stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.
62
Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic
Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_
stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.
63
Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of
Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/
papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.
64
Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of
Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/
papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 411 20/08/2018 16:48
Table 7.9 Average daily passenger trips between Hong Kong and the Mainland (by transport mode)
Transport mode 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2009 2011 2014
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 412
(No. (%)) (No. (%)) (No. (%)) (No. (%)) (No. (%)) (No. (%)) (No. (%)) (No. (%))
Boundary train 214,800 249,900 239,600 246,200 267,400 264,800 292,000 295,000
(75.5) (75) (62.6) (55) (54.5) (52.5) (51.9) (48.8)
Coach 22,200 19,900 49,600 61,300 57,300 58,000 54,700 69,500
(7.8) (6) (13) (13.7) (11.7) (11.5) (9.7) (11.5)
Private car 400 7,300 10,000 12,700 12,400 22,900 25,600 27,100
(0.2) (2.2) (2.6) (2.8) (2.5) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5)
Shuttle bus 9,600 16,300 38,800 75,900 62,900 47,100 40,500 26,700
(3.4) (4.9) (10.1) (16.9) (12.8) (9.3) (7.2) (4.4)
Air 9,300 9,200 10,500 16,100 19,500 19,100 23,100 23,200
(3.3) (2.8) (2.7) (3.6) (4) (3.8) (4.1) (3.8)
Ferry 19,500 21,000 23,300 23,400 20,400 13,400 15,800 16,400
(6.8) (6.3) (6.1) (5.2) (4.2) (2.7) (2.8) (2.7)
Through train 6,200 5,900 7,600 9,000 9,000 8,500 11,300 11,800
(2.2) (1.8) (2) (2) (1.8) (1.7) (2) (1.9)
Franchised bus/green – – – – 30,800 55,200 78,200 113,400
minibus/taxi (6.3) (10.9) (13.9) (18.7)
Others 2,500 3,800 3,300 3,600 11,200 15,600 21,200 21,700
(0.9) (1.1) (0.9) (0.8) (2.3) (3.1) (3.8) (3.6)
Total 284,600 333,200 382,800 448,100 490,900 504,600 562,400 604,900
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Source: ‘Table 3A.1b: Average Daily Passenger Trips between Hong Kong and the Mainland by Transport Mode’, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/p_study/comp_s/nbsb2013-2014/table_cbts2013-14_ch3A.xls.
20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 413
was completed in July 2007. The SWC stretches approximately 5.5 kilometres
(3.5 kilometres in Hong Kong and 2 kilometres in Shenzhen), spanning Deep
Bay from Ngau Hom Shek in north-western New Territories to the HKSAR’s
boundary, and links up to Shekou in Shenzhen.65 The construction of the Hong
Kong Section (excluding the DBL) cost 3.2 billion Hong Kong dollars.66
Issues with co-location arrangements for customs clearance
As Hong Kong lacked sufficient land for the co-location of customs, immigration
and quarantine facilities for both Hong Kong and the Mainland, and the issue of
reclamation was vigorously debated in the local community during the prepara-
tions for the SWC construction, it was decided that a 117.9-hectare customs
clearance zone would be built by the Shenzhen government by way of reclama-
tion, of which 41.6 hectares of land was used by the Hong Kong authorities and
76.3 hectares by the Shenzhen authorities.67 Alongside this, the Hong Kong
government was facing additional financial burdens for the construction of the
DBL to connect the SWC’s Hong Kong Section with Yuen Long and nearby
areas. In 2001, the cost of the DBL was estimated to be up to 7.723 billion
Hong Kong dollars.68 Besides, with Deep Way being an ecological conservation
area, an alignment would have to be carefully selected for any transport facility.
The structural form and construction methods should also comply with the EIA
Ordinance so as to maintain noise, air quality, landscape, water quality and so on
within established standards and guidelines. The government would also plant
trees to compensate for loss during construction and would avoid damage to
concerned archaeological heritage.69
As the fourth vehicular crossing between Hong Kong and the Mainland, the
Shenzhen Bay Port (SBP) alleviates the nearly saturated existing land bound-
ary crossings at Lok Ma Chau, Man Kam To and Sha Tau Kok and boosts
trade between Hong Kong and southern China. Its current capacity is second
only to Lok Ma Chau. However, the utilisation of the SBP was not as good as
expected in its early days. The daily two-way vehicular flow at the SBP had been
estimated to be 29,800 trips before the construction began. But in fact it was
only around 1,400 trips in July 2007 when the SBP was put into operation and
65
Highways Department, Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link brochure, second
edition, Hong Kong, Government Logistics Department, December 2004.
66
Highways Department, Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor website, www.hyd.gov.hk/tc/
road_and_railway/road_projects/6759th/.
67
‘Xibu tongdao kouan tianhai qu za jia buchang cheng shengang zhengyi xin jiaodian’ (Compensation for
Cost Overruns in the Construction of the Western Corridor Boundary Crossing Reclamation Area Becoming
a New Focus of Disputes between Shenzhen and Hong Kong), www.singtaonet.com, 27 August 2006, www.
singtaonet.com:82/china/20060827_309723.html.
68
Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of
Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/
papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.
