism was based in this class—in early twentieth century Chinese society and politics.
Wu Tingfang was an example of the "colonial intelligentsia" of nineteenth century Hong Kong, a miniscule group of western-educated Chinese of mercantile bourgeois backgrounds. Along with He Qi, Wang Tao, Zheng Guanying and others, Wu was part of a social and political stratum which was noted for espousing an early form of modern nationalism in China, calling for institutional reforms in the structure of the state to facilitate industrial development and promote commercial competition with foreign commercial interests. They advocated modernizing educational facilities so as to create a modern bureaucracy, and proposed reforms in recruitment qualifications for officialdom. Finally, they advocated broadening the decision-making base of the Qing state through the adoption of British-style advisory bodies. They maintained that these reforms would promote unity and national strength. Their overall objective was to promote Chinese equality in its relations with the western world and to protect China's sovereignty against forces and institutions, such as extraterritoriality, that weakened it. Selective westernization and adoption of British-style “liberal” laws and institutions were but means to achieve the nationalist vision.
287
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Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History
It is my contention that the content of this early nationalism reflected the reaction of the colonial intelligentsia of Hong Kong to the structural inequalities of the “colonial situation," which Hong Kong shared with other nineteenth century European colonies in Asia and Africa. While mobilizing politically to assert the economic and political interests of the wealthier Hong Kong Chinese, Wu Tingfang and others did so in the framework of the cultural and political assumptions of the British colonizers rather than in terms of their indigenous society. This made them relatively marginal and isolated from the vast majority of Chinese in nineteenth century China, masses and elite alike.
During the years 1877–82, Wu Tingfang attempted to reform the Hong Kong colonial structures so as to strengthen the position of wealthy Chinese and improve the status of all Chinese colonial subjects. His mixed experiences, however, reflected his dependence upon sympathetic colonizers such as Sir John Pope Hennessy, without whose support reform was an impossibility. When Hennessy's weakened position forced his departure from Hong Kong, Wu Tingfang too fell from power.
Upon leaving Hong Kong in 1882, Wu Tingfang became part of the nationalist-inspired reform movement that developed in China Proper in the latter part of the Qing Dynasty. His participation in the reform effort can be divided into three distinct phases: (1) the pre-1895 Self-Strengthening Movement under Li Hongzhang, (2) the post Sino-Japanese reform movement, 1895-98, and (3) the post-Boxer reform movement, 1902-11. In all three phases Wu Tingfang sought to use his skills to implement a nationalist foreign policy, to develop railway, mines and other industrial and commercial projects, and to promote law reform so as to abolish extraterritoriality,
Wu Tingfang was a central figure in the Self-Strengthening Movement under Li Hongzhang. While his accomplishments, especially in railway development, were impressive, they fell short of his expectations. Unable to attract sufficient merchant capital, the role of the state in funding and managing the railway became more critical and led to structural problems stemming from the nature and organization of the Qing bureaucracy. The railway and other modernizing projects were regional rather than national in scope, and were relegated to Li Hongzhang's private bureaucracy (mufu) rather than the formally designated bureaucratic state structure. Wu's authority derived in great measure from his personal relationship to Li Hongzhang, but this relationship, in turn, was inadequate to enable Wu to prevent the railway administration from falling prey to the prevailing bureaucratic parasitism and factionalism. This was most marked when he lost control of the railway in 1891 to one of Li's relatives.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 led to a new phase in China's modernization movement. On the one hand, the various modernizing projects Li Hongzhang had previously sponsored were put under the control of other regional officials as a consequence of Li's fall from power. Also, Wu Tingfang suffered from his association with Li in the political climate that surrounded China's disastrous defeat. On the other hand, however, the crisis created an
Conclusion
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environment in which the reform agenda was taken up in a more thorough way at the national level, while able foreign-affairs officials like Wu were given the opportunity to move into more substantive diplomatic positions. Wu's appointment as Minister to the United States and Spain in 1896 was seen by him as an opportunity to advocate a more assertive foreign policy and to implement a more nationalist diplomacy than previously possible.
Just as the war gave rise to a greater impetus for state-sponsored reforms, it also led to Sun Yixian's organization of a revolutionary movement dedicated to the overthrow of the Qing and the establishment of new political system. This new development led to a split between Wu and his brother-in-law He Qi. He Qi briefly considered taking an official position under Sheng Xuanhuai but fled in disgust at the retrogressive atmosphere of Qing official life. He subsequently became a sometime patron of Sun Yixian. Wu, on the contrary, continued committed to his career under the Qing and to the prospects of its reform for nationalist ends. Wu never publicly displayed sympathy for the revolutionary agenda during his years as a Qing official in spite of ambivalent feelings about the Qing's prospects for genuine reform.
