sent out in 1972 that China did not recognize the validity of the British claims, reinforced by Mr Heath two years later and formalized in the Sino-American declarations, it is surprising that this intention was ever in doubt; but there was optimism that the resumption of sover-eignty might not necessarily involve the end of British administration.
It was sometimes suggested -but rarely seriously -that Britain might simply refuse to budge, resting her case to have absolute sover-eignty over Hong Kong Island and Kowloon town and demanding a renegotiation of the lease. Some right-wingers even advocated building a 'Berlin Wall' along the line of Boundary Street, separating British Kowloon from the New Territories. The stupidity of this suggestion was evident, and only slightly less clear was the impracticability of retaining the New Territories in the face of Chinese opposition -the water supply being only one of the more obvious difficulties. Outright defiance, however, might just have been possible. International law would probably have conceded Britain's sovereignty over the island and Kowloon, and internationalist sentiment might have agreed to a 'grant of independence' by Britain to Hong Kong. It would not have been easy for China to have defied both international law and goodwill, and forcibly to have resisted; and had the Chinese authorities, at the time of the negotiations, shown the brutality they demonstrated in June 1989 in Tiananmen Square, the outcry at any Chinese intervention would have been immense.
But in 1982, when discussions eventually began, the odds were heavily against such a policy. The British recovery of the Falk.land Islands, accompanied by the -probably unjustified and certainly much-condemned -sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano, had tested the loyalty of Britain's allies and enraged her opponents. The USSR was still a world power, although embroiled in Afghanistan and hanging on with increasing difficulty to its European satellites. Sino-Soviet relations were strained (they began to improve only in 1985), but Russia would have vetoed any United Nations move to secure the indepen-dence of Hong Kong against the determined opposition of China. Had the USA been involved, something might have been done, but at that time, with President Reagan in the White House, US rhetoric was much more concerned with Iran, Nicaragua, Vietnam and the USSR; military and civilian sales to China were improving, and human rights within that country were not the subject of anxiety that they later became.
Bluff would have been too risky, for Britain was not prepared to
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tough it out. The days when Hong Kong had been an asset, either strategically or commercially, had long passed. Independence for Hong Kong might well have been desirable, but trade and good relations with the largest country in the world were very much more so. Hong Kong's future could only be guaranteed by agreement with China, and the only realistic objective of any negotiations, accepting the inevita-bility of the colony's retrocession, would be to secure the best possible conditions for its people under Chinese rule.
Towards the end of 1982, with Rhodesian independence settled and the Argentinians ejected from the Falkland Islands, the Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher was ready to take up the offer made three years earlier to start discussions. Cynics -and it is difficult not to be at least sceptical about the purity of British motives -noted that one essential preliminary to disposing of the Hong Kongproblem had been hastened out of the way. The British NationalityAct of 1981 allowed a loophole in the definition of 'patrialism' (thetest by which the right of abode in Britain was granted} in order tofavour Falkland Islanders and Gibraltarians, but at the same timeexcluded those Hong Kong citizens who, as British subjects, had con-stitutionally been in exactly the same category; racially, and this was afact from which British politicians shied away, they were not. Shouldnegotiations with China fail and conditions in Hong Kong becomeintolerable, at least Britain would not be plagued by 3.3 million Chinesegdemanding to live there.
In the interval the Chinese government had been considering the greater problem of Taiwan, which they insisted must be concluded at some future unspecified date by similarly absorbing the island into the motherland. Taiwan was to be promised a high degree of authority as a special administrative region, without interference in its domestic affairs. Its 'current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, as will its way of life'. These conditions, designed for Taiwan, were to form the framework in which the Hong Kong agreement was to be constructed, and were so advanced, in the most commonplace fashion, to a group of Hong Kong schoolchildren by anonymous Beijing officials in July 1983. Their twelve-point plan adumbrated the main features of the final settlement, but with the notable exception of any reference to democratic ,institutions. Furthermore, it was made clear on more than one occasion that an agreement on Ho.g Kong must be finalized within two years of the first meetings -by the autumn of 1984.
Similar suggestions, with their necessary insistence that sovereignty
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
must revert to China, had been informally discussed with Edward Heath in April 1982. In spite of being bitterly at odds.with the British Prime Minister, Mr Heath remained trusted by the Chinese leader-ship. He passed the proposals on to the Foreign Office, where they grounded. The idea of placing 'A Proposal to Divest Sovereignty over Hong Kong to Foreigners', as it was described, 'under Mrs Thatcher's nose ... was more than any Foreign Secretary could bear'. Nor was the Prime Minister willing to modify her prejudices. One experienced and revered China watcher, summoned to give background advice, was subjected to half an hour's lecture on Chinese geography, politics and economics and the characteristics of 'Chinamen' -which pejorat-ive description Mrs Thatcher only reluctantly abandoned. Only at the end of July were Deng's proposals discussed in Whitehall. A painfully long and 'abrasive' series of interviews with the Prime Minister ensued (the Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, being at that time a non-person, having incurred Mrs Thatcher's wrath by his civilized diplomacy, was not consulted), resulting in the more obvious impossibilities being reluctantly rejected, but with 'no exchange of ideas of substance about Hong Kong at all'.7
Sir Percy Cradock, an intellectual sinologist and skilled negotiator, began the frustrating series of tedious negotiations which he was to continue for the next decade, and which opened 'a Pandora's box of misunderstandings, forced hands and allegations of bad faith'. On several occasions the lid was forced shut, but equally often it contrived to be reopened. From the start difficulties lay not only with intransigent Chinese, but with diverse interests and prickly personalities in Britain and Hong Kong. It took a year, for example, to persuade Mrs Thatcher to allow the possibility that Britain would relinquish the sovereignty Chinese from the very beginning. and administration of Hong Kong -both conditions insisted on by the
byThe opening of formal discussions was marked in September 1982 a visit from the British Prime Minister to Beijing. It was not a success. The opening British position, which Mrs Thatcher, fresh from her triumph over Argentina's General Galtieri, advanced with some energy, was that while the right of China to assume sovereignty Inight be conceded, it would be in everyone's interest if the British continued to administer their former colony. Felix Patrikeeff reported that Mrs Thatcher 'apparently behaved with extraordinary naivete: during her audience with Deng Xiaoping she referred to the impor-tance of the nineteenth-century treaties governing Hong Kong, treaties
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which had been weighted heavily in Britain's favour. When her words were translated for Deng his response was said to be so violent and filled with expletives that the interpreter could not translate it for her. 'That stinking woman' was apparently one of them.8 The conservative Daily Telegraph quoted [?eng as muttering to an aide: 'I can't talk to that woman, she is utterly unreasonable.' Needless to say Mrs Thatcher was told, unmistakably clearly, that no other country would be allowed to administer the territory on China's behalf.
After Beijing, the Prime Minister called at Hong Kong. Her stay was reported by David Bonavia of The Times: 'Mrs Thatcher left the next day, somewhat like one of those typhoons which run in from the Western Pacific, leaving a trail of destruction behind them. Seldom in British colonial history was so much damage done to the interests of so many people in such a short space of time by a single person.' Felix Patrikeeff suggests that the Prime Minister's 'hatred' of Hong Kong's 'second-class' businessmen was manifested, but it is doubtful whether, apart from making the task of the British negotiators more difficult, Mrs Thatcher's intervention had any disastrous long-term effects. The facts were that China was determined, and that Britain had few cards to play.
Militarily, Britain could do nothing to resist a Chinese move; the success of the Falklands expedition had been a very near thing indeed -and China was not Argentina, nor Hong Kong any longer a barrencisland. China had absolute certainty of the rights of her own case,cwhich had effectually been acknowledged by the United Nations incremoving Hong Kong from the list of colonies. Even in Hong Kongcitself, although the great majority of the population would pref er thatcthings continued under the British administration they had becomecaccustomed to -85 per cent according to one survey made in 1982,cas against only 4 per cent who wanted a return to China9 -therecwas a highly vocal minority, particularly among students, who werecemotionally critical of the 'unequal treaties' and had a strong sense ofcChinese nationalism, and protested against the 'brainwashing of thecslavish colonial education'.10
One key factor that the British negotiators hoped might assist them was the backing of the United States. Post-war British governments accepted that a foreign policy independent of America was, if .not impossible, at least extremely difficult. Churchill had put his finger on it on 5 July 1954:
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Speaking very earnestly, he implored [Anthony Eden] not to quar-
rel with America, whether China was or was not a member of the
United Nations ... 'Up to July 1944 England had a considerable
say in things; after that I was conscious that it was America who
made the big decisions. She will make the big decisions now.'
Winston said this with a air of finality.
'We do not yet realize her immeasurable power.'11
Anglo-American relations at the time of the talks with China were particularly good, assisted by the personal friendship that had developed between President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher. It was Ameri-can support that had enabled the Falklands expedition to proceed unhampered by the United Nations, in the face of considerable oppo-sition -a support that was later repaid by British acquiescence in the American invasion of a Commonwealth country, Grenada. There were sound reasons for the United States to want a peaceful handover in Hong Kong. Not only was China an essential ally in what was still at the time viewed as a life-and-death struggle against the 'evil empire' of Soviet Russia, but there was little prospect of Taiwan's reaching an accommodation with China if this could not first be satisfactorily arranged with Hong Kong. This need to keep on the right side of the Chinese led to such perversions of foreign policy as the support, both British and American, for the despicable Pol Pot regime in Cambodia; it was enough that Pol Pot was opposed by Vietnam, the current Ameri-can villain, and that Vietnam was at odds with China (odds that had led to a border campaign in which the deficiencies of the People's Liberation Anny were pitilessly exposed). More practically, American investment in Hong Kong, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, was worth safeguarding. Such considerations led the United States to encourage accommodation with Chinese requirements; much sympathy would be expressed with the Hong Kong people's democratic aspirations, but as with Taiwan, American support would have its limitations.
Although it had been apparent since 1972 that the Chinese simply were not going to accept any continuation of British sovereignty over any portion of the colony, it was not until after the June 1983 British election was safely won, and Mrs Thatcher was finally convinced that the Chinese were serious about resuming not only sovereignty but administration, that realistic negotiations could at last begin. These were confided by the British to a team led by the Ambassador to China,
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initially Sir Percy Cradock, later Sir Richard Evans, together with the new Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Edward Youde, who had replaced Maclehose just before the 1982 meeting in Beijing. Like Maclehose, Youde had a Foreign Office rather than a Colonial Office background. He was an excellent choice, having begun his service in Nanking and Peking immediately after the war, when he had been responsible for negotiating with the People's Liberation Army over the release of HMS Amethyst. Subsequently Sir Edward spent much time in China, culmin-ating in the Ambassadorship between 1974 and 1978. While in London he had put in some time as Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, and was therefore both experienced in Chinese affairs and well-known in Downing Street. He was a dedicated and much-admired man, whose tireless activity contributed to his early death in 1986.
The negotiations that took place were officially only between Britain and China, Hong Kong not being represented. When Sir Edward Youde suggested that he, as Governor, represented the people of Hong Kong he was sternly contradicted by the Chinese; the people of Hong Kong were Chinese, and their interests were the concern of China. Sir Edward was only present as part of the British delegation. As something of a concession from China, although the negotiations were only between the two sovereign powers, it was agreed that the Hong Kong Executive Councillors should be kept informed. According to Sir Percy Cradock, the British government attached considerable importance to the Councillors' view that 'what was best for Hong Kong was the governing criterion for Mrs Thatcher', who could always be brought 'up short by reminding her that Exco, representing the people of Hong Kong, was consulted and had to agree before every step'. Since more than half the councillors were expatriates, and the Hong Kong members were carefully selected for their prudently conservative ideas, uncompromising dissent was unlikely; but Exco did its honour-able best to represent what its members saw as the best interests of the Hong Kong people. As an inevitable consequence of the secrecy, reports of progress were vague and unspecific. When Fenner Brock-way, the veteran �Pleft-winger and opponent of privilege, later Lord Brockway, asked in the House of Lords on 14 November 1983 if 'anything might be done to relieve the frustration among the people in Hong Kong-98 per cent Chinese -because the talks are conducted by a non-elected governor of a non-elected Legislative Council', he was answered by Lord Trefgarne, the Minister responsible for Hong Kong: 'Those who are representing the United Kingdom are taking
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
very fully into account the views of the people of Hong Kong.' Lord Trefgarne would not, of course, have been able to explain quite how these views had been conveyed to the negotiators, in the absence of any communication between them and the people. (Itis worth recording, as typical of the modest importance accorded to Hong Kong by the British government, that Lord Trefgame's previous government experience had been four years as a Whip, followed by a few months as Parliamen-tary Under-Secretary at the Department of Trade. He spent a similarly short time at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office before pressing on to the Department of Health and Social Services. Over the next twelve years he was succeeded at frequent intervals by a series of Ministers of the most minor importance; by good fortune one or two of them were enthusiastic and able, but never in office for long.)
Since the British government, reluctantly but inevitably falling in behind Mrs Thatcher, continued to reject the idea of 'Chinamen' actually running Hong Kong, it was only after a financial crisis of unprecedented severity that real progress began to be made. On 1 2 September 1983 Edward Heath, still attempting to act as an acceptable honest broker and bring home the realities of the situation to the Hong Kong Councils, 'stormed out' of a meeting. A few days later the Financial Secretary, Sir John Bembridge, hinted at exchange rate uncertainties; the Hong Kong dollar, already weak, slid downwards to lose 20 per cent of its relative value before being pegged, with Bank of England support, at 7 .80 to the US dollar. Mrs Thatcher had been persuaded by Sir Percy to modify her inflexible stance, and by Novem-ber serious discussions began; but it was 'in many ways back to square one'.12
The British view was not unanimous. In January 1984 Sir Percy Cradock became foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister, and continued to exercise great influence on negotiations. He was suc-ceeded in Beijing by Sir Richard Evans, and both men saw their task as essentially to secure the survival of Hong Kong values -the rule of law, economic autarky, and the preservation of as many personal freedoms as possible. Having lived through the violence of the Cultural Revolution Sir Percy was well aware that everything depended on ensuring consistent Chinese co-operation, and that their room for manoeuvre was limited. Sir Edward Youde, and his Executive Council, when they began to be consulted, emphasized another point, the admis-sion of Hong Kong British passport holders to that right of abode in the United Kingdom which had been snatched from under their noses
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by the Nationality Act.13 Legislative Councillors took the lead in plead-ing for more political liberty and representative institutions -which would, incidentally, assist the capitalist economy to flourish, an argu-ment calculated to appeal to the business interests so heavily rep-resented on both Coun.ils. A delegation of the unofficial Exco members, led by Youde and Sir S. Y. Chung, was received by a sympath-etic Mrs Thatcher, but it was Sir Percy, now in Whitehall at the Prime Minister's right hand, and Evans's embassy team, bearing the heat and burden of the day in Beijing during successive rounds of negotiation, who exerted the most powerful influence. Sir Percy was supported by Sir Geoffrey Howe, who became Foreign Secretary in 1983. Following a meeting with Deng in April 1984 Howe had become convinced that British withdrawal was inevitable, and exerted himself strenuously to secure the best conditions for the Hong Kong people after 1997.