69
Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of
Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/
papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 413 20/08/2018 16:48
414 · MAKING HONG KONG
Table 7.10 Cross-boundary vehicle traffic in Hong Kong, 2007–2014 (average daily trips
inward/outward)
Year Man Kam To Sha Tau Kok Lok Ma Chau Shenzhen Bay Total
2007 6,901 2,297 30,989 3,103 43,290
2008 5,823 2,402 27,883 5,899 42,007
2009 5,216 2,176 25,514 7,451 40,357
2010 4,606 2,250 27,368 8,792 43,016
2011 4,234 2,429 26,582 9,529 42,774
2012 4,178 2,491 25,876 9,893 42,438
2013 4,367 2,642 25,536 10,042 42,587
2014 4,762 2,190 24,752 9,970 41,674
Sources: Transport Department, Annual Transport Digest, 2008–2014, http://www.td.gov.hk/tc/publications_and_press_
releases/publications/free_publications/annual_transport_digest/index.html; Transport Department, Monthly Traffic and
Transport Digest, April 2015, http://www.td.gov.hk/filemanager/en/content_4700/1504.pdf.
subsequently climbed to 3,256 trips in September 2007.70 By 2013, the two-way
vehicular flow at the Shenzhen Bay BCP was 10,042 trips per day,71 well below
the government’s estimate. Some members of the cross-boundary freight trade
attributed this to the ancillary facilities around the Shenzhen port area not being
fully developed, and Hong Kong freight companies could not set up offices near
the control point to provide support to cross-boundary goods vehicle drivers
on customs declaration and clearance of goods. They also mentioned the fact
that the BCP was not operating on a 24-hour basis. The number of daily cross-
boundary vehicle trips increased from 30,000 in 1999 to 41,600 in 2014, an
increase of about 39 per cent.72 (See Table 7.10.)
At the end of 2006, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress (NPC) authorised a lease of the SBP Hong Kong Port Area (HKPA)
for a 50-year period, subject to renewal upon consultation after its expiry. By way
of an ordinance, Hong Kong is authorised to extend its jurisdiction to designated
areas in the SBP.73 The laws of Hong Kong are applicable within the HKPA, and
Hong Kong officers are authorised to take enforcement actions as from 1 July
2007.74 Under the co-location arrangements, border officials from Shenzhen
and Hong Kong handle relevant formalities at the Joint Inspection Building
in Shenzhen, and passengers are cleared at one location.75 Passengers only
have to get on and off once instead of twice for clearance procedures, thereby
70
‘LCQ7: Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor’s Throughput’, Press Releases, 31 October 2007,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200710/31/P200710310141.htm.
71
Transport Department, Annual Transport Digest 2014, 2014, www.td.gov.hk/mini_site/atd/2014/tc/sec
tion5_14.html.
72
Planning Department, Northbound Southbound: Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2013/14, Hong Kong,
Planning Department, 2014, Table 5.1b.
73
Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 9 January 2007, p.B05.
74
Southern Weekly, 20 December 2007, p.B10.
75
Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 9 January 2007, p.B05.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 414 20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 415
shortening the clearance time by about five to ten minutes for each traveller.76
The co-location arrangements faced a judicial dilemma at first. The HKPA,
located within Shenzhen, is naturally within the jurisdiction of the Immigration
Ordinance and the Customs and Excise Service Ordinance of Hong Kong; but how
about the other laws of Hong Kong? Should Mainland laws be applicable? And
who should enforce those laws? Finally it was decided that Hong Kong officers
would be authorised by the NPC to take enforcement actions within the HKPA
located in Shenzhen, with detailed legal arrangements to be agreed between
Hong Kong and Shenzhen.77 Another problem was that local insurance compa-
nies were reluctant to provide related services at first, citing the fact of the Joint
Inspection Building being outside the Hong Kong territory. Eventually, most
insurers agreed to extend the scope of vehicle third-party insurance and other
private insurance policies to the HKPA by means of market agreements, without
any extra charge.78 As for maintenance, the HKPA does not include the waters
and airspace near the bridge. In terms of emergency rescue arrangements, there
is an established mechanism to facilitate cross-boundary search and rescue oper-
ations between Hong Kong and the Mainland.
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge
Prior to 1995, Zhuhai first proposed the Lingdingyang Bridge (LDYB) to be
built from the city across the mouth of the Pearl River Estuary to the NWNT.79
The Planning Department initiated the Crosslinks Study in September 1995,
which was subsequently completed in May 1996. The study examined various
options for landing points for the two bridge proposals, as well as route options
for connecting the road bridges into the existing and planned future road
network of Hong Kong. Lan Kok Tsui in Tuen Mun was preliminarily pro-
posed as the landing point.80 In 1999, the government issued the Feasibility
Study for Additional Cross-border Links, including the cross-harbour bridge
connecting Zhuhai and Hong Kong (Lingdingyang Bridge) in its longer-term
planning.81 On 20 September 2002, it was agreed at the third Mainland/HKSAR
Conference on the Coordination of Major Infrastructure Projects that a joint
study should be conducted on the transport linkage between Hong Kong and
Pearl River West.82 In January 2003, the National Development and Reform
76
Wen Wei Po, 7 February 2007, p.A12.
77
Wen Wei Po, 1 July 2007, p.A64.
78
Ming Pao, 12 April 2007, p.A29.
79
Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic
Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_
stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.
80
Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic
Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_
stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.
81
Legislative Council of Hong Kong website, http://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_tp/tp-
zhuhzi-macao-bridge.htm.
82
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 415 20/08/2018 16:48
416 · MAKING HONG KONG
Commission (NDRC) and the Hong Kong government jointly commissioned
the Institute of Comprehensive Transportation to conduct a study entitled
‘Transport Linkage between Hong Kong and Pearl River West’. The study con-
firmed the strategic significance of and urgent need for the construction of a
land transport link between the HKSAR and Pearl River West. On 4 August
2003, the State Council approved the report of the study and agreed that the
governments of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao should set up an HZMB
Advance Work Coordination Group and press ahead with the advance work for
the construction of the bridge. (See Figure 7.8.)
