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From the High Court’s verdict on the Winfat case, there was a tribunal ‘Tenth
Statement’ agreed by the Privy Council to affirm the verdict of the Winfat case,
that the land could be used for warehouses or a car park before resumption
without the need to seek approval from the government.213
On the closing day of the Winfat case, the government spokesperson stated
that a lot of agricultural lands in the New Territories would apply to change
their land use if the government lost the case. Therefore, the government ‘would
consider whether to use legislation to maintain how the government has been
controlling land use in the New Territories’. The spokesperson also stated that
there were town planning ordinances in most countries and that it would be ‘a
feasible measure’.214
This discussion of the above disputes on changing land use in the New
Territories has explained the difficulty in opening up the New Territories. The
government could not afford the time and investment capital needed to resume
land for development. Apart from the opposition from indigenous inhabitants,
the involvement of property developers had to be taken into account. The results
of the appeal forced the government to amend the Town Planning Ordinance to
provide a legal basis for New Territories planning in the future.
Amending the Town Planning Ordinance
In 1987, the government conducted a comprehensive review of the Town Planning
Ordinance. In early 1988, the government had established an advisory committee
to facilitate the review, and had decided to redraft the statute on town planning
using the Town Planning Ordinance of 1939 as a blueprint. In June 1990, the gov-
ernment published the Consultative Document on Interim Amendments to the
Town Planning Ordinance, and began a six-month public consultation from July
1990. The Document listed out controversial issues at the time, such as the Town
Planning Ordinance’s lack of power over areas outside urban districts. There was
an urgency to enact laws that govern land in the New Territories so as to regulate
private development outside of the new towns.215 Without strengthened govern-
ing measures, it was difficult to achieve planning goals.216 The statute itself did not
confer the Town Planning Board with such power. Moreover, the Town Planning
Board itself already had a heavy workload. Should its work extend to the rural areas
in the New Territories, the Town Planning Board would need to hand over part
of its work to the committees under it or the Director of Planning to ensure effi-
ciency.217 The Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance of 1991, which was passed
213
Roger Nissim, Land Administration and Practice in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University
Press, 2012, p.20.
214
Hong Kong Standard, 30 April 1983.
215
Planning Department, Consultative Document: Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance,
Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990, p.2.
216
Planning Department, Consultative Document: Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance,
Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990, p.2.
217
Planning Department, Consultative Document: Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance,
Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990, p.2.
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on 23 January 1991, gave the Town Planning Board power to make plans and des-
ignate certain areas as ‘development permission areas’. Unless otherwise specified
or provided in the plans, any development within these areas would have to apply
for permission in accordance with section 16 of the Town Planning Ordinance.218
According to section 20(5) of the ordinance, a ‘development permission area’
plan would be valid for three years, and its validity might be extended by one year
with the Governor’s permission. The planning of land uses included village-type
development, agricultural or other designated rural uses, areas or regions of open
storage, country park, coastal protection area, Site of Special Scientific Interest,
green belt or other specified uses for promoting environmental conservation or
protection.219 The ordinance contained enforcement provisions against unauthor-
ised developments within a development permission area,220 which aimed to stop
incompatible and inappropriate land uses in rural areas in the New Territories
from spreading. Section 22 of the ordinance provided that the Director of Planning
might, without warrant or notice but at a reasonable time, and with the consent of
the occupier or person in charge of the premises, enter land and any premises on
it for the purposes of posting a notice and verifying an unauthorised development.
Where a magistrate was satisfied that there was unauthorised development, the
magistrate might issue a warrant authorising entry into such land or premises,
and the relevant individuals of such land or premises must offer assistance.221 The
Director of Planning (the Planning Authority) was empowered by the ordinance
to take enforcement action against unauthorised development.222
Before the amendment of the ordinance in 1991, areas for which the Town
Planning Board had prepared outline zoning plans were mainly new towns,
including Tsuen Wan, Kwai Chung, Tsing Yi, Sha Tin, Ma Wan, South Lantau
Coast, Tai Po, Tuen Mun, Fanling, Sheung Shui, West Tsuen Wan, Yuen Long,
Ma On Shan, Tseung Kwan O and Tin Shui Wai. After the 1991 amendment,
the Governor gave directions on 10 March 1991 authorising the Town Planning
Board to prepare 30 draft development permission area plans for areas that had
been covered by interim development permission area plans previously (in
1990). The government had consulted the relevant district councils, rural com-
mittees and village representatives on the preparation of these draft plans in
April, May and June of 1991, and had subsequently conveyed such opinions to
the Town Planning Board. The draft plans were gazetted on 12 July 1991 for
the public’s inspection. These plans covered 14,300 hectares of rural land,223
218
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1992, p.14.
219
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1992, p.14.
220
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1992, p.14.
221
Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.A28.
222
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1992, p.15.
223
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1992, p.28.
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and some 30 areas: Kwun Yam Shan and Fa Sum Hang, Ho Chung, Pak Kong,
Sha Kok Mei, Pak Sha Wan, Tseng Lan Shue, Shap Sze Heung, Fu Tei Au and
Sha Ling, Ting Kok, Luk Keng and Wo Hang, Man Uk Pin, Lung Yeuk Tau and
Kwan Tei South, Ping Che and Ta Kwu Ling, Kwu Tung North, Kwu Tung
South, Ping Kong, Kau Lung Hang, San Tin, Ngau Tam Mei, Pat Heung, Lam
Tsuen, Mai Po and Fairview Park, Nam Sang Wai, Kam Tin North, Kam Tin
South, Shek Kong, Lau Fau Shan and Tsim Bei Tsui, Ha Tsuen, Tai Tong, and
Sheung Pak Nai and Ha Pak Nai. Up to 2015, the Town Planning Board had
exhibited 76 development permission area plans, most of which had since been
replaced by outline zoning plans. (See Figures 5.9 and 5.10.)
