almost no safe shelter. The damage caused by the typhoon made the govern-
ment realise that construction materials were not strong enough to withstand
typhoons.68 After disaster struck, reconstruction of the seawalls became a prior-
ity. Reclamation was also undertaken as part of the reconstruction works.
67
The total population of 1874 is actually data from 1872. Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha &
Co., 1874, p.122. From 1873 to 1876, the government did not conduct any census and only cited figures from
1872 as reference. Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 24 February 1877, p.81. Such
figures are provided here as well for reference only.
68
‘Captain Superintendent of Police to Colonial Secretary’, 30 September 1874, Hong Kong Government
Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 17 October 1874, No. 168.
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 35
In 1875, the government proposed large-scale construction of the Praya.
Governor A.E. Kennedy appointed Registrar General C.C. Smith, Surveyor
General J.M. Price, Superintendent of Fire Brigade C. May, P. Ryrie of Turner &
Co., and H. Rowlock of Gibb, Livingstone & Co. to a committee69 discussing the
reconstruction of the Praya and the large-scale reclamation works from west to
east along the coast. The plans also included the waterfront that would connect
the barracks in Central and Wan Chai. Districts with wider reclamation areas
included the District No. 2 (Sai Ying Pun) and District No. 4 (Sheung Wan)
of the City of Victoria,70 and also the area from White’s Lane at Sheung Wan’s
harbourfront (today’s Wing Wo Street in Sheung Wan) to the Government
Wharf in front of the Cricket Ground in Central, the navy’s dockyard and the
coastal area of the neighbouring buildings of the British military. (See Figure 1.3
and Table 1.3.) In order to reinforce the seawalls against typhoons, the govern-
ment proposed using new construction technologies that increased construc-
tion costs. The owners of marine lots in Sai Wan and Sheung Wan were invited
to participate in the plans. However, although the original owners were guaran-
teed the ownership of the reclaimed land by the government, most were only
willing to pay for the basic reclamation works and not the additional works for
reinforcing the seawalls. The government was facing economic difficulties after
the typhoon and could not afford such major expenditure. It was also difficult to
find financial backers other than the prospective owners of the reclaimed land.
The committee therefore had no choice but to propose a loan from the British
government.
The government planned to borrow a loan of 214,500 Hong Kong dollars
from the United Kingdom at an interest rate of 5 per cent per annum, to be
repaid over 15 years. With an annual payment of 15,000 Hong Kong dollars,
the loan principal repayment amount would be 14,250 Hong Kong dollars after
deducting interest of 750 Hong Kong dollars. The 15-year loan would have been
sufficient to cover the reclamation costs.71 One thing of note is that the British
military had always opposed reclamation in front of the land it owned before
the typhoon hit Hong Kong in 1874. However, the typhoon had blocked the
drains and sewers of the coastal land owned by the British military, causing
water to accumulate and sewage to backflow during heavy downpours. In addi-
tion, after the typhoon struck, local residents disposed of garbage by discharge
along the coast, badly affecting the hygiene of the barracks. The British military
therefore also supported the reconstruction of the harbourfront and its expan-
sion by way of reclamation.72 Regrettably, the government failed to secure the
loan in the end. With unfavourable economic conditions after the typhoon,
Governor Kennedy was unable to implement the plan during his time in office.73
69
CO129/170, pp.531–534.
70
CO129/170 refers to Sai Ying Pun as District No. 2 and Sheung Wan as District No. 4.
71
CO129/170, pp.536–538.
72
CO129/174, ‘Foreshore in Front of Naval and Military Reserves’, 11 July 1876, pp.350–363.
73
Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1862–1919: Years of Discretion, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University
Press, 1975, p.39.
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M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 36
Source: CO129.
Figure 1.3 Reclamation plan for Victoria Harbour in the late nineteenth century
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 37
Table 1.3 Expenditure budget for Praya reconstruction works (May 1875)
HK$
Repairing, and where necessary rebuilding, seawall from Gas 55,000
Works to White’s Lane
Rebuilding seawall from White’s Lane to Government Wharf 105,400
Increasing width of Praya Central 12,500
Repairs to Praya East 20,000
Contingencies 19,100
Total 212,000
Sources: CO129/170, Praya Wall – Transmits Report of Board of Enquiry on, and other Papers Relating to Rebuilding of, 6 May
1875.
The reclamation works from the Hong Kong and China Gas Works in Sai Wan
to the Government Wharf in Central did not commence until 1889.
Compared to reclamation works, building typhoon shelters requires less funds.
The government’s building of the first typhoon shelter in Causeway Bay for boat
people was also a response to the devastation the boat people suffered in the 1874
typhoon. Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter was completed in 1883, and cost around
97,000 Hong Kong dollars to build.74 When it was first built, the breakwater was
only 1,400 feet long75 and could not accommodate a lot of ships.76 It therefore could
not offer sufficient space when typhoons struck. In December 1903, Legislative
Council member Gershom Stewart proposed an expansion of the Causeway Bay
Typhoon Shelter, which was approved unanimously in the Legislative Council.
However, despite approval, the plan was not implemented, owing to insufficient
funds. In 1904 and 1906, although being pressed by Legislative Council members
and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the government was still
not able to expand the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter.77 On 18 September 1906,
Hong Kong was again struck by a strong typhoon, which destroyed 3,653 ships and
killed over 15,000, most of whom were boat people.78 The expansion of the typhoon
shelter was thus again brought to the forefront, and in March 1908 the government
accepted the proposal of the General Chamber of Commerce dated 16 July 1904,
increasing the depth by 9 feet and expanding its area by 75 acres. In 1953, the gov-
ernment undertook reclamation works at the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter, and
the typhoon shelter was moved north from its original location.79
From the end of 1906 to the beginning of 1907, the Legislative Council
considered building a new typhoon shelter at one of these locations: Cheung
74
‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1909’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong
Kong, Noronha & Co., 1910, Appendix O.
