to and from Hong Kong, exerting strict control over the export of materials and
thus control over resources.50
Agricultural arrangements
The Governor’s Office paid much attention to enhancing Hong Kong’s produc-
tivity to avoid reliance on foreign materials, and strongly criticised the colonial
government’s neglect of fertile land on Hong Kong Island and in Kowloon as
unreasonable. On 2 August 1942, Chan Tiu-kum, the New Territories district
officer, pointed out in an interview with a reporter that,
as the traffic was not completely restored to normal after the war, Hong Kong
Island and Kowloon almost entirely relied on the New Territories for the supply of
vegetables for a period of time. At the time, the population of the New Territories
was 117,181, with 57,604 males and 59,581 females, and a total of 24,294
48
Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong
Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, p.88.
49
Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong
Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai
chubanshe, 1975, pp.52–53.
50
Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong
Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai
chubanshe, 1975, pp.50–51.
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Experiencing the war (1941–1945) · 133
households. Before the war, it was worthless for farmers to be engaged in farming
. . . because the British used the city as the centre. The post-war New Territories
was transformed. Farmers no longer had to worry about selling the agricultural
products they worked hard for, as they were in demand and commanded high
prices. As a result, enhancing production and speeding up cultivation was the
unanimous demand of farmers. Enhancing production and establishing the
economic foundation of the New Territories is an important part of the policy for
that area, and is also one of the objectives in building a new Hong Kong.51
In November 1942, official estimates placed the annual demand for v egetables
in Hong Kong at around 50 million catties, more than half of which came from
the Guangdong region. A five-year plan was thus drawn up to actively plant
vegetables in the New Territories – with a budgeted planting of 600 jongbo
(one jongbo equals roughly one hectare) per month – in the hope that the city
would become self-sufficient in terms of vegetables within five years. There were
also plans to plant sweet potatoes and the like on 1,000 jongbo of wasteland
to be used as livestock feed,52 in order to promote the output value of animal
husbandry. As residents from the city were purchasing rice from farmers in the
New Territories, this caused a price hike for rice and resulted in the government
forbidding the transport of rice out of a district. As for intra-district transport,
a transport permit had to be obtained from the District Affairs Bureau first, or
the rice in question would be confiscated by the Kempeitai and police and the
persons involved severely punished.53 After a year of aggressive promotion of
the agricultural industry, there were still newspaper reports on the import of
food by the government by sea to satisfy Hong Kong’s needs in early 1943.54
As transport on the water was not yet fully restored after the war, food shortage
remained a serious problem in 1945.
In 1942, Hong Kong’s water supply was clearly laid out in the Investigation
Report on Hong Kong Waterworks compiled and written by Haraga Subaru.55
The Japanese military government was of the view that the British did not prop-
erly manage water resources, which led to the abandonment of agriculture, and
that this should be actively remedied. In February 1943, in order to improve
farming practices, the Governor’s Office hired agricultural experts from Taiwan
to conduct field studies in Hong Kong. The Governor’s Office also promoted
plans for forestry planting in the New Territories and the nearby islands. These
plans were implemented by the Home Affairs Department56 in order to achieve
self-sufficiency in agricultural products. In July 1943, Toshimichi Asaeda, Head
of the Division of Forestry and Fisheries of the Home Affairs Department, said:
51
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 6 August 1942, p.2.
52
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 8 November 1942, p.2.
53
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 30 November 1942, p.2.
54
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 29 January 1943, p.2.
55
Haraga Subaru, Honkon suidō chōsa hōkokusho (Investigation Report on Hong Kong Waterworks),
Taiwan, Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1942.
56
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 23 February 1943, p.3.
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134 · MAKING HONG KONG
Agriculture in Hong Kong had been in a slump due to inferior farming methods.
The issue of water source alone was a failure – utter reliance on rainfall meant it
became helpless if there was no rain. Inappropriate application of fertilisers, a lack
of attention on hoeing depth and no improvement on plant species were all factors
hampering development. From now on, the development of agriculture and forestry
would be planned anew. The key focus will be on storage of water, application of
fertilisers, and improvement of farming tools and plant species. There are plans to
set up some sort of agricultural guidance occasions, where farmer representatives
would receive onsite guidance. Agricultural clubs or groups in the villages are also
planned for, where personnel sent by District Affairs Bureaus would teach farmers
on the spot, so that these representatives could learn agricultural knowledge and
return to their villages to provide guidance to other farmers.57
Measures that improved agriculture were then implemented based on
the ideas of the Head of the Division of Forestry and Fisheries. In July 1943,
the division set up an Agricultural Guidance Office in Fanling, where senior
officer Kosawa taught residents about rice planting and fertilisation methods,
as well as using cattle for ploughing. The office also provided necessary fertilis-
ers to farmers. The Governor’s Office commissioned the Taiwan Development
Company Ltd to operate the Tai Po Farm, converting some of the farmland
used for growing fruits into paddy fields. The Governor’s Office also appointed
Fukuoka Kanji, director of general affairs of the Nikko Development Farm, to
develop some 60 to 70 acres (around 0.6 to 0.7 hectares) of farmland in Kam
Tsin Village to demonstrate vegetable growing and keeping different kinds of
livestock.58 The government also encouraged winter farming in the whole of
the New Territories,59 storing up manure and cultivating wasteland.60 The race-
course and the golf course in the New Territories, the airfield in Kam Tin61 and
other private gardens were all converted into farmland to boost food production.
This policy of so-called agricultural self-sufficiency was actually aimed at sat-
isfying the basic needs of the Japanese living in Hong Kong. For instance, the
planting of agricultural products required by the Japanese in their daily life was
encouraged. From mid-1943, experimental farming stations were set up in the
New Territories and on outlying islands to promote the growing of Japanese
calrose rice.62 On 21 June 1943, a seminar on growing calrose rice was held in
Fanling in the New Territories by the New Territories Farming, Husbandry and
Gardening Group, Fanling Branch Office. Keisaburo (Head of the Division of
Agriculture of the Governor’s Office) said at the time that
the current problem of food shortages bears a significant relationship with
agricultural production, which is a responsibility of the farmers. How then should
57
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 10 July 1943, p.4.