Before the Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 was passed, the
Town Planning Board’s jurisdiction only covered the current urban areas as well
as regions that could be developed into urban areas.224 All of the government’s
control over land uses in rural and village areas was effected through the conditions
in Crown leases and the government’s administrative measures. According to the
Block Crown Lease, any farmland owner might change the land’s use without
obtaining the permission of others (the owner’s neighbours, the local village head
and the Land Office), provided that the user did not carry out building works,
employ offensive or noxious substances, or undertake illegal activities.225
After the amendment of the ordinance, new development permission area
plans were made for rural areas in the New Territories, providing interim plan-
ning control and development guidance for areas pending the preparation of
outline zoning plans. Any development on land falling within the boundaries
of these development permission area plans must first obtain permission from
the Town Planning Board unless otherwise specified or provided in the plans.
The land use zonings specified in development permission area plans were
not as detailed as those in outline zoning plans, with many areas marked as
‘Unspecified Uses’.226 As the development permission area plans were only
meant to be a form of interim control measure, they were valid for only three
years, after which they would have to be replaced by outline zoning plans.227 This
was the government’s provisional measure for exerting control over land use in
the New Territories.
On 18 July 1991, the Town Planning Ordinance was again amended,228 to
introduce an appeal mechanism. An Appeal Board was established, in place of
petitions to the Governor in Council, to process appeals against decisions made
by the Town Planning Board in relation to planning applications. Any person
who was aggrieved by a decision on a review by the Appeal Board under section
224
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1992, p.28.
225
Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 31 October 1990, p.199.
226
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1994, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1995, p.18.
227
Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1992, p.28.
228
Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, pp.A745–A748.
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Source: Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.33.
Figure 5.9 Area covered by development permission area plans in the New Territories (1991)
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Source: Town Planning Board, ‘Coverage of OZPs and DPA Plans’, http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/tc/list_of_plans/coverage_enlarge.html (accessed 4 December 2015).
Figure 5.10 Area covered by statutory plans in Hong Kong (2015)
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Approaching the handover (1979–1997) · 295
17 might lodge, within 60 days after notification of the Board’s decision under
section 17(6), a notice of appeal.
After this, no major amendment was made to the relevant statutes. In 1995, the
fine for unauthorised developments was raised from 100,000 to 500,000 Hong
Kong dollars on first offence and 1 million Hong Kong dollars on repeated offenc-
es.229 In 2004, regulatory functions were enhanced by giving greater enforcement
powers to the Director of Planning, who acts as the planning authority, allowing
the Director of Planning to intensify enforcement actions. The time required to
act on unauthorised developments was also reduced, as the Planning Department
no longer had to wait for the planning application process to be completed before
taking enforcement or prosecution actions. As a result, the number of unauthor-
ised developments gradually fell, and the area of land used by unauthorised devel-
opments also fell, from 185 hectares in 1995 to 125 hectares in 2006.230 In 2007,
around 603 hectares of land was designated for open storage and port back-up use
to address the demands of the industry. Of this, 372 hectares of land was located
in the north-west of the New Territories (primarily in Ngau Tam Mei, Pat Heung,
San Tin and Ha Tsuen), while the rest (231 hectares) was situated in the north-
east of the New Territories (primarily in Ping Che and Ta Kwu Ling).231
The New Territories have a greater area than urban areas, possessing land
resources that would allow the city to expand its borders. Before the handover,
the indigenous residents had hoped that the HKSAR government would rein-
state the rights of owners of New Territories land according to Qing law, includ-
ing the freedom to decide on land use, and that, even if it were necessary to apply
for a change in land use, there would not be a high additional premium. As New
Territories land became commercialised, its price had been on the rise since the
1920s. The owners of such land were also no longer limited to indigenous resi-
dents of the New Territories. Private developers with financial resources over time
began to own large amounts of New Territories land by way of land exchange enti-
tlements and found themselves becoming part of New Territories land use dis-
putes, thus further complicating the issues regarding New Territories land.
Summary
Hong Kong’s planning at the end of the 1970s was at first a response to the
implementation of the reform and opening-up policy in China, adjusting Hong
Kong’s economic structure and transforming the post-war focus on develop-
ment of manufacturing industry to the enhancement of entrepôt trade and
financial activities. The planning and construction of the new airport by the
229
Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1995, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, p.B1342.
230
Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, Planning for Open Storage and Port Back-up
Uses in the Rural New Territories, April 2007, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/
papers/plw0424cb1-1410-5-e.pdf.
231
Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, Planning for Open Storage and Port Back-up
Uses in the Rural New Territories, April 2007, p.2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/
papers/plw0424cb1-1410-5-e.pdf.
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296 · MAKING HONG KONG
government was aimed at improving port facilities to promote Hong Kong’s
economic development through foreign trade. As Governor Wilson said, it was
not a novelty that Hong Kong was affected by its external environment, nor was
it something the people of Hong Kong could control.