75
Wah Kiu Yat Po, 25 August 1968; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 June 1960.
76
Huazi ribao (Huazi Daily), 2 November 1906.
77
Huazi ribao (Huazi Daily), 2 November 1906.
78
‘A Review of Natural Disasters of the Past’, in Ho Pui-yin, Weathering the Storm: Hong Kong Observatory
and Social Development, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2003, p.81.
79
Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 June 1960.
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38 · MAKING HONG KONG
Sha Wan, east of Stonecutters Island, Kellett’s Bank in Causeway Bay, the har-
bourfront of Kennedy Town, and so on. In 1908, the Public Works Committee
agreed unanimously that Mong Kok Tsui in Yau Ma Tei would be most suitable.
The typhoon shelter, upon completion, would have an area of 166 square acres80
and was estimated to cost 1.54 million Hong Kong dollars.
On 7 March 1908, the Hong Kong government submitted the proposal and
budget for the Mong Kok Tsui Typhoon Shelter to Britain for approval. On
2 September 1908, in order to make timely precautions against typhoons, the
government purchased the hopper dredger St Enoch from Messrs Punchard,
Lowther & Co. to start dredging works at the site even before approval was
obtained from Britain. The design plans of the typhoon shelter were consid-
ered and revised by engineer J.F. Boulton of the Public Works Department and
other consulting engineers, and the new plans were approved by the Legislative
Council in November 1909. Dredging works were completed by the end of
January 1910. Construction works were contracted to Messrs Him Tai on 27
October 1910 at the lowest price, and included building a breakwater that was
3,325 feet long with a foundation 192 feet wide, as well as a 450-feet-long and
30-feet-wide concrete pier to be built on the south of the harbour by reclama-
tion. Upon completion, the typhoon shelter area within the breakwater would
cover 165 acres (0.67 square kilometres). The depth would be affected by tidal
movement and would range from 9 to 18 feet, with 82 per cent of the waters at
12 feet deep and 56 per cent of the waters deeper than 15 feet. There were two
entrances into the typhoon shelter: the northern entrance was 300 feet wide,
while the southern entrance was 390 feet wide.81
Building the Mong Kok Tsui Typhoon Shelter necessitated raising the level
of Reclamation Street, which was originally adjacent to the sea, as well as
relaying sewage and water discharge facilities. The government was also of
the view that the houses with a frontage to the sea should be rebuilt, as they
were damaged by lack of repair or even destroyed by typhoons or fires in
some cases. However, when the redevelopment plans were introduced, the
owners of Marine Lot Nos 29, 30 and 31 opposed the new reclamations and
demanded that the government compensate them for the loss of value in their
land as a result of losing their favourable coastal positions. The government
paid 161,217 Hong Kong dollars as compensation to the owners of Marine
Lot Nos 29, 30 and 31 in April 1911.82 The works spanned five years and
were finally completed in August 1915 as scheduled. The typhoon shelter was
unveiled by Governor F.H. May on 16 December that year. The works cost 2.21
million Hong Kong dollars, exceeding the originally estimated 1.54 million
80
‘Correspondence Regarding the Typhoon Shelter at Mongkoktsui and the Proposed Temporary
Increase in Light Dues’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 24, 1908, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1909,
pp.506–507.
81
‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1915’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong
Kong, Noronha & Co., 1916, Appendix Q, Q 86–88.
82
CO129/377, ‘Memo in Reply to Messrs Deacon, Looker & Deacon’s Letter’, 18 March 1911, 7 April
1911, 18 April 1911.
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 39
Table 1.4 Statistics on typhoon shelters in Hong Kong
Place Year of build/ Size in 2015
reconstruction
(hectare) (acre)
Typhoon shelters:
Causeway Bay 1883/1951 9.9 24.5
Tau Ma Tei 1915/1992/1993 64.6 159.6
Aberdeen West 1964 34.2 84.5
Aberdeen South 1985 26.1 64.5
Rambler Channel 1966 12.9 31.9
Shuen Wan 1966 10.3 25.5
Yim Tin Tsai 1968 9.2 22.7
Sam Ka Tsuen 1960s 1.9 4.7
Shai Kei Wan 1972/1992 17.2 42.5
Kwun Tong 1974 33.8 83.5
Cheung Chau 1981 50 123.6
Tuen Mun 1982 56.8 140.4
To Kwa Wan 1994 14.8 36.6
Hei Ling Chau 1999 76.6 189.3
Sheltered anchorages:
Chai Wan Cargo Basin 1986 11.2 27.7
Sha Tau Kok 1991 0.6 1.5
Tai O 2006 4 9.9
Kat O 1.6 4.0
Tsuen Wan 3.7 9.1
Sources: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1969–1970, Hong
Kong, Government Printer, 1970, p.154; Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for
the Financial Year 1965–1966, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1966, p.33; Planning and Development Office, Marine
Department, internal data; Sing Tao Daily, 30 April 1959; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 25 March 1968; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 January 1966;
Oriental Daily News, 29 June 1990.
Hong Kong dollars by 670,000 Hong Kong dollars.83 On 2 September 1937,
Hong Kong was again ravaged by a strong typhoon, and the space provided by
the typhoon shelter proved insufficient. However, it was not until 1962 that
the government would build additional typhoon shelters. In the 1970s, the
government implemented a priority settlement housing programme for boat
people voluntarily giving up their fishing vessels and settling inland. Hong
Kong’s floating population has drastically dropped since. By 2015, the floating
population only accounted for 0.2 per cent of the entire population of Hong
Kong. (See Table 1.4.)
Carrying out reclamation works and building reservoirs and typhoon
shelters – these were all Hong Kong’s responses in answer to nature’s challenges,
83
‘Report of the Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha &
Co., 1916, Appendix Q, Q 74.