Between them the British team, under the guidance of the long-suffering and patient Howe, supported by the indefatigable Cradock, attempted to reach a settlement. They did not have an easy time of it, holding no cards of any value, and after a year's delay; as one of the team admitted, the Chinese were able to 'hammer the shit out of them'. Under great pressure from the Chinese, and with Sir Geoffrey's consistent support -he concluded 'most of the major issues' during a visit to Beijing in July -a final agreement emerged in September 1984. The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong was presented as a fait accompli; there was 'no possibility of an amended agreement. The alternative to acceptance of the present agreement is to have no agreement ... This is a choice ... imposed by the facts of Hong Kong's history.'
The Joint Declaration of the British and Chinese governments ini-tialed on 26 September 1984 is a remarkable document.14 Lord Macle-hose, as the former Governor had become on his retirement, believed: 'For a Communist government to commit itself to maintaining this capitalist enclave may seem to sound so bizarre as to be incredible.'15 It was certainly the result of much patient negotiation which reflected great credit on all those concerned. Nothing quite like it had ever been done before, an agreement to transfer a territory with a population greater than that of Norway, Israel or Ireland, not as the result of war, and without the people concerned having any direct say in the m.tter; an agreement in which China undertook to retain laws, customs and a social system quite alien to her own, and to allow freedoms denied to her own people to those living in Hong Kong.
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On sovereignty, the Chinese view unequivocally prevailed:
The Government of the People's Republic of China declares thatto recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island,Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to asHong Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire Chinesepeople, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of sover-eignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.
The phrase 'decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty' indicatesa clear and firm one-sided decision by China, rather than a mutualagreement. The possibility of any British involvement in administrationafter sovereignty had been transferred was not mentioned. After 1997what went on in Hong Kong would be an internal Chinese affair, andno concern of Britain's. A polite gloss had to be put on it from theBritish side:
The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will
restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect
from 1 July 1997.
With the sovereignty question disposed of, a century�P and a half ofevents viewed by China as humiliations were brought to a close, andwith some elegance. The Chinese authorities could afford -indeed,face demanded it -to be generous and accommodating. Annexe 1, inwhich the Chinese undertakings were detailed, included pledges tomaintain all existing Hong Kong laws, the judicial system, the capitalisteconomic and trade systems, and educational policies; the Hong KongSpecial Administrative Region (HKSAR), as it was to be known, wouldhave its own form of government, with the existing institutions, includ-ing a Governor, and a 'high degree of autonomy'. It was to be allowedto levy its own taxes, all of which were to be retained, to decide itsown monetary and financial policies, and to continue issuing is ownconvertible currency. Any People's Liberation Army units stationed in
would not interfere in the internal affairs of the HKSAR;Hong Kong would be free to participate in international organizationsand trade agreements, and to establish official missions abroad; itwould even have its own flag. Individual rights were detailed:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall
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maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of move-ment, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom , to marry and the right to raise a family freely ...
Every person shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, representation in the courts by lawyers of his choice, and to obtain judicial remedies. Every person shall have the right to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts ...
Religious organizations and believers may maintain their relations with religious organizations and believers elsewhere, and schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions run by religious organ-izations may be continued.
On the face of it this was a remarkable list of concessions, which would result in Hong Kong remaining a much pleasanter place than any other part of China. There would be 'one country', but 'two systems'. What had been done was, for all practical purposes, to create of Hong Kong a treaty port, much after the pattern of those established by the Treaty of Nanking. Like, say, Shanghai then, Hong Kong would be an enclave within China controlled by its own inhabitants, not subject to Chinese law but obeying its own regulations enforced by its own judicial system -something very closely resembling that extra-territoriality so fiercelydenounced by previous Chinese governments! Independent in manyways, the HKSAR had privileges unknown in the old treaty ports -no taxes paid to China and an elected legislature. This last concessionwas secured by the last-minute personal intervention of Sir Geoffrey,who secured an undertaking that the 1997 legislature would be 'consti-tuted by elections' and that the executive would be 'accountable to thelegislature'. Itwas a point of great importance, but the lack of precisionmas to the method of elections was destined to cause ferociousmcontroversy.
The Joint Declaration was subjected, especially in Hong Kong, to the minutest scrutiny, and many possible weaknesses were i,1deed exposed. A common suspicion was that pledges were indiscriminatelyloaded into the Declaration, without there being any intention on the Chinese government's behalf of keeping them. It was also noted that
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preparation of the 'Basic Law', which was to be the HKSAR's consti-tution, would be the responsibility of the National People's Congress, albeit with Hong Kong representation on the drafting committee. Whatever reservations might be expressed; however, the Joint Declar-ation remained a hopeful achievement, and the only agreement on offer.
The draft agreement was duly submitted to such representative insti-tutions as existed in Hong Kong. There being no question of a refer-endum, to which the Chinese government was implacably opposed, and no democratically elected body in Hong Kong which might ratify the terms more authoritatively, the proposals were put to the Hong Kong people indirectly, through a series of polls and opinion surveys, made after a mass distribution of the explanatory White Paper. These generally showed wide, if not enthusiastic, support: the most reliable. poll, carried out in October, indicated that, out of a random sample of 6, I 24 people, 79 per cent of those answering agreed that sovereignty should be returned to China, and 77 per cent believed the agreement to be the best obtainable under the circumstances, but 7I per cent were only willing to credit the agreement as 'quite good' .16 There was a considerable question over how many actually understood what was happening: in another poll, of 4,614 respondents 27 per cent admitted to not understanding the agreement. Younger people were especially insistent on the need for more democracy and for active participation by the Hong Kong people in drafting the Basic Law.
An Assessment Office and Independent Monitoring Team, led by Sir Patrick Nairne, a civil servant of great experience and integrity and Mr Justice Simon Li, reported on the result of these soundings. They concluded that 'most of the people of Hong Kong find the draft agree-ment acceptable', and found 'a general feeling of relief and a wish to build Hong Kong's future on the foundation provided by the draft agreement', but noted that of the one thousand or so written views received, more than two-thirds expressed dissatisfaction with the agreement. The business community had few reservations: the worry-ing uncertainty had been replaced by some strong assurances. Even if these were not cast-iron guarantees, businessmen do not expect certainties: 'What guarantees are there that there will be a democratic capitalist market in West Germany in 1997?' asked Sir Michael Sand-berg, the Chairman of the Hongkong Bank, somewhat rhetorically.17 Simon Keswick spoke of'unqualified support', but neither Sir Michael nor Mr Keswick, like other senior Hong Kong businessmen, would
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have to stay there if it happened not to suit them. Those who had no choice in their future were less happy, and pointed out that a due performance of the guarantees depended on the continuance of a like-minded government in Beijing, and that while, since 1949, West Ger-many had a steady record of elected democratic governments, China had suffered an unhappy succession of wars and coups, changes of, course, the Hundred Flowers Blooming, the Cultural Revolution and had only recently, under Deng Xiaoping, settled into what seemed to be a reasonably stable economic policy. Social questions, justice, free-dom and human rights were separate matters, and what would happen after Deng was still very much an open question.
Indications of dissatisfaction could therefore understandably be dis-cerned. One member of both the Executive and Legislative Councils, Mr T.S. Lo, resigned, and two Legislative Councillors abstained from voting on the acceptability of the draft agreement -one, Mr J .J. Swaine, on the grounds that British policies on immigration had shut out from Britain those Hong Kong people who had regarded themselves as British subjects. They now found their future was being arranged for them by Britain, in negotiations in which they had no say, and the results of which they had perforce to accept. The redoubtable Emily Lau asked Mrs Thatcher, when she called briefly at Hong Kong after signing the agreement in Beijing, 'if delivering five million people into the hands of a Communist dictatorship was morally defensible, or is it really true that in international politics the highest form of morality is one's own natural interest?' The Prime Minister 'fudged ... bullied ... and blustered'. 18
For their part, the British negotiators had agreed to some clauses
in the Joint Declaration which were likely to present difficulties:
1.m
To allow China the final voice in determining the Basic Lawof the new Hong Kong, albeit in accordance with the principlesestablished in the Joint Declaration. Some Hong Kong citizensmwere to be asked to contribute their thoughts, and reflectionsmthat 'democracy' and 'representative institutions' might imply verydifferent things in Beijing and London were suppressed.
2.m
To form a Joint Liaison Group with China 'to ensure amsmooth transfer of government in 1997'. The group, which was to continue in being until 2000, was consultative only and 'would play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or the HKSAR. Nor shall it have any supervisory role over the administration.'
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Mrs Thatcher, in the course of her unfortunate visit to HongKong, had declared that the Governor, Sir Edwar. Youde, wouldbe a member of this group. This was never the intention, andindeed never happened, but once more indicated how the PrimeMinister was either fudging issues or paying very little attentionto what was being decided about Hong Kong.19
3.gAlthough this was not part of the Joint Declaration, to con-sult, in some unspecified fashion, the people of Hong Kong.
Further Proceedings Stood Postponed
Such consultation was rendered difficult by the absence of directlyelected representative bodies. TheJoint Declaration affirmed that 'thelegislature of HKSAR shall be constituted by elections. The executiveauthority shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legisla-ture.' There are, of course, elections and elections, and those currentin the People's Republic of China were not identical with those inWestern countries. Under British rule in Hong Kong, there had beenno elections to the legislature at all, and it was felt that some progresstowards establishing a Western-style representative government oughtto be ventured, however unwelcome this might be to China. As afirst step the Hong Kong Green Paper of July 1984 recorded thegovernment's intention 'to develop progressively . . . a system of ofgovernment ... which is able to represent authoritatively the
Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the peopleof Hong Kong'.
The Green Paper, a consultative document, proposed as a start thattwelve of the fifty-seven Legislative Council seats be open to electionin the new Council session due in the following year. While this wasmodest enough, since the elections would be indirect, and on a restric-ted franchise, the Green Paper went on to propose further advancesin future sessions, including direct elections on a universal franchise,and -a particularly revolutionary thought -the idea that the Governorand a majority of Executive Councillors be selected by the Councillorsthemselves. These suggestions had radical implications, guaranteed toalarm Beijing. Open election, with a free choice offered among candi-dates of all parties, was unknown in any Communist country; and thethought that councillors so elected might participate in choosing an
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executive was anathema. While to start with less than a quarter of Legislative Councillors might be democratically chosen, their number would be certain to increase and result in a truly democratic state. Beijing would not -could not -admit the possibility. Chinese dis-pleasure was made clear.
The Green Paper was �Paccordingly succeeded five months later by a much more cautious White Paper, understood to be an action pro-gramme, which recomwended elections to be held in the following year, 1985, in which twenty-four of the Legco members would indeed be elected, but not by any dangerously democratic method. Twelve would be selected by an electoral college of the local authorities, and twelve by a system of 'functional' constituencies described by Dr Miners as 'hideously complicated',2�X with constituencies representing business and the professions, including two seats for 'labour'. The principle of functional constituencies is a classic oligarchic device to ensure that acceptably 'responsible' people are elected; a British variant was the device of having separate representations for the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge.
Functional seats were allocated to bodies representing the pro-
fessions and corporate bodies -businesses, banks, trades unions and social service organizations. So closely knit were many of these 'con-stituencies' that no election was needed, since candidates were often unopposed -in the first election, in October 198 5, five of the twelve representatives were returned without the need for a vote. Some con-stituencies were narrowly confined; the medical function, for example, excluded nurses. The electoral college was similarly restricted, the number of electors in each constituency varying from twenty-seven to sixty-three. Such a system enabled, in September 1985, twenty-four members of the Legislative Council to be elected by a total of 25,206 voters, or rather more than half of I per cent of those who in a normal system might have had the franchise -hardly a great extension of democracy. Apart from the Labour Party in Britain, which retained a similar system for trades union representation, such undemocratic practices had long since ceased to have any place in British politics. In spite of being intended to avoid such contretemps, the elections pro-duced one new member, a candidate for the legal constituency, who was to become the leader of the democratic activists -Martin Lee, QC.
Few people could have thought after the first such limited elections in 1985 that they would have to wait until 1991 for further progress.
520 �PA HISTORY OF HONG KONGo
In 1984 vague statements had been made by members of the Britishgovernment implying that direct elections would begin reasonably soon.There was a good deal of talk about 'the determination of the British
and their government to fulfil our moral obligations to thepeople in Hong Kong' (Lord Fanshawe, House of Lords, 21 May1984).21 Mrs Thatcher had referred, while in Hong Kong on 27 Sep-tember 1982, to Britain's 'moral responsibility and duty to the peopleof Hong Kong'. Sir Geoffrey Howe had promised: 'During the yearsimmediately ahead, the government of Hong Kong will be developedon increasingly democratic lines.' It was not easy to argue, in 1984,that 1991 could reasonably be regarded as 'immediately ahead'. On 5December 1984 Sir Geoffrey'sJunior Minister, Richard Luce, said inthe House of Commons: 'We all fully accept that we should build upa firmly-based, democratic administration in Hong Kong in the yearsbetween now and 1997.' On the tenth Baroness Young, speaking forthe government, 'fully accepted the legitimate concerns which havebeen expressed that we should develop a solidly based democraticadministration in Hong Kong in the period up to 1997'. On 21Januarythe following year Mr Luce spoke of 'a progressive strengthening ofrepresentative government in the territory during the next ten years'.Indeed the 1984�P White Paper had spoken of 'a very small number ofdirectly elected members in 1988 building up to a significant numberin 1997', but even this vague statement was discreetly hedged. Whenclosely examined, all these and similar statements did not quite amountto a firm promise quickly to implement at least some elements ofdemocratic practice, but they were, not unreasonably, taken as suchby those who very much wanted to believe them, and who had notlearnt to examine the statements of politicians very carefully indeed.
The 1984 White Paper had suggested that the Hong Kong peoplewould be consulted in 1987 over the question of direct elections forthe 1988 Legislative Council. At that time there would be ten yearsremaining before the handover, and it was therefore reasonable toassume that some action would be forthcoming soon after the consul-tation, since elections in 1988 would leave only nine years for thepractice of democracy to begin to take root. This proposal howeverhad immediately been severely criticized by the Chinese governmentas contrary to theJoint Declaration. Beijing felt that a system of govern-ment in Hong Kong which had suited London for the best part of 150years without any change, and which contained no hint of democracy,would also suit them very well indeed. What was sauce for the goose
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should also be offered with the gander, and not adulterated with demo-cratic flavours to make digestion more difficult. The Hong Kong government was embarrassed. In October 1984 the Executive Council had debated the views of the Chief Secretary, Sir Philip Haddon-Cave and his supporters, who included the influential Lydia Dunn, and who pressed for a rapid move to some form of representative government. They were opposed by conservative councillors, anxious to avoid the risks which popular power might bring. The conclusion, that no demo-cratic elections would be held until after 1988, was then kept secret. Signals from Westminster began to lower the tone of expectationsof democratic progress; the need for 'convergence' between political developments in Hong Kong and the Basic Law being drafted under the auspices of the Chinese government was emphasized -and strongly reinforced by Beijing. But it was felt that, however regrettably, a com-mitment of some sort had been made, and another Green Paper was therefore produced in May 1987 setting out proposals for discussion. Again, in the absence of credible representative institutions these pro-posals had to be canvassed colony-wide and arrangements were dulymade for this to be done.