At the beginning of the 1980s, China and Britain began talks on the return
of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997. When British hopes for the right
to rule in exchange for sovereignty did not come to fruition, the British felt that
the efforts they had expended in Hong Kong in the past had gone to waste. If
the British could have no further role in what they had considered to be a com-
mercial stronghold for Britain in the Far East region, why should they continue
to invest in the long-term planning of Hong Kong? The colonial government
thus promptly called off plans for building a new airport, opting instead for the
expansion of Kai Tak Airport to address short-term needs. The government did
indeed realise that the expanded airport would bring tremendous transportation
and population pressure to Kowloon. However, it repeatedly refused to develop
large-scale infrastructure, using financial deficiency as an excuse.
The democracy movement incidents in May and June of 1989 yet again plunged
Hong Kong’s economy into a trough. Many believed that the government had
used the Rose Garden Project to roll out large-scale works and regain the confi-
dence of the people of Hong Kong as well as the world’s confidence in Hong Kong.
This was because not only could the works create a lot of jobs and lower the unem-
ployment rate among the lower classes, but the Airport Core Programme also
required professional personnel, thus helping with retaining professional talent
and alleviating the rapidly escalating wave of emigration, maybe even encouraging
emigrants to return. Past experience had shown the government that rolling out
large-scale works had been an effective solution when facing an economic crisis.
Some also said that the government had had plans to reintroduce the new airport
project since as early as October 1987, but that the timing just happened to coin-
cide with the political events in China in May and June 1989.
One thing that could not be ignored was the issue of financing. The Airport
Core Programme would involve huge expenditure, and the government had
been considering how to use private investment to solve the shortage of funds
so that, as with previous large-scale works, the government would be able to
achieve its objective with minimum investment on its part. In November 1986,
the government considered Western Harbour – Strategic Proposal for Lantau
Island Development, a proposal submitted to the government by the three major
consortiums, Hopewell, Cheung Kong and Hutchison Whampoa, which would
mean accepting 25 billion Hong Kong dollars investment from the private
sector. On 4 July 1991, the government announced that the planned expendi-
ture for the Airport Core Programme would be 98.6 billion Hong Kong dollars,
of which 54 billion Hong Kong dollars would come from the government.232
The government would further provide 17 billion Hong Kong dollars, while the
232
E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong,
Government Printer, 1991, p.75.
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Approaching the handover (1979–1997) · 297
Airport Authority would be responsible for 16.5 billion Hong Kong dollars, with
only about 11 billion Hong Kong dollars’ worth of private investment. Not only
did the government not accept the proposal of the three consortiums, but it was
able to raise over 70 billion Hong Kong dollars in funds within a few years, dem-
onstrating a surprisingly robust hidden prowess in arranging financing. From
the discussion above, it can be seen that long-term planning required a large
amount of funds, and the economic strength of the Hong Kong government
at the end of the 1980s should not be underestimated. It also became apparent
that, at the time, the British intended to leave a good impression of their colonial
governing history in Hong Kong for the people of Hong Kong as well as the
world. No matter what the intent of the British, it was Hong Kong’s people who
benefited the most. It could be said that politics was what terminated the new
airport programme, but it was also politics that gave the new airport programme
new life.
With a sizeable transportation network, the city was able to expand in scale.
Such an expansion in scale extended the city’s reach from its two cores to the
New Territories, and one of the most difficult issues encountered in the process
was the issue of land use in the New Territories. After almost a century of
development, ownership of New Territories land had changed hands numer-
ous times, from indigenous residents to the post-war immigrants, and from the
clans to individuals and subsequently to private developers. From the building
of Small Houses to private estates and the running of container yards, the issue
not only was immensely complicated, but also proved to be the largest obstacle
for the city’s long-term planning.
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6
Transformation after the
return to China (1997–2015)
We believe that in order to meet sustainability challenges, local governments need
to re-define their roles by providing an enabling local environment, promoting
ethical conduct, transparency and accountability in city administration, fighting
corruption and encouraging participation of citizens in policy discussion, decision-
making and implementation, and raising awareness of sustainable development
through education, taking into account the national and local circumstances. We
underscore a functioning legal system as an essential component of effective urban
governance and as a solid foundation for ensuring citizen participation. (Hong
Kong Declaration on Sustainable Development for Cities, 2004)
Hong Kong returned to China on 1 July 1997 after 155 years of British rule.
The political ideas of ‘one country, two systems’ and ‘Hong Kong people ruling
Hong Kong’ are the governing ideal of the HKSAR Government. Should the
long-term planning of the city be adapted to the overall development of China?
For urban planning at a historical turning point, what should we change and
what should we keep? And what were the principles and development charac-
teristics of Hong Kong’s urban planning before 1997? Those questions linger
in the minds of Hong Kong people. Roger Bristow, a famous geographer, once
asserted that Hong Kong did not have urban planning at all before the Second
World War. Many experts believed that the idea of long-term urban planning
for the city only started in the 1950s, mainly inspired by the preliminary report
of Sir Patrick Abercrombie, a British town planner, in 1948. In the 1950s, the
Hong Kong government started systematic field inspections and data collection
in various regions. After the views of different departments were coordinated,
urban development plans for ten years or more were drafted in line with popula-
tion growth and economic development. Be it the Hong Kong Outline Plan in the
1960s or the ten-year Housing Programme and the preparation programme for
the new international airport in the 1970s, they all aimed at catering to the needs
of population and economic growth. Those plans, intended for a period of more
than a decade, focused on the development of land, transportation, housing and
other aspects. They were considered the key to the take-off and rapid growth of
the city’s economy, featuring the principles and development characteristics of
town planning in the territory.
Did the experience in urban planning continue to apply after the 1997
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Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015) · 299
handover? Could planning programmes that were developed one or two
decades earlier be implemented step by step? Should town planning be led by
the government or driven by the people? Is it positive or negative to have a rapid
pace of development? Could pre-war expedient policies keep up with social
developments? These were the questions and challenges for the implementation
of pre-established programmes in 1997.