In 2003, the governments of Guangdong Province, Hong Kong SAR and
Macao SAR set up the HZMB Advance Work Coordination Group to start
preparations for the HZMB. The Hong Kong government also engaged con-
sultants to carry out investigation and preliminary design of the HZMB Hong
Kong Section and North Lantau Highway Connection for linkage to the local
road network. In February 2004, the Coordination Group commissioned China
Highway Planning and Design Institute (HPDI) to conduct a feasibility study
on the HZMB, covering a number of topics such as navigation clearance, hydrol-
ogy, environment, traffic, economic benefits and financial viability. The study
was substantially completed in 2005. Various alignment options had been put
forward by the HPDI for evaluation, and a decision was made in 2005.
In April 2005, the NDRC organised an Expert Panel Meeting on HZMB
Alignment in Zhuhai. The Expert Panel unanimously recommended the Northern
bridge-cum-tunnel alignment option, with landings at San Shek Wan of HKSAR,
Gongbei of Zhuhai, and A Pérola of Macao SAR.83 Geographically, the HZMB has
to land in north-western Lantau, in view of its lesser environmental impact and
closer proximity to HKIA and Disneyland, which could directly bring cross-bound-
ary traffic to those destinations through a shorter connecting infrastructure.84
In 2008, the Legislative Council approved funding for site investiga-
tion and preliminary design. In May 2009, the LegCo Finance Committee
approved funding of 9,046.5 million Hong Kong dollars for the detailed
design and construction of the HZMB Main Bridge.85 Following the State
Council’s endorsement of the Feasibility Study Report for the HZMB project
in October 2009, the construction of the Main Bridge commenced on 15
December 2009 and was planned to be completed by 2016.86 On 22 January
Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011,
October 2011, p.1.
83
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–
Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)407/08-09, 17 December 2008, p.2.
84
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–
Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)407/08-09, 17 December 2008, p.2.
85
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–
Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011,
October 2011, p.3.
86
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–
Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011,
October 2011, p.3.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 416 20/08/2018 16:48
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 417
Source: Planning Department.
Figure 7.8 Cross-boundary transport infrastructure: west axis
20/08/2018 16:48
418 · MAKING HONG KONG
2010, a Tung Chung resident applied for leave for judicial review to the
Court of First Instance regarding the EIA reports approved and the environ-
mental permits granted by the Director of Environmental Protection (DEP).
The High Court handed down its judgment on 18 April 2011. The court
judgment quashed the Director of Environmental Protection’s approval of
the EIA reports for the HZMB and the environmental permits of the projects.
The DEP appealed against the court’s judgment. The Court of Appeal handed
down its judgment on 27 September 2011, allowing the DEP’s appeal and
confirming the validity of the environmental permits previously granted by
the DEP.87 In November 2011, the Legislative Council approved additional
funding of 48.53 billion Hong Kong dollars for the construction of Hong
Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities and other link roads.88 In October 2014,
the government submitted another funding application to the LegCo and
estimated that the completion of the works would be delayed to 2017, with
5 billion Hong Kong dollars in cost overruns. When attending a meeting of
the Legislative Council Panel on Transport on 16 January 2015, the Secretary
for Transport and Housing pointed out that the Joint Works Committee
of the Three Governments (JWC) had advised that it would be very dif-
ficult to complete the entire HZMB project by the end of 2016. The Hong
Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities (HKBCF) and Hong Kong Link Road
(HKLR) projects would not be completed in time by the end of 2016. The
Highways Department was reviewing the anticipated completion dates. As
for the Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link, the completion time of its Southern
Connection will dovetail with that of the HZMB Main Bridge, whilst its
Northern Connection is anticipated to be completed by 2020.89
The HZMB Main Bridge runs from the artificial island off Gongbei of Zhuhai
to the eastern artificial island for the tunnel section just west of the HKSAR
boundary. The project includes a 29.6-kilometre dual three-lane carriageway
in the form of a bridge-cum-tunnel structure, including a tunnel of about 6.7
kilometres. There will also be two artificial islands for the tunnel landings west of
the HKSAR boundary. The total contribution of the three places (Hong Kong,
Mainland and Macao) will be RMB15.73 billion, of which Hong Kong will con-
tribute RMB6.75 billion. The Legislative Council has approved funding of 9.28
billion Hong Kong dollars. The Hong Kong Link Road will be 12 kilometres in
length, comprising a 9.4-kilometre-long viaduct section from the Hong Kong–
Guangdong water boundary to Scenic Hill on the Airport Island, a 1-kilome-
tre tunnel section through Scenic Hill, and a 1.6-kilometre-long at-grade road
section on the reclamation to the east of HKIA, with a total cost of 25.047 billion
87
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–
Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011,
October 2011, p.6.
88
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–
Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)268/13-14(02), 15 November 2013, p.3.
89
‘Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link (TM-CLKL)’, Highways Department website, https://www.hyd.gov.
hk/tc/road_and_railway/hzmb_projects/tmclkl/index.html.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 418 20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 419
Hong Kong dollars. The Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities will provide
clearance facilities for goods and passengers respectively using the HZMB. The
HKBCF will be located on an artificial island of about 150 hectares (about 130
hectares for the HKBCF and about 20 hectares for the Tuen Mun–Chek Lap
Kok Link Southern Landfall) reclaimed from the open waters off the north-
east of HKIA, with a project cost of 30.4339 billion Hong Kong dollars. (See
Figure 7.9.)
The landing of the bridge will be next to HKIA and Tung Chung New Town.
With a variety of public transport modes available in the proximity, the HKBCF
will become a multi-modal transportation hub (including HKIA, SkyPier, the
Airport Express Line and the Tung Chung Line). From HKIA, passengers
will be able to go directly to the urban areas via the North Lantau Highway
Connection, or else to Tuen Mun via harbour crossings. Hong Kong’s trans-
port network can be extended northwards to connect with the road network
of Shenzhen, so as to form a ring road network in the PRD region. The western
PRD will fall within a three-hour commuting radius from Hong Kong.