It has long been acknowledged that questions can be put in such a way as to elicit the required answer, and the suspicion is that the Hong Kong government conducted its 1987 enquiries into the question of direct elections in that spirit. The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government was a complex and confused document, which a great number of Hong Kong people found difficult to under-stand. Indignant denials were made that this was an attempt to fudge the issue, but suspicions were not allayed by the Managing Director of A.G.B. McNair and Co., the company engaged by the Hong Kong government to assess the reactions to their proposals. When asked her view on the effectiveness of the survey she was quoted in the House of Commons as saying, 'Given a free hand to ask a wider sample more direct questions, the questions on the survey were not the ones that would have been asked.'22
But they were the questions that produced the answer the govern-ment wanted, which was that no widespread enthusiasm for direct elections existed, and that those who would favour them at some future date felt that 'the time was not yet ripe'. There is some evidence that the response in favour of direct elections was played down; the assessors refused to accept one petition with 230,000 authenticated signatures, and other polls showed results contrary to those found by
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
McNairs. Dr Miners thought the conclusion of the assessors 'extra-ordinary' in view of the fact that of a total of 368,431 written sub-missions or petitions, 265,078 were in favour of direct elections being held in the next year.23 Frank Ching, an acute and intelligent observer, concluded that the 'careful burial' of the 1987 Green Paper, 'giving in to Chinese pressure, then ascribing the cancellation of direct elec-tions in 1988 to public opinion, had a big impact on the way the Hong Kong public from then on perceived both the British government and the Hong Kong administration'.24 Civil servants might well have beengright in stressing that it was dangerous to anger the Chinese by unilat-eral action, but it was certainly doubtful policy to attempt so obvious a cover-up, which served only to irritate still further democratic activists already disheartened by what they saw as a progressive British retreat before Chinese pressure; but such enthusiasts, although vocal and persuasive, only represented one section of public opinion.
The business community agreed among themselves, and with Bei-jing, in finding little virtue in constitutional change. They had almost a monopoly of representation on the Executive Council, and were secure in the Legislative Council. Dr Helmut Sohmen, a prominent businessman who was also an appointed member of the Legislative Council, went further than most in rejecting democracy, giving the classic view of all oligarchs since Plato: elections would 'denigrate the role and the remarkable work of past and present councillors who were appointed or indirectly elected, and in the public mind will be relegated in future to second or third rank behind their directly elected col-leagues'25 -which is, after all, precisely what democracy is about. Ademocratically elected representative possesses a moral authority much superior to that of an appointee; but morality is a tricky business.
When the question was debated in the House of Commons on 20 January 1988 some influential voices were raised in support of elections being held that year. The most weighty was that of Edward Heath, who urged, 'There is much greater danger of our dragging our feet than of being over-hasty,' and warned, 'Unless action is taken quickly now we shall be unable to hand over any form of experienced represen-tative government.' None could speak ,vith greater authority than the former Prime Minister, who had in 1972 taken the first critical decision to end the colonial status of Hong Kong, and who had thereafter correctly interpreted the Chinese views at times when his colleagues were badly off course. The Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary, Gerald Kaufman, agreed that direct elections should begin immediately, but
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the majority preferred a more gradual approach, and the decision was taken not to take a decision.
The motion was not put to a vote, but the conclusion of the debate
is not without a sad relevance. Sir Geoffrey Howe was speaking:
There can be no cast-iron guarantees about the future of Hong
Kong, but that is true of any country or territory. I believe that
Hong Kong is well equipped to face the future and -
It being seven o'clock and there being private business set down by direction of THE CHAIRMAN OF WAYS AND MEANS proceedings stood postponed. under Standing Order No. I6 [time for taking private business], further
Tanks in Tiananmen Square
Making the best of things appeared to be the general mood in Hong Kong after 1984. The popular Governor, Sir Edward Youde, died in 1986 and was replaced by David Wilson, who had personally designed much of the detailed content of the Joint Declaration. Sir David's background was unconventional in that after having served in Hong Kong (as a Foreign Service language student) and Beijing (as First Secretary) he resigned to prepare a Ph.D thesis at the School of Orien-tal and African Studies in London and afterwards to edit the ChinaQuarterly. On rejoining the service he served in the Cabinet Office during Harold Wilson's premiership and as political adviser in Hong Kong to Sir Murray Maclehose. This varied and useful experience, combined with personal toughness and charm, was to be very much called upon in his difficult task. During his six years Hong Kong evolved rapidly as a political society and proceeded to its first experi-ment with parliamentary democracy.
For the first years after the publication of the Joint Declaration the economy continued to expand. Growth rates in 1986 and 1987 were high, with the economy operating at near full capacity. Hong Kong was affected, as were all other markets, by the Stock Exchange crash of October 1987, and 1988 did bring warning signs of rising inflatiqn and slower rates of growth.
A HISTORY OF HONG KONGO
GDP Year on Year
19861987
Percentage Increase
Inflation
5.5
7.510.
9.8
19881989
7.9
1g
A crop of questionable financial incidents implicating the then Chair-man of the Stock Exchange confirmed the continuing ability of Hong Kong to produce material for scandal. Economic co-operation with China flourished: in 1985 China became, and has since remained, Hong Kong's largest trading partner, and by 1987 Hong Kong had in tum overtaken Japan to become China's largest trading partner. By 1988 China accounted for 29 per cent of Hong Kong's overall external trade, and Hong Kong for a similar proportion of China's. Financial links developed to the extent that by the end of 1988 Hong Kong claims on Chinese banks reached $100,000 million, and Hong Kong's share of foreign investment in China was somewhere between 50 and 70 per cent. Personal contacts increased, nearly eighteen million visits to China by Hong Kong residents and tourists being made in the course of 1988.
After 4June 1989 such progress came to a sudden halt. Confidence was shattered by events in Tiananmen Square, in the centre of Beijing, when unarmed students demonstrating for democratic rights were shot down by the People's Liberation Army. The pictures shown on the world's television screens horrified Hong Kong; the thought that a regime capable of slaughtering their own people in hundreds, or thou-sands (Beijing insists the figre was much lower, but that belief is not
gu
general), was going to be responsible for the colony's future in a few years' time was terrifying. A million people turned out on the streets, demonstrating with great dignity their silent grief. Most Communist institutions in Hong Kong protested against the Chinese government's action, and banners appeared even on the Bank of China building. Beijing's defiant response did nothing to help matters. Deng congratu-lated the army on their massacre of 'counter-revolutionaries', and asked for a moment's silence in memory of the soldiers who had died (some were, it is said, tom to pieces by the enraged populace). But the Chinese leaders were shaken by the intensity of Hong Kong's reaction, and from that time on were increasingly worried about the potential of its citizens to create trouble once back in the bosom of
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the motherland. One immediate effect of the massacre was the founda-tion of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Democratic Move-ment in China, which attracted an instant mass following, raised millions of dollars, and insisted that Hong Kong could never become democratic unless China did so too. Sir Percy Cradock, facing angry and frightened officials in Beijing, recorded that 'Joint Liaison Group meetings reverted to a gladiatorial pattern. Democracy in Hong Kong in particular became a neuralgic issue.'26
Students who had previously cried 'Down with the unequal treaties! The treaties forced upon China should not be recognized!', 27 protestedagainst 'the brainwashing of the slavish colonial education' and call_ed for reunification, presumably had second thoughts as their contempor-aries were crushed under the freedom-loving People's Liberation Army tanks. The question was incessantly and anxiously asked whether Britain would still consent, in these circumstances, to hand over the colony. One possible strategy might have been if not to tear up, at least to shelve indefinitely the Joint Declaration. The British govern-ment could have declared it humanly impossible to cede the people of Hong Kong to a government capable of such atrocities. World opinion would have supported such a move, and China could have done little immediately to counter it. But the arguments against it were overpower-ing. The future of Hong Kong would once more be thrown into the melting-pot, with resultant great uncertainty and confusion. Relations with China would be shattered, and Deng, who had held to a policy of economic liberalization and who was a predictable and reliable fac-tor, would quite possibly be replaced by a more aggressive hard-liner. Moreover, Britain by now lacked the moral authority to take such drastic action in the name of the Hong Kong people. After painfully negotiating the Joint Declaration, and assuring its acceptance, only a representative Hong Kong government would be capable of taking such a stand; and such a government was far away. Nor was Britain herself irreproachable; she may have had little to be ashamed of in her governance of Hong Kong, but it was only seventeen years since the Parachute Regiment had fired on unarmed demonstrators in Londonderry, an action comparable with, if smaller in scale than, that of the People's Liberation Army in Beijing.28 However powerful the indignation aryused by the massacre, the cold imperatives of reality demanded plodding ahead on the agreed track. It was well known that the Chinese system included repression, purges, labour camps and other endearing features, but if the 'one country, two systems' concept
526 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
meant anything it must mean that Hong Kong would be protected from such things; and, it might be said, the implication was that the corollary of China's not interfering in Hong Kong was that Hong Kong should not interfere in China.
Other drastic measures were however considered. One positive British reaction was that of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons report, published on 30 June 1989, which suggested that the progress towards representative government should be speeded up by electing half the members of the Legislative Council in 1991 and all in 1995, with Governors chosen by universal suffrage. Moral guarantees given earlier were recalled; did not these oblige Britain to provide a refuge if the future for Hong Kong under Chinese rule should prove intolerable? This opinion was reinforced by the Governor, who spoke of Britain's moral obligation to give Hong Kong British citizens right of entry. There were those in Britain who would have agreed, and welcomed the prospect of an influx of Hong Kong energy and enterprise into an economy tottering on the brink of pro-tracted recession. The Times spoke of duty and honour, which demanded that Britain should welcome those who held British pass-ports, even if those passports had been neutered under the 1981Nationality Act; both Sir David Wilson and Lady Dunn, the senior member of the Executive Council, supported this. In spite of these praiseworthy sentiments, it was vain to expect much of a response: there was no prospect of a British government agreeing to extend the right of abode even to those in Hong Kong who had British citizenship -some 3.3 million from a total of 5.6 million. With unemployment inBritain having risen to a true total of at least three million, such aninflux would never be acceptable at the constituency level, always dis-trustful of immigration. This would be true either of the Conservativegovernment or the Labour opposition (the Liberal Democrats, securein the knowledge that, having only a handful of seats in the House ofCommons, they would never be called to decide, were more favourablyinclined on the issue of passports).
Gerald Kaufman, the Labour spokesman, made tnis clear in the House of Commons on 5 July 1989: 'The�P Opposition believe that it would not be right to offer any commitment to Hong Kong British Dependent Territory passport holders on the right of entry into the United Kingdom.'
Support to those thought differently, and believed that moral obliga-tions should override political expediency, could not be offered by the
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Foreign Office. China had made it clear that any large-scale grant of the right of abode would be considered by them as a grave affront, showing a complete lack of confidence in Chinese guarantees. Geoffrey Howe, still Foreign Secretary, had placed much stress on the agree-ment which his department had negotiated, and had been duly embar-rassed in April 1984 when he honourably attempted to explain these facts in Hong Kong, to be greeted by cries of 'Bullshit!'29 He nowg' promised to ask China not.to station PLA troops in Hong Kong, there being no reason so to do, since Shenzen garrison was on the border, and to improve the protections being included in the Basic Law. He also outlined a package designed to promote confidence, including the issue of some British passports and the issue of a Bill of Rights.
The danger, clearly appreciated by the Foreign Office, was that should the British government attempt to satisfy public indignation, the Chinese would surely regard any such action as being directly in contradiction to the Joint Declaration, and the agreements negotiated with such difficulty would be in danger of being nullified. Politically conscious Hong Kong people did not find this argument convincing. A compromise which offered some comfort was advanced by the British government's agreement in July 1990 to issue full British passports to fifty thousand heads of families who had, it was considered, some special claim to consideration by virtue of their importance to the satisfactory running of Hong Kong. This concession followed a vigor-ous campaign begun in July 1989 to get British passports for as many people as possible. It was supported by pillars of the establishment including the Hongkong Bank, Jardine's, Swire's, Hutchison's, the Stock Exchange, the General Chamber of Commerce and others. Simon Keswick, the Chairman of Jardine's, complained that the Foreign Office had 'the vision of a bat', and both Keswick and Simon Murray of Hutchison's compared Howe's assurances over the agree-ment to Neville Chamberlain waving his piece of paper after meeting Hitler in Munich in 1938.30 It was also said that 'encouragement' was given tangible form by large donations from some Hong Kong businessmen to the Conservative Party. While this is nut admitted, the party of free enterprise being remarkably shy about disclosing the sources ofgits income, it is certainly true that some Hong Kong business leaders enjoyed free access to 10 Downing Street, both before and after the fall of Mrs Thatcher in November 1990, to an extent that surprised the Hong Kong Office in London. Approval for this con-
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
cession was not unanimous among the Hong Kong leadership, Lady Dunn believing that it would be divisive and indefensible.
The eventual allocation of passports was seven thousand to the 'disciplined services' (police and customs), six thousand to the 'sensi-tive services' (senior civil servants and the media), and 36,500 to others considered to be key workers (professionals and businessmen), with five hundred reserved for important investors. Eventually, after a good deal of pressure, passports were also offered to the Portuguese and Chinese survivors of the Hong Kong Volunteers. Applications for pass-ports were not as numerous as might have been expected: there were 65,700 applicants for the first tranche of 43,250 places, and by 1996 it seemed that, rather than covering some quarter of a million family members, the new passports would give protection only to rather more than half that number.
The off er did carry the political bonus of putting the Labour oppo-sition in an unhappy dilemma. While wishing to appear liberal, the leadership knew that the rank and file of the party would never allow them even to advocate the admission of so many immigrants, so they had to content themselves with opposing the limited grant of passports as 'elitist'. From the government side Norman Tebbit, former Chair-man of the Conservative Party, and noted for the bluntness of his comments, exemplified this sentiment. In an interview in.January 1990 he claimed that: 'Coming to Britain in such large numbers the immi-grants from Hong Kong would not integrate ... Theywould maintain themselves as Hong Kong Chinese, with their own values and customs ... There is a very nasty smouldering resentment which is concealed when life is reasonably good. But ties of blood and history and religion are far stronger than government directives.' On what amounted to an attack on his former Cabinet colleagues, Mr Tebbit said that it was part of Britain's democratic system that governments should not reverse manifesto commitments without good reason. The Tory pledge to oppose further large-scale immigration had been unequivocal: 'I get a bit huffy when people who campaigned and were elected on that mani-festo now accuse me of neo-racist populism for wanting to adhere to it.'31 He believed that at least a hundred Conservative backbenchers thought government policy wrong, but only managed to persuade forty-three other Tory MPs, 'those legislators who would see Hong Kong tear itself to shreds rather than vote to vary the Nationality Act to help non-Caucasians',32 to vote against the Bill, which secured a substantial majority.
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Predictably, the government of China saw the decision to issue British passports in this way as a serious violation of the Joint Declar-ation and as being unnecessary, insulting and provocative. It was announced that even those Hong Kong citizens who held the second-class British passports woulli be regarded as Chinese subjects -pro-vided, that is, they looked Chinese. It was also made clear that anyone holding these passports would have doubtful prospects of public office in the HKSAR, and that the documents might not even be regarded as valid there or in China; and Beijing held the trump card of being able to decide the form of the new Basic Law.