58
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 30 March 1943, p.4, 27 July 1943, p.4.
59
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 14 October 1942, p.3.
60
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 2 February 1943, p.2.
61
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 27 July 1943, p.4.
62
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 27 March 1944, p.4.
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Experiencing the war (1941–1945) · 135
the agriculture industry develop? How can farmers increase production? These
are all issues worth studying. This calrose rice planting activity greatly helps the
development of the industry. At the same time, hopefully the farmers would
studiously learn Japanese agricultural techniques with passion so as to widely
promote the new method of planting calrose rice.63
Districts on Hong Kong Island, except commercial districts such as Central
District and Western District, were all engaged in the development of agricul-
ture. These districts covered areas including Causeway Bay, Shau Kei Wan, Chai
Wan, Stanley and Aberdeen, and the planting of forests, grains, vegetables and
calrose rice was introduced and promoted. With such policies actively encour-
aging the development of the agricultural industry, there was indeed a slight
increase in the harvest of agricultural products. However, it still proved insuf-
ficient to meet local demand. In 1944, the harvest of ‘early crops’ failed to meet
expectations, and this was blamed on bad weather.64
Afforestation plans
The Japanese set up a seedling nurturing authority in 1942, with the aim of
developing Hong Kong into a model woodland zone of South China.65 In
June 1943, Oyama was named the Head of the Department of Agriculture and
Forestry. He implemented afforestation plans in the District Affairs Bureaus
throughout Hong Kong and Kowloon,66 and transported a large number of sap-
lings and seeds from Taiwan to Hong Kong. It was hoped that the effect of such
measures would be seen within a year.67 Shau Kei Wan was chosen as the first
district where afforestation was implemented, as it had a large amount of waste-
land suited for this purpose.68 The saplings would then be distributed from Shau
Kei Wan to other District Affairs Bureaus for test planting. It was planned that,
within a decade, an area of 300 square miles around the hills would be planted
with pines.
Government figures of 28 July 1943 showed that a total of 40 litres of seeds
had been planted, among which were: 15 litres of acacia seeds, with 60,000 sap-
lings for each litre, thus yielding a total of 900,000 acacia trees; 10 litres of silk
tree seeds, with 6,000 saplings for each litre, yielding a total of 60,000 silk trees;
and 15 litres of teak seeds, with 1,000 saplings for each litre, yielding a total of
some 15,000 teak trees. Thus the 40 litres of seeds meant planting saplings of
about 975,000 trees.69 Especially the acacia, where 900,000 trees would yield
from 15 litres of seeds, proved to be most cost-effective. Even today, acacia trees
can be seen everywhere, and yet the reasons for transplanting these trees from
63
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 22 June 1943, p.2.
64
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 17 August 1944, p.4.
65
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 8 November 1942, p.2.
66
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 20 June 1943, p.4.
67
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 23 February 1943, p.3.
68
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 20 June 1943, p.4.
69
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 28 July 1943, p.4.
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136 · MAKING HONG KONG
Taiwan to Hong Kong were neglected. In 1944, the Japanese military govern-
ment initiated another afforestation campaign. In April that year, in support
of the campaign, the staff of all District Affairs Bureaus were mobilised to lead
by example in an intense afforestation operation. Different locations in various
districts were also designated for the planting of seeds of white popinac trees.
The plan was that, from the end of April to the end of May, a total of 40 litres of
white popinac seeds (amounting to 240,000 trees) would be planted at various
locations.70 Not only did the trees have a greening effect on the environment,
but the timber was an important resource. Tree-planting in the districts was
promoted for the purpose of increasing natural resources. However, before the
trees grew up, the limited timber could only be reserved for military use, and the
citizens of Hong Kong were prohibited from cutting down trees for wood.71 As
firewood and charcoal were daily necessities for people at the time, the prohibi-
tion order was controversial.
Transport hub
Transit hub for sea transport
As Hong Kong was a military port, its transport to the outside world was under
the complete control of the Japanese military. Commercial vessels could not sail
freely into or out of Hong Kong. The Japanese army also prohibited Chinese
fishing boats (sampans) from undertaking maritime activities, allowing fishing
boats to fish only at designated locations. On 10 December 1942, to cut off
the smuggling of food and medicine between some fishing boats and Macao or
through refugee repatriation vessels, the Japanese established the Sailing Vessel
Trading Company to monitor trade between Hong Kong and neighbouring
Mainland China.72
The Japanese set up warehouses and shipyards in Hong Kong, hoping to
swiftly rebuild harbour facilities and restore the port’s transport functions,73
and to gain full control over incoming and outgoing goods. In 1942, Governor
Rensuke Isogai stressed that ‘Hong Kong would become the central distribution
point of resources in the south’.74 On 19 January 1943, while speaking through
a Domei broadcast on the objectives in rebuilding Hong Kong, Rensuke
Isogai noted that, as Hong Kong could not rely on Japan for human and other
resources, the rebuilding had to be achieved by making use of local materials and
human resources. Hong Kong also had to fulfil its role as a central distribution
point of resources in the South Pacific through the use of locally made wooden
70
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 13 April 1944, p.4.
71
Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong
Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai
chubanshe, 1975, pp.53–54.
72
Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control,
Washington, DC, 1943, p.79.
73
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 19 December 1942, p.2.
74
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 13 October 1942, p.2.