The project will not only release some capacity of the existing roads (including
Tuen Mun Road, Ting Kau Bridge and others), but also offer strong support to
the logistics industry in Lantau. The travelling time between Zhuhai and the Kwai
Chung Container Port and HKIA will be reduced by more than 60 per cent and
80 per cent respectively through the HZMB.90 And the travelling time from the
new economic hinterland of Zhuhai to Hong Kong will be shortened from the
current four hours to 45 minutes. The HZMB will reinforce HKIA as an inter-
national and regional aviation hub by providing an alternative route to HKIA.91
Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL)
In 2000, the government proposed the construction of the Hong Kong
Section of the XRL (initially referred to as ‘Regional Express Link’) in the Rail
Development Strategy 2000. On 22 April 2008, the government invited the
MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) to proceed with the further planning
and design of the XRL Hong Kong Section. On 8 July of the same year, the
LegCo Finance Committee approved the funding for the design and site inves-
tigation of the XRL Hong Kong Section. In October 2008, the proposed Hong
Kong Section of the XRL was announced as one of the ten major infrastructure
projects. The railway scheme of the Hong Kong Section was gazetted under
the Railways Ordinance (Cap. 519) on 28 November and 5 December 2008.
Detailed design commenced in January 2009.92 The scheme was approved on
90
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Related Hong Kong Projects website, http://www.hzmb.hk/tchi/
benefits_transportation.html.
91
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Related Hong Kong Projects website, http://www.hzmb.hk/tchi/
benefits_transportation.html.
92
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Background Brief on Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section)’, LC Paper
No. CB(1)2582/08-09(02), 17 September 2009, p.1.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 419 20/08/2018 16:48
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 420
Source: Ho Pui-yin, Ways to Urbanisation: Post-war Road Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2008, p.297.
Figure 7.9 Plan for the HZMB
20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 421
20 October of the same year, with an estimated cost of 62.4 billion Hong Kong
dollars. On 16 January 2010, the LegCo Finance Committee approved funding
of 66.9 billion Hong Kong dollars,93 including the railway construction cost
(65 billion Hong Kong dollars), non-railway construction cost and special ex
gratia payments in relation to the XRL project (1.9 billion Hong Kong dollars).
The works of the XRL Hong Kong Section commenced at the end of January
2010 and were expected to be completed in 2015.94 On 11 August 2014, the
MTRCL announced that the construction cost would increase from the original
65 billion Hong Kong dollars to 71.52 billion Hong Kong dollars,95 with an extra
amount of around 6.5 billion Hong Kong dollars.96
There was an uproar in society when the government applied for funding
from the Legislative Council for the construction of the XRL in 2009 and 2010.
The sustainability assessment conducted by the government identified various
potential environmental and ecological problems in the short term, including
noise impacts during construction, air and water pollution from works sites,
construction and demolition wastes from tunnel excavation, loss of natural
habitats, impacts on historic and archaeological sites, and landscape and visual
impacts.97 However, the EIA report concluded that the environmental impacts
of the project could be controlled to within established standards and guide-
lines through mitigation measures implemented during construction and
operation.98
Under the project, an emergency rescue station and stabling sidings would be
installed at Choi Yuen Tsuen (CYT) in Shek Kong, causing strong opposition
from the villagers. There were about 150 households in CYT broadly spread-
ing across an area of about 27 hectares. Apart from a few households living in
houses on privately owned building land, most villagers in CYT had their houses
erected on private agricultural land, and about ten households were on unleased
government land.99 They were not eligible for compensation, since they were
93
Ming Pao, 17 January 2010, p.A02.
94
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/database/xrl-in-hk.
html.
95
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/key-
information.html.
96
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Progress and Financial Situation of the Construction of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–
Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)260/14-15(04), November 2014, pp.2–3.
97
Transport and Housing Bureau, ‘Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail
Link Funding Arrangement and Special Rehousing Package’, Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief, October
2009, p. 21, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/tp_rdp/papers/tp_rdp1022-thb200910a-
e.pdf.
98
Transport and Housing Bureau, ‘Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail
Link Funding Arrangement and Special Rehousing Package’, Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief, October
2009, p. 20, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/tp_rdp/papers/tp_rdp1022-thb200910a-
e.pdf.
99
Transport and Housing Bureau, ‘Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail
Link Funding Arrangement and Special Rehousing Package’, Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief, October
2009, p. 11, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/tp_rdp/papers/tp_rdp1022-thb200910a-
e.pdf.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 421 20/08/2018 16:48
422 · MAKING HONG KONG
not landowners. To settle the turmoil, the government approved a special ex
gratia rehousing package for CYT villagers and other parties affected by land
resumption and clearance of sites required under the XRL Hong Kong Section
project, with higher compensation amounts.100 It also assisted the villagers in
identifying land for agricultural resite.