The preparation of the Basic Law was begun immediately after the Joint Declaration was published, and was only completed in 1990.33 Beijing invited a representative selection of Hong Kong people to sit on their Drafting Committee, not only the obvious conservative businessmen but such awkward characters as Martin Lee, and such clearly independent personalities as the two senior vice-chancellors. Of the fifty-nine members, twenty-three were from Hong Kong, and were able to take many initiatives and to secure agreement on some points. They included Louis Cha, publisher of the influential indepen-dent newspaper Ming Pao; Maria Tam, another lawyer, a member of the Executive Council; and Cheng Kai-nam, a sensible pro-Beijing teacher. Lu Ping, who was to become a very important figure indeed, Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, was the most active of the mainland delegates. Discussions on successive drafts of the law were protracted and serious, with representatives of most sec-tions of Hong Kong opinion on both the drafting committee and the consultative committee, composed of Hong Kong residents and through which more than seventy thousand submissions were passed. Points of principle were cogently argued, and substantial amendments were agreed by Beijing; but the Chinese got their revenge for the issue of British passports by insisting that only 20 per cent of the legislators could have foreign nationality, and, ominously, added a prohibition against 'subversion' to the Basic Law. Common law is not without its peculiarities: blasphemy and buggery remain crimes and arson in a naval dockyard, together with treason, capital, but the concept of sub-version is unknown. If it were, democratic opposition would be imposs-ible. More than any other single development, this undefined 1nd perilous idea forms the gravest threat to the continuance of a reputable rule of law in Hong Kong.
Constitutional lawyers and those equipped to understand the issues
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
53�X
followed the discussions closely, but the great majority of Hong Kong residents did not. The subject which did exercise them and their rep-resentatives on the Councils and the Basic Law Drafting Committee was the possibility of speeding up democratic representation. Even the conservative businessmen and pro-Beijing activists had been shocked by Tiananmen into accepting that a more democratic Hong Kong constitution might be a safeguard against Chinese authoritarianism after 1997. A consensus was worked out between Executive and Legis-lative Councillors requesting that twenty Legco members be directly elected in 1991, and just under half in 1995. Lydia Dunn and Alan Lee, as senior Executive and Legislative Councillors, attempted to persuade the British government to accept this in the face of any Chinese objections. Sir Percy Cradock, supported by the Foreign Secretary, was unconvinced. He had been asked to try, once more, to speed the advance towards democracy, and only with the greatest diffi-culty had persuaded Beijing to accept eighteen directly elected seats in 1991, rising to twenty in 1997 and to halfonly in 2003. He recorded that: 'The number of seats in 1995 and other arrangements for those elections, the last under British rule, were left unsettled, and we reserved the right to approach the Chinese again on the matter. Other-wise we had a clear understanding for a larger number of directly elected seats than we had begun with, plus the assurance of a steady increase in such seats ... These understandings were reflected in the final version of the Basic Law; they would stick.'34 But, Cradock reported, the Chinese had made it clear that any such unilateral action would lead to the previous agreements being abrogated, leaving the Hong Kong people worse off than before. The Foreign Secretary reluctantly agreed: the compromise was not 'ideal', but could 'reason-ably' be recommended. Martin Lee called it 'a shameful act of surren-der', and the lines between democratic Hong Kong activists and the 'reasonable' men in Whitehall were drawn up.
In spite of the good faith that had been demonstrated during the drafting process, a number of questions remained unanswered. The vocabulary of constitutional discourse differed widely between Beijing and London. It was only since I 982 that China had enjo)ed a recogniz-able constitution, under which the rule of law had any meaning; and that was a Communist conception oflaw, very different from that held in the West. Communist countries -and China, with North Korea, are the only two recognizable survivors -held that society was under-pinned by the Communist revolution, which had secured all freedoms
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that could be allowed under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was the duty of the Communist Party to monitor government and ensure that the achievements of the revolution were not threatened; individual rights must be subservient to this great necessity. Given China's turbu-lent history there was muc. to be said for such a philosophy, but it was one that sat uneasily upon the people of Hong Kong, heirs to a. century and a half of the security offered by common law.35 One of the interesting features of the Basic Law drafting process was the opportunity provided for Chinese lawyers and officials to define their own constitutional ideas, but with so many potential misunderstand-ings, could even a sincere agreement hold up?
In many respects the Basic Law provided for a considerably more advanced democratic constitution than that of colonial Hong Kong. The Chief Executive, who was to replace the Governor in the new HKSAR, was not to be appointed, but elected. He would have exten-sive powers, but less than those of a British Governor. The Legislative Council over which he was to preside had powers to initiate legislation and even to impeach the Chief Executive himself. But Britain had rarely exercised its wide-ranging imperial powers, and it had become acceptl!d that Hong Kong would be left to deal with its own affairs, as matters of minor importance to Whitehall.
To China Hong Kong was of very great importance indeed -its largest trading partner, the biggest source of foreign funds, its leading investor, the example of Chinese flexibility which was intended to attract Taiwan back to the fold, yet at the same time a potential breed-ing ground of dissatisfaction and subversion. A Chinese government was more likely than a British one to wish to take advantage of its constitutional powers, and less likely to interpret them liberally, an impression reinforced by the shock waves emanating from Tiananmen Square. The first 'Other Hong Kong Report', produced in 1989, carried a fiercely indignant article by John Walden, who had served for thirty years in the Colonial Administration, retiring in 1981 as Director of Home Affairs, on the 'sad saga of poor political judgement, wishful thinking, broken promises, lack of determination and deliberate misrepresentation'36 that had characterized the British government's handling of Hong Kong's future.
When the Basic Law was finally promulgated on 4 April 1990, the tone was quieter. Where the published drafts had been amended, it was in the interests of the Hong Kong people. Although the production had been the undivided responsibility of the Chinese government, real
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
notice had been taken of points raised by the Hong Kong representa-tives on the drafting committee. Particular attentio.n was paid to the responsibilities of the Chief Executive and to the method of his appointment by a form of election (or indeed her appointment, for in 1994 a new Chief Secretary was to be appointed, the first Chinese, and moreover a woman, Mrs Anson Chan). The more suspicious might point out that many of the freedoms supposedly guaranteed in China's own constitution were hardly detectable in practice, and that any docu-ment that mentioned elections, without defining the role that the Com-munist Party might be expected to play in them, was perilously near fantasy. But, bearing in mind that political practice in China looked to be evolving in a less oppressive direction, and that previous authori-tarian excesses were at least less common, the Basic Law was accepted without much demur. There seemed little point in raising objections to individual articles when no one could forecast what sort of govern-ment there might be in China by 1997, and few were confident that any conceivable Beijing administration would not be prepared to take whatever action thought necessary to maintain its authority, however unconstitutional. Television cameras in the streets were a better guar-antee of human rights than any document.
The Basic Law was not received with much enthusiasm: 'There was hardly any interest in the document. It was felt that the freedoms that Hong Kong people will continue to enjoy will be those restricted to dancing and horse racing . . . their freedoms, human rights and the rule of law will probably be considerably eroded.'37 Dick Wilson, an experienced journalist, agreed: 'The people who continue to live here are not going to have the same sort of freedom. They will, I think, have the same freedom to make money and to live as Chinese. That's going to be less of a problem for the lower half of society. The people to whom it will be a problem are the Westernized Chinese. And they are the people who are likely to leave anyway.'38 But Wilson, also a former editorial adviser to Singapore's Straits Times group, does not believe Hong Kong will end up quite like that island state with its 'one man, one party' system and what he calls its 'arid politics'.
The British and Hong Kong governments gave a cautious welcome to the Basic Law. Sir David Wilson commented: 'The really important point is that most people in Hong Kong now accept that the Basic Law is there, and that it has been passed whether they agree with every single paragraph of it or not, that is now the framework for the present.'39
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Presenting the Basic Law to the British Parliament as part of the first report on Hong Kong was the task of the new Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd. Mr Hurd's appointment suggested that Hong Kong might be treated more expertly by the British government during his tenure of office. He was the first Foreign Secretary to have personal experience of China -two years at the Beijing Embassy in the 1950s -and he had written a good book on the Arrow war (as well as a novel,cThe Smile on the Face of the Tiger, which centres on a fictitious Chinesecattempt to take over Hong Kong). But it was also probable that hiscexperience in China and his Foreign Office background would inclinecthe new Foreign Secretary more to reach an accommodation withcBeijing than aggressively to represent the views of Hong Kong. On 26cApril 1991, in his annual report to the House of Commons on HongcKong, he stated: 'The concern throughout the drafting process was tocensure consistency between the Basic Law and the provisions of thec
Joint Declaration. On the whole [the Hong Kong government] arecsatisfied that this has been achieved and that the Basic Law providesca firm foundation for Hong Kong's future as a Special AdministrativecRegion of China. But there are some provisions that they would havecpreferred to have seen omitted or drafted differently.'40 The extent ofcthe Hong Kong government's enthusiasm for the Basic Law may becjudged from the space devoted to it in their Annual Reviews. It wascgiven the same attention as that accorded to the Outward BoundcSchool, and much less than the Urban Council Parks. As some protec-tion to those who would have to remain in Hong Kong, GeoffreycHowe's promised Bill of Rights was prepared which gave legal effectcin the territory to the International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights and should therefore, at least theoretically, govern Hong Kong legislation before and after 1997. Whether it does or not remains to be seen, for Hong Kong law must not contradict the Chinese constitution, which has a very different view of human rights, a fact which the Chinese government has underlined by insisting that this Bill of Rights is no more than a piece oflocal legislation that may easily be repealed;
and for good measure has insisted that the People's Liberation Army will indeed be stationed in Hong Kong.
Drastic though the effect of the Tiananmen Square massacre was on confidence in Hong Kong, economic ties with China continued to flourish. In 1990 the total visible trade between Hong Kong and China was $395 thousand million, up approximately 15 per cent from the previous year, although that increase was significantly lower than the
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
ten-year average of 35 per cent per annum. The government review laconically commented that this 'was at least partlY. related to China's
41
austerity programme'.
This was not supported by the sharp increase in the numbers of those deciding to leave Hong Kong. Before 1989 the Annual Review published by the Hong Kong government had not found it necessary to mention emigration, but after Tiananmen it was quickly discovered that 'Emigration has been a feature of life in Hong Kong for over a hundred years,' as numbers leaving rose steeply -sixty-two thousand in 1990 and a similar forecast for 1991.42 The true figre was certainly
gu
higher, as persons not defined as emigrants managed to acquire resi-dent status abroad and as young people studying abroad failed to return. Optimistic statements are sometimes made by officials that many emigrants are returning, but this is generally taken with a pinch. of salt. Since half the forty-odd thousand recent 'economically active' emigrants were from the professional and managerial classes, and a majority of the remainder were students, the brain drain is becoming a source of increasing concern. Writing in 'The Other Hong Kong Report,' Dr Tsim reported: 'Hong Kong is operating at a level below what it was capable of several years ago. The tell-tale signs are begin-
ning to show ... many salesmen cannot operate the office equipment
they are selling ... standards are going down across the board.'43 That
was in 1989; seven years later the Economist wrote: 'The people of Hong Kong have a problem with the English language. If anyone interesting to inquiry more for longtime of this problem, please atten-tion to this journalist.' Although similar examples could readily be culled from British sources, in a world where a command of English is becoming essential to success in business, such a deterioration has damaging implications.
In the autumn of 1990 Mrs Thatcher was forced out by her previous colleagues, inspired by Sir Geoffrey Howe who had finally, after many provocations and humiliations, turned. She was succeeded by a more emollient figre, John Major, who personally contributed to finding a
gu
solution for one practical difficulty which had eucerbated post-Tiananmcn relations. Kai Tak airport, founded in 1924, was already uncomfortably overcrowded, and rapidly increasing air traffic dictated the provision of another major international airfield to serve Hong Kong and Guangdong. The Hong Kong government had identified a suitable site on Lantau Island, which could be integrated with both the Chinese and Hong Kong ground transport systems; the proposal
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met with suspicious hostility from the Chinese government. Suspicions were aroused -quite wrongly -that the British government was pro-posing to empty the colonial coffers for the benefit of British construc-tion companies; and, more reasonably, that a major decision of this sort, resulting in a project which would straddle the 1997 handover and affect the economy of.the whole of the South China coast for many years to come, should be taken in conjunction with the Chinese authorities. A prolonged public controversy was eventually settled after the invaluable Sir Percy Cradock paid another quiet visit to Beijing,which was followed by a much more public visit in September 1991 by a somewhat reluctant John Major. His friendly reception was taken to symbolize the end of China's pariah international status.
For the moment Sino-British relations looked once more set fair; a state of affairs which lasted for a very short time. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Ports and Airfield Developments (MOU on PADs in the new, appalling Foreign Office jargon) was signed on 3 September 1991. Twelve days later the first election to the Legislative Council to include an element of direct democratic election was held. It produced evidence of strong anti-Beijing sentiment, and the emerg-ence of a single party in a position of unequivocal strength, energeti-cally pressing for more democracy.
Voluntas Populi Suprema Lex?
At the time the Basic Law appeared, Sir David Wilson had suggested that, 'Quite rightly, people's attention is now focused on the more immediate things in Hong Kong -like how to make a success of the 1991 elections.' The rate of progress towards direct elections for the Legislative Council had been agreed at a much slower pace than that indicated by the British government in 1984, or that suggested by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons and recommended by such knowledgeable figures as Edward Heath. Far from having 'the firmly-based, democratic administration' by 1997 that Mr Luce had spoken ofin 1984, there were to be only eighteen directly elected seats (out of sixty) in the Legislative Council by 1991; in the ensuing elections, to be held at four-yearly intervals, these would rise to thirty jn 2003, by which date parity would be achieved with the thirty members elected by functional constituencies.
The political situation in Hong Kong in 1991 was both complex and
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
interesting. The elements of a Marxist analysis did exist: working-class interests were opposed to those of capital and business in such matters as the provision of social benefits and welfare subsidies, perceived as endangering the low taxation economy. At least one area, that of hold-ing down commuter fares at the cost of providing subsidies to transport enterprises, continues to provide a focus for the issue. But there was wider recognition that the survival of a free-market economy was in the common interest, and thus a considerable reluctance to endanger its prosperity. Any Marxist credibility was severely damaged by the examples available over the frontier. No Hong Kong trade unionist could derive inspiration from the impotent Chinese workers' organiza-tions. Working-class interests were represented by both democrats and pro-Beijingers, but even the latter overwhelmingly favoured operating within the capitalist system.
Capitalist interests were well protected by the Legislative Council's constitution: all government-nominated members were selected for their balance and experience, and most of the functional constituencies were so arranged as to return safe business delegates. Generally speak-ing the calmer, more biddable members agreed with Sir Percy Cradock and David Young in seeing the best hope for Hong Kong in a continu-ing accommodation with China, not provoking negative reactions, but safeguarding cherished freedoms as securely as possible, while the democratic activists were for an extended fight with Beijing -and if necessary both Whitehall and Government House -appealing to international support in order to place the defence of Hong Kong freedoms on every agenda.
The election results, when they came, indicated with alarming clarity where the voters' sympathy lay. Their role was limited: of the sixty Legco seats three were held ex officio by the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Attorney General, eighteen were to be appointed by the Governor, and twenty-one were to be selected by the 'functional' constituencies. It was hoped that this would produce a co-operative and conservative chamber. The nominated members could be relied on, and most of the functional members expected, to be supportive of the government and not too critical ofBP.ijing. Doubt-less some of the eighteen directly elected members would be difficult, but a system of two-member constituencies, calculated to give the less popular, tamer candidates a chance, should reduce their numbers.