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40 · MAKING HONG KONG
drawing on both human and material resources to strive for the city’s sur-
vival. Swift responses in the face of adversity have also helped develop a habit
amongst the people of Hong Kong where speed is pursued in everything. The
city’s numerous constructions served as the government’s means to drive urban
development in its attempt to take the initiative in the city’s town planning.
However, was infrastructure alone sufficient in meeting the needs of an ever
growing population?
The bubonic plague: redeveloping the Taipingshan District
After the typhoon in 1874, not only did the city’s hygiene not improve, but
it actually grew worse. This is because, while the population increased cease-
lessly, the government had taken no measures to improve the environment.
From January to May 1894, a bubonic plague broke out in Guangzhou, taking
tens of thousands of lives.84 In May, the first case of the plague was found in
the Taipingshan District in Hong Kong, and by June the bubonic plague had
reached its peak. Some had speculated that this was due to the warm and humid
weather at the end of spring being conducive to bacterial growth. From October
1893 to 16 May 1894, no rain had fallen in Hong Kong. In districts with a
crowded living environment where residents already paid little attention to
hygiene, the issue of cleanliness was even more neglected in periods of insuf-
ficient fresh water supply.
The abhorrent hygiene environment caused the disease to spread rapidly. The
government hired Dr M. Wilm to conduct a study of the bubonic plague from
1894 to 1896. The doctor pointed out that the living environment of Chinese
residents was overcrowded: small living areas that were generally one-tenth or
one-fifteenth of those of Europeans. In 1894, the Chinese population was about
210,000, while the European population was only 6,000. A typical Chinese res-
idence would be a three-storey stone cottage with small windows facing the
street. Each floor would house around 16 to 25 residents, adding up to at least
48 residents in total in the tenement without a well-laid sewerage system.85 In
the early stages of the plague, voluntary cleaning groups were organised, which
included as members the voluntary servicemen of the Shropshire Light Infantry
and the police. These groups, under the supervision of the Sanitary Board execu-
tive committee, disinfected the Taipingshan District with lime water.86 About
7,000 Chinese residences were quarantined for inspection, 350 of which were
sealed off where the plague bacteria were found. However, Chinese residents
84
‘Medical Report on the Prevalence of Bubonic Plague in the Colony of Hong Kong during the Years
1895 and 1896’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1897, p.289; Huazi ribao (Huazi
Daily), 21 June 1895, 30 December 1895.
85
Staff Surgeon Wilm, Epidemic of Bubonic Plague at Hong Kong in the Year 1896, Hong Kong, Noronha &
Co., 1897, p.23.
86
Yiu Chung-yim, Xianggang shuyi weisheng huanjing yu jianzhu (Hong Kong’s Bubonic Plague,
Environmental Health and Architecture), Hong Kong Historical Photo Research Competition, organised
jointly by the Hong Kong Museum of History and We Love Hong Kong Association, 2007, http://www.welo
vehkhist.com/thesis/2007/2007-1-1.pdf.
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 41
were disgruntled by the government sending quarantine personnel into their
homes for hygiene inspections, as they considered this a disturbance to decent
ladies staying at home, and thus an affront to traditional ethics.87
According to the government’s medical reports, by mid-May in 1894 there
were 150 confirmed cases of the plague, and over 70 were hospitalised daily
because of the plague. Glass Works Hospital, a hospital managed by the Tung
Wah Hospital, admitted some 200 patients, twice that of Tung Wah Hospital’s
capacity.88 In fact, those willing to be admitted and treated were in the minority
– the actual number of infected might well be far more than recorded numbers.
At the end of May the number of deaths announced by the government was
over 450, and by 15 June the number announced by the government had risen
to 1,900. Among those infected, the rate of death of the Chinese was 93 per cent
higher than that of Europeans or other ethnicities.
Commercial activities in Hong Kong were deeply impacted by the plague.
A lot of business owners brought with them their employees and families and
returned to Guangdong, while those who had plans to come to Hong Kong for
business delayed such plans. By 15 June, the number of people leaving Hong
Kong and returning to Guangdong reached 80,00089 (accounting for 38 per
cent of the population of Hong Kong). Of the population of 210,000, only
130,000 remained. As a result of a shortage of supply caused by the declining
trade and commercial activities, the prices of food and daily goods soared 30 to
50 per cent.90 In addition, the Victoria Harbour was ravaged by two consecutive
typhoons in September and October 1894. With the government at its wits’ end
with the plague, the 11th Governor, William Robinson, ordered Sheung Wan
and the entire district of Taipingshan to be sealed off and all residences within
the districts demolished. Hong Kong was declared an infected city, and those
infected with the plague were prohibited from leaving Hong Kong.
Ripon, a British engineer, was of the view that the Hong Kong government
should immediately increase the capacity of Hong Kong’s two reservoirs,
with the supply capacity of Tai Tam Reservoir to be increased by 80 million
gallons. He also suggested that the government devoted resources to cleaning
each house with a generous amount of water in order to destroy the bacteria.91
However, to increase the supply capacity of reservoirs was easier said than done.
While the government had no way of improving the circumstances on water
supply, the situation was worsened by the unfavourable weather conditions.
Hong Kong experienced a drought year in 1895, with annual rainfall only at a
87
Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional
Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1894, p.283.
88
Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional
Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 20 June 1894, p.286.
89
Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong
Sessional Papers, No. 21/1894, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 20 June 1894.
90
William Robinson, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong
Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1894, p.288.
91
Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional
Papers, No. 21, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 20 June 1894.
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42 · MAKING HONG KONG
total of 45.8 inches (1,163 mm) – half of the yearly average. To conserve water,
the government had to restrict water supply to three to four hours a day from
April to June and from October to December that year. The average daily water
supply per capita was only 7.7 gallons (35 litres) from April to June, while that
of June to July was 9.7 gallons (44 litres). Some contaminated wells were sealed
shut in order to impede the spread of the plague, thus further worsening the
shortage of water supply. In 1895, the recorded number of deaths as a result of
the plague was 2,000. It should be noted that the official number of deaths was
based on records made of bodies found. There were still cases beyond count
where the Chinese had dealt with the bodies privately. It is therefore undisputed
that the plague was out of control.