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Experiencing the war (1941–1945) · 137
transport vessels and the appropriate allocation of materials. Therefore, the issue
of shipbuilding had to be solved first, to be followed by improvement in harbour
and warehouse facilities.75
Before the war, the large-scale shipyards in Hong Kong relied on steel
imported from the East Asia region. During the Japanese occupation, the Hong
Kong Governor’s Office was unable to obtain steel for building steel ships,
and had to import rosewood from the Philippines and teak from Thailand and
Burma (today’s Myanmar) to develop the shipbuilding industry.76 In October
1942, the government began building a large number of wooden motor sailing
boats, while at the same time training sailors to handle these wooden boats by
establishing seafarer training schools. Generally a ship could be built in 40 to
63 days. The plan was to build a few 150- to 250-tonne ships,77 and gradually
develop Hong Kong into a transit terminal for goods as well as a shipbuilding
hub.78 By the end of 1942, under the direct supervision of government depart-
ments, wooden boats began transporting raw materials and commodities (such
as oil, timber and rice) to the South Pacific region to assist in reconstruction.
From 1 April 1943, as the transit hub for the East Asia region, Hong Kong
coordinated the trans-shipment of goods to and from northern and eastern
China as well as South-east Asia: the routes of the East Asia Sea Transport
Company’s ships sailing along the coast of China all ended at Hong Kong.
The Dalian–Guangdong route, Tianjin–Guangdong route and Shanghai–
Guangdong route were all abolished with effect from 1 April; all routes sailed
to Hong Kong instead.79 Other small connected ports around Hong Kong,
such as Shantou, Guangdong and Xiamen, had small vessels sailing to and from
Hong Kong.80 Ships sailing along the south–north route, such as those travel-
ling to Vietnam and Thailand with rice and to northern China with coal, would
first berth at Hong Kong to save transport resources. The goods would then be
loaded on to smaller vessels in Hong Kong and transported to their intended
destination. Thus the idea of making Hong Kong a cargo hub port along the
north–south route of the Pacific region was realised.
Expansion of the airport
The Kai Tak Airport, which was for both military and civilian use by 1930, had also
increased in size, from 60 acres (24.3 hectares) in 1925 to 205 acres (83 hectares),
and could accommodate the landing of larger planes and seaplanes.81 By the end of
the 1930s, Kai Tak Airport, in preparation for the war, with fighter aircraft hidden
nearby, anti-aircraft machine gun bunkers and air-raid shelters, was an important
75
Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control,
Washington, DC, 1943, pp.79–80.
76
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 19 December 1942, p.2.
77
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 25 November 1942, p.2.
78
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 18 December 1942, p.2.
79
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 20 March 1943, p.3.
80
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 1 April 1943, p.4.
81
CO129/511/13, ‘Extracts from Hong Kong Daily Press’.
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138 · MAKING HONG KONG
military base in Hong Kong. In 1941, in order to enhance the combat capabili-
ties of the airport, the British planned to build a concrete runway dedicated for
military aircraft use. The runway was to be built in the vicinity of the large aircraft
hangar on the waterfront, beside the take-off and landing ramp for seaplanes, and
was to sit at 130 degrees and 500 yards (457.2 metres) long. Coincidentally, on
the day that works were to begin, the Japanese attacked Hong Kong.
During the period of attack on Hong Kong by the Japanese, the airport was
spared from major damage. After the fall of Hong Kong, Japanese military air-
craft began taking off and landing in Kai Tak Airport. In mid-1942, after the
Japanese army had successfully occupied many countries in South-east Asia,
Hong Kong became an important transport hub for the deployment of resources
for the Japanese army82 and for connecting Japan to the South-east Asia region,83
owing to its geographical location and air transport facilities. After occupying
Hong Kong, the Japanese started fully testing the aviation facilities based on the
official records of the colonial government by assessing existing flight control
towers, airline offices, short- and medium-wave radio devices, direction finders,
aviation weather stations, oil storage levels, night flight equipment and water
landing gears,84 and proposed an expansion plan for the airport. The Japanese
army was of the view that Kai Tak Airport, situated in the north-east of Kowloon
Peninsula with only one south-facing runway, with the sea in front and hills
behind, was too small to satisfy transport demand. They also thought that the
air defence in the east and west corners was deficient, calling into question the
airport’s ability to defend against enemies. It was therefore proposed that a new
east–west runway, sitting at 70 degrees (almost perpendicular to the north–
south runway), be built. The airport was to expand in size and be installed with
control towers and radar transmission stations, with enhancement in aircraft’s
take-off and landing efficiency as well as the monitoring of airspace.
The airport’s expansion plan necessitated the demolition of the original ter-
minal building. It also required the expropriation of a large area of land, result-
ing in the demolition of many houses and the displacement of occupants. At
least some 20 villages – some 2,000 households of around 20,000 residents –
were affected. In April 1942, buildings and hundreds of factories around Prince
Edward Road and Sung Wong Toi, as well as villages in the vicinity of Sai Kung
Road, were also designated as within the area of the airport and therefore
required to be taken down.85 Kowloon City was quite severely affected, with 16
villages in the district being forced to move by 10 August 1942. In June 1942, the
Japanese military ordered the residents and commercial establishments around
82
Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku (Hong Kong under
Military Rule: The Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944, Ch.1,
s.1.
83
Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control,
Washington, DC, 1943, pp.74–75.
84
‘Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Colony of Hong Kong, 1938’, Hong Kong
Administration Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1939.
85
Ye Dewei et al., comps and eds, Xianggang lunxian shi (History of the Fall of Hong Kong), Hong Kong,
Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1982, pp.103, 353.