It was accepted that there was little likelihood of enthusiastic demon-strations in favour of Beijing. Voting tended to be strongly influenced
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by personalities, but even those who supported pro-Beijing candidates were highly critical of the mainland leadership. In Kowloon Central, a constituency in which the pro-Beijing candidate, Chan Yuen-han, was likely to do well, 87 per cent of her supporters were found to disagree with the proposal that China should 'have a decision-making role in Hong Kong', and only 26.5 per cent felt that it was 'important to accept Chinese views in potential disputes'.44
Although Mrs Chan did respectably in the election, she did not win a seat. Of the eighteen directly elected seats, fifteen went to pro-democracy candidates and three to independents. One of these, a conservative, became the subject of a police investigation, and a demo-crat was elected in his place. Proclaimed pro-Beijing candidates won not a single seat, and obtained less than 8 per cent of the vote, while two-thirds of the voters backed the democrats -and not just in the geographical constituencies. Only two of the functional constituencies had anything like a representative electorate -Teaching with 38,678 voters, and Health Care with 10,636. (For comparison the Financial division had 234 voters and Real Estate 373; both returned unopposed candidates, while in a third, Financial Services, six candidates slugged it out, competing for 694 potential votes.) Both the constituencies with representative electorates returned democratic activists.
Most such activists were loosely organized into an alliance between the United Democrats, led by the combative and intense Martin Lee, Meeting Point, and the Association for Democracy and the People's Livelihood (ADPL), who won twelve, two and one seats respectively. Voting usually with the United Democrats' two functional representa-tives, these formed the only organized bloc in the new Legco. They were generally supported by one independent, Margaret Thatcher's interlocutor of 1984, the energetic Emily Lau, a graduate of the London School of Economics who acted as a gadfly to any flagging democratic enthusiasm. Martin Lee himself had a personal triumph in his constituency of Hong Kong Island East, with 76,831 votes; together with his running mate, the UDHK candidates there won 63 per cent of the votes.
Some councillors from functional constituencies claimed allegiance to established parties -the popular Jimmie McGregor and Dr Leung Che-hung to the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (HKDF), a generally-liberal organization. Wong Hong-yuen, the accountants' rep-resentative, belonged to the conservative pro-Beijing Liberal Demo-cratic Federation, and the two other pro-Beijingers returned were from
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
the Labour division; between them the three constituencies boasted fewer than three thousand electors. Taking everything into consider-ation, it was uncomfortably obvious that Hong Kong sentiment was not in favour of Beijing, and that a new challenge was awaiting the Hong Kong administration.
Scarcely had the dust settled after the elections than another cause of dissent arose. During his Beijing visit Mr Major had urged the final draft of a sensitive subject, the creation of a new Court of Final Appeal. As a colony, cases adjudicated in Hong Kong could be referred on appeal to the judicial committee of the Privy Council, a facility still used by many of the Caribbean former colonies, and until recently by Australia and Canada. With the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, and while a separate Hong Kong legal system was retained, a local Court of Final Appeal had to be substituted.
Its form had been clearly stated in both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which allowed for the court, 'as required ... to invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit', a condition that was appreciated to contribute an element of independence from possible Chinese pressure. The number of such outside judges was not indi-cated. The British believed two from a total of five to be appropriate, but during negotiations between the two countries the Chinese insisted on only one outside appointment. When they heard that the Chinese point of view had been accepted, Hong Kong lawyers were outraged.
A debate in the Legislative Council reinforced the anger; on 25 October 1991, just a month after the elections, all Legco members with the exception of two officials voted to reject the Joint Liaison Group accord, recommending instead a return to the original agree-ment. In spite of Chinese threats and government warnings a second vote a few weeks later produced the same result, with thirty-four to eleven against the government. So massive a majority, in a Council which had been designed to prevent such an uncomfortable result, was something of a facer for both Britain and China. During the debate the Attorney General, Jeremy Matthews, stated the correct conventional view that the language of any treaty -which the Joint Declaration was -had to be read in the context of any subsequent interpretation agreed between the parties. Hong Kong was not a party to the Joint Declaration, and therefore Britain and China might legally agree to anything which amended it: a prospect which many influential Hong Kong people found alarming. Suspicions that the British govern-
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ment placed good relations with China before the interests of the Hong Kong people, voiced seven years earlier by Emily Lau, increased.
Such suspicions were not allayed by the Governor's reaction to the suggestion that one democratically elected member of Legco might be appointed to the Executive Council. Four new councillors were indeed so appointed; one, Mrs Selina Chow Liang Shuk-yee, was an , appointed member of the Legislative Council; two, Edward�P Ho Sing-tin and Hui Yin-fat, were members of the Legislative Council elected by functional constituencies. Hui had been elected unopposed for the Social Services constituency, and Ho returned by the 552 votes of the Architectural, Surveying and Planning constituency. But one of the new Executive Councillors had been democratically elected, so it seemed that, for the first time, at least one member of the Executive Council was there with a valid claim to represent the people's will. It was, however, not quite as simple as that. Mr Andrew Wong was not a member of the United Democrats, who had so convincingly won the popular vote, but one of the three independents. Nor was he even the preferred choice of the electorate of the New Territories East, who had given the ardent democrat Emily Lau 46,515 votes, and Mr Wong 39,806. But Mr Wong was reliable, a popular figure with few enemies; his apolitical stance -and perhaps his naivete -is finely illustrated by his electoral platform of fighting to achieve 'blissful living, consummate community; loving society, democratic system'.
As a result, the more than 600,000 voters (representing some 85 per cent of those who cast their votes) who had elected 'so-called' liberals45 had no representation whatsoever on the Executive Council. This was certainly a very moderate progression towards the principles of a democratic government for Hong Kong.
Somewhat surprisingly, both Chinese and British criticized the valid-ity of the elections. That China, with a very imperfect grasp of the principles of democracy, should scorn the new Legco as nothing more than an advisory body, and warn that their own National People'sCongress would enforce the Basic Law and the decisions of the Joint Liaison Group, whatever the objections of Legco, was natural enough. It was not to be expected that they shoulq find considtrable support in the British Parliament,
Woodrow Wyatt, now in the House of Lords, having ceased to support the Labour Party, wanted to know (29 January 1992) whether the government was 'satisfied with arrangements concerning democ-racy and justice in Hong Kong?' He noted that Martin Lee's supporters
54o A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
had 'swept the board' in the elections but were not represented in Exco. The House of Lords is usually a sedate assembly, but quite a fierce exchange followed as Lord Caithness attempted to answer for the British government. His statement that the Hong Kong adminis-tration was pressing ahead with the Court of Final Appeal as agreedwith China, over the objections of Legco, was attacked by Lords Wyatt and Ennals; Lord Caithness's attempt to claim that no Hong Kong government party existed in Legco was contemptuously dismissed as 'mad'. Were not twenty-one members of Legco actually appointed by the government?
Six months later, on 17 July 1992, the House of Lords returned to the subject. Lord Maclehose opened the debate, and proceeded to demonstrate the gulf that separates an experienced, talented and incomparably well-informed public servant who has never stood for an elective office or had any dealings with an elected assembly from those who, like Wyatt and Ennals, had been through the House of Commons mill and experienced democracy in action. The former Gov-ernor began by applying well-deserved butter to the Chinese; their government was 'the major player in this success story ... to which great credit is due and all too rarely given'. Less justifiably, he went on to echo Beijing's depreciation of the elected Legislative Councillor's authority: 80 per cent of the population who might have been entitled to vote did not; their views were 'far from unanimous' and others had 'equal if not greater claims to have the interests of Hong Kong at heart'.
It was then nearly thirteen years since Lord Maclehose had himself begun the discussions which had eventually led to what was, in any terms, a remarkable agreement between Britain and China. Its results, however, could be sacrificed at any time by reactions in Hong Kong which might lead a perennially suspicious Chinese government to upset the accord; and an anxious concern to defend the agreements became a central point of future arguments between those British officials who had negotiated them and the new democratic activists in Hong Kong. Other attempts to reinforce the Chinese government's reputation were less successful; the aged Earl of Perth, in suggesting that 'the Western media' were 'a good deal to blame' for the 'incident' in Tiananmen Square, and Lord Marlesford, describing the massacre as 'unfortu-nate', but 'not malevolent by intent', deprived Lord Maclehose's case of much authority.
Democracy's claims in the House of Lords debate were convincingly
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advanced by Lord Willoughby de Broke, an aristocrat 'pur sanj if ever there was one, twenty-first in succession to a fifteenth-century peerage. 'Whatever the shortcomings', he declared, the 1991 elections 'showed beyond doubt that the United Democrats were the only party then that commanded popular support'.
There was nevertheless much truth in Lord Maclehose's case that the popular election was poorly supported and therefore unrepresent-ative, although it did seem that interest in elections was on theincrease. In the 1981 Urban Council elections the miserable total of 6,195 votes was cast -from a potential electorate of some three million -for twelve seats. That year the existing restricted franchise was altered to simple adult suffrage. Registration increased considerably, to over 700,000,of whom some 160,000 actually cast votes, which did indicate a percep-tible improvement in political participation. In 1985 the RegionalCouncil took over the Urban Council's New Territory responsibilities, and was given a similar mixture of appointed and elected members -thirty-six, of whom twelve were ele.cted directly, on a similar franchise. Many of the appointed and elected members came through the Heung Yee Kuk, an advisory body, originally of village elders, founded in 1926.
By 1991 the number of those qualified to vote in Hong Kong elec-tions was estimated at 3,690,000 (1992 Review): of these, 1,916,925 -51.9 per cent -registered, thus signifying some interest in politicalmaffairs, but less than half commonly proceeded to vote. In that yearm215,869 votes were cast in the Urban Council election -21 per centof those registered but only about I o per cent of those who could haveso qualified. In the Regional Council election 177,895 votedm-23.6 percent of the registration. Taken together these amounted to 393,764, orless than 11 per cent of the total number of potential voters. At themDistrict Board elections 423,923 voted from 1,305,714 registered;since in the 1985 election 477,000 voted, this shows an actual declinem
in interest.m
Those elections were held in May 1991; in September the Legislat-ive Council elections saw, from the same electorate, 750,467 votes cast. This was 39 per cent of the registration, and therefore, as Lord Maclehose had pointed out just over 20 per cent of the estimated potential -considerably better than in the other Council's elections, but not perhaps quite as the 1992 Review described it: 'Election fever�P gripped Hong Kong in the autumn when 39 per cent of electors turned out to vote in Hong Kong's first direct elections to the Legislative
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Council.'46 The nearly So per cent who could have voted but didn't seem to have been remarkably immune to this fever, and the political lethargy of Hong Kong would seem to be not entirely a fiction. A brave face was put on it by the authorities, but the sceptics feltthemselves to have been vindicated.
Those who had, like Edward Heath and Sir Mark Young before him, argued for an earlier introduction of democratic elections, had been proved right in that not enough time had been left to develophabits of democracy in Hong Kong. The traditional reluctance to be involved too closely with government (except when wanting some spe-cific action from an official still often regarded in the ancient light of a father-mother mandarin, a solver of individual problems) had been sustained by the variety of complaints channels available. A worried citizen could appeal to a Mutual aid Committee, Area Committee, District Officer, the Heung Yee Kuk, the Regional or Urban Councils, the Office of the Members of the Legislative Council (OMELCO), the Police Complaints body, ICAC or the Commissioner for Adminis-trative Complaints, all government or government-sponsored bodies. This long-established attitude had by 1991 straddled over to a new concern. With 1 997 bringing a new sovereign power, and one not famous for tolerating political opponents, it would not be prudent to appear publicly, even to the extent of being seen to vote (party workers are able, in Hong Kong elections, to muster outside ballot stations), and certainly not to have one's name and address appearing on anypolitical list. In 1 996 the Chinese Justice Ministry admitted holding2,700 people in jail, often without trial, for counter-revolutionaryoffences. 'Many more are imprisoned for acts harmful to state security, or for leaking state secrets.'47
But merely bringing forward direct elections to 1988 would have affected events in 1991 only marginally; the killings in Tiananmen Square in 1989 provoked such universal indignation that a newlyelected minority of members could not have added much weight to the protests of the Legislative Council. Fewer liberals would, in all probability, have been elected in 1988 than were successful in 1991, and the pressure on the British government to increase its ration of passports might have been more effective.mJobbing backwards, it seems that the real opportunity was lost when the Young Plan, or one of its derivatives, was rejected. China was in no position to object to demo-cratic reforms in 1947, and America would have welcomed them. Even in 1950, with the Labour government's determination to preserve
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British rule manifested by the show of military strength, the new People's Republic could not have intervened. After that date China would have looked with grim disfavour at any attempt to democratize the colonial administration, which would have been taken as progresstowards independence. In addition, the received wisdom, that no demand for democratic advance existed, was only called seriously into question by the Star Ferry riots of 1966. The colonial government was thereafter too nervous that liberalization would lead to disorder to initiate any but the must subdued moves towards reform, and the negotiations between the West and China which began soon afterwards served to stop any progress. Thirty-five years had to elapse after Sir Mark Young's proposals before the first democratically elected legisia-tor was returned.
Although convincing reasons can be advanced at every stage for the reluctance to establish democracy in Hong Kong, the irredeemable error was that of the British government's discrimination against its own Hong Kong citizens in the 1971 Immigration Act. Had that legisla-tion never been passed, China could never have objected to the right of Hong Kong people to vote with their feet, and to make their homes, if they could find nowhere better, in that country of which they were citizens. Had they so decided, the benefits of that energy and intelli-gence must have had dramatic effects on the otherwise indifferent economic performance of Great Britain.
EPILOGUE
Times change; but political life in Britain follows a consistent pattern. In 1833 the Whigs, obliged to find a decent job for their stalwart supporter Lord Napier, who had lost his seat in Parliament, sent him off to the Pearl River estuary at a most generous salary. One hundred and fifty-nine years later the Tories, needing to find a suitably dignified position for their energetic Party Chairman Chris Patten, who had lost his seat in Parliament, sent him off to the Pearl River estuary at a most generous salary; and, to prove that colonies continued to serve the same purpose, also found a comfortable berth for a -former Home Secretary, David Waddington, as Governor of Bermuda.
There had been indications of unhappiness in Whitehall for some months. Sir David and Lady Wilson were not bred-in-the-bone guber-natorial characters, and they had their detractors.1 It was apparently felt that the next appointment, to what would almost certainly be the last British Governor of Hong Kong, demanded very special talents; but there seemed great difficulty in identifying these. It was known in December 1991 that Sir David was to be replaced, when he was pro-moted to join his predecessor Murray Maclehose in the House of Lords, but no successor was announced for some months. While not entirely unprecedented -Lord Maclehose drew attention to the four-month gap between his own retirement and the announcement of a successor -such a delay caused much speculation and concern. Mr Patten's appointment in late April 1992 came as a surprise.
There had been, it is true, suggestions that the last Governor should be a British politician, but Mr Patten, who had no experience of China or of diplomacy, was an unexpected choice.2 The reason for his appointment lay not only in his undoubted personal qualities of energy,
EPILOGUE 545
humour, sympathetic charm and considerable intellect, but in the euphoria that engulfed the Conservative Party after its unexpected victory in the April General Election. It was generally acknowledged that Patten's organizational abilities and his talent in representing a more amiable and humane aspect of the Tory Party to a suspiciouselectorate had been a vital factor in this triumph. John Major, always loyal to those he accepted as friends, was acutely consGious of an' obligation to Chris Patterr, and ready to offer him any post he chose. The opportunity to rally the forces of democracy in Hong Kong and to shape the future of its people was an irresistible challenge to a man of Patten's quality, and the diplomatic triumph that would accompany success was hardly negligible. Douglas Hurd, as Foreign Secretary, and with some experience of China, albeit thirty years previously, was warned of the dangers in such an appointment, but chose to ignore them, advising his officials 'not to nanny the Governor'. Major, Hurd and Patten were united in seeing an opportunity to retrieve what they believed to have been an unnecessary surrender to Chinese pressure over the speed of democratization in Hong Kong. That such action would also represent a reversal of a previous policy of Mrs Thatcher's was an added incentive.