From 4 to 29 January 1896, a further 45 cases of the plague were diagnosed in
Hong Kong. The infected were immediately transferred to the Kennedy Town
Hospital in the Western District for quarantine, and their houses were sealed
off. From 25 February to 21 April the same year, the Sanitary Board’s quarantine
personnel inspected Chinese houses every ten days, disinfecting 3,200 houses,
or a total of 8,330 floors of residences. Abandoned bodies of the infected were
found by the government in the streets, at the piers and in the sea.92 To prevent
the spread of the plague, the government decreed that infected bodies must be
buried with lime. The Chinese were also prohibited from leaving Hong Kong.
Governor Robinson’s methods of quarantining patients for inspection were met
with opposition from the Chinese, and an increasing number demanded to be
allowed to return to Guangdong for treatment. The government in the end lifted
the prohibition order on 21 March, allowing people to leave Hong Kong. Despite
the various government measures, the plague remained uncontrollable. Of the
715 Chinese patients infected with the plague who were treated by the govern-
ment from January to May that year, 639 died, representing a death rate of 89 per
cent.93
In 1896 the Government Analyst conducted a sampling survey on 40 wells
in the Yau Ma Tei, Tsim Sha Tsui and Mong Kok districts in Kowloon and in
Central and Sheung Wan, and found that the well water was severely contami-
nated by wastes from both humans and livestock. In a water well at 267 Queen’s
Road West, the level of chlorine was found to be 373.8 milligrams per litre. The
average chlorine level of the 40 wells was 106 milligrams per litre,94 whereas
today people are worried about carcinogens where the level of residual chlorine
is 1 milligram per 1 litre of water.95 The large quantity of chlorine in water at the
time was due to people trying to sterilise their water by using bleaching powder,
a method of sterilisation not unlike drinking poison to quench thirst. With the
92
‘Report of the Medical Officer of Health on the Epidemic of Bubonic Fever (Plague) During the Half
Year Ending June 30, 1901’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 35, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1901, p.457.
93
Joseph Chamberlain, ‘Governor’s Despatch on the Incipience and Progress of the Bubonic Plague in
Hong Kong during 1896’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 27, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., May 1896.
94
W. Edward Chow, ‘Report of the Government Analyst’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong,
Noronha & Co., 1896, p.310.
95
According to the report on the hygiene standards of Hong Kong’s fresh water published by the Water
Supplies Department in 2000.
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 43
water supply contaminated by human and livestock wastes, the water had a high
E. coli content, causing gastroenteritis in those who drank it, or other gastroin-
testinal diseases such as cholera and dysentery in more severe cases. The reason
for such contamination of the water supply was overpopulation. The fresh water
in the Chinese communities was of poor quality and insufficient supply. The
physical safety of the residents at the time was truly worrying.
Dr M. Wilm’s report in 1896 showed that the bacteria of the plague could
survive for 20 days in distilled water, 16 days in 200 millilitres of cultured samples
taken from tap water and well water, and 6 days in 200-millilitre samples taken
from seawater. In June, when the plague was spreading swiftly, Dr Wilm took
water samples from three wells at Yau Ma Tei on the Kowloon Peninsula still
in use at the time, and found that one well, which was situated in lowland and
always overflowing, had a large quantity of the plague bacteria in its water, while
the other two remained uncontaminated, owing to the fact that they were situ-
ated on higher ground and thus the water level was almost 4 yards away from
the mouth of the wells.96 Apart from well water, water from rivers and the sea
was also highly susceptible to contamination by bacteria. The entire harbour
was under the threat of the plague in 1896. In September, the number of deaths
announced by the government was 2,000. However, the actual number may well
have been much higher than this. The government’s reluctance to disclose the
actual circumstances concerning the plague was a sign of its helplessness against
the plague.
Health reports from the end of the 1890s show that those who died of the
plague were mostly from Central and Sheung Wan. In particular, the situation
was most serious in the Taipingshan District. In 1861 the district had a popula-
tion of only 18,000.97 This rose to 31,000 in 1891.98 By 1891, 272,000 square
feet of private land was divided into 355 land lots in just 31 years. There were
estimated to be about 400 tenement buildings, 76 of which had at least three
infected residents per building. Assuming each tenement building housed some
70 residents, these small and densely populated land lots were stuffed with the
poorest in society in terrible hygiene conditions. They were therefore the areas
where the plague was most severe. Apart from the 272,000 square feet of private
residence, the district was also home to the Chinese charitable organisation
Tung Wah Hospital, the Pound Lane Police Station, No. 8 Police Station and
the Taipingshan market. It could only be imagined that, with the police stations
keeping public order and the hospital providing shelter to patients, there was
little space left for any other activities. Such was the kind of place the Chinese
lived in at the time.
On 17 September 1894, the Legislative Council passed the Taipingshan
96
Staff Surgeon Wilm, Epidemic of Bubonic Plague at Hong Kong in the Year 1896, Hong Kong, Noronha &
Co., 1897, p.27.
97
‘Return of the Population and of the Marriages, Births and Deaths’, Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong,
Noronha & Co., 1861.