Upon his arrival in the United States in 1897, Wu supported the reform movement among high officials and threw his weight behind a pro-British anti-Russian foreign policy, which, however, was not implemented. During the peak of the 1898 reform movement he received a mandate to undertake the law reforms he had advocated for over twenty years, but the reform movement was stifled in the Empress Dowager's coup of September 1898 before Wu could have had much time to embark upon this project.
Although Wu was an admirer of Kang Youwei, he had not been part of Kang's faction, and thus was kept on in his post after the reform movement was crushed. In spite of the discouraging events in China, Wu began an aggressive but ultimately unsuccessful campaign to prevent the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Laws to Hawaii and the Philippines. His diplomacy followed his long-standing conviction that to be effective, China had to wage an aggressive campaign to influence public opinion in the western world. Wu did succeed in becoming a public figure in the United States in a manner never before achieved by a Chinese figure. In the short run,
he was unsuccessful in his efforts to repeal Chinese Exclusion legislation, but it is more difficult to assess how useful his public exposure was in aiding China's long-term national interests.
The crushing of the Boxer Uprising and subsequent occupation of the Chinese capital by the Allied Expeditionary Force created a new and more powerful impetus for the modernization reform effort, and it provided opportunities for Wu Tingfang to play a more central role in it. He was able to take some of the credit for what many high Qing officials viewed as the relatively lenient policy of the United States in the negotiations of 1901 between the Court and the foreign powers, and Wu's reputation accordingly rose in China.
Returning to China in 1902, Wu assumed key posts in the Beijing government until 1906. He helped to design and establish the new Board of
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Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History
Commerce in 1903 but was removed from the Board after clashing with his patron Yuan Shikai over its staffing. Turning then to foreign policy, Wu utilized the emerging political power of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Shanghai and other major cities to promote a nationalistic approach in foreign policy. He did so by leaking sensitive information to the press in hopes of stimulating public outcry over Britain's aggression in Tibet and by taking a tough line over various problems foreign syndicates encountered in capitalizing railway and mining projects. But his nationalist approach was seen most strikingly in his encouraging the development of the boycott of American goods in 1905.
These policies and acts earned him the enmity of British and American diplomats, who were unprepared to calmly accept China's new nationalism and who consequently sought to coerce the Qing government into a more submissive mold. Wu's political position, ironically dependent upon foreign goodwill, was thus undermined by the nationalist policies he promoted.
Moreover, Wu's main patron during this period was Yuan Shikai, but Wu, unlike Tang Shaoyi, was not a close subordinate of Yuan's. Thus Yuan used Wu when convenient and relegated him to lesser positions when it was not, as in the instance of the Board of Commerce noted above. Hence Wu was prey to the vagaries of bureaucratic factionalism to a higher degree than previously. These finally led to Wu's removal from foreign policy decision-making in 1905.
The limitations of his situation depressed Wu and led him to considerable ambivalence about the viability of Qing reform and his role in the government. He had nearly resigned in 1904 and again in 1905, only to return to his official positions in the end. He resigned yet again in 1906 but later agreed to serve once more as Minister to the United States and various Latin American nations. After being recalled in 1909, Wu declined further appointment and bided his time until the revolution of 1911. His persistence under the Qing reflects the enduring seductions of official life-personal as well as political- and his underlying belief that reform of the Qing, no matter how difficult, was still China's best hope for modernization.
Wu's second major contribution to the late Qing modernization effort lay in the area of law reform, but even more so than in the case of foreign policy described above, his accomplishments were muted by frustrations. In spite of some Imperial support for his and Shen Jiaben's proposals to humanize judicial proceedings, his Draft Procedural Code, which was heavily based on British judicial procedures, was rejected at all official levels as too subversive to the maintenance of public order.
Wu promoted law and judicial reforms so as to enable China to abolish extraterritoriality, which he viewed as an institution that seriously diminished China's sovereignty. In this respect Wu appears as a simple nationalist. But it is also clear that his interest and involvement in law reform were quite obviously products of his early experiences in the Hong Kong courts and his barrister's training in London; his advocacy of the British system not only reflected his background but also his firm belief in the universal value of British legal and judicial institutions. This belief distinguished Wu from other nationalists who sought reforms as means to achieve national power in a
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purely instrumental sense without regard for the moral or philosophic underpinnings inherent in the reforms.
Wu's example suggests that the term "liberal" is appropriate to describe the nexus of values associated with at least some elements of the new urban elites that emerged politically in the late Qing and early Republican period. Wu was “liberal" in the sense of non-radical—in promoting a reformist rather than revolutionary approach to change—as well as in the sense of advocating nineteenth century “liberal” British political structures as crucial to China's modernization.