The urban section of the XRL would run by the side of Lin Cheung Road,
passing Hoi Wang Road, Tai Kok Tsui district and Sham Mong Road, before
entering Kam Shan via Lai Chi Kok Interchange. Some residents in Tai Kok
Tsui were worried that the foundations of their old buildings might be affected
by the works. The MTRCL conducted pre-construction condition surveys and
monitoring in a comprehensive manner, and executed a third-party risks insur-
ance policy to cover any liability incurred.101
On 15 April 2014, the government and the MTRCL announced that the
Hong Kong Section of the XRL would be completed by the end of 2016 instead
of within 2015, and the formal completion would be postponed to the end of
2017.102 According to the MTRCL report, the delays occurred at three locations,
i.e. the West Kowloon Terminus North, the Yuen Long tunnel section between
Tsat Sing Kong and Tai Kong Po, and the cross-boundary tunnel section.103
Unforeseen and unfavourable ground conditions were a common primary cause
for the delays, affecting tunnel boring machine (TBM) tunnelling, drill-and-blast
tunnelling, diaphragm wall construction and excavation. Other causes included
contractors’ resources, workmanship and logistic problems, interfacing issues and
coordination problems of contractors, utility diversions, temporary traffic diver-
sion constraints, inclement weather and so on.104 On 30 June 2015, the Secretary
for Transport and Housing quoted the MTRCL’s latest assessment as saying
that the Hong Kong Section of the XRL would not be completed by the end of
2017 and that the commissioning target would be delayed to the third quarter of
2018, including a six-month contingency period.105 As of the end of May 2015,
the overall progress of the project was 70.4 per cent completed, indicating a delay
100
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Background Brief on the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’,
LC Paper No. CB(1)1581/09-10, Meeting on 16 April 2010, p.5.
101
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Background Brief on the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’,
LC Paper No. CB(1)1581/09-10, Meeting on 16 April 2010, p.6.
102
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Updated Background Brief on the Latest Position of the Construction of the Hong Kong Section of the
Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1328/13-14(04), Meeting on
5 May 2014, p.7.
103
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Construction and Commissioning of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong
Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1354/13-14(01), MTR Corporation, May 2014, pp.4–5.
104
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Updated Background Brief on the Latest Position of the Construction of the Hong Kong Section of the
Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1328/13-14(04), Meeting on
5 May 2014, p.12.
105
‘Transcript of STH’s Meet-the-Media Session on XRL Hong Kong Section (1)’, Press Releases, 30 June
2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/30/P201506300850.htm.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 422 20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 423
of 5.8 percentage points compared with the planned progress of 76.2 per cent
stipulated in the MTRCL’s revised schedule for the end of 2017, or a further
delay of 0.8 percentage points compared with the overall progress as at the end of
March 2015 reported by the administration on 19 May of the same year.106 The
cost to complete (CTC) was revised by the MTRCL to 85.3 billion Hong Kong
dollars, including a revised total project cost of 83.2 billion Hong Kong dollars
and a sum of 2.1 billion Hong Kong dollars for contingency. The revised CTC
was 31.23 per cent more than the original entrustment fee of 65 billion Hong
Kong dollars in January 2010, and 19.3 per cent higher than MTRCL’s revised
CTC of 71.5 billion Hong Kong dollars announced in the previous August.107
In 2014, the government indicated that the co-location arrangements would
be adopted at the West Kowloon Terminus of the Hong Kong Section of the
XRL, which would truly unleash the potential of a time-saving express railway.
Under the co-location arrangements, passengers boarding the XRL trains in
Hong Kong would only have to pass through the immigration control points
of Hong Kong and the Mainland at the West Kowloon Terminus once before
boarding and taking the train to all the cities along the national XRL network.
Similarly, XRL passengers embarking in any Mainland city would be able to
travel non-stop to Hong Kong, and pass through the two immigration control
points only upon arrival. In other words, passengers could complete immigra-
tion clearance for both Hong Kong and the Mainland in one go without the
need to disembark for immigration checks en route. This would realise the con-
venience and speediness of the XRL. Additionally, when passengers boarding in
Hong Kong could get off at any XRL station in the Mainland, train deployment
could be more flexible to maximise the benefits of XRL services.
The concept of implementation of the co-location arrangements at the West
Kowloon Terminus is to let Mainland inspecting officers enforce the Mainland’s
immigration and clearance procedures and the related Mainland laws at the
station. The prime concern of implementing the co-location arrangements at a
designated area within the territory of Hong Kong is enabling Mainland officers
to smoothly carry out their inspection duties under the Mainland law (including
those relating to customs, immigration and quarantine matters) within the con-
stitutional framework. The Department of Justice, the Transport and Housing
Bureau, the relevant policy bureaus and departments are actively studying the
above issues and discussing them with their Mainland counterparts. As the work
is rather complex, it takes a longer time to deliberate and examine the related
issues. The relevant work is still under way.108
The XRL will operate in tunnels, which will be constructed by tunnel
boring, or by drill-and-blast methods. The West Kowloon Terminus as well
106
‘STH’s Opening Remarks on XRL Project at LegCo Transport Subcommittee’, Press Releases, 3 July
2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201507/03/P201507030389.htm.
107
‘Transcript of STH’s Meet-the-Media Session on XRL Hong Kong Section (1)’, Press Releases, 30 June
2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/30/P201506300850.htm.
108
‘LCQ6: Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, Press Releases, 3
December 2014, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201412/03/P201412030567.htm.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 423 20/08/2018 16:48
424 · MAKING HONG KONG
as facilities like Shek Kong Stabling Sidings and Emergency Rescue Siding
will be constructed by the cut-and-cover method. The tunnel between Ngau
Tam Mei and Tai Kong Po in San Tin and that between Tse Uk Tsuen in Pat
Heung and Mei Lai Road in Sham Shui Po (via Shek Yam in Kwai Chung)
will be constructed by the drill-and-blast method. The main tunnels in Yau
Tsim Mong, Sham Shui Po and Yuen Long districts will be constructed by
tunnel boring machines.109 Dedicated tunnels can minimise the impacts on
the neighbouring communities, without hindering either existing domestic
services (for example the Airport Express Line, Tung Chung Line and West
Rail Line) or the future XRL.110 The maximum operating speed can reach 200
kilometres per hour, with the maximum frequency of one train every three
minutes, and the capacity to carry up to 10,000 passengers per hour in each
direction.111
The XRL will connect Hong Kong with the largest high-speed rail network
in the world. It is estimated that a population of at least 60 million will reside
within a four-hour journey zone from the West Kowloon Terminus. The social
and cultural exchanges with the Mainland as well as the economic development
in Hong Kong will be greatly enhanced. The XRL will have a total length of
about 140 kilometres linking up Hong Kong with Guangzhou via Futian and
Longhua in Shenzhen and Humen in Dongguan. Its terminus in Guangzhou
will be located at Shibi, the centre of the Guangzhou–Foshan metropolitan area.