98
‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1891’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government,
28 September 1901, p.754.
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44 · MAKING HONG KONG
Resumption Ordinance, 1894 (or ‘An Ordinance for the Summary Resumption of
Certain Crown Lands Situate in the Taipingshan District of the City of Victoria
and for Other Purposes’) after the third reading. In March 1895, Surveyor
General F.A. Cooper submitted the Scheme for the Improvement of the Resumed
Area in the District of Taipingshan.99 The Surveyor General divided the district
into 11 sections – A to K. In accordance with Ordinance No. 8 of 1894,100 the
Surveyor General submitted the plans for ‘Enclosed Area Taipingshan, with
Details of Lots’ in August 1895. The government accepted the proposal of
Belilios and burnt down the district by fire starting from August that year. From
August to October 1895, the wooden structures and houses on Taipingshan
Street, Market Street, Upper Station Street, Square Street, Bridges Street and
Tank Lane were the first to be demolished. At the same time, in order to avoid
old gutters hindering the progress of the redevelopment of Taipingshan, new
stormwater drains were laid from Hollywood Road to Caine Road. Demolition
works were halted by heavy rainfall in February 1896, and were only half done
by June. The entire project was not completed until 1898.101 A total of 6.2
acres (0.025 square kilometres) of land was resumed from private owners for
replanning (Figure 1.4), as the government required that each adult should have
on average a minimum of 21 square feet of living space. It was estimated that
820,000 Hong Kong dollars was paid for this private land.102 With these meas-
ures in force, the district lost 12,554 (40 per cent) of its population. By 1897, the
population left in Taipingshan District was 18,784,103 such was the impact of the
plague on the district.
In 1900, the government attempted to improve public hygiene in Chinese
communities by introducing new waste disposal methods. Five public latrines,
each with about 40 cubicles, were added in five locations with Chinese com-
munities: in the east end of Wing Lok Street, Taipingshan District, at the
slaughterhouse at the end of Queen’s Road West, So Kon Po and Gough Street.
Some 2,000 to 4,000 Hong Kong dollars was invested in each of these public
latrines, with the dry closets replaced with water closets. This was considered a
public hygiene breakthrough at the time, as it not only changed the daily habits
of the Chinese, but also introduced the use of water closets into the Chinese
communities.104
In 1903, the plans for the redevelopment of Taipingshan District were pub-
licised by the government. The most striking was Blake Garden, which was to
be built in sections D and E in the middle area of the district after the houses
there were burnt down. The garden would cover an area from Square Street in
99
Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 30 March 1895, p.262.
100
CO129/264, ‘Sanitary Board . . .’, 7 September 1894, pp.83–86.
101
Jerome J. Platt, The Whitewash Brigade: The Hong Kong Plague of 1894, London, Dix Noonan Webb,
1998, p.78.
102
Hongkong Telegraph, 11 January 1895.
103
‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1897’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha &
Co., 1897, p.485.
104
‘Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Government Gazette,
Hong Kong Government, 11 May 1901, p.957.
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Source: ‘Insanitary Properties Resumptions’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905.
Figure 1.4 Map of Taipingshan District (1895)
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46 · MAKING HONG KONG
the east to Po Hing Fong in the south, Pound Lane in the west, and Kat Cheung
Street in the north. The entire eastern portion of Taipingshan District – the
original lots in sections A and B – was to be replanned from the ground up. In
the south-east, the Bacteriological Institute was to be built on land in section
G (today’s Caine Lane) after clearance, and to the south-west of the Institute
would be the staff quarters for the disinfection work staff of the Sanitary Board.
No. 8 Police Station in the south would be expanded, as the houses in section G
were to be demolished, and sections H and I in the west (today’s Rutter Street
to Po Hing Fong) would be replanned as larger land lots after clearance. Inland
Lot No. 700 (today’s Wa On Lane to Po Yan Street) was to be overhauled as
the Chung Hing cinema. Section K, after clearance, would become a new wing
of Tung Wah Hospital. While inland Lot No. 361 would continue to be used
by Tung Wah Hospital, section F beside the hospital would become inland Lot
No. 1356 after clearance and would be used by Tung Wah Hospital and would
eventually become the founding site of Po Leung Kuk.105 A small portion of land
in the north would be retained for private residential development, though at a
much lower density.
According to figures published by the government in 1905, compensation
paid for the resumption of Taipingshan District reached 821,000 dollars. Adding
this to the 123,000 Hong Kong dollars of expenditure in relation to roads and
sewerage systems, cost totalled 944,000 Hong Kong dollars. On the other hand,
sale of private land after redevelopment brought in 171,000 Hong Kong dollars,
and profits from the sale of construction waste from the clearance as reclama-
tion materials amounted to 20,000 Hong Kong dollars, bringing total income to
191,000 Hong Kong dollars.106
After redevelopment, the density of buildings was greatly lowered, with land
available for private development reduced from 272,000 square feet (25,270
square metres) to 97,000 square feet (9,012 square metres).107 (See Table 1.5.)
The redeveloped Taipingshan District has added public open space in the form
of Blake Garden, an entertainment venue in Chung Hing Theatre, and health-
and hygiene-oriented facilities including the Bacteriological Institute, quarters
for the Sanitary Board’s disinfection, and public latrines. (See Figure 1.5.) These,
together with the pre-existing Tung Wah Hospital and police station, made up a
very complete set of public facilities that also served as a blueprint for the plan-
ning of future Chinese communities.
From 1894 to 1896, a large number of Chinese left Hong Kong for
Guangzhou to escape from the bubonic plague, and the people around south-
ern China were reluctant to trade with Hong Kong. According to statistics in
105
‘Tablet of the Reconstruction of the Property at Po Yan Street (Original Site of Po Leung Kuk)’, in
Donghua sanyuan gengzi nian dongshi ju, ed., A Development History of Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1870–
1960, Hong Kong, Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1960, p.10.
106
‘Resumption Schemes Financial Statement, to 1 May 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong,
Noronha & Co., 1905, p.1.
107
‘Resumption Schemes Financial Statement, to 1 May 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong,
Noronha & Co., 1905, p.18.