Unlike Lord Napier, who had been nothing more than a respectable name to Lord Palmerston, Chris Patten arrived in Hong Kong not as a politician put out to grass, but as a prince in exile, a close political ally of the Conservative leadership, with immediate access to Downing Street. While Sir David Wilson had been obliged to go 'through chan-nels', consulting with Lord Glenarthur, Lord Caithness, or whichever very junior Minister was temporarily responsible for Hong Kong, Mr Patten was able to settle things directly with the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister, rather than following Foreign Office officials' guidance. This, as was made obvious in the later enquiry made by a Select Committee of the House of Commons, would have been to follow a more cautious policy, an attitude also adopted by the previous Governors, Lords Maclehose and Wilson, whose presence, and that later of the experienced Hong Kong politician Lydia Dunn, made the House of Lords the centre of Westminster's Hong Kong expertise.
From his first appearance in Hong Kong -not, as all his prede-cessors, in full colonial fig with cocked hat, plumes and sword, but ln a subfusc grey suit -the new Governor made it clear that he intended to act briskly and independently. In other than sartorial aspects, Chris Patten was a very different man from his predecessors (one cannot,
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
for example, easily conceive a 'Dave' Wilson or a 'Bob' Black). A masterly communicator, thinking on his feet, and p.ot circumscribed by protocol in what he said, nor much limited in his authority to say it, Mr Patten had only limited experience of departmental responsibil-ity, but great political acumen.
Or so it was said. In his years as Governor, Mr Patten deployed great reformist energy, virtually restructuring the machinery of govern-ment and acting as a tireless advocate of Hong Kong interests. At the same time he brought the whole agreed mechanism of the colony's return to the brink of disaster -and perhaps beyond -and polarized the division in Hong Kong public opinion between the conservative 'realists' strenuously advocating convergence with Beijing, and the lib-eral 'idealists' passionate for an open and democratic society. An exemplar, perhaps a caricature, of the first was the ancient, extremely rich Lord Kadoorie, who claimed that Hong Kong was 'one big business which must have a good management and a well chosen board of directors';3 but it is, after all, the shareholders who elect the directors. The standard-bearer of the second remained Emily Lau, ready passionately to defend Hong Kong freedoms. This polarization, apparent since Sir John Pope Hennessy's days, was made absolute by his successor, and admirer, Chris Patten, but between the two extremes the majority of Hong Kong people, warily apprehensive, got on with their own affairs.
The new Governor's independence was demonstrated when on 7 October 1992 he gave a long address to the Legislative Council out-lining his intentions for the future. It was phrased boldly, even arbi-trarily: 'The policies of the government I lead will be based on four key principles' -which, while hardly in the spirit of consensus politics, gave a clear signal that decisive action might be expected.
Itwas the fourth of these principles that caused the uproar: '... We must make possible the widest democratic participation by the people of Hong Kong in the running of their own affairs, while reinforcing certainty about Hong Kong's future.' Mr Patten summarized his per-sonal political convictions: 'I owe it to the community to make my own position plain. I have spent my entire career engaged in a political system based on representative democracy. It would be surprising if that had not marked me.'
The new Governor admitted being 'constrained' in progressing towards a democratic system, but progress was only constrained, 'and not stopped in its tracks'. It had previously been assumed that with
EPILOGUE 547
the introduction of eighteen directly elected members to the Legislative Council, a number reluctantly increased to twenty by the Cradock negotiations, democratization had gone as far as permitted under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Mr Patten did not agree: 'Stand-ing still,' he insisted, 'is not an available option.' Those who drafted the Basic Law, he argu.-d, doubtless recognized that the community wanted a greater measure of democracy. This was, to say the least, �P open to question. Drafting�P the Basic Law had been the responsibility of the Chinese govemment, although the views of the Hong Kong representatives were taken into account, and what the Chinese govern-ment meant by 'democracy' was unlikely to be the same as Mr Patten's interpretation. On the contrary, they had from the beginning, when
Geoffrey Howe slipped in his last-moment amendment, continued to be suspicious of the whole idea.
The Governor's proposals divided into two sections, the first of which was presented as afait accompli. Radical alterations to the Consti-tution were to be immediately effected:
I have concluded that, at the present stage of our political develop-ment, there should not be any overlapping membership between the Executive and Legislative Councils. I intend, for the time being, to separate the non-official membership of the two bodies.
Those members of the Executive Council who were also members of the Legislative Council had to resign -only a year after some of them had been appointed -and were replaced by appointed members, both officials and nominated outsiders.
The Legislative Council, shorn of its links with the Executive Coun-cil, would be 'left free to run its own affairs, and, in the process, to develop further its relationship with the government'. A wary observer might conclude that this meant that the Council would be allowed to bombinate in a vacuum, without any real power. Such an interpretation might be fortified by the Governor's statement that he would be 'answerable as the head of the Executive to this Council [the Legislative Council]'. Being 'answerable' Mr Patten defined as: 'to make myself available to answer members' questions and to discuss governmentpolicies and proposals, on at least one Thursday every month that you are in session'. This is an idiosyncratic definition of a word for which the Oxford English Diaionary gives as its first meaning: 'Liable to be
A HIS fORY OF HONG KONG
called to account; responsible ... e.g. 1. He was answerable with hls head.'
Chief Secretary David Ford had already identified, with commend-able foresight, the problems presented by a partly elected Legislative Council. There is no question that Britain ever intended Hong Kong to have a 'responsible' government of the classic colonial model, in which the executive was dependent on the support of a majority in the legislature, as the presence of elected Legislative Council members in the Executive Council would have suggested. It was the second part of Mr Patten's constitutional alterations that provoked violent reactions from the Chinese government. These reforms were misleadingly described as being designed 'to ensure that Hong Kong has a vigorous and effective executive-led government which is accountable to the legislature', and proposed:
1.
That all direct elections should be on the Westminster model of single-member constituencies elected on the 'first past the post' method, with the voting age reduced from twenty-one to eighteen, as in both Britain and China.
2.c
That all members of Municipal Councils and District Boardscshould be elected, with no further appointments being made.
3.c
That functional constituencies should be increased fromctwenty-one to thirty, and that the franchise for these should be significantly widened to include nearly three million workers (it then stood at seventy thousand).
4.c
That the only remaining indirect elections, the ten seats tocbe chosen by a committee, would be made by District Board members, who themselves had been elected.
On the face of it these suggestions for reform were hardly revolution-ary. Foreign Office advice was unanimous that no proposal violated the Joint Declaration; but this was advice tendered by lawyers, and therefore, almost by definition, subject to attack by other lawyers. The Chinese government and press, convinced that perfidious Albion was going back on the settlement already so painstakingly agreed, did not attempt to consider the legalities but shouted down the proposals with a shower of personal abuse: the Governor was 'a strutting prostitute', 'a clown', 'a serpent', 'the criminal of all time in the history of Hong Kong'.4
So violent a reaction should have come as no surprise. From at
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least as early as 1987, when the suggestions for direct elections were tentatively advanced, only to be embarrassingly withdrawn after a fudged 'consultation', Beijing had made it starkly clear that no decli-nation towards democracy was to be allowed. After the painful shock of June 1989 the Chinese autl).orities were even less likely to counten-ance any such moves. Bitterly resentful of international criticism -and possibly not without some residual feelings of guilt -the ;Chinese leadership perceived the intense sympathy expressed for the victims of Tiananmen Square by the people of Hong Kong as a disturbingthreat. If this was what Western-style democracy led to, they wanted none of it. Percy Cradock had warned after his difficult post-Tiananmen negotiations that the Chinese government considered that any unilateral interference with those understandings would negate all agreements reached. The Chinese would impose their own conflicting arrangements in 1997, and there would be 'big trouble'.
This the Patten proposals were guaranteed to provide. In the first place they were advanced by the Governor of Hong Kong, regarded by China as a mere civil servant with no business to intermeddle in matters which had been settled between two sovereign governments; and then the proposals, although made confidentially first to the Chinese govern-ment, were to be debated in the Councils, who had even less business to be concerning themselves with issues already settled between Britain and China. 'To their mind,' Sir Percy Cradock observed-and there was no one in a better position to know -'the reforms and the manner of their promulgation represented a I So-degree tum in British policy on co-operation and convergence ... The fact that the United States, Can-adian and Australian governments warmly endorsed the Governor's con-stitutional plans confirmed Peking in the instinctive suspicion that there was international backing for such a plan.'5
It might just have been possible that yet another series of painstaking and patient confidential talks might have won some measure of consent, had not the British side insisted that the proposals must be publicly discussed in Hong Kong. 'The days of negotiation with Peking over the heads of Hong Kong,' declared the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 'were past.' To the Chinese leadership, bruised by controversies over the airport, passports, the Court of Final Appeal, it seemed that the British could not be trusted to stick to their agreements. Had they not done their own bit by producing a Basic Law which had been approved, and which included many unprecedented concessions? Had they not, thrice, given way on democratic issues?
55�X A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Opposition came not only from Beijing. The Hong Kong business community as a whole saw little merit in extendir)g democracy, and much danger in upsetting China. Anticipating the probable Chinese reaction, Lord Jvlaclehose warned that Mr Patten's proposals were 'quite valueless to the people of Hong Kong unless they can be carried through 1997'. Sir Percy Cradock, who had borne the brunt of ten years' arduous disputation, was fiercely indignant. British and Hong Kong government actions would 'harm democracy, the rule ofelaw and the attributes of a free and open society'. The structure agreed "ith so much patient effort would be 'dismantled, and we shall have a subsenient legislature, and democracy "ill be permanently damaged'. Mr Patten's policies were 'entirely self destructr,e'. The proposals had negated the positive achievements of that protracted period of 'quiet, confidential and tenacious negotiation'. The result was 'a tragedy for Hong Kong'.6 Mrs Elsie Tu, that old campaigner for democracy, later complained of the 'disgraceful episode' and the 'dubious methods' of the Governor and 'his political party'. Hong Kong, she asserted 'has never had any democracy to destroy' during the 'unjust colonial era';7 which was pitching it a trifle strong. Sir Da\id Akers-Jones, who had done much as Chief Secretary to "in approval for the Basic Law, and who was personally committed to sharing Hong Kong's future, was bitterly opposed. Edward Heath's considered verdict was that he was 'absolutely cominced that [the election] was a terrible mistake'.8
More than a little taken aback by the ,igour of critical responses, the Foreign Office attempted to pull its chestnuts from the fire. Sir Percy Cradock's assessment that 'we have got ourselves into a frightful hole' was correct. The British had made the classic diplomatic error of allo"ing neither party any room for manoemTe. ?\1r Patten's proposals, made "ith the full consent of the Cabinet, had been enthusiastically received by the most vocal and actiYe of Hong Kong people. There could be no question of "ithdra"ing or even substantially amending them, as had quietly been done in 1987. Nor could the Chinese leader-ship afford to lose face "ith their o"n people or, and more dangerously, encourage their own democratic dissidents by further concessions. Talks about talks between the British Ambassador and the Chinese Foreign .Ministry led to stiff conversations, stretching from May to November 1993. Robin l\.facLaren and Christopher Hum spoke for the British side, although there was 'a Hong Kong element' in their team, and their actions were 'agreed with Ivlr Patten acting on the achice of his Executive Council'. Some modifications of the original
EPILOGUE 55 1
proposals were made, the most important being the reduction of the functional electoral roll from 2. 7 million to 840,000, but seventeen rounds of talks produced only a stalemate. The only substantive point the Chinese were willing to accept, apart from the relatively minor matter of voting procedures for District Boards and the Municipal Council, being the lowering of the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen. Since this was already the age in both China and Britain it was a concession that might easily have been obtained in the normal course of events.
Caught in this unfortunate dilemma the Foreign Secretary attempted to explain to Parliament, at length, but hardly satisfactorily, why the initiative had been attempted. Some importance was attached to the 'increasing' public debate on the question of elections that had taken place after 1984, although it was still claimed that as late as 1988 'opinion was sharply divided about the timing of their introduction'. The blame however was firmly placed on 'the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989' and their 'profound effect on Hong Kong opinion'. Only after a 'series of tough discussions' -the secret Cradock talks -in late 1989 and early 1990 had the prize of extra elected seats been wrested from the Chinese.9 Which is where, as the Chinese reasonably expected, the matter might have been allowed to rest.
By that time, however, the initiative had passed from the British government to the people of Hong Kong. Mr Patten's proposals, so badly received by both the Chinese government and the business leaders in Hong Kong, had sparked off a real and constructive political debate. With British and Chinese governments locked in immobility, Hong Kong voters and their representatives took up the debate on their own future.
The 1991 elections had produced an undoubted success for the democratic activists, who welcomed the proposed liberalization of the franchise. The Legislative Council, charged with debating and agree-ing, should they think fit, the reforms, were less enthusiastic. The next electoral cycle was due to begin in September 1994 with voting for the District Boards, the more important Legislative Council election following a year later. A series of debates on the new proposals accord-ingly took place in the Legislative Council between October 1993 and January 1994 which showed the divisions between the 'conservatives', anxious to-avoid offending Beijing, and the 'liberals' pressing for more�P democracy. It took seventeen hours of debate, and much behind-the-scenes arm-twisting, which included John Major pressing Henry Kes-
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
wick -the Taipan of Jardine's still being a central figure in Hong Kong affairs -who in tum briefed Martin Barro"'., a reliable Legco member, before the arrangements were accepted, and then only by the narrowest of majorities. The 1995 Legislative Council was to be the first in Hong Kong history in which all members owed their seats to some form of election
Faced with the necessity to put on the best possible performance in this unwelcome contest, Beijing did what it could to mobilize what potential support existed. Enthusiasm was in short supply, but there were some prominent and even respected pragmatists who recognized that co-operation with China was preferable to outright defiance. Lu Ping, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, who had taken an active part in the negotiations, adopted a domestic anal-ogy: if two women could not live amicably with the same man, one must. set up another cooking stove (or second kitchen, in some versions). If Britain was reneging -which was how China saw it -on the Joint Declaration, then China would set up its own unilateral alternative arrangements.
Success for Beijing in the 1995 elections was entrusted to a new party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DABHK), which drew support mainly from Communist and Socialist trades unions. Their manifesto of 10 July 1992 had proclaimed their 'fundamental position' as a 'devotion to Hong Kong and China ...csupporting the return of Hong Kong to her motherland'. Naturally, the DABHK supported democracy, there being little prospect of suc-cess for those who did not make such a claim, but it must be a democ-racy in which 'the actual needs of the circumstances be advantageous to maintaining social stability and economic prosperity'; a definition which would allow for unlimited interference with the majority's wishes
-always, of course, for their own good!c
Sharing a similar wish to accommodate Beijing, but with a verycdifferent constituency, the Co-Operative Resources Centre (CRC) was more a political club than a party, composed initially of Legco and Exco members, all supporting conservative business interests. This was to evolve into the Liberal Party, a name confusing the previously accepted divisions, in which the democratic activists were usually termed liberals. Democracy, again, was defined by the Liberals in a way that suited their interests as 'an obligation to transparent, accountable, responsible and responsive government that works in the interests of the people'. The careful phrasing disguises the fact that democracy is
EPILOGUE 553
more usually taken to mean government by the people. A quasi-respectable fascist government, such as that of Mussolini, Salazar or Dr Malan, could well have supported the Hong Kong Liberal Party's definition (although it might have a little trouble with 'accountable').