Historical turning point
In the 1980s, China and the United Kingdom conducted negotiations on
Hong Kong’s handover in 1997. On 19 December 1984, the Sino-British Joint
Declaration was signed, affirming that the government of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with
effect from 1 July 1997. The declaration set out, among other things, the basic
policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong. Under the principle of ‘one country,
two systems’, the Chinese government ensure that the PRC’s socialist system
and policies will not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) and that Hong Kong’s existing capitalist system and lifestyle
will remain unchanged for 50 years. The declaration, however, did not stabilise
the political situation in Hong Kong. Instead, it led to Sino-British disputes
over Hong Kong’s political reform and the special administrative region’s fiscal
reserves after the handover. The philosophy of basing urban planning purely on
economic development or people’s livelihood was shaken by political disputes.
After Hong Kong’s handover on 1 July 1997, the government of the HKSAR
made no significant changes to the city’s direction of development for the sake
of political stability.
Economic crisis and long-term housing planning
In the 1980s, the government had two major planning priorities: the Territorial
Development Strategy (TDS) and the ten airport core projects. In 1982 the gov-
ernment even divided the territory into different sub-regions: North West New
Territories, North East New Territories, Tseung Kwan O–Sai Kung (renamed
South East New Territories in 1985), Lantau Island (renamed South West New
Territories in 1985) and the Urban Area (renamed the Metro Area in 1985).
The Lands and Works Branch in 1988 stipulated comprehensive land use plans
for the sub-regions in the New Territories. The TDS was revised in 1986 and
1988 after several rounds of public consultations. In 1988, the government
published Metroplan: The Aims, which served as the blueprint for Hong Kong’s
top ten infrastructure projects and guidelines for the city’s development in the
1990s. On 24 February 1998, the TDS was approved by the Executive Council
and became the Territorial Development Strategy Review (TDSR), with further
in-depth discussions on metropolitan development and new development area
planning. (See Figure 6.1.)
In 1985 the government published Planning for Growth, which assessed the
population distribution and employment potential in the five sub-regions by
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Source: Planning Department, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Quick Reference, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.10.
Figure 6.1 Boundaries of the five sub-regions
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Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015) · 301
Table 6.1 Assessment of population distribution and employment potential in the
sub-regions
Sub-regions Estimated Additional Overall Jobs
population in population population (No. (%))
1996 capacity capacity
(No. (%)) (No. (%)) (No. (%))
Metropolitan Area 4,055,600 1,341,800 5,397,400 2,426,200
(66) (41) (57) (75)
North West New 838,700 546,000 1,384,700 324,700
Territories (14) (17) (14) (10)
North East New 1,022,500 554,800 1,577,300 394,700
Territories (16) (17) (17) (12)
South West New 56,700 700,000 756,700 14,300
Territories (1) (21) (8) (0.4)
South East New 206,200 142,000 348,200 75,600
Territories (3) (4) (4) (2)
Total 6,179,700 3,284,600 9,464,300 3,235,500
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Source: Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Planning for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1985, pp.10, 19.
1996. According to the estimates, the full development of the sub-regions would
provide about 4,400 hectares of new land to accommodate an additional popu-
lation of 3.3 million. The planned population in the urban areas and new towns
was estimated to be up to 9.5 million.1 (See Table 6.1.)
The figures in Table 6.1 show that the Metro Area remained the focus of
development as in previous policies. The planned population in the Metro Area
would account for 57 per cent of the total, which, despite a 9 per cent decrease
from the initial plan of 66 per cent, would make the sub-region the most densely
populated one in Hong Kong. Job opportunities available in the Metro Area
would also account for more than 75 per cent of the total. The Metro Area was
expected to maintain its leadership in the city’s development. Meanwhile, the
figures in Table 6.1 also indicate an ongoing movement of population to the
New Territories (especially South West New Territories).
Annual level of housing production
As the population was estimated to continue to increase after 1997, it became the
government’s top priority to address the housing problem. After the handover in
1997, the first Chief Executive promptly put forward a long-term housing devel-
opment policy in his Policy Address, announcing the construction of a minimum
of 85,000 housing units on average per year in the following decade, including
1
Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Planning for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1985,
pp.10, 19.
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302 · MAKING HONG KONG
50,000 public housing units. At the same time, the Housing Authority introduced
the Tenants Purchase Scheme to enable public rental housing tenants to purchase
their own flats, with the aim of boosting economic stability and development
with a stable housing supply. In 1998, the government published the White Paper
on Long Term Housing Strategy, reaffirming that the production target of 85,000
housing units per annum would be one of its ‘top priorities’ in 1999–2000. The
Financial Secretary subsequently set up the Steering Committee on Land Supply
to assist the implementation of the housing target. The Committee developed a
13-year rolling programme for flat production, which was even longer than the
ten-year Housing Programme launched by Governor Murray MacLehose. The
Committee was expected to monitor housing production and land supply, to
provide proposed infrastructure related to housing development, and to formu-
late measures to monitor the planning of development areas.