Liberals like Wu played a moderating role in the revolution of 1911, throwing support to the Republican forces but blunting the radicalizing impulses of the revolutionary movement. Their main political accomplishment was assisting Yuan Shikai in his drive to power. But there were limitations to liberalism. For Wu and the constitutionalists he was associated with, the issue of the form of government-constitutional monarchy or republic-was secondary to the issue of Yuan Shikai's assuming the reigns of power. Men thus took precedence over institutions, even for those liberals such as Wu who deeply believed in the superiority of British political institutions.
The tendency to look to powerful or charismatic individuals as linchpins of state power and authority, which appears characteristic of twentieth century Chinese politics, is thus shown in Wu Tingfang's political role during the 1911 revolution and after. Wu helped to engineer Yuan's assumption of the Presidency in 1911–12 and then continued to support him in spite of Yuan's increasing autocratism. Not only did Yuan fail to implement liberal reforms patterned after Anglo-American political institutions, but he eventually violated their spirit in highly public ways. Not until the public outcry against Yuan's monarchical plans was underway, however, did Wu hesitantly join the anti- Yuan chorus. Even then his criticism was muted: bad advisers surrounding Yuan were responsible for Yuan's failures.
Given the cultural emphasis upon powerful individuals rather than institutions, and given the political weakness of social classes and political groupings in early Republican China, political factionalism at all levels became deeply embedded in the Chinese political landscape following Yuan Shikai's death. In this increasingly factionalized and fractionalized environment, Wu's overriding concern became the search for that individual who possessed the political authority, coupled with military backing, who could reassemble a viable national state structure.
Wu's quest led him, first, to support Li Yuanhong in the latter's drive to reconstitute the national government under the Republican constitutional structures. By spring 1917, however, it was clear that these structures were politically unviable; that is, they were unauthoritative in the operative political culture of the early Republic. Wu's defiant defense of constitutionalism in the face of Li Yuanhong's betrayal of its principles in May 1917 was a symbol of Wu's personal courage. But Wu's personal victory was largely hollow, for his act created little more than a ripple of admiration, which meant little in a Chinese political arena now dominated by factionalism and militarism.
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In the last period of Wu's life, in which he was politically active in the Guangzhou-based rump governments, constitutionalism and liberalism appear to have been little more than slogans employed by various southern factions intent on seizing national power and obtaining international recognition. That principles were largely irrelevant is demonstrated by the shifting coalitions that marked the national political scene. Wu and his son C. C. Wu were players on this vast board game as one team among the many politicians who participated in the endless negotiations and deal-making that were endemic to factional politics.
In addition to their role as would-be peacemakers, the Wus functioned secondarily as key administrators of the Guangzhou Governments from 1917 to 1922. These governments were only marginally effective in providing the security and leadership so desperately craved by the urban public in Guangzhou and other cities nominally under their jurisdiction; nor could they protect the rural population against the pillaging by “guest” armies in the latters' exploitation of Guangdong's resources.
Public disgust over these outrages led to the provincialist "Guangdong for the Guangdongese" sentiment of 1919, which in turn merged with nationalist outrage over the humiliating Versailles negotiations. Nationalism and provincialism, in this instance, complemented rather than competed with each other. In his opposition to the Guangxi clique, Wu Tingfang emerged both as symbol for Guangdong provincialism as well as for the emerging nationalist-inspired May Fourth Movement. But as in the case of his earlier opposition to Li Yuanhong, Wu's hands were empty; he had no military authority to back up the moral authority of the cause he had come to represent.
In the last two years of his life, Wu worked closely with Sun Yixian in helping Sun achieve his dream of a united China under Nationalist Party leadership. The Wu-Sun alliance should be seen both in the context of the faction-driven politics of the period, as well as of the invalidity of the constitutionalist program in the Republican period.
As noted above, institutional reform following Anglo-American models had been submerged during the revolution of 1911 by the strength of the constitutionalists' faith in Yuan Shikai's executive abilities, only to later drown in the tides of militarism and factionalism that followed Yuan's death. Wu joined Sun, I believe, not only because they both shared a Cantonese heritage, but also partly because from Wu's perspective there was nobody else in the national political arena who had a genuinely national vision of China's future and the personal dynamism and charisma needed to unify an emerging nationalist movement. Just as during the revolution of 1911, Wu and his friends looked to Yuan Shikai to maintain and strengthen a national government capable of modernizing China, so now Wu Tingfang, following his son's lead, looked to Sun Yixian in hopes of seeing a new "strongman" who could lead China into the promised land of national strength and dignity. That the issue of national unification and state building assumed priority amidst the crumbling edifices of Chinese political life in Wu's later years is
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clear. Concerns about westernization and China's cultural identity most understandably assumed a lower priority. But these deeper issues have surfaced in China time and time again during this century. Although westernization has sometimes been viewed within the "western stimulus-Chinese response" model described by Paul A. Cohen, a "China-centered" approach still requires that one examine the issue of westernization in modern and contemporary Chinese history.'