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 47
Table 1.5 Land use comparison before and after the replanning of Taipingshan District
Area
(sq. ft) (m2)
Before:
Lots leased or granted 272,021 (25,271.58)
Market and Police Station 11,492.5 (1,067.69)
Roads 79,177.5 (7,355.83)
Total 362,691 (33,695.10)
After:
Disposed of by public auction 46,631 (4,332.16)
Granted to Tung Wah Hospital, District Watchman’s 39,613 (3,680.17)
Quarters, and Temple, Taipingshan Street
Utilised for Bacteriological Institute, Sanitary Board 28,169 (2,616.99)
Quarters, Latrine and Bath House
Laid out as public gardens 47,700 (4,431.48)
(gross area including roads: 67,950)
Still available for sale 50,926 (4,731.18)
Devoted to roads, steps, lances, etc. 149,652 (13,903.13)
Total 362,691 (33,695.10)
Source: ‘Resumption Schemes Financial Statement, to 1 May 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co.,
1905, p.18.
Guangdong’s customs records, the number of people heading from Guangzhou
to Hong Kong fell at an average rate of 10 per cent per annum over the four-year
period 1894–1898. At the same time, the population moving from Hong Kong
to Guangzhou was on the rise, with the highest rate of increase being recorded in
1898 – a 23 per cent increase when compared to 1897.108 Hong Kong’s economy
was slowed down to almost a standstill, and the authorities faced major govern-
ing challenges. The Hong Kong government invited many experts from Britain
to advise on the problem of the plague. As it was widely accepted at the time that
the plague was spread by rats, the 12th Governor, Henry Arthur Blake, actively
advocated rat eradication upon assuming office in 1898, calling upon the entire
population of Hong Kong to participate and imposing a reward of 2 shillings
per rat caught. In 1900, the people of Hong Kong got rid of up to 43,000 rats.
However, despite the rising number of rat deaths, the hygiene situation barely
improved. In the end the government found that some people were smuggling
rats on to Hong Kong Island from the New Territories in order to earn the
108
Guangzhou shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, Guangzhou shi zhi (Gazette of Guangzhou),
Volume 18, Guangzhou, Guangzhou chubanshe, 1996, p.270; Guangzhou shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuan
hui bangong shi and Guangzhou haiguan zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, ed., Jindai Guangzhou kouan jingji
shehui gaikuang: Yue haiguan baogao huiji (1860–1949) (An Economic and Social Overview of Modern
Guangzhou Port – A Collection of Reports of Guangdong Customs), Guangzhou, Jinan daxue chubanshe,
1995, p.928.
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 47 20/08/2018 16:47
M4593-HO_9781788117944_t.indd 48
Source: ‘Insanitary Properties Resumptions’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905.
Figure 1.5 Redevelopment plan for Taipingshan District (1905)
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 49
reward. The rat eradication thus ended in confusion.109 Hong Kong would go on
to live in the haze of the plague for the next decade.
Governing
The demarcation of Chinese and foreign residential areas
On 6 July 1843, when then Land Officer, Surveyor and Inspector of Roads
Alexander T. Gordon110 was drawing up the building plans for the City of
Victoria, the Chinese’s residential areas were intended to be mostly located in
Sheung Wan. In the development plans for the city drafted by the first Governor,
Henry Pottinger, in 1841, there was never a ‘Chinatown’ planned as a settlement
area for the Chinese. In Pottinger’s plans, there was only a planned location for
the bazaar. Among the pieces of land that the government offered for bidding
by the private sector on 14 June 1841, a total of 268 pieces were bazaar lots,
including the Upper Bazaar, consisting of 118 pieces of land of 504 square feet
(14 feet by 36 feet) each, and the Lower Bazaar, consisting of 150 pieces of land
of 800 square feet (20 feet by 40 feet) each. The Upper Bazaar is located west of
today’s Aberdeen Street and north of Hollywood Road, around the area at Kau
U Fong and Gough Street, while the Lower Bazaar is situated at today’s Jervois
Street and Bonham Strand West. The first land sale did not prohibit Chinese
participation. As the bazaar lots were smaller and thus would not require a large
amount to invest in them, they attracted quite a few Chinese purchasers who
were hoping to identify investment opportunities in Hong Kong. Therefore,
there were a lot of Chinese landowners around Wellington Street and the
Sheung Wan waterfront in the 1840s. Thus it can be seen that the extent of active
territory of the Chinese in the early days was largely determined by commercial
investment opportunities. While the government’s land development policies
did not intentionally divide between Chinese and foreign communities, the dis-
parate Eastern and Western cultures and the rapidly rising Chinese population
had meant that each of the communities had created their own distinct and
increasingly diversifying features based on their daily needs.
As Hong Kong’s status as an entrepôt continued to elevate and most of its
commercial activities were concentrated in Central, the price of land in Central
rose substantially. The military barracks at today’s Admiralty and the govern-
ment department offices in Central had already occupied a large portion of the
land in Central. The government very much intended to alter its original plans,
resume the 1.5 acres (0.61 hectares) of land at the heart of the Central com-
mercial district that was the Upper Bazaar and turn it into an area for European
commercial activities in order to collect more Crown rent. The government’s
plan was to designate the area east of Possession Street and around Taipingshan
Street south of Queen’s Road Central as the commercial district for the Chinese
109
G.B. Endacott, Fragrant Harbour: A Short History of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press,
1962, p.128.
110
Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 5 January 1843.
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50 · MAKING HONG KONG
– the Taipingshan District – and move the stores of the Upper Bazaar to that
district.
At the end of 1843, Land Officer Gordon resold by auction the land around
the waterfront at Sheung Wan (around today’s Bonham Strand to Gough Street)
and the Upper Bazaar lots (west of today’s Aberdeen Street, north of Hollywood
Road, Kau U Fong and Jervois Street).111 On 22 January 1844, the 27 pieces
of land situated at the Upper Bazaar were successfully bid for by Europeans.