In line with the expected housing production requirements of the Long Term
Housing Strategy and to fulfil the Chief Executive’s commitment to building at
least 85,000 housing units each year, the Planning Department conducted a large-
scale integrated planning and development study in North West New Territories,
North East New Territories, Hong Kong Island South/Lamma Island and other
areas. Tin Shui Wai was one of the areas for which there were changes to the
development blueprint. The area covered about 430 hectares, with a development
zone of 220 hectares in the southern part to house 200,000 people, and about 210
hectares in the northern part. The Planning Department reserved about 70 hec-
tares in Tin Shui Wai for residential housing development.2 According to the
1997 Tin Shui Wai Outline Zoning Plan (OZP), the area was originally intended
to house 325,000 people. The Town Planning Board, however, amended the
Tin Shui Wai OZP after the government set out the target of 85,000 housing
units. The 1998 OZP indicated full-scale development for Tin Shui Wai and set
a target population of 349,000. There were 150,000 people in Tin Shui Wai in
1999. The administration planned to spend 30.59 billion Hong Kong dollars
on the development of Tin Shui Wai North in order to attract another 199,000
people.3 Unfortunately, before the government amended the development
plans for various areas, the target of increasing the annual housing supply became
unachievable owing to the Asian financial turmoil.
It all began on 2 July 1997 when Thailand adopted a floating exchange rate
system, which led to a significant drop of 17 per cent in the value of the baht
against the US dollar. The volatility of the Thai baht also made the Philippine
peso, the Indonesian rupiah and the Malaysian ringgit vulnerable targets for
international speculators. The financial crisis in South-east Asia quickly spread
to Hong Kong. The local stock market plunged in October 1997.4 International
2
Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report, Hong Kong, Planning
Department, 1997, pp.36–37.
3
Tin Shui Wai/Yuen Long Development Programme, 1999/2000 edition, Hong Kong, North West New
Territories Development Office, Territory Development Office, 2000, p.1.20.
4
Yuan Qiushi, comp. and ed., Xianggang huigui yilai dashiji, 1997–2002 (Chronology of Hong Kong since
Its Return, 1997–2002), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 2003, p.37.
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Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015) · 303
speculators attacked Hong Kong’s linked exchange rate system. By massive
short-selling of the Hong Kong dollar on the currency, stock and futures
markets, they forced the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to squeeze the money
market and accordingly pushed up the interbank interest rates, waiting to see a
drastic drop in the stock market. Then the speculators built up substantial short
positions in the futures market, from which they benefited.5 With the inter-
est rate surge caused by the currency crisis, property prices slumped by more
than 30 per cent.6 The property market even started a six-year downward cycle
and did not hit the bottom until the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
outbreak in 2003. Compared with the base value of 100 in July 1997, the Centa-
City Leading Index (CCL), which tracks second-hand property prices, dropped
to nearly 30 in 2003, when there were more than 100,000 negative equity cases
across the territory.
Before the recession in the property market, the Panel on Planning, Lands
and Works (PLW Panel) and the Panel on Housing of the Legislative Council
focused on ensuring sufficient land supply and steady long-term housing devel-
opment so as to keep property prices affordable. After the property slump in
1997, the focus was changed to ensuring the stability of the property market.
Some even argued that the government should reposition its policy to stabilise
the property market.7
Public confidence in the property market continued to fall after the Asian
financial crisis. In view of the additional pressure of the Home Ownership
Scheme (HOS) on property sales, the government suspended the sale of HOS
flats in September 2001. In November 2002, the government announced it
would cease the production and sale of subsidised flats and drastically reduce
its share in housing production. It would only continue to provide subsidised
rental housing for low-income families and maintain the average waiting time
for public rental housing (PRH) at three years. On 13 November 2002, the
government even announced that it would stop all scheduled land auctions
and suspend the Application List System until the end of 2003, in order to
boost public confidence in the property market. In January 2004, the gov-
ernment decided to resume the Application List System, which would serve
as the only means of triggering new land auctions.8 Despite the preliminary
pick-up in the property market in the same year, the government still main-
tained a prudent housing policy and was in no hurry to resume the sale of
HOS flats. It was not until 2007 that the Housing Authority resumed the sale
of the approximately 16,000 remaining HOS flats in phases. Property prices
5
Chen Jingxiang, ed., Xianggang jinrong fengyun 40 zai (40 Years of Hong Kong Finance), Hong Kong,
Hong Kong Economic Journal Co.; Enrich Publishing, 2013, p.190.
6
Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong, translated by Yan Shi-min, Hong Kong, Enrich
Publishing; Hong Kong Economic Journal Co., 2010, p.79.
7
Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Background Brief on Government’s Land Supply Strategy with
Particular Reference to the Application List System’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1128/05-06(04), 27 March 2006,
p.4, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw0328cb1-1128-4c.pdf.
8
Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Information Note: Land Supply in Hong Kong’, 21 March 2006, p.7,
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/chinese/sec/library/0506in20c.pdf.
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304 · MAKING HONG KONG
in Hong Kong surged after 2009, which led to increasing public demand for
public housing. To meet the aspirations of low- and middle-income families
to buy their own homes, in October 2011 the government announced the full
resumption of the Home Ownership Scheme and the enhancement of the
My Home Purchase Plan,9 which eventually marked an end to the property
slump.
In the face of different challenges after the handover, the government’s policy
attempt of increasing the supply of residential housing was reduced to passive
actions. It just catered and adapted to the demand and supply in the property
market, with hardly any breakthrough. After all, Hong Kong’s overall economy
has been dependent on the real estate sector since the first land auction in 1841.
The property market serves as both an indicator of economic growth and a
stable stream of revenues for the government. Therefore, it would be difficult
to achieve a steady growth of the overall economy against a substantial fall in
the property market. After witnessing a 70 per cent drop in property prices in
2003 compared with 1997 and 100,000 negative equity cases in the territory, the
government became more prudent and cautious to avoid any major increase in
the supply of public housing. Its long-term housing planning was significantly
slowed down as well owing to the impacts.