Martin Lee's United Democrats remained the most powerful politi-cal force. Renamed the Democratic Party in 1994, it included former members of the Meeting Point, and was usually supported by the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADLP). Mr Lee's passionate advocacy of popular rights and his travels abroad had made him the best-known of Hong Kong politicians, matched only by Emily Lau, who had faced up to Mrs Thatcher in their confrontation of
1984.
Picking up the pieces
However indignant the Chinese might be, the necessity of progressing everyday matters continued to bring them into contact with the British government. The Joint Liaison Group continued its regular meetings, ironing out, not without some acrimony, such matters as the disposal of government lands. One Chinese concern, their fear that the British intended to raid Hong Kong's wealth before retiring, was put to rest as a programme of land sales, the proceeds of which were shared between the present and future Hong Kong administrations, was implemented. Easily the most obvious of these was the redevelopment of the military headquarters and naval dockyard, HMS Tamar, which had been a prominent feature of central Hong Kong since the earliest days of the colony. The basin which had once served the sleek cruisers of the China Squadron and from which fleets had been despatched to many conflicts was filled in to become yet another office block and shopping centre.
Hong Kong's continued existence as an international entity was underpinned by agreement on almost all multinational treaties, includ-ing its participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Asian Development Bank and the International Labour Organiz-ation. The doubtful protection afforded by the Bill of Rights was sup-plemented by a Freedom of Information Act and by the establishment�P of Legco committees with some element of administrative oversight. Many tricky issues however remained, notably those relating to the
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
integration of existing Common Law into the framework of the Basic
Law.
There was some danger, amid all the political turbulence, of forget-ting the essential work of carrying on an effective government. One of Chris Patten's most significant achievements was the appoinhllent of excellent local officers to the most senior civil service posts. At the time of his arrival the three ex officio civil service members of Exco -Chief Secretary, Finandal Secretary and Attorney General -were all expatriates. Within four years all were to be replaced; a remarkable Chief Secretary, Mrs Anson Chan, acted almost as head of government rather than merely a senior civil servant, visiting Europe and America, meeting Prime Ministers and Presidents, as well as doing her best to stay on reasonable terms with Beijing and to run the Hong Kong administration. She did much, indeed, to define the role of the future Chief Executive of the HKSAR, a position for which she was well qualified.
In spite of expatriates being replaced by locals, some colonial civil service attitudes lingered. Councillors paid $50,000 per month (a con-venient way of comparing Hong Kong to British salaries is to call the monthly dollar sum an annual sterling total, and Councillors were also entitled to quite generous support costs, although these had to be proved) complained of the condescending behaviour of senior civil servants who considered that their own monthly pay of $150,000, with housing and other benefits, reflected their superior abilities and station in life.
If in practical terms the continued prosperity of Hong Kong was more important to China than it ever had been -all that vast territory and huge population produced only four times as much wealth as the minuscule British colony -economic criteria were not the only con-cerns of the Chinese government. The leadership's not unconstructive or intolerant stance had been substantially modified since 1982. Deng Xiaoping, the Great Helmsman, last of the Maoist immortals, the initiator of the economic reforms, was old and feeble; his nominal successor, Jiang Zemin, was unremarkable and incapable of inspiring enthusiastic support. Residual power leaked from the Communist Party to the People's Liberation Army and to provincial magnates. Corrup-tion became endemic as factions jostled for power in the succession. The recovery of Taiwan receded to a distant prospect as Taiwan itself developed all the characteristics of a respectable national state, although recognized by but a few others, notably South Africa. After
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all, Taiwan had only been Chinese since 1683, and formal sovereignty only dated from the 1953 Cairo Declaration. It looked as though Mao's original conception of Taiwan as an independent state was more likely when the first democratic election in 1996 returned President Lee Teng-hui, in spite of Chinese missile practice in the coastal waters which provoked in tum the protective intervention of the US Navy. In these circumstances the importance of a successful takeover of Hong Kong serving as a precedent to agreeing the same approach with the Taiwanese was eroded, and with it Chinese willingness to co-operate.
In 1979, for the first time in many years, the direct through rail service from Canton to Hong Kong was opened. The 'through train' became a metaphor to describe the arrangements for a smooth transfer from British to Chinese sovereignty in which the members of the Executive and Legislative Councils elected under British rule would constitute the first governing body of the Special Autonomous Region. From the time when the 1993 talks dragged to an end the Chinese government made it clear 'in no uncertain terms' that the 'throughtrain' could no longer be guaranteed. If the Hong Kong government went ahead with elections which China insisted contravened the Basic Law, 211 bodies so elected would be dissolved when the British left. This decision was publicly formalized by a resolution of the National People's Congress in August 1994.
It is possible that this attitude might have been softened had the 1995 elections thrown up a substantial number of Beijing supporters, but this did not prove to be so. Disillusionment with both British and Chinese governments was noticeable. Public opinion polls taken in 1993 and 1994 indicated that trust in the two sovereign governments had declined from 23.9 per cent (China) and 27.6 per cent (Britain) to 19.2 per cent and 22.4 per cent; the Hong Kong government was considerably better regarded, but trust had still diminished from 54. 7 per cent to 4 7 .1 per cent. 10 Elected leaders were trusted only moder-ately; in 1993 the top four were Elsie Tu, Emily Lau, Martin Lee and Lau Chiu-shek; by the next year Elsie Tu, regarded as having defected to the Beijing camp, had disappeared from the list, then headed by Lau Chiu-shek, who had resigned on a point of principle, with Emily Lau and Martin Lee joined by Christine Loh. All were strong demo-cratic activists, albeit with different emphases.
The much-discussed elections of 17 September 1995 confirmed�P similar soundings. Martin Lee's Democratic Party did better than any other grouping, winning twelve of the twenty democratically elected
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
geographical constituencies, with two going to the associated ADPL. Two more went to that remarkable pair Emily Lau a.d Christine Loh, standing as democratic independents. Although the Democratic Party could count, for most constitutional purposes, on the support of sixteen of the twenty directly elected members, which entitled Martin Lee to claim a substantial popular mandate, they had done less well in the functional constituencies, winning only five of the seats; after all, it was the intention of such a peculiar franchise to curb the powers of the too-aggressive democrats, but altogether some twenty-nine of the sixty members were reckoned to be democratic activists.
On the other side the pro-Beijing DABHK increased their single representative to seven members of the new Legco. Only two of these, however, were elected by the geographical constituencies, and both the Party Chairman and Vice-Chairman were unsuccessful. Something of a division between urban democrats and conservative New Terri-tories inhabitants was detectable. The ten Legco members appointed by the Electoral College divided as to three Democrats, two 'leftists' and five mainly supportive of Beijing. The Liberal business party won only one directly elected seat, but eight from the functional constituen-cies -again proving the effectiveness of this device in curbing excessive democracy. Many of the Liberal members constituted a valuable pool of experience -Miriam Lau, Selina Chow and Henry Tang, previously appointed members, were successful when standing for election.
Outside the main political parties the most powerful influences were those of the two independent members Emily Lau and Christine Loh. Emily Lau, the first woman to be elected to Legco in 1991, had agitated ceaselessly for British recognition of the Hong Kong people's national-ity rights, and insisted that Beijing must honour the promises of the Joint Declaration by 'exercising maximum self-restraint and not inter-fering in Hong Kong's internal affairs'. Her high profile and boldness has drawn one majestic warning from Lord Maclehose: describing his visits to Chinese prisons -very unpleasant places where files are 'lost' so that recalcitrant prisoners can be held indefinitely and where the inmates' only solace is cigarettes brought by rare visitors: 'And, Emily, I proinise I will bring you cigarettes.'11
Christine Loh, equally defensive of Hong Kong interests, was criti-cal of what she describes as 'ankle-biting', and prefers to concentrate on specific problems which would fall to be addressed by any future administration. She instances, for example, the predicted increase in population to over eight million by 2011, which will bring with it
EPILOGUE 557
pressing demands on the infrastructure. Grave difficulties are already being encountered by Hong Kong -ten million tons of garbage is produced every year, and can only be disposed of on landfill sites. Those available are rapidly being filled, and in the future space can only be provided by filling in large sections of the harbour, with serious and unpredictable consequences. Air pollution, already at dangerous levels, will be made much worse by the expected five-fold increase in
lorry traffic from the new container terminals.12
Such varying emphases make a simple division between pro-and anti-Beijing attitudes misleading as a guide to voting patterns on other subjects. DABHK members with trade union experience were likely to vote with Democrats on social issues in opposition to conservative business-oriented Liberals, which provoked a defensive nervousness from those quarters. David Eldon, a Director of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, commented the day after the election that the fully elected legislature (although two-thirds of the members were there by only quasi-democratic methods) 'may well have a voice' .13 So grudging an acceptance of democracy reflects the difficulty experienced by even intelligent and liberally minded Hong Kong businessmen in appreciat-ing the authority of elected representatives.
It was possible to argue, and Beijing did so forcefully, that the elections, like those of four years before, were not representative. The contention had some validity, for once again only a proportion -some65 per cent -of those eligible had chosen to register. Of these only a minority, 36 per cent, had voted. Although more people voted than in 1991, the 1995 turnout in the geographical constituencies was more than 3 percentage points lower. While the Hong Kong government made the most of this -Mr Patten was 'delighted that we saw a record number of people participating as candidates, party workers and enthusiasts. I think it's a thumbs-up for the people of Hong Kong' -the unpleasing fact that less than a quarter of the eligible populationhad bothered to vote hardly proved a burning enthusiasm for demo-cratic participation. Lau Sui-kai, an experienced observer, consideredthat the Hong Kong system provided 'several ways of gaining politicalpower. The electoral element is one of these, but not the most impor.,.tant ... Political parties and their leaders, like Martin Lee, enjoy onlya limited support. The United Democrats are popular mostly becausethey play the part of the opposition.' One poll showed that 90 per centof the respondents judged no lea4er to be trustworthy.14
Jeremy Hanley, the then Foreign Office junior saddled with res-
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
ponsibility for Hong Kong, a pleasant but slightly absurd politician, lived up to his reputation by claiming that 'the new legislature, elected in conformance with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, would be equipped to help to shape the next chapter of Hong Kong's history': but China had already made it clear to the most optimistic that it had no intention of allowing this to happen.15
Earlier Chinese threats to appoint a parallel Legislative Council were not immediately implemented, but the fate of the newly elected Legco appeared sealed when, in December 1995, Beijing announced the establishment of a 'Preparatory Committee', charged with selecting the post-1997 Hong Kong administration. The 150 members, all appointed by Beijing, were carefully chosen to be reliably sympathetic, and by no means representative of Hong Kong people. Not one Demo-cratic Party member was included in the 'eclectic mixture of academics, lawyers and business tycoons ... uniformed Chinese generals, officials and Communist Party cadres'. Ninety-four came from Hong Kong, fifty-six from the mainland. Among the Hong Kong members were Tung Chee-hua, a 'stupendously rich tycoon' who had become very close to the Beijing leadership, Li Ka-shing and Robert Kuok, owner of, among much else, the South China Morning Post. It was calculated that fifty of the members owned between them companies accounting for about a third of the Hong Kong stock market's capital.
The Hong Kong government greeted the establishment of the Pre-paratory Committee politely; after all, its composition looked remark-ably like that of an expanded Executive Council. Mrs Anson Chan, the Chief Secretary, was sure that the committee 'would want to reflect the views of the Hong Kong people': such confidence placed her in a minuscule minority. On 24 March 1996 Qjan Qjchen, the Chinese Foreign Minister, announced that 'to mechanically ape the Western democratic model does not accord with Hong Kong's actual conditions or accommodate the interests of all social strata'. The PreparatoryCommittee therefore obediently voted to abolish the elected Legislative Council as soon as the takeover enabled this to be done, and to replace it with an appointed 'provisional legislature'. Within a matter of days the single dissident voice among the Committee members, that of Frederick Fung, Chairman of the ADPL, was silenced. Mr Fung's offence was to suggest that most of tl1e existing Legislative Council members should form the new provisional legislature. He was immedi-ately ordered either to withdraw or resign; he refused, and was dis-missed. 'If you can't accept one dissenting vote, how can you expect
EPILOGUE 559
Hong Kong to be a showcase for Taiwan, where there is an entire party that votes for independence?' Mr Fung asked. Answer came there none, since what the Preparatory Committee intended was a Hong Kong safe for investors, to which end inconvenient dissidents and the whole principle of democracy could well be sacrificed.16 'What,' cynically asked Alan Lee, the Liberal Chairman, 'is wrong with a U-tum?'m
The Hong Kong people showed an immediate appreciation of themprobable future. Within one week of Mr Fung's dismissal 130,000 applied for British passports which would give them travel, but not residence rights, after 1997. A sports field was opened to accommodate the waiting crowds. When applications closed it was calculated that, with those travel documents already issued, 'less than half the terri-tory's residents would travel on Chinese-issued passports'. Mr Lee's Liberal Party, which he was 'not afraid that people may label ... as pro-Chinese', had already drawn in its horns, reduced its staff, and prepared to 'take time to prepare .the roles they would take up in the Preparatory Committee'. There was no question that the new insti-tutions would include any member of the Democrats, henceforth, it would seem, to be excluded wherever possible.
That a necessary preliminary would be the dissolution of an elected legislature did not seem to bother either the Chinese or their allies, among whom the Liberal Party was now clearly numbered. What Britain was prepared to do, maintaining as they did that such action would be in breach of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, was vague; Chris Patten promised that 'action would be taken', and brave noises had been heard in the Houses of Parliament, but any action that might be contemplated was almost sure to be ineffective.
Upstanding, flourishing and trading
And so indeed it proved. The valedictory debate on Hong Kong in the House of Commons was held on 14 November 1996, 156 years after Captain Elliot had first raised the Union flag on the island. As so often when Hong Kong's future was in question, the debate was conducted by a few dedicated members in a sparsely attended sitting. Accurately reflecting the gift for platitudes possessed by his leader ('Hong Kong people will never walk alone' was perhaps Mr Major's best) the junior Minister responsible, Jeremy Hanley, wound up with
'A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
the maudlin sentences: 'I love Hong Kong. The House loves Hong Kong. We shall always love Hong Kong and look after its interests.'
Such affection was hardly demonstrated by the Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind. Faced with the fact that the Chinese government had vowed to replace the elected legislature with an appointed body -and that within a month's time from the debate -he could only saythat in the event of the Chinese acting in a way that could be inconsist-ent with its commitments under the Joint Declaration 'they should beencouraged in a spirit of well-intentioned advice, to act in this areamwith all possible prudence.' Since it was a direct consequence of hismown government's actions that such an unhappy state of affairs hadmcome about, any more decisive action would be difficult, but much lessexcusable was the Foreign Secretary's refusal to give an unequivocalmguarantee that all those remaining non-Chinese -mostly Indian -residents of Hong Kong would be allowed access to Britain. Onlyindividuals subjected to 'any activity which clearly demonstrates thatthey are being treated unreasonably and unacceptably' would be admit-ted and allowed to apply for citizenship.