The Mainland section of the XRL will start from Shibi and enter Hong Kong
via Huanggang.112 The XRL will facilitate the connectivity of Hong Kong with
cities in the PRD region as well as other major cities in the Mainland, thus
enhancing Hong Kong’s position as a regional hub. The XRL will significantly
reduce the travel time between Hong Kong and Mainland cities. For example,
the railway journey time between Guangzhou and Hong Kong will be halved
from 100 minutes to 48 minutes. The XRL will serve a number of major cities
in the Mainland with frequent and fast through train services. The XRL will
greatly reduce the travel time of Hong Kong residents. More Mainland cities
and regions will be included in the daily commutable area of Hong Kong. The
concept of a one-hour living circle within the PRD region will be realised, which
will also help promote social, economic, cultural and academic exchanges with
the Mainland.
The Hong Kong Section is approximately 26 kilometres long, which will run
from the boundary at Huanggang to West Kowloon Terminus, a commercial,
109
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/construction/cons
truction-methods.html.
110
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig
nment.html.
111
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/key
-information.html.
112
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways,
‘Background Brief on the Implementation of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong
Kong Express Rail Link project’, LC Paper No. CB(1)2170/10-11(01), Paper for Special Meeting on 20 May
2011, May 2011, p.1.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 424 20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 425
retail, hotel and residential hub located at the north of the West Kowloon
Cultural District, and between the Airport Express Kowloon Station and the
West Rail Austin Station. The terminus will be well connected to the city-wide
MTR system and a public transport interchange that will provide links to des-
tinations throughout the city via bus, minibus, taxi and so on.113 It is estimated
that, during the first year from the commencement of passenger services of the
XRL, around 30 per cent of the local population (2.1 million) and almost half
of the workforce (1.7 million) will be within 5 kilometres of the West Kowloon
Terminus. From there, one can change to the MTR and reach commercial
districts such as Tsim Sha Tsui and Central in around 15 minutes by MTR,
and residential districts like Taikoo Shing, Shatin, Tsuen Wan and Yuen Long
in around 30 minutes.114 With the terminus of the XRL Hong Kong Section
nearby, the West Kowloon Cultural District will become easily accessible and
attract more visitors from the Pearl River Delta for arts and cultural activities.
The WKCD will, in turn, increase the passenger volume and enhance the cost-
effectiveness of the XRL.115
The XRL will create approximately 11,000 employment opportunities during
the peak of construction. It will also facilitate growth in other industries such as
catering and retail, tourism, professional services and more, generating numer-
ous employment opportunities for Hong Kong and Mainland cities during
its operation. It is estimated that the XRL will save approximately 42 million
hours of travelling time annually for citizens, bringing up to 87 billion Hong
Kong dollars in economic benefits in 50 years of its operation (based on the
time savings of passengers alone). Besides, the XRL is more environmentally
friendly in terms of energy conservation and reduction in gas emissions. It will
also enhance the sustainable development of Hong Kong.116
Greater Pearl River Delta planning
The Hong Kong–Guangdong Cooperation Joint Conference was set up in 1998 to
strengthen the multifaceted cooperation between the two places. In 2001, China
joined the World Trade Organization and fully opened itself to the world. Hong
Kong ceased to be the only channel by which international funds could enter
the Mainland. After the SARS outbreak in 2003, Hong Kong entered into the
Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)
with Mainland China.117 In 2008, the central government promulgated the Outline
113
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig
nment.html.
114
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig
nment.html.
115
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig
nment.html.
116
Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/
benefits.html.
117
Chan Wing-kit, ‘Planning Vision and Realistic Challenges of Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Integration’,
in Leung Kit Fun Beatrice and Lo Shiu Hing Sonny, eds, Zhujiang sanjiaozhou fazhan yu gangao zhi ronghe
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 425 20/08/2018 16:48
426 · MAKING HONG KONG
of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta, which, for the
first time, included its close cooperation with Hong Kong and Macao in the devel-
opment planning for the PRD region. The Outline stated that Guangdong Province
should develop a system of modern service industries to facilitate Hong Kong as
an international financial centre. It also discouraged vicious competition among
similar sectors in Guangdong Province, especially the PRD region, and Hong Kong
or Macao, while supporting the development of complementary sectors with a
view to expanding the Hong Kong–PRD economic zone. In 2010, the Framework
Agreement for Hong Kong–Guangdong Cooperation was signed,118 with a view to
promoting closer cooperation between the two places.
In the Seventh Plenary of the Hong Kong–Guangdong Cooperation Joint
Conference held in 2004, both sides agreed that stepping up the coordination
in regional planning would be key to realising the full economic potential of the
Greater PRD Region. Both sides agreed to exchange information and views on
city planning and regional development in the process of conducting an advance
study on planning and development and cross-boundary infrastructure projects.