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Experiencing the war (1941–1945) · 139
the airport to organise a Kai Tak Airport Expansion Works Committee for Post-
relocation Assistance to Residents and to form a Model Village Construction
Guidance Committee, in order to help the Japanese military complete its ‘great
airport’ construction project. Local residents were forced to relocate to residen-
tial areas designated by the Japanese military.86
The Japanese government built two new villages in Kowloon Tong and
Sheung Shui – New Kowloon Tong Model Village and New Lo Wu Model
Village – to rehouse residents of Kowloon City. The New Kowloon Village was
constructed under the purview of Yamashita Ichikawa, former Deputy Director
of the Kowloon District Affairs Bureau. Occupying an area of some 380 acres87
(about 3.8 hectares), the village housed 106 households of around 700 resi-
dents. On average, each household was entitled to three acres (about 297.5
square metres) of land for farming. It was reported in the official Japanese news-
paper that, ‘as harvest could come easily, the residents should use half of the land
to plant taros and potatoes for food, and the other half for vegetables’. Apart
from farming, they raised chickens and ducks.
The New Lo Wu Village was also known as the New Territories New Village or
the New Territories Model Village, and was situated at the old British barracks at
Lo Wu in Sheung Shui, New Territories. The village occupied an area of 200,000
tsubo, equivalent to 1.2 million Chinese square feet. Each household was allocated
fields where they could farm for food, and they were described by the Japanese as
‘pioneers in developing the wasteland in the New Territories’. On 27 February
1943, residents officially moved into the village upon completion of works on
water and electricity facilities. As the affected residents were prioritised for rehous-
ing, it was difficult to accommodate all applicants. Applicants therefore had to reg-
ister and be vetted by the Model Village Construction Guidance Committee. Only
those who had an actual residence or business in the demolished areas would be
eligible for registration. The residents were reviewed based on two criteria. First,
only those who were already on the local register would be eligible. And those on
the local register were divided into full farmers and semi-farmers, with full farmers
having priority over semi-farmers. Second, the number of properties owned by
applicants would be considered when determining their eligibility.88
In September 1942, although the housing issue of residents affected by
the demolition and relocation remained unresolved, the military government
went ahead and began the expansion works for the Kai Tak Airport. The Hong
Kong Airport Building Committee was set up, with Arisue, Chief of Staff of
the Governor’s Office, appointed as chairman, and 21 officials from various
departments as well as army and navy officers as committee members. On 10
September 1942, Chief of Staff Arisue presided over the ground-breaking cer-
emony for the airport expansion. The expansion works began on 15 September,
86
Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong
Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, p.128.
87
1 acre in Japanese or Taiwanese units of measurement is equivalent to 0.99174 hectares in the metric
system.
88
Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 27 February 1943, p.3, 13 June 1943, p.4.
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140 · MAKING HONG KONG
with Dolly Gray leading 800 prisoners of war from the Sham Shui Po camp to
start on the works. By 25 September, the number of civilian workers had risen to
1,600. Owing to the arduous nature of the work, more and more workers were
engaged in the project. By 1 October, a total of 4,000 workers were taking part in
the expansion works.89 In early 1944, the airport was attacked by the American
military while the expansion works were in progress. The expansion works were
completed in 1945. The airport area more than doubled in size to 376 acres
(152.3 hectares). The airport runway had a weight-bearing capacity of 70,000
pounds, allowing large aircraft such as Skymasters and Lancastrians to take off
and land. The 4,580 feet (1,386 metres) long, 321 feet (98 metres) wide, 13/31
runway was busier than the 4,730 feet (1,442 metres) long, 221 feet (67 metres)
wide, 07/25 runway.90 Apart from the two runways, the airport’s new construc-
tions included the control tower for the Japanese air force on a small hill north
of the airport, the U-shaped mobile hangars on the eastern, western and north-
ern sides of the airport, the Japanese air force hangars north of the airport’s
perimeter (today’s Tai Hom Village), the concealed machine gun bunkers, and
the Kai Tak Nullah and road facilities built in coordination with the airport’s
development91 (see Figure 3.2). Expanded with military purposes in mind, Kai
Tak Airport nevertheless failed to reverse the fortunes of the Japanese army. The
Japanese surrendered unconditionally in August 1945.
Summary
In just three years and eight months, the Japanese rejected Hong Kong’s pre-war
development experience, making drastic changes to the city in order to forge
Hong Kong into Japan’s transport hub in the Pacific region, as well as a resource
supply station for its Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Faced with the dif-
ficulty of lacking natural resources in Hong Kong, the Japanese had to employ
two-pronged measures that would tap new resources and reduce expenditure. In
terms of tapping new resources, local resources such as the agriculture and for-
estry industry were aggressively developed. As for economising on expenditure,
the Japanese tackled this by reducing the resident population. The Japanese mili-
tary rule was criticised both locally and internationally. Before the Japanese occu-
pation, Hong Kong was an important economic and trading base for Britain in
the Pacific region. When the British ruled Hong Kong, they held British interests
in the Pacific region as the priority. They handled Hong Kong’s economic devel-
opment issues with caution, employing a policy of appeasement to allow tradi-
tional Chinese culture to continue to survive in Hong Kong. There was hardly
89
‘Work on Kai Tak Airfield Breaking the Sod Ceremony’, Hongkong News, 11 September 1942, p.3;
Charles Eather, Airport of the Nine Dragons: Kai Tak, Kowloon, Surfers Paradise, QLD, Chingchic Publishers,
1996, p.47.
90
Charles Eather, Airport of the Nine Dragons: Kai Tak, Kowloon, Surfers Paradise, QLD, Chingchic
Publishers, 1996, p.53.
91
Wu Bangmou, comp. and ed., Zaikan qide: cong rizhanshiqi shuoqi (Looking again at Kai Tak: Starting
from the Japanese Occupation Period), Hong Kong, ZKOOB, 2009, pp.54–56.
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M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 141
Source: HKRS115-1-43, ‘Airport – Kai Tak – General Layout (1948)’, enclosure 50.