The Protection of the Harbour Ordinance
Whenever there is economic recession, the government unveils stimulus meas-
ures featuring major infrastructure projects. According to past experience, land
reclamation not only created jobs but also provided proceeds from land sales.
During the property market slump, land reclamation brought in a steady source
of revenue for the Treasury despite the low land premiums. The government,
however, did not anticipate public objections to reclamation after the hando-
ver. In the 1980s, the Town Planning Office listed ten ‘strategic growth areas’
for reclamation projects in the Territorial Development Strategy Review, which
were Au Tau/Kam Tin/Yuen Long South, Central/Wan Chai Reclamation,
Fanling North/Kwu Tung, Tseung Kwan O, Tung Chung/Tai Ho, Hong Kong
Island South, Green Island Reclamation, South East Kowloon, Tsuen Wan Bay
Further Reclamation and West Kowloon Reclamation, in order to build more
than 470,000 housing units (roughly equivalent to 22 per cent of the number
of units in 1998) for about 1.6 million people.10 Some strategic growth areas,
such as Kai Tak (South East Kowloon), Green Island, Tseung Kwan O, Tung
Chung, Tai Ho, Tsuen Wan Bay Further Reclamation, and Central and Wan
Chai Reclamation, would also help address medium-term housing needs and
9
Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Updated Background Brief on Re-launching of the Home Ownership
Scheme and Tenants Purchase Scheme Prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (Position as at 8
March 2012)’, LC Paper No. CB(1) 1259/11-12(04), 8 March 2012, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/
chinese/panels/hg/papers/hg0314cb1-1259-4-c.pdf.
10
Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Hong Kong 50th Anniversary, Hong Kong, Planning
Department, 1998, pp.57, 80.
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Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015) · 305
traffic problems.11 Among all those areas with needs for site formation and recla-
mation, the Metro Area featured a tighter schedule.
In the mid-1980s, the government formulated the Study on Harbour
Reclamation and Urban Growth and the TDS. Reclamation of Victoria Harbour
was carried out to obtain about 1,000 hectares of new land to accommodate
major offices, hotels and residential development as well as major urban parks,12
so that the Metro Area could take on a new look. Details of the reclamation
projects in the 1980s and the 1990s were published in the Study on Harbour
Reclamation and Urban Growth in 1983, the TDS in 1994, the Metroplan in
1991 and the TDS Review in 1996.13 The projects were subsequently carried out
by the Land Development Policy Committee upon completion of the feasibility
study in 1989. (See Figure 6.2.)
In 1995, the Society for Protection of the Harbour (SPH) was founded as
a non-governmental organisation for the purpose of protecting and preserv-
ing Victoria Harbour. It considered Victoria Harbour to be a valuable natural
landscape with significant economic and social values. It opposed reclamation
works at the harbour, claiming that such works would affect the marine eco-
system, undermine maritime traffic safety and turn the harbour into a narrow
river. It requested that the government immediately stop all reclamation projects,
ushering in the controversies on reclamation. In September 1995, the Planning,
Environment and Lands Branch (PELB) tried to communicate the government’s
point of view to the public. In December of the same year, it published Land for
Urban Growth: The Role of Reclamation, The Quest for Lands, Hong Kong: A City
of Vision and The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour
Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong. In these publications, the
PELB explained that, when carrying out the reclamation projects, the govern-
ment needed to consider a number of factors, including the population increase,
the rising housing needs, the shortage of land for subsidised housing, the need for
land for the sustainable development of Hong Kong as an international centre
of finance and information processing, the high costs of land resumption in the
New Territories, and the cost-effectiveness of reclamation projects in the Metro
Area.14 The government needed to balance all those factors, as well as the inter-
ests of various stakeholders in society, without taking any actions in haste.
In 1996, the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance (PHO) was submitted as a
private member’s bill by Legislative Councillor Christine Loh to the Legislative
Council and was passed in June 1997. Section 3 of the PHO, with the ‘presump-
tion against reclamation in the harbour’, stipulates that:
11
Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report, Hong Kong, Planning
Department, 1997, p.34.
12
Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press,
1996, p.350.
13
Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Central and Wan Chai Reclamation: Background Brief’, LC Paper
No. CB(1) 921/04-05(02), 21 February 2005, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/plw/
papers/plw0222cb1-921-2c.pdf.
14
Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press,
1996, pp.353, 362.
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Source: The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, p.7.
Figure 6.2 Reclamation projects committed, proposed and under investigation (1990s)
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(1) Th
e harbour is to be protected and preserved as a special public asset and a
natural heritage of Hong Kong people, and for that purpose there shall be a
presumption against reclamation in the harbour. (Amended 75 of 1999 s.4)
(2) All public officers and public bodies shall have regard to the principle stated
in subsection (1) for guidance in the exercise of any powers vested in them.
The enactment of the PHO made it impossible to carry out the pending
reclamation projects in the Metro Area as scheduled, including those at Tsuen
Wan Bay, Kowloon Point, Tsim Sha Tsui East, South East Kowloon and Green
Island, as well as Central Reclamation (CR) Phase III (CRIII) and Wan Chai
Reclamation (WR) Phase II (WRII). It also led to the suspension of the origi-
nal development plans for Green Island, South East Kowloon (Kai Tak Airport
site) and others. However, works which had commenced prior to the enact-
ment, including the projects of CRI, CRII and WRI, as well as ancillary facili-
ties for the new airport (Airport Express Line) and the development of the
Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre, would be completed by 1998
as scheduled.15 And the land reclaimed would account for about 44 per cent
of the original total proposed in the Metro Area. Besides, it was necessary to
increase the plot ratios for some completed projects owing to the smaller recla-
mation areas, in order to alleviate the problem of land shortage.16 (See Tables
6.2 and 6.3.)