Joint studies were agreed upon on areas of mutual concern. As a result, an Expert
Group on Hong Kong/Guangdong Town Planning and Development was set
up, with a first task of carrying out the Planning Study on the Coordinated
Development of the Greater Pearl River Delta Township (the Greater PRD
Study).119 The Greater PRD Study, as a joint effort between the Guangdong,
Hong Kong and Macao authorities, commenced in early 2006. The study exam-
ined the latest land use pattern, railway and highway proposals, and port and
airport facilities within the Greater PRD Region with the intention of deriv-
ing a development strategy beneficial to the entire region. Important issues of
concern to the governments within the region were addressed, including cross-
boundary infrastructure, environmental quality management, and the coopera-
tion and coordination mechanism. The study also served to provide a platform
for Hong Kong and Guangdong to exchange views on future planning and
development issues.120 The study was completed in 2009 and provided clear def-
initions of the Greater PRD and the PRD. To be specific, the PRD refers to the
cities of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Zhaoqing, Jiangmen,
Dongguan and Zhongshan, while the Greater PRD also includes Hong Kong
and Macao. On 28 October 2009, the Development Bureau and the Planning
Department of Hong Kong, together with Guangdong Provincial Department
of Construction and the Secretariat for Transport and Public Works of Macao,
(Pearl River Delta and Its Integration with Hong Kong and Macao), Hong Kong, City University of Hong
Kong Press, 2014, p.239.
118
Chan Wing-kit, ‘Planning Vision and Realistic Challenges of Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Integration’,
in Leung Kit Fun Beatrice and Lo Shiu Hing Sonny, eds, Zhujiang sanjiaozhou fazhan yu gangao zhi ronghe
(Pearl River Delta and Its Integration with Hong Kong and Macao), Hong Kong, City University of Hong
Kong Press, 2014, pp.239–240.
119
Planning Department, ‘Planning Study on the Coordinated Development of the Greater Pearl River
Delta Township’, Introduction, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/misc/great_prd/outline_c.htm.
120
Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong
Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.168.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 426 20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 427
Table 7.11 Land area and population of the Greater Pearl River Delta (2014)
Pearl River Hong Kong Macao Total
Delta
Land area (km2) 54,643 1,110 29 55,782
Resident population 57,633,800 7,240,000 636,200 65,510,000
Notes: The Pearl River Delta includes Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Zhaoqing, Jiangmen,
Dongguan, Zhongshan and other cities. The Greater Pearl River Delta includes the HKSAR, the Macao Special
Administrative Region, and the cities of the PRD Economic Zone.
Sources: Guangdong Statistical Year Book 2015, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2015; ‘Population’, Hong Kong: The Facts,
Hong Kong SAR Government Information Services Department, 2015, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/
population.pdf; ‘Demographic Statistics 4th Quarter 2014’, Government of Macao Special Administrative Region Statistics and
Census Service, http://www.dsec.gov.mo/c/demo.aspx; http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/%E4%B8
%AD%E5%9C%8B%E7%B6%93%E8%B2%BF%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99/%E7%8F%A0%E4%B8%89%E8%A7%92%
E7%B6%93%E6%BF%9F%E6%A6%82%E6%B3%81/ff/tc/1/1X000000/1X06BW84.htm.
held a joint seminar in Macao for the promulgation of the outcome of the
Greater PRD Study121 and proposed the goals for the three places as follows:
Hong Kong should continue to strengthen its position as an international
metropolis in Asia and develop into one of the world’s most important centres of
modern service industries and a global city with good living quality; Pearl River
Delta should be developed into a world-class base of advanced manufacturing and
modern service industries as well as an important economic centre of China; and
Macao should be developed as the world’s most attractive tourism and recreation
centre as well as commercial and trading services platform.
To achieve these objectives, the study set out a number of cooperation pro-
posals and imminent major tasks in the areas of cross-boundary transportation,
development of cross-boundary areas, ecological/environmental protection,
and coordination mechanisms, with a view to strengthening the coordinated
development among the three places. The town planning authorities of Hong
Kong and Guangdong exchanged information and opinions in the course of the
study. (See Table 7.11.)
In 2008, the State Council promulgated and implemented the Outline of the
Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020).
In February 2009, the governments of the three places jointly undertook the
Study on the Action Plan for Livable Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary (Bay
Area Study),122 a conceptual regional planning study under the established town
planning cooperation mechanisms between Guangdong and Hong Kong and
between Guangdong and Macao. The Bay Area Study was launched in April
2010 to explore ways of facilitating the development of the Bay Area of the Pearl
121
‘Promulgation of the Outcome of the “Planning Study on the Coordinated Development of the
Greater Pearl River Delta Townships”’, Press Releases, 28 October 2009, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/gene
ral/200910/28/P200910270167.htm.
122
http://www.prdbay.com/UploadFile/2015221359494443.pdf.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 427 20/08/2018 16:48
428 · MAKING HONG KONG
River Estuary into a core area of quality living as well as economic prosperity in
the Greater PRD Region.123 The first and second stages of public engagement
for the Bay Area Study were carried out in January 2011 and January 2014,
respectively, for the purpose of public consultation. The Bay Area Study was
completed in December 2014 and proposed focus actions for conservation such
as the ‘Blue Network’ and ‘Green Network’, as well as the provision of a ‘Leisure
and Cultural Bay’ and the promotion of ‘Livable Communities’.