Figure 3.2 Layout plan of Kai Tak Airport after expansion (1948)
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142 · MAKING HONG KONG
any concerted civilian effort to oppose the British colonial government. The gov-
erning strategy of the Japanese, however, was not economy-based, but was aimed
at the swift unification of the Greater East Asia region. It was therefore necessary
for the Japanese to employ military means. The oppressive military rule utterly
strangled local culture and failed to consider whether they succeeded in winning
the minds of the local people. During the three-year, eight-month period under
the rule of the Japanese, countless documents and files were burnt, and numerous
monuments and cultural relics were irreparably damaged.
Of the harsh policies of military rule forcibly implemented by the Japanese,
the population policy was certainly the most effective – solving the thorny gov-
ernance problems in densely populated communities simply by massacre or
expulsion. The policy over-achieved its target in just a few years. The distribu-
tion of districts also applied no consideration other than ensuring the safety and
satisfying the daily needs of the Japanese. The daily life issues of the local popula-
tion were neglected, with the locals treated as second-class citizens. Japan did
not consider the economic and reputational loss that the country would suffer
as a result of the damage caused to an invaded territory, because Japan’s aim at
the time was to make use of occupied Hong Kong to gain control of the whole
of South-east Asia. Using Hong Kong’s advantageous geographical location to
develop trade was no longer the focus of the city’s development. As opening up
to foreign trade would make the situation difficult to control, commercial activi-
ties were completely forbidden. Even Hong Kong’s transport with the outside
world was subject to absolute control.
To make the city self-sufficient in resources, the forestry and agricultural
industry was vigorously promoted. Although the effort was ineffective, the push
presented an alternative development possibility. After the war, the colonial
government actively developed agriculture in the New Territories, hoping to
develop the New Territories into the hinterland for the urban areas. This was
to a certain extent influenced by the Japanese military government. To increase
resources, the Japanese engaged Taiwanese forestry and agricultural experts
and planted acacia trees and silk trees in all the districts on Hong Kong Island,
Kowloon and the New Territories. To this day, these trees are spread all over
different districts in Hong Kong. Of all the Japanese infrastructure investments
in Hong Kong, the Kai Tak Airport in Kowloon City stood out as the most
significant one. By forcibly displacing residents of various districts, the airport
expansion project was given ample space for development. When develop-
ing the aviation industry after the war, the government naturally drew refer-
ence from the Japanese expansion blueprint for Kai Tak Airport. The airport
remained Hong Kong’s centre of air transport until 1997.
For Hong Kong, the greatest damage brought about by the war was of course
casualties. Those who survived were left destitute and homeless, while the city
lived in fear under an oppressive tyranny. It was difficult for post-war reconstruc-
tion work to begin. The city was burdened with indelible and painful memories
of this period of history.
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4
High-density development
planning (1945–1979)
Hong Kong is built on a steep rock, which means that Town Planning there
presents problems of considerable interest as well as difficulty. There was need,
even before the war, for the redevelopment of the old part of Victoria when
Chinese housing conditions were recognized as bad, and in other places, the
damage caused by the war offers a notable opportunity, of which we are anxious
to take the fullest advantage, for carrying out improvements. It is, of course,
also essential that the Colony’s natural harbour, and port facilities should be
preserved and developed on the right lines, since Hong Kong is the focal point of
our trade in the Far East and its entrepôt trade plays a large part in the economy
of the territory. (CO129/614/2, Despatch from Colonial Office to Sir Patrick
Abercrombie, in ‘Appointment of Town Planner, Visit of Sir P. Abercrombie’,
No. 54298/1/47, 24 March 1947)
The scale of Hong Kong as a city in the early twenty-first century widely differs
from that in the mid-nineteenth century. And yet the efforts of early post-war
town planners working to modernise Hong Kong can be seen everywhere.
Tracing the source of such efforts, it is apparent that the long-term planning
blueprints from the early years after the war proved to have far-reaching effects.
In 1948, an urban development proposal for the second half of the twentieth
century that was prepared by Patrick Abercrombie, a British town planning
expert, discussed in comprehensive detail the future development potential of
the city. Faced with post-war problems including turbulent political circum-
stances, economic crises and a lack of resources, as well as the livelihood needs
of society and ceaseless political bickering, was the ideal blueprint realised in
time? How much of this ideal blueprint was substantially altered, or completely
abandoned? The unravelling of the early post-war planning blueprint, analysis of
how planning influenced the city’s development in the following decades, and
consideration of how the government amended the planning blueprint made by
town planning experts according to the circumstances at the time could perhaps
allow us to ponder the significance of the planning experience half a century ago
for the future development of Hong Kong, thus strengthening our understand-
ing of the city’s long-term planning.
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144 · MAKING HONG KONG
Long-term planning
Post-war reconstruction efforts had been difficult, given political issues such as
the independence of colonies around the world, the Chinese Civil War and the
Cold War, as well as the challenges brought on by a lack of economic resources
and the incessant influx of immigrants into Hong Kong. In November 1946,
in order to solve the housing and public health issues that had long plagued
the city’s development, Governor Mark Aitchison Young, together with the
Post-war Building Reconstruction Advisory Committee, applied to the British
Colonial Office to use the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (established
in 1945) to invite British town planning experts to Hong Kong and prepare the
development blueprint of Hong Kong for the next 50 years. In March 1947, the
British Ministry of Town and Country Planning considered that five town plan-
ning experts were qualified to advise on the post-war town planning of Hong
Kong. These five experts were: William G. Holdford; James A. Stewart, chief
engineer of the Calcutta (now known as Kolkata) Improvement Trust; Clifford
Holliday, a planner of Haifa, Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka) and Gibraltar;
Max Lock, a young engineer; and Patrick Abercrombie (1879–1957) from the
University of London. Stewart and Abercrombie had previously participated in
the Greater London planning project and had a wealth of experience to offer.