Table 6.2 Land reclamation projects implemented as scheduled before 1997
Reclamation project Area
(hectares)
Container Terminal No. 9 90
West Kowloon Reclamation 334
Stonecutters Island Naval Base 12
Hung Hom Bay Reclamation 35
Belcher Bay Reclamation 13
Central Reclamation Phase I 20
Central Reclamation Phase II 5.3
Wan Chai Reclamation Phase I 7
Aldrich Bay Reclamation 10
Total 526.3
Sources: Hong Kong Government Information Services, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995–1997; Nyaw
Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1996, p.362; The Shape
of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong,
Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, pp.58–59.
15
Central and Wan Chai Reclamation website, last modified 23 March 2012, http://www.devb.gov.hk/
reclamation/tc/basic/plans_and_maps/project/.
16
Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press,
1996, pp.362–363.
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Table 6.3 Land reclamation projects to be suspended in 1997
Reclamation project Area
(hectares)
Tsuen Wan Bay Reclamation 30
Kowloon Point Reclamation 48
Tsim Sha Tsui East Reclamation 6
Kowloon Bay Reclamation 300
Green Island Reclamation 186
Central Reclamation Phase III 32
(reduced to 18 ha in 2003)
Wan Chai Reclamation Phase 48
(reduced to 12.7 ha in 2009)
Total 650
(reduced to 600.7 ha)
Sources: Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Item for Public Works Subcommittee of Finance Committee’, Paper No. PWSC(2008–
09)51, 15 December 2008, p.1, www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/fc/pwsc/papers/p08-51c.pdf; Hong Kong Legislative
Council, ‘Item for Public Works Subcommittee of Finance Committee’, Paper No. PWSC(2009–10)53, 10 June 2009, p.1, http://
www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/fc/pwsc/papers/p09-53c.pdf; Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong
Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1996, p.363; The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour
Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, pp.58–59.
Central and Wan Chai Reclamation
The project affected the most by the PHO was the Central–Wan Chai Bypass,
which was intended to urgently address the traffic congestion problems in
Central, followed by the South East Kowloon development plan. Both areas
needed redevelopment. The Central and Wan Chai Reclamation drew the
most public attention. It allowed the whole community to have an in-depth
reflection on the balance between the social values of heritage and the needs of
economic development. The proposed Central and Wan Chai Reclamation con-
sisted of three development areas separated by parks, namely Central, Tamar
and Exhibition Centre. These development works were divided into five phases:
three phases for Central and two phases for Wan Chai. The development focus
and details are set out in Table 6.4.
On 29 May 1998, the Draft Central District (Extension) OZP No. S/
H24/1, including about 38 hectares of land for reclamation (of which 32 hec-
tares under the CRIII and 6 hectares as part of the Wan Chai Development
Phase II (WDII)) was gazetted for public inspection. The Town Planning
Board (TPB) subsequently received objections in view of opposition from the
public, and the government consulted the Legislative Council (LegCo) PLW
Panel on the Draft Vision Statement for the Victoria Harbour and Central
Reclamation Phase III regarding the scale of reclamation, the approach of
planning and the proposed road network on 10 June 1999. However, the
implication of the reclamation project for the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier
was not discussed, thus arousing strong repercussions among members of the
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Table 6.4 Details of the Central and Wan Chai Reclamation projects (1993–2017)
Project Central Reclamation Central Reclamation Central Reclamation Wan Chai Reclamation Wan Chai Reclamation
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase I Phase II
Area (hectares) 20 5.3 Reduced from 32 to 18 7.0 Reduced from 48 to 12.7
Cost (HK$) 2,710 million 320 million 5,761.5 million 590 million 4,642.7 million
Date Sept 1993 – June 1998 Dec 1994 – Sept 1997 28 Feb 2003 – Oct 2011 March 1994 – July 1997 Late 2009 – 2017
Facilities Phase I provided the site Phase II mainly consisted Phase III provided land for Phase I included the Phase II extended along the
for the Airport Railway of reclamation of the construction of transport formation of an island by waterfront from the Central
Hong Kong Station. The Tamar Basin. One of the infrastructure, consisting reclamation at the northern Reclamation Phase III to
remaining newly formed sites was sold in 1995 for of the Central–Wan Chai side of the Hong Kong North Point. It provided land
land was for reprovisioning commercial development. Bypass, the Airport Railway Convention and Exhibition for the construction of the
of piers, cooling water Extended Overrun Tunnel, Centre. Central–Wan Chai Bypass,
pumphouses and other the MTR North Hong Kong the Island Eastern Corridor
facilities displaced by the Island Line, the supporting Link, the Hong Kong Island
reclamation. road networks and a section of the MTR Shatin to
waterfront promenade. Central Link and the North
Hong Kong Island Line, and
a waterfront promenade.
Sources: Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Item for Public Works Subcommittee of Finance Committee’, Paper No. PWSC(2008-09)51, 15 December 2008, pp.1–2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/fc/pwsc/papers/
p08-51e.pdf; Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Item for Public Works Subcommittee of Finance Committee’, Paper No. PWSC(2009-10)53, 10 June 2009, pp.1–3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/fc/pwsc/papers/
p09-53e.pdf.