In the context of nineteenth century Chinese history, Wu Tingfang would appear to be at the far end at the "scale" of westernization in China. What is significant, however, is that Wu was always an advocate of selective rather than complete westernization, and as he aged, he became more and more selective. A baptized Christian in his youth, he was an early critic of Christian missionaries as “un-Christian.” As an adult he never believed that the West was completely progressive and China completely reactionary in the framework of world history. During his lengthy stay in the United States, 1897-1902, he developed a world view that rejected outward westernization of Chinese life- style, as symbolized by diet, dress and “hygienic” behaviors. In particular, he upheld Chinese familism and the Confucian values associated with it as core values in Chinese culture. He saw these as forces of stability in a world of rapid change, and he admired the works of American social purity reformers, who like many of their contemporaries in China, were cultural conservatives reacting with dismay to rapid social changes in their world. Wu maintained these views at the same time that he advocated wholesale adoption of British legal and political institutions in China for reasons, as discussed above, that were only partly pragmatic.
What is of interest here is the delicate balancing act inherent in Wu's style of selective westernization. His particular blend of what to keep and what to reject in China's culture and what to import from contemporary western culture reflects the particular historical period in which he grew to maturity. That was a period in which England was the dominant foreign power in China and a major power in the world, and Wu Tingfang, like many others, looked to British economic and political institutions as keys to unlock the secrets by which to attain the nationalist goals of "wealth and power.
"2
The historical period is different now, the culture of powerful nations in the world is different too; but the issue of China's cultural identity still remains as one of potential contention as the twenty-first century nears and modern communications technology makes it increasingly difficult for powerful states to control access to information. While the enterprise of selective westernization is still alive, as repeated campaigns against “spiritual pollution” and “harmful bourgeois ideological influence” suggest, they coexist with more persistent exhortations calling for China's rapid modernization at
1. Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
2. As brilliantly explored in Benjamin Schwartz's classic study, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
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Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History
all cost. We may speculate that in an era in which modern China's early nationalist vision, which Wu Tingfang helped to shape, has been only partially realized, the issue of culture change remains subordinate to the political call for nation building. While subordinate, however, it is far from absent, and as the nation building effort is hopefully more successful in decades to come, we may expect that the cultural issues may assume greater prominence.
Glossary
Baoliang Ju
baoxiao 報效
Bing Bu
buliang fenzi 不良分子
can 參
Canyiyuan 參議院
chaiwei 差委
cheng 承
chong yang chong de lihai
崇洋崇得厲害
Chou'an Hui 籌安會
Da Qing Luli 大清律例
daotai 道台
daoyin 道尹
guandu shangban 官督商辦
Guangzhou Gongsuo 廣州公所
guanshang heban 官商合辦
Hanlin Academy
Hong Bang 洪幫
Hu Bu 戶部
Huazi Ribao
#7°*»
Huiban Dachen 會辦大臣
Jinbudang 進步黨
jinshi 進士
Liji《禮記》
lijin 釐金
mufu 幕府
Nanbei Guild 南北行
dibao 地保
Nonggongshang Bu 農工商部
Donghua Hospital
qi 氣
duban 督辦
dudu 都督
Qing Bang 青幫
qingyi pai 清議派
dujun 督軍
Duzhi Bu 度支部
Emperor Shun 舜帝
Emperor Yao 堯帝
Falu Xiuding Guan 法律修訂館
Gonghe Tongyi Hui 共和統一會 Gonghedang 共和黨
Qiren 旗人
renzheng 仁政
ru儒
Shang Bu 商部
shangzhan 商戰
ti
Tongmeng Hui
295
296
tongxiang 同鄉
Waiwu Bu 外務部
Weisheng Hui 衛生會
wenming paiwai 文明排外
Wenwu Temple 文武廟
wulun 五倫
xiao 孝
Xing Bu 刑部
Xing Zhong Hui 興中會
Xinwen Bao《新文報》
xiyisuo 習藝所
Xunhuan Ribao «»
yangwu rencai #^ƒ
yi 義
yi lao mai lao 倚老賣老
yici 義祠
Yiyou She 誼友社
yong 用
Youchuan Bu 郵傳部
zhengshi 正式
Zhonghua Huiguan 中華會館
Zhongwai Xinbao
Zhongyiyuan 眾議院
Ziqiang/Yangwu Yundong
自強/洋務運動
zongcai 總裁
Zongli Dachen
E
Zongli Yamen 總理衙門
zongsiling 總司令
Glossary
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