In particular, Abercrombie had experience in planning for different areas, even
other colonies such as Cyprus, and compared favourably against the other nomi-
nees in terms both of qualifications and of reputation. It was also more costly to
hire him than the other nominees. Governor Young did not let cost dictate his
choice, and decided to appoint Abercrombie as the consultant.1
In March 1947, when Abercrombie was officially engaged as a consultant for
Hong Kong’s long-term town planning, the Colonial Office clearly stated the
two issues that he had to contend with: 1) in light of Hong Kong’s rugged terrain
and old and damaged pre-war houses, the problems caused by the rapid rise in
the population; 2) a strategy for Hong Kong to become Britain’s trade strong-
hold in the East Asia region. It was hoped that Abercrombie could formulate
long-term development strategies in view of these characteristics and elevate
Hong Kong’s international status. In March of the same year, Abercrombie held
detailed discussions with Governor-Designate Sir Alexander Grantham, and
promised to come to Hong Kong in the autumn to advise on the development
of the harbour and the city. In October 1947, 1,250 pounds sterling was allo-
cated from the 1 million pounds sterling reserve of the Colonial Development
and Welfare Fund to invite Abercrombie to come to Hong Kong for a six-week
visit. As the government attached great importance to this town planning work,
it established for the first time a Town Planning Office under the Public Works
Department before Abercrombie’s arrival to coordinate with his brief visit.
Human resources were allocated to conduct field studies and collect data in
various districts in preparation for planning work.
1
CO129/614/2, ‘Appointment of Town Planner, Visit of Sir P. Abercrombie’, July 1946.
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High-density development planning (1945–1979) · 145
Abercrombie’s planning blueprint
The long-term planning report issued by Abercrombie in 1948 was only 23
pages long. Yet each word of the report was a gem and hit the nail on the head.
Abercrombie first stated that, as resources were limited after the war and given
the unique geographical environment of Hong Kong, planning had to first focus
on resolving the most urgent needs of the time. He pointed out that the planning
of a district had to take both short-term and long-term needs into consideration,
and could be readjusted in the future according to the amount of resources. As
an entry point, the report addressed the two main problems of urban develop-
ment raised in the letter of the Colonial Office in March 1947 – housing and
population. The report agreed that, with a severe lack of land in the core districts
and a continuous influx of population, Hong Kong’s town planning could not
draw reference from the experience of other major cities, such as the develop-
ment of suburbs in London, the development of land outside the peninsula
of New York City, and the design patterns of other cities such as those of Sri
Lanka. The planning approaches of these cities were not able to solve Hong
Kong’s problem of an ever increasing population. In order to enhance Hong
Kong’s trading position in the East Asia region and strengthen its advantages
as an entrepôt, while at the same time diverting the population of the urban
areas to somewhere else, the report suggested three focuses: 1) to improve the
city’s internal and external transport, including port facilities, road networks,
tunnels and railways; 2) to develop the suburbs and expand the space available
for development in the city, as well as to solve the problems of housing, public
space distribution and inadequate ancillary facilities brought on by the popula-
tion increase, so as to achieve a reasonable population density; 3) to improve
urban planning legislation and mechanisms, design the distribution of govern-
mental, commercial, industrial and residential land uses, and rationally face the
city’s inherent deficiencies, in order to bring the city forward. Abercrombie’s
proposals, based on his abundant experience in town planning and drawing on
the development experience of different regions around the world, were fully
endorsed by government departments at the time. His ideas thus became the
basic concepts of the city’s development in the decades that followed.2
Further analysis of Abercrombie’s designs revealed that the proposal to
improve harbour transport was primarily based on David Owen’s harbour plan
of 1941, which focused on the piers and ancillary facilities on both sides of
Victoria Harbour. Of the piers connecting Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon
Peninsula, apart from those connecting Central and Tsim Sha Tsui, the piers
connecting North Point with Hung Hom and Kowloon City, as well as those
connecting Wan Chai and Jordan, were all focuses of development, as the
majority of industrial and commercial activities would be expanded to the above
districts. As for railways, it was proposed that the section from Kowloon Tong to
2
CO129, Memorandum of 25 August 1950 from the Financial Secretary to the Deputy Colonial Secretary
in BL/1/5281/50, PRO, Hong Kong.
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146 · MAKING HONG KONG
Tsim Sha Tsui be abolished, and a line running along Nathan Road, Reclamation
Street in Yau Ma Tei and Public Square Street in the west of the Kowloon
Peninsula be constructed to tie in with the development of the area around
Yau Ma Tei and Jordan. Among Abercrombie’s proposals, the construction of
a cross-harbour tunnel was one of the more forward-looking. Although the pro-
posed design of the road networks at the exits on both sides of the harbour was
different from what we have today (the proposed exit on Hong Kong Island was
in Central, while the proposed exit in Kowloon was in Tsim Sha Tsui, diverging
into Hung Hom and Yau Ma Tei), the exits and the road networks were concen-
trated on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island and the southern end of the
Kowloon Peninsula. The future development of harbour transport was to centre
around the pre-war urban districts, and it would not be necessary to actively
develop the New Territories.
Dispersing the population was a centrepiece of Abercrombie’s urban planning.
In the 1944 Greater London Plan, Abercrombie proposed measures to disperse
the population in overcrowded districts, including adding public space, moving
industrial areas to transport interchanges, and redistributing the population and
industries.3 The long-term planning he devised for Hong Kong in 1948 showed
all the above characteristics. According to Abercrombie’s estimates, Hong Kong
had a total population of about 1.5 million in 1948, with around 1 million on
Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, approximately 300,000 in the
New Territories, and a floating population of about 200,000. It was estimated
that by 1961 the population of Hong Kong would grow to 2 million, and that the
Kowloon Peninsula and New Kowloon would be the sources of land supply that
would bring the density of urban population down to a reasonable level in the
following few decades.