Accordingly, the government ordered the businesses and residents of the Upper
Bazaar to move out within six months from 15 January 1844.112 The Chinese of
the Upper Bazaar therefore had to relocate.113
The Chinese landowners were unhappy with the government reselling the
Upper Bazaar lots without their consent. After the sale of the Upper Bazaar
land, Governor Pottinger ordered then Chief Magistrate Major William Caine,
Registrar General Charles Gutzlaff and Land Officer Gordon to form a commit-
tee to handle the relocation of the businesses of the Upper Bazaar. However,
not only did the government not consider the interests of the original owners,
but it declared that the land leases executed by the first Land Officer, George F.
Mylius, were provisional in nature and had no permanent effect. Public opinion
at the time was harshly critical of the colonial government forcing Chinese busi-
nesses out of the Upper Bazaar, even going so far as referring to the government
as bandits.114 The government paid no heed to such opposition, but declared on
25 July 1844 that the Upper Bazaar businesses were to move out by September
1844. The Upper Bazaar was then transformed into a European commercial
district.
With no bargaining power, the Chinese businesses had to accept the govern-
ment’s arrangement to re-establish at Lot Nos 44 and 78 of Taipingshan District
(the area around the east of today’s Possession Street and west of Shing Wong
Street). The government exempted the annual Crown rent of the affected busi-
nesses until January 1849, and each business was paid 40 Hong Kong dollars
compensation.115 However, Governor Pottinger was of the view that those
conducting immoral businesses such as running gambling houses and brothels
should not be compensated. Among the 112 businesses that were relocated by
the government, only 81 were paid the 40 Hong Kong dollars compensation.116
During the relocation, the government spent some 5,900 Hong Kong dollars
on forming land in Taipingshan District. Thus the area around Bonham Strand,
Taipingshan Street and the Lower Bazaar in Sheung Wan became an area where
the Chinese settled. As the government imposed no specifications on the houses
built by the Chinese, they were allowed to build temporary houses with thatch
or wood. Therefore, the constructions in areas where the Chinese were active
111
CO129/2, ‘Gordon to Pottinger’, 19 December 1843, p.445.
112
CO129/5, ‘Woosnam to Gordon’, 10 January 1844, p.69.
113
CO129/2, ‘Davis to Stanley’, 26 July 1844, p.435.
114
Friend of China, 10 August 1844.
115
CO129/6, ‘Carrie, Gutzlaff and Gordon to Bruce’, 21 May 1844, p.444.
116
CO129/6, ‘Carrie, Gutzlaff and Gordon to Pottinger’, 21 May 1844, p.440.
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 51
were mostly very primitive. This, coupled with the dense population and poor
environmental hygiene, resulted in a big gap between the environment of the
Chinese commercial areas and their Western counterparts. The government
thus made every attempt to segregate the Chinese communities from the for-
eigners. Chief Magistrate Caine even ordered that, except police officers, no
Europeans be allowed to live in Chinese-populated areas.
From the seven districts to the ten districts
In 1844 the colonial government not only forced the Chinese businesses in
the Upper Bazaar out of Central into Taipingshan District, but also enacted
multiple laws in an attempt to deal with law-and-order problems by way of a
Western legal system. In order to block undesirables from entering Hong
Kong and maintain public order, the second Hong Kong Governor, Sir John
Francis Davis, who had assumed office less than six months earlier, promul-
gated the Ordinance for Establishing a Registry of the Inhabitants of the Island of
Hongkong and Its Dependencies on 21 August 1844 to monitor by administrative
means those entering Hong Kong. The ordinance was to come into force on
1 November 1844, and provided that everyone entering Hong Kong should
declare to the Registrar General within 24 hours their date and place of birth,
address and marital status. In addition, those who had a monthly income above
20 Hong Kong dollars had to pay a 5 Hong Kong dollar annual registration fee
to the office of the Registrar General, while those with a monthly income below
20 Hong Kong dollars and 10 Hong Kong dollars had to pay 3 Hong Kong
dollars and 1 Hong Kong dollar, respectively.117 This annual fee became known
as a ‘poll tax’.
From an administrative standpoint, the ordinance allowed the government
to have a good grasp of information on the newly immigrated population and
facilitated governing, while also increasing the government’s financial income.
However, the ordinance was also criticised by various parties when it was
announced: the foreign businessmen believed that a law preventing undesira-
bles from entering Hong Kong should not apply to them, as people of economic
status, as such an application would mean equal treatment between them and
the Chinese as bad people, as well as that foreign businesses would have to go
through registration procedures and be taxed as well. On the other hand, the
Chinese workers, who were paid a salary of 2 to 3 Hong Kong dollars per month,
considered the 1 Hong Kong dollar tax to be too severe a burden on them. On
2 November 1844, the day after the intended effective date of the ordinance,
a strike broke out among workers in Hong Kong against the poll tax. A large
number of Chinese workers left Hong Kong for their home towns. Meanwhile,
British businesses also jointly petitioned Britain in opposition to the same tax. The
government was ultimately forced to suspend the enactment of the ordinance.
117
‘An Ordinance for Establishing a Registry of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hongkong and Its
Dependencies’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 21 August 1844.
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On 13 November, the Legislative Council amended the original ordinance
and named it An Ordinance to Repeal Ordinance No. 16 of 1844 – Registry and
Census of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hong Kong. The amended ordinance
provided that each male adult of 21 years of age or above had to register with
the Registrar General upon arrival in Hong Kong and be declared a person
with no criminal conviction before he could work in Hong Kong. The Registrar
General would have the right to refuse residence in Hong Kong to those without
a good record. However, those who belonged in the military or worked at gov-
ernment departments or the East India Company, whose annual salary was
over 250 Hong Kong dollars or whose annual income was otherwise not less
than 500 Hong Kong dollars, were exempted from registration.118 There was
no mention of the imposition of any tax in the amended ordinance. Thus the
poll tax originally intended for monitoring the incoming population was revised
even before it took effect. The registration ordinance for Hong Kong residents,
which was modelled on the governing methods of European cities, failed to be
implemented according to plan, and Governor Davis was forced to step down.