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310 · MAKING HONG KONG
public. On 16 July of the same year, the TPB published in the Government
Gazette the amendments to the Draft Central District (Extension) OZP No.
O/S/H24/1-A under section 6(7) of the Town Planning Ordinance. One of
the amendments was to reduce the size of reclamation area to 23 hectares
(including 18 hectares under the CRIII and 5 hectares as part of the WDII).17
On 12 April 2000, the PLW Panel received objections relating to the reloca-
tion of the Star Ferry Pier. The TPB recognised the historical significance and
importance of the Star Ferry Pier as one of the major icons and tourist attrac-
tions in Hong Kong and agreed that it should be reconstructed at the new
Central waterfront. However, no exact location and specific design of recon-
struction works were proposed. On 4 January 2002, the TPB approved the
proposal of reprovisioning the clock tower and decoration of the Star Ferry
Pier and Queen’s Pier. It was also stressed that the reconstructions would
resemble the original design as much as possible.18
On 27 February 2003, the SPH lodged a judicial review against the TPB’s
decision regarding the Draft Wan Chai North OZP No. S/H25/1. On 8 July
of the same year, the High Court ruled that the TPB had failed to comply with
section 3 of the PHO and ordered the TPB to reconsider the draft OZP and
related objections. The High Court also ruled that every reclamation proposal
should be assessed individually with reference to the three tests of: 1) compel-
ling, overriding and present need; 2) no viable alternative; and 3) minimum
impairment to the harbour. An appeal was filed by the TPB after the Court
handed down the judgment on the WDII, but was dismissed by the Court of
Final Appeal on 9 January 2004 on the grounds that the proposed reclamation
was unable to fulfil the overriding public need test. As a result, the government
had to review the planning of the WDII before resubmitting the relevant OZP
for consideration by the TPB.19
On 25 September 2003, the SPH applied to the High Court for an interim
injunction over the CRIII and a judicial review on the approval of the Central
District (Extension) OZP by the Chief Executive in Council (CE in C). The
High Court dismissed both applications on 6 October 2003 and 9 March 2004
respectively. The CRIII works, which had been suspended pending the Court’s
decision, resumed in early April 2004.20 The reclamation, with a reduced area
17
‘Factsheets, Plans and Maps Review Report: Central Reclamation Phase III (CRIII) – Basic Facts’,
Development Bureau website, http://www.devb.gov.hk/reclamation/en/basic/basic_facts/central_map_
recl/index.html; ‘Chronology of Events Relating to Central Reclamation Phase III (CRIII)’, Development
Bureau website, https://www.devb.gov.hk/reclamation/en/basic/chronology_of_events/central_chronol-
ogy/t_index.html.
18
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, ‘Background Brief on Planning
Arrangements for the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier in Central’, LC Paper No. CB(1)677/06-07(03), 10
January 2007, pp.1–5, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw0123cb1-677-3-c.
pdf; Development Bureau, ‘Chronology of Events Relating to Central Reclamation Phase III’, www.devb.gov.
hk/reclamation/tc/basic/chronology_of_events/central_chronology/t_index.html.
19
Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Background Brief on Central–Wan Chai Bypass and Wan Chai
Development Phase II’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1634/08-09(06), 20 May 2009, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yr08-09/chinese/panels/dev/papers/dev0526cb1-1634-6-c.pdf.
20
Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Central and Wan Chai Reclamation: Background Brief’, LC Paper No.
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Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015) · 311
of 12.7 hectares21 and a cost of 5.76 billion Hong Kong dollars, was basically
completed in October 2011.22
In May 2004, the government set up the Harbour-front Enhancement
Committee (HEC), with the objective of better informing the public of the
planning of the reclamation area, as well as advising the Housing, Planning and
Lands Bureau on the planning, land uses and developments along the exist-
ing and new harbourfront of Victoria Harbour. In January 2005, the govern-
ment adopted the HEC’s recommendation of enhancing public participation
in the course of the review. On 18 August 2005, the Sub-committee on WDII
Review convened the Expert Panel Forum on Sustainable Transport Planning
and Central–Wan Chai Bypass. In October 2005, it published a report on short-
term, medium-term and long-term measures to achieve sustainable transport
planning. It considered the construction of the Central–Wan Chai Bypass to
be a medium-term solution for improving the east–west link in the transport
network of Hong Kong Island and for tackling the problem of deteriorating
traffic congestion in the Central and Wan Chai areas. On 20 April 2006, the
sub-committee engaged consultants to prepare concept plans for the WDII
Review on possible trunk road alignments and harbourfront enhancement,
and proposed five ‘character precincts’ for the enhancement. After consider-
ing all the feasible proposals on trunk road development, the sub-committee
adopted the option involving the smallest area of reclamation while maintaining
similar effects of traffic control. In early October 2006, a series of harbourfront
enhancement activities were organised, including introduction of the concept
plan, roving exhibitions and community workshops. In May 2009, the CE in C
approved the Wan Chai North OZP No. S/H25/2, which contained the pro-
posed amendments under the WDII Review. (See Figure 6.3.)
In 2007, the Planning Department commenced the Urban Design Study
for the New Central Harbourfront (UDS) in order to refine the existing urban
design framework of the new Central Harbourfront and to prepare planning and
design briefs for key development sites in the area to guide their future develop-
ment. The study covered eight key sites, and their respective final recommended
planning and design proposals are set out in Table 6.5.
Central Harbourfront military dock
The land uses of the new Central Reclamation area also became controversial.
The 1994 Sino-British Defence Land Agreement included the reservation of
150 metres of the waterfront for the construction of a ‘military dock’ after the