On 31 December 2014, the State Council officially approved the estab-
lishment of the China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone (GDFTZ). The
116.2-square-kilometre GDFTZ includes three areas: the Nansha New Area
of Guangzhou of 60 square kilometres (including the Guangzhou Nansha
Bonded Port Area of 7.06 square kilometres); Qianhai and Shekou in Shenzhen,
having an area of 28.2 square kilometres (including the Shenzhen Qianhai Bay
Bonded Port Area of 3.71 square kilometres); and the Hengqin area of Zhuhai,
covering 28 square kilometres. As the GDFTZ was further opened up on 21
April 2015, Hong Kong, capitalising on CEPA concessions, gained an early
step into the Mainland market in terms of services incidental to manufactur-
ing, telecommunication services, financial services, legal services, and technical
testing and analysis services.124 In the 13th Five-Year Plan promulgated by the
central government in November 2015, the paragraphs relating to the HKSAR
stated that regional cooperation should be strengthened and Guangdong–Hong
Kong cooperation would be of the utmost importance in this regard. On the
principle of achieving mutual benefits through active participation and joint
planning, Guangdong Province intends to draw on Hong Kong’s experience
in economic development and social management services when establishing
the Guangdong–Hong Kong in-depth cooperation zone in Nansha. The Hong
Kong government will provide advice on planning concepts and other areas to
Guangdong.125
Vision for the city
Sustainable development strategy
In 1972, representatives from industrialised and developing nations around the
world were brought together at the UN Conference on the Human Environment
123
Housing and Urban–Rural Development Department, Guangdong Province, Development Bureau and
Planning Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Secretariat for Transport and Public
Works, Macao Special Administrative Region, Study on the Action Plan for Livable Bay Area of the Pearl River
Estuary: Summary of Recommendations, December 2014, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/p_study/com
p_s/pearl_river_stage2/Summary_tc.pdf.
124
China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone website, http://www.china-gdftz.gov.cn/zwgk/qygl/
qyjj/#zhuyao; HKTDC Research website, http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/artic
le/%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%96%87%E7%AB%A0/%E5%BB%A3%E6%9D%B1%E8%87%AA%E8
%B2%BF%E5%8D%80%E7%9A%84%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E6%A9%9F%E9%81%87/rp/tc/1/1X00
0000/1X0A2FJ8.htm.
125
2016 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2016/chi/.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 428 20/08/2018 16:48
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) · 429
in Stockholm. The conference explored the rights people could expect in regard
to a healthy and productive environment, and proposed the concept of sustain-
able development.126 Fifteen years later, in 1987, a report entitled Our Common
Future was published, describing sustainable development as ‘development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gener-
ations to meet their own needs’.127 This definition has since been widely adopted.
In 1989, the Hong Kong government set out a ten-year programme to tackle
environmental problems for the first time, with planning policies formulated for
waste management, water pollution, air pollution, noise pollution, and environ-
mental education.128 It also published a white paper entitled Pollution in Hong
Kong – A Time to Act to address environmental problems ignored in the past due
to the rapid growth in the economy and population.129 Section 6.14 of the white
paper recommended reviewing the Town Planning Ordinance to include envi-
ronmental considerations. It was an early experience for Hong Kong of taking
part in sustainable development.
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
was held in Rio de Janeiro, which resulted in the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development130 and approved Agenda 21, under which participating countries
are committed to establishing sustainable development policies suitable for their
own circumstances.131 China is one of the 178 countries adopting Agenda 21.132
In 1994, the Chinese central government announced its sustainable development
strategies in accordance with Agenda 21.133 In 1997, the Planning Department
commissioned a consultancy study on Sustainable Development for the 21st
Century in Hong Kong (SUSDEV21). In 1999, the Hong Kong government
formed the Council for Sustainable Development to offer advice to the govern-
ment and to enhance the public’s understanding of sustainable development. The
126
Sustainable Development for the 21st Century: Executive Summary, Ch. 5, http://www.pland.gov.hk/
pland_en/p_study/comp_s/susdev/ex_summary/final_chi/ch5.htm.
127
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 1987, http://
www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.
128
Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Government Secretariat, Heading towards Sustainability:
The Third Review of Progress on the 1989 White Paper: Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act, Hong Kong,
Government Printer, 1996, pp.49–52.
129
Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Government Secretariat, Heading towards Sustainability:
The Third Review of Progress on the 1989 White Paper: Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act, Hong Kong,
Government Printer, 1996, p.6.
130
For details of the 27 principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, see https://
zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%87%8C%E7%B4%84%E7%92%B0%E5%A2%83%E8%88%87%E7%99%BC%
E5%B1%95%E5%AE%A3%E8%A8%80.
131
Education Bureau, ‘Sustainable Development’ E-learning Teaching Kit, http://cd1.edb.hkedcity.net/
cd/mce/ESD/esd-definition.htm.
132
Sustainable Development in Hong Kong for the 21st Century: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Government
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 1998, p.5; Post Sustainability Institute, ‘List of the Nations
Who Attended and Agreed to the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Agenda 21)’,
http://www.postsustainabilityinstitute.org/which-nations-signed-agenda-21.html.
133
Sustainable Development in Hong Kong for the 21st Century: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Government
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 1998, p.5.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 429 20/08/2018 16:48
430 · MAKING HONG KONG
government also planned to spend over 30 billion Hong Kong dollars in the fol-
lowing decade to implement various programmes of environmental protection.134
In August 2000, the Planning Department completed the SUSDEV21 Study
based on the opinions of the UN World Commission on Environment and
Development as well as the actual situation in Hong Kong. The goal of sustain-
able development in Hong Kong is to balance social, economic, environmental
and resource needs, for both present and future generations, simultaneously
achieving a vibrant economy, social progress and a high-quality environment,
locally, nationally and internationally, through the efforts of the community and
the government.135 Therefore, sustainable development is more than environ-
mental protection. It involves a balance between economic, social and environ-
mental considerations. SUSDEV21 became an important part of Hong Kong’s
urban planning, with the focus of planning strategies being shifted from social
demands to sustainable development.
The SUSDEV21 Executive Summary136 integrates the concept of sustainable
development into the decision-making process. Starting in 2001, all govern-
ment bureaus and departments were required to comply with the Eight Guiding