Since the construction of the city, the government of Hong Kong had never
implemented any policy that would prohibit the Chinese from entering Hong
Kong, as the cheap labour force coming to the city looking for job opportuni-
ties was a solution to Hong Kong’s lack of human resources in its develop-
ment. Separately, being situated at the centre of the Pacific Ocean and on the
southern tip of China, Hong Kong was influenced by the Chinese political cir-
cumstances and was becoming increasingly important as it fell into pace with
the global economy. In the 1850s, the Taiping Rebellion of the Qing Dynasty
had caused the Chinese around the Guangdong and Guangxi area to escape
south, and British-governed Hong Kong was considered a political refuge. At
the same time, railroads were being built in America and Canada, while gold
mines were being discovered in Australia. As a result, Hong Kong also served
as a springboard for Chinese workers seeking to head to these places to make a
living. Transporting Chinese workers overseas became a big part of the entrepôt
trade of Hong Kong. According to government figures in the Hong Kong Blue
Book, the population of the City of Victoria rose by 24 per cent from 25,000 in
1849 to 31,000 in 1850. By 1859, the population of Hong Kong had increased
by 2.4 times when compared to that in 1849 (see Table 1.6).
The rapid increase in population of the City of Victoria exposed the weakness
that the government was only focused on the city’s commercial constructions.
Issues affecting the livelihood of the city’s people, such as public order, food,
housing and health, had led to a governing crisis for the administration. As a
result, it was obvious that the government’s pace of urban development was
influenced by the relief measures employed to address the Chinese communi-
ties’ urgent social needs, and not driven by any long-term planning strategy. In
fact, without mid- to long-term development goals in the governance of the city,
118
‘An Ordinance to Repeal Ordinance No. 16 of 1844 and to Establish a Registry and Census of the
Inhabitants of the Island of Hongkong’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 13
November 1844.
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Duality in planning (1841–1898) · 53
Table 1.6 The statistics on Hong Kong’s population increase in the second half of the nine-
teenth century (1841–1897)
Year Chinese Europeans Total
and other
City of Residing Kowloon Boat Others
nationalities
Victoria in the population
villages
of Hong
Kong
Island
1841 800 4,350 – 2,000 300 – 7,450
1842 6,081 4,180 – 2,100 – – 12,361
1844 6,640 5,068 – 5,368 1,925 454 19,455
1845 19,014 4,100 – – – 1,043 24,157
1846 15,675 4,774 – – – 1,386 21,835
1847 17,599 4,867 – – – 1,404 23,870
1848 12,281 4,897 – 5,644 – 1,176 23,998
1849 15,257 5,018 – 8,022 – 1,210 29,507
1850 16,712 4,898 – 10,359 – 1,305 33,274
1851 15,601 5,234 – 10,178 450 1,520 32,983
1852 17,070 6,168 – 11,829 450 1,541 37,058
1853 18,017 4,820 – 13,119 1,580 1,481 39,017
1854 26,252 5,359 – 21,189 1,272 1,643 55,715
1855 36,743 6,279 – 23,529 4,100 1,954 72,605
1856 38,007 5,800 – 19,944 5,500 2,479 71,730
1857 43,290 4,051 – 25,017 3,325 1,411 77,094
1858 45,417 4,704 – 21,925 1,700 1,757 75,503
1859 48,219 4,574 – 30,837 1,650 1,661 86,941
1860 56,856 5,276 – 28,559 1,750 2,476 94,917
1861 66,069 6,110 5,105 30,909 8,187 2,941 119,321
1862 68,277 5,866 6,431 31,639 8,326 2,972 123,511
1863 70,288 7,628 4,922 30,537 8,395 3,080 124,850
1864 73,982 7,967 3,869 29,334 2,795 3,551 121,498
1865 80,639 7,220 4,151 26,885 2,780 3,829 125,504
1866 72,264 6,200 3,418 26,954 2,718 3,544 115,098
1867 82,194 6,133 3,818 21,323 452 3,551 117,471
1868–69 79,698 6,696 4,468 22,529 478 3,416 117,285
1870–71 79,593 5,946 4,561 23,709 479 3,478 117,766
1872 82,026 6,474 5,198 20,199 441 3,314 117,652
1876 90,304 7,526 7,704 22,745 512 3,733 132,524
1881 102,385 7,585 9,021 28,989 870 4,008 152,858
1891 145,340 12,493 19,997 32,035 530 6,878 217,273
1897 160,273 11,644 26,442 33,275 1,646 8,482 241,762
Sources: ‘Chinese Repository’, Hong Kong Gazette, May 1841, p.289; Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 24 March
1842; ‘Census of Hong Kong Chinese Population’, Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1844–1899; ‘Census
Returns of the Population of the Colony for the Year . . .’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1856–
1881; ‘Census Report’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1891, 1897.
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54 · MAKING HONG KONG
it would be difficult to draw in the cheap labour force that would satisfy the ever
growing entrepôt trade. With the failure of the attempt to implement legislation
on household registration in 1844, the government had no choice but to divide
the city into different districts and rule the districts separately. In addition, the
government made use of the traditional Chinese community self-monitoring
system or self-administration system (lijia system), and tried to get a better
picture of the population in Hong Kong by asking the head of the community
(jiazhang) to provide the number of people in each household and the occupa-
tion of each member of a household.
In the 1840s, the urban area of the City of Victoria did not include the entire
Hong Kong Island, nor was the city divided into districts. The urban area of
the city covered mostly Wan Chai in the east, to the Mid-Levels of Central in
the south, the area around Sheung Wan in the west, and the coast in the north.
The whole area consisted of about 1,000 acres (4 square kilometres) of land,
with unclear borders and no notion of division into districts. In 1857, 13 years