The natural appearance of the land from north of the mountain ranges in
Kowloon to south of the Shenzhen River was kept to serve as the city’s hinter-
land, providing the urban areas with food, water sources, and leisure grounds
and space for outdoor activities. It would not be densely developed. It was
proposed that a few districts would be chosen in the New Territories to be
developed as satellite cities, which included Tsuen Wan and Gin Drinkers Bay.
Districts which were within the New Territories but had since been renamed as
New Kowloon, including Kwun Tong, east Ho Man Tin, east Kowloon Tsai,
west Kowloon Tong, Castle Peak Road and the northern part of Kai Tak dis-
trict, could accommodate additional population. Hung Hom on the Kowloon
Peninsula, with its land area expanded by reclamation, could also contribute
to the dispersion of people from overcrowded districts. It was estimated that
the nine development districts in Hong Kong could provide about 1,993 acres
(807.17 hectares) of land for development and support some 600,000 people, of
whom around 500,000 would be new population, and 100,000 would be those
diverted from densely populated districts on Hong Kong Island. This would
alleviate overcrowding in densely populated districts such as the stretch from
3
Patrick Abercrombie, The Greater London Plan 1944, London, HMSO, 1945, p.v.
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High-density development planning (1945–1979) · 147
Table 4.1 The area and population capacity of the major development areas assessed by
Abercrombie (1961)
District Area Population capacity
(acre (hectare)) (million)
East of Ho Man Tin 200 (81.0) 5.7
Kau Lung Tsui East 325 (131.63) 9.27
Kowloon Tong West 275 (111.38) 7.85
Castle Peak Road area 125 (50.63) 3.56
Kun Tong Reclamation 175 (70.88) 5
Hung Hom Reclamation 150 (60.75) 7.5
Gin Drinkers Bay 200 (81.00) 5.7
Tsuen Wan 193 (78.17) 5.5
Overspill north of Kai Tak 350 (141.75) 10
Total 1,993 (807.17) 60.08
Source: Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948, p.6.
Hennessy Road to Gloucester Road in Wan Chai, where the population density
could reach as high as 2,000 people per acre (0.405 hectares),4 and reduce the
population density of Hong Kong to 300 people per acre. Three-quarters of an
acre (0.304 hectares) of public space was to be reserved for every 1,000 people
for use as shops, recreation space, schools and medical facilities. The aim of
these proposals was to improve the overcrowded living environment and allow
for a more reasonable level of living space. (See Table 4.1.)
Abercrombie’s population dispersion plan was still based upon the city’s core
districts. The main purpose for developing New Kowloon and satellite cities in
the New Territories was to complement the then existent core districts. This was
partly due to the fact that Abercrombie had not foreseen the rapid population
growth of the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, by 1961, the population of Hong Kong
had grown to 3.13 million. (See Figure 4.1.)
Abercrombie also gave careful consideration to the distribution of land use
by the government, commerce, light and heavy industries and even the offensive
trades. Central remained the political and commercial centre, fulfilling its leading
cultural and political role in the city. Exuding the characteristics of a modern
metropolis, the district had landmark buildings that would aim to accentuate
the city’s style. Industries could be developed in East Point, North Point and
Shau Kei Wan at the eastern end of Hong Kong Island, while slaughterhouses
and offensive trades could be set up in Sai Wan.5 On the Kowloon side, Ma
Tau Kok in east Kowloon could also be used for the development of industries,
with Tai Wan in Hung Hom serving as a distribution centre for transport and
4
Dr Fehily’s study pointed out that, in some densely populated areas, the population density was as high
as 2,268 per acre. Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1948, p.7.
5
Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948,
p.10.
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M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 148
Source: The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, p.39.
Figure 4.1 Abercrombie’s plan for Hong Kong planning (1948)
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High-density development planning (1945–1979) · 149
logistics, and Yau Ma Tei as a light industry and commercial district. Lai Chi
Kok and Cheung Sha Wan in west Kowloon could be used to develop indus-
tries, with Cheung Sha Wan acting as a base for offensive trades. On the basis
of population distribution and number of factories in different districts in the
future, traffic flows would be formulated and assessment be made on the air pol-
lution problems caused by industrial production. Planning in the districts would
be more effective in controlling land use and population distribution than the
mixed commercial and residential development approach employed before the
war, and would stimulate economic growth.
Although Abercrombie’s forecasts and his proposed countermeasures were
not completely realised, the issues and solutions he raised were excellent points
of reference for the city’s future planning work. In particular, the method of
using basic information for long-term planning assessment continues to be
adopted to this day.
The Planning Department and its predecessors
In 1947, to tie in with Abercrombie’s work on town planning, the Public Works
Department established the Town Planning Office to start gathering infor-
mation. This heralded the organisation of town planning work in a systematic
manner. The responsibilities of the Town Planning Office included formulating
the land uses, development blueprints and reclamation plans of the districts,
such as the industrial development plan for Kwun Tong in New Kowloon, as
well as the development blueprints of the New Territories (such as Tsuen Wan)
to be provided to the New Territories District Offices.6 These plans were more
suited to the city’s long-term development needs than the focus on notions
of safeguarding public health, safety and interests that were current before the
war. In 1953, the Public Works Department reorganised the Town Planning
Office and established a Planning Branch under its Crown Lands and Surveys
Office for the first time. The branch would be responsible for town planning
affairs, with a new responsibility of coordinating the views of various govern-
ment departments and drafting blueprints for future urban development. In
1953, Hong Kong’s urban areas (including Hong Kong Island and Kowloon)
were divided into 32 planning districts,7 and, by 1954, 18 of the districts had
development blueprints formulated. In 1957, the number of urban planning dis-
tricts increased to 37, of which 33 were undergoing planning by 1959. The draft
planning blueprints for all the districts in Hong Kong were mostly completed by
the 1970s, and the distribution of the planning districts is as shown in Table 4.2.
In the 1960s, there was an avid demand for industrial land. To cater for long-
term planning and development, the Crown Lands and Surveys Office under
the Public Works Department used statistics from the Commerce and Industry
6
‘Industrial Lay-outs Were Prepared for an Area at Tsun Wan and Kun Tong (1st Section)’, Hong Kong
Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1947, p.42.
7
Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer,
1952, p.20.
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150 · MAKING HONG KONG
Table 4.2 Distribution of the planning areas in the urban area of Hong Kong (1953–2015)
Planning Distribution in 1953–1970s Distribution in 2015
area no.
Hong Kong planning area:
HKPA No. 1 Kennedy Town Kennedy town and Mount Davis
HKPA No. 2 Sai Ying Pun HKpA No. 2 merged into HKpA No. 3
HKPA No. 3 Sheung Wan Sai Ying pun and Sheung Wan
HKPA No. 4 Central District central District
HKPA No. 5 Wanchai Wanchai
HKPA No. 6 Causeway Bay causeway Bay
HKPA No. 7 Wong Nai Chung Wong Nai chung
HKPA No. 8 North Point North point
HKPA No. 9 Shau Kei Wan Shau Kei Wan
HKPA No. 10 Mount Davis (1962–1963)/Pok Fu Lam pok Fu Lam
(1969–1970)
HKPA No. 11 Mid-Level 1 (1972–1973) Mid-Levels West
HKPA No. 12 Bowen Road Area Mid-Levels East
HKPA No. 13 Tai Hang Road and Jardine’s Lookout Jardine’s Lookout and Wong Nai
chung Gap
HKPA No. 14 The Peak Area the peak Area
HKPA No .15 Aberdeen and Ap Lei Chau Aberdeen and Ap Lei chau
HKPA No. 16 Little Hong Kong (Wong Chuk Hang) HKpA No. 16 merged into HKpA
No. 15
HKPA No. 17 Wong Nai Chung Gap Shouson Hill and Repulse Bay
HKPA No. 18 Tai Tam and Shek O tai tam and Shek O
HKPA No. 19 Stanley Stanley
HKPA No. 20 Chai Wan chai Wan
HKPA No. 21 Quarry Bay Quarry Bay
HKPA No. 22 – Siu Sai Wan*
HKPA No. 23 – Mount Butler**
HKPA No. 24 – central District (extension)
HKPA No. 25 – Wan chai North
Kowloon planning area:
KPA No. 1 Tsim Sha Tsui tsim Sha tsui
KPA No. 2 Yau Ma Tei Yau Ma tei
KPA No. 3 Tai Kok Tsui Mong Kok
KPA No. 4 Shek Kip Mei and Kowloon Shek Kip Mei
Tong (1963–1964)/Shek Kip Mei
(1969–1970)
KPA No. 5 Cheung Sha Wan cheung Sha Wan
KPA No. 6 Mong Kok and Yau Ma Tei (East) Ho Man tin
KPA No. 7 Mong Kok KpA No. 7 merged into KpA No. 6
KPA No. 8 Kowloon City (1960–1961)/Kowloon Wang tau Hom and tung tau
Tong and Kowloon City (1969–1970)/
Wang Tau Hom and Tung Tau
(1970–1971)
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High-density development planning (1945–1979) · 151
Table 4.2 (continued)
Planning Distribution in 1953–1970s Distribution in 2015
area no.
KPA No. 9 Hung Hom Hung Hom
KPA No. 10 Ma Tau Kok Ma Tau Kok
KPA No. 11 Diamond Hill (1960–1961)/Kai Tak Tsz Wan Shan, Diamond Hill and San
(1965–1966)/Diamond Hill and Tsz Po Kong
Wan Shan (1969–1970)/Tsz Wan Shan,
Diamond Hill and San Po Kong
KPA No. 12 Ngau Chi Wan Ngau Chi Wan
KPA No. 13 Ngau Tau Kok Ngau Tau Kok and Kowloon Bay
KPA No. 14 Kwun Tong K14N: Kwun Tong North
K14S: Kwun Tong South
KPA No. 15 Sam Ka Tsuen (1965–1966)/Cha Cha Kwo Ling, Yau Tong, Lei Yue
Kwo Ling, Yau Tong, Lei Yue Mun Mun
(1966–1967)
KPA No. 16 Lai Chi Kok and Kau Wa Keng (1965– Lai Chi Kok
1967)/Lai Chi Kok (1974–1975)
KPA No. 17 Kowloon Bay Reclamation Area KPA No. 17 merged into KPA No. 13
KPA No. 18 Kowloon Tong Kowloon Tong
KPA No. 20 – South West Kowloon
KPA No. 22 – Kai Tak
Notes: * Siu Sai Wan is covered by Chai Wan Outline Zoning Plan. ** Mount Butler is not covered by any
outline zoning plan, as it is located within the Country Park.
Sources: Planning Department internal information; Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works
for the Financial Years 1946–1976, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1947–1976; Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong
Kong Government, 1854–1997; Statutory Planning Portal: http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/.
Department and censuses to enhance the feasibility of planning and design
the distribution of industrial and residential areas, the density and construc-
tion quality of residential housing, and large-scale infrastructure such as reser-
voirs, water supply systems and electricity supply facilities, community service
facilities and other ancillary facilities in accordance with the needs of economic
development. The aim was to match the labour force supply and daily living
needs of different districts. On the one hand, planning required the coordina-
tion of the opinions of different government departments. On the other hand,
public consultation was needed for affairs including the review of the distribu-
tion of offensive trades such as ship-breaking, bleaching and dyeing, and fishing,
the proportion of public space, and reclamation works. Town planning work
became much more comprehensive and detailed than that before the war.
In 1965, the Crown Lands and Surveys Office had three sections: 1) Urban
and South New Territories; 2) Tsuen Wan, Yuen Long and Tai Po; and