Robin Cook, the Labour spokesman, who reminded the House that he might quite possibly be responsible at the time of the retrocession -a general election in which it was widely believed the Conservativesmwould lose power being due -regained some credit for British politicalmorality by undertaking that the Labour Party would indeed provideman absolute guarantee that these people would be offered British citi-zenship.
In Hong Kong itself very little trust in the British governmentremained. A strained optimism was shown by Mrs Anson Chan, who believed that it had become 'increasingly clear that the "one country, two systems" can work'. Lady Dunn was more ebullient; in a flush of metaphors she would not admit 'a single doubt' that the Hong Kong people would 'scale new heights, break new records and set even higher standards' .17 From a very different viewpoint Zhou Nan, a member of the Chinese team who had prepared the Joint Declaration, Director of the Xinhua News Agency and, according to one British diplomat 'a shit ... a nasty piece of work','8 insisted that 'Hong Kong's economic ascendance is in no way a reflection of the colonial pattern.' When 'the yoke of colonialism' was thrown off, he said, the 'creativity and pioneering spirit of the Hong Kong people will be brought into full play as they get rid of the barriers of colonialism' .19 While very few were likely to agree with such dismal jargon, so completely at odds
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with observed reality, a real possibility exists that Hong Kong will continue to perf onn tolerably well. The HKSAR will remain, after all, the most effective mechanism for powering the economic development of China. USS70 thousand million of investment in that country -6o per cent of all investment -comes through Hong Kong, labouring as
it does under 'the yoke of colonialism'. Chinese investment in the colony is probably around US$20 thousand million, and Chinese insti-tutions have raised over USS100 million on the local stock market.
But the 8o per cent of Hong Kong people who had not voted in the elections had other priorities, and had begun to prepare themselves. A low profile traditionally offered the best way of escaping the authori-ties' attention, and 'self-censorship' became a topic of discussion. The Education Department has never been enthusiastic about political dis-cussion. Its guidelines, even in recent years, banned 'activity of any kind of a political or party political nature'. This must have contributed greatly to the lack of interest in political matters, and only since 1990 have these draconian regulations, which would not have allowed the sort of vigorous debate that has long been taken for granted in British schools, been modified.20 In 1996 the Department mounted an oper-ation to popularize the Basic Law. .een's College pupils, asked the best way to show their 'sense of belonging to society', overwhelmingly voted for 'social service' rather than 'participation in politics';21 theyhad correctly read the runes. A group of Preparatory Committee members set about changing place names; some wag suggested the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Oub might prefer to be known as 'The Humble People's Sampan Oub'. One by one the Royal Hong Kong Volunteers, the Amiliary Air Force and the 48th Gurkha Brigade were disbanded. Putonghua became compulsory in schools.
New men, their sights fixed on opportunities in China, took the places vacated by the Knights Commanders of the British Empire in David Tang's China Oub, rather than those of the Hong Kong Club.
T.S. Lo, a potential Chief Executive, ceased to style himself as a Commander of that Order and took out Chinese papers, becoming Lo Takshing. Rong Yiren, Chairman of CITIC, and Larry Yung, son of the Chinese Vice-President, became Stewards of the Jockey Club. A group of four hundred Hong Kong notables -which included Sir David Akers-Jpnes -was appointed by Beijing to elect the new Chief_ Executive -0f the Special Autonomous Region. Their choice fell on Tung Chee-hua; regarded as a reasonable man, but no democrat, Tung immediately announced his intention of installing a provisional,
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
unelected legislature. Anxious eyes watched for signals from across the border. When these came they were often muddled and contradic-tory, the product of some minor mandarin's eagerness to curry favour by sounding stern. When the Lutheran World Foundation asked Bei-jing for permission to hold their assembly in the HKSAR they were advised against it and warned that visas might not be issued. In fact permission for such gatherings was not required, and after criticism the Chinese backed down.
Incompetence and the spread of corruption are likely to be more immediate dangers than large-scale persecution, but one area must remain a source of anxiety. Hong Kong will bring with it as a dowry, proving Britain's care of the bride, some �G45 thousand million of foreign exchange reserves. This money, it is clearly understood, belongs to the HKSAR and not to China, but the temptation to make off with some of it will be great, given China's pressing need for capital, which was in 1996 bringing her right up against World Bank lending limits. Colourable excuses could be invented -infrastructure works in Guangdong, which might be held to benefit Hong Kong, regional bonds or even a carrier squadron, based in the harbour.
Any moves on this scale depend crucially on what happens in China, and there the picture is uncertain. Whatever group is in charge in Beijing will encounter serious difficulties, some of which are traditional harbingers of disaster. Inland water resources are shrinking as rivers and lakes are poisoned and run dry; coastal regions thrive while in the rest of the country 200 million underemployed peasants (the traditional wreckers of d)nasties) confront a rapacious new middle class. The People's Liberation Army, active in business ventures and exposed to corruption, grossly overstaffed, undertrained and underequipped, is searching for a role. Traditional state enterprises are declining and have been overtaken by local co-operatives (village and township enter-prises); the theoretical basis of the Communist state is crumbling and no coherent replacement is yet offered.
For his part in shaping Hong Kong's future, Chris Patten is unapolo-getic. He can well claim that his period of office has seen substantial improvements in education, health care and housing; inflation and unemployment have both fallen and that infallible index of public con-fidence, the Hang Seng index, has reached record high levels. The last Governor has transformed the Civil Service and brought forward people of outstanding ability; the quality of Legislative Councillors and of political debate has been immeasurably improved. Hong Kong is,
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in reality, no longer a British colony: 'If we'd made the accommoda-tions that some old sinologists wanted, we would now have in place less freedom, less democracy, less protection of human rights ... Who do you think the demonstrations would have been against then?' He points out that 'A great, pulsing society . . . a civil society ...eChurches, professions, voluntary organizations, newspapers, political parties and a well-educated, well-informed, well-travelled middle class ... produces a political agenda, and nothing will get that back in the bottle.'
The old sinologist, however, would reply that 'As a result of the Patten changes, disregarding warnings, Hong Kong will have less democracy, less rule oflaw, less protection than ifhe had not left Bath. In particular, instead of a through train for an elected legislature it will have, at least to begin with, a Chinese-appointed body.'22
Any judgement on Hong Kong's history, however, has to be made not on the last five years of British rule, but on the whole period of its development from a scattered community of fisherf olk and peasants on the outermost fringe of the Chinese Empire to a distinctive near-national entity with its own recognized place in the world. Viewed in this light successive British governments may take some credit for not having made too many mistakes. For the first century of its existence the colony was safeguarded from the revolutions, wars, perils and destruction that so often made life in China a misery. The rule of law was established and accepted; and when British imperialism in any part of the world is critically examined this is likely to be, however grudgingly, applauded. From the first constitutions of the North American colonies to the bewigged judges of South Africa, the Common Law has shown a remarkable capacity for survival, and has contrived to off er some degree of protection to the individual against state oppression. With the rule of law has gone the freedom of com-ment; again, neither perfect nor absolute, always restricted with a ner-vous eye to Chinese reactions, but to an extent difficult to equal, and certainly never surpassed, in all Asia. A midnight knock on a Hong Kong door is not the precursor of arbitrary arrest and detention without trial.
British colonial policy, from its painful evolution in the first decades of the nineteenth century, has remained tolerably liberal, and a suc-cession of mostly decent Governors and administrations has applied it well. In parenthesis it might be remarked that the 'British' Empire was to a notable extent not only defended but governed by the Irish:
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
from Pottinger to Patten through Pope Hennessy, Robinson, MacDon-nell and Blake, some of the worthiest Hong Kong Governors have been Irish. When first confronted by the British, Emperor Tao-kuang haughtily observed that 'these barbarians are wanting in any high pur-poses of striving for territorial acquisition; they always look on trade as their first occupation.' The history of Hong Kong proves the Emperor's point.
Charles Elliot in his own account explained why he had called off the attack on Canton. ' ... the object was not to destroy the city (which could easily have been done by a few shells and rockets from the men-of-war lying before the town) but that it should be left with its million of inhabitants upstanding, flourishing and trading to our great advantage.'
His colony is to leave British rule as Elliot left Canton, upstanding and flourishing, although Hong Kong has never been run consistently for the benefit of the British taxpayer. Many expatriate fortunes have been made and continue to be made, and the sheltered and stable environment has notably benefited British-owned and -staffed com-panies, but Chinese, Indian, American and Japanese businesses have profited equally.
It is also true that colonial authority has rarely been imposed with a heavy hand. The inhabitants of Hong Kong have less government interference with their private lives than those of most other countries; and the freedom to get on with their own lives has not been accom-panied by a negligible provision of social services and protection. But the real credit for Hong Kong's success must go to the people them-selves, enterprising, adaptable, industrious and skilful, but also inde-pendent, humorous and capable of organization and self-discipline. Ancient authoritarians, striving to retain personal power and some control over 1,200 million people, may with good reason be apprehen-sive about the effects of injecting six million insolent individualists, accustomed to freedom, into a society already subject to many strains, but the young, contemporaries of those who perished in Tiananmen Square, should find their new countrymen a powerful reinforcement.
As a result of the retrocession the economy of China will be con-siderably stronger. Properly handled this improved prosperity should continue, and should help in counteracting the potentially dangerous effects of disappointment and discontent now apparent among the wretched millions of Chinese poor. An additional factor which should quell Chinese officials' apprehension is that Hong Kong people are
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proud to be Chinese, conscious of their ancient civilization and remark-able culture. Even the most radical democrats, the belligerent Martin Lee and the amiable Szeto Wah, are as dedicated nationalists as the most stolid adherent of Beijing orthodoxy, and as ready to rally to the cause of the Mother Country as any Victorian British colonist flocking to uphold the flag against the Boers; a characteristic still not without
its dangers.
Accident, chance and the vicissitudes oflife in that unsettling region make it unlikely that either side, idealist or pragmatist, will ever be proved to have been entirely correct. It will always be possible to argue that things might have turned out otherwise, for better or for worse, had not this or that happened, but in the final hours of imperial rule some of the old shades return. Just as the politician Napier and the hopeful reformer Pope Hennessy foreshadowed Patten, so the new rich and confident Hong Kong business leaders, the David Lis and Lo Takshings, assured of their ability to shape events to their own purposes, seem to be revived Jardines and Dents, Mathesons and Inneses, keeping on terms with Beijing as with Whitehall, but striking out on their own paths. Conscientious Chinese posted to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will undergo the same difficulties in adapting to the odd customs of the natives as did John Bowring or Lugard. And, final irony, the new region's magistrates and officials, the Major Caines of the late twentieth century, will have to deal with a crowd of drunken, boisterous coolies, imported to labour on the new airport, working hard all week, but in their free time carousing with their unaccustomed wealth to the annoyance of industrious citizens. In the world-turned-upside-down of the closing twentieth century, they are, of course, British.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A British Governments and Prominent Chinese
PRl.ll'. HIRt:IGN COl.01'.IAL PLEl',;IP( ITL1'TI.\RY l:.\IPt:RORS .\ 1'1>
.1 11',;ISTlR SECRlT.\RY su:RET.\RY oon:RM>R PK< l\ll1't:Yr Cl ll'it-:SI.
Lord Grey (Whig) I .on! P,llmerston Lord Goderich Emperor �Prao-kuang .\ lu-chang-a
18_13 Lord Stanley
1834 Lord Melbourne (\\'hig) (Dcccmhcr) R. Peel (Conservath�Pe) Duke of Wellington T.nSpring RicenLord Aherdecnn Loni l\apicr J.Da,�Pisn
Lord .lelhournc (Whig) Lord Palmcrston C.nGrantn(Lord Gknclg)n (i. Rohinson
1836 C.nElliotn
1839 Lord Normanhy Lin Tsc-hsii
Lord Russell Ch'i-shan
1841 R. Peel (Con) Lord Aherdeen Lord Stanlev (later 14th Lord Dcrhy) H. Pottingern 1-li-pun
1844 J. Da,�Pisn Ch'i-ing
. W. E. Gladstone
1846 Lord John Russell (Whig) Lord Palmerston Lord Grey
1848 G.nBonhamn
1849 I lsu I luang-chin
Emperor Hsien-feng
185n1 (Dec.) Lord Granville Yeh .!\ling-ch'cn
1852 (Feb.) 14th Lord Derby
(Con)
(Dec.) Lord Aberdeen
(coalition)
1853
1854
1855 Lord Palmerston (I ,iberal)
1858 14th Lord Derhy (Con)
1859 Lord Palmerston (Lib)
1862
1863
1864
1865 Lord John Russell (Lib)
1866 14th Lord Derby (Con)
1867
1868 B. Disraeli (Con)
(Dec.) W. E. Gladstone
(Lib)
1870
1872
1874 B. Disraeli (Con)
Lord Malmesbul)
Lord John Russell
Lord Clarendon
Lord Malmeshury
Lord John Russell
Lord Clarendon
Lord Stanley
Lord Clarendon
Lord Granville
15th Loni Dcrhy
J.Pakingtonn
Duke of Neunstlc
G.nGreyn
(Feb.) S. Herbert
(Feb.) Lord Russell
auly) W. Molesworth
Oct.) H. Labouchere
Lord Stanlcv
(later 15th Lord
Derhy)
Duke of Newcastle
E.nCardwelln
Lord Carnarvonn
Duke of Buckinghamn
Lord Granville
Lord Kimherky
I .ord Carnarrnn
J.Bowringn
H.nRobinsonn
R. .\l.icDonndl
.-\. 1':l�Pnncdy
Emperor T'ung-chi
Prince Kung
Tseng Kuo-fon
Chang Ch 'i-tung
\\'o-jcn
I .i I hmg-chan!(
Emperor Kuang-hsu
�P\sn,ndanl�P1 ofn
I)1111'1f!l'. Fmpn:"n
APPENDIX A-C(/11td.
PRIME t'ORUGN COLONIAL PLENIPOTt:l','l'I.\R\/ DIPt:RORS .\M)
JII IN ISTt:R St:CRETARY St:CRETARY GO\'l::RNOR PRO.IIM:1'-T cmr-r::st:
1877 J.Pope Hennessy2
1878 Lord Salisbury M.2Hicks-Beach2
188o W. E. Gladstone (Lib) Lord Granville Lord Kimberley2
1882 15th Lord Derby2
1883 G.2Bowen2
1885 Lord Salisbury (Con) Lord Salisbury F. A. Stanlev ( 16th Lord Derby)
1886 (Feb.)W. E. Gladstone (Lib) Lord Rosebcrv Lord Granville
(Aug.) Lord Salisbury Lord lddesleigh E.2Stanhop.2
(Con)
1887 Lord Salisbury Lord Knutsford W.2Des2\'oeux2
1891 W.2Robinson2 Sun Yat-sen
1892 W. E. Gladstone (Lib) Lord Rosebery Lord Ripon
1894 Lord Rosebery (Lib) Lord Kimberley
1895 Lord Salisbury (Con) Lord Salisbury J.Chamberlain2
1898 H.2Blake2 K'ang Yu-wci
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao Emperor Hsuan-t'ung
1<}00 Lord Lansdowne
19() I Ascendancv of Yiian Shi-kai
1902 A J. Balfour (Con)
1903
1904
1go6 H. Campbell-Bannerman
(Lib)
1907
1go8 H.J. Asquith (Lib)
191 1
1912
1915 (coalition)
1916 D. Lloyd George
(War Cabinet)
1919 (coalition)
192 1
1922 Bonar Law (Con)
1923 S. Baldwin (Con)o
1924 J. R. MacDonald (Labour)
(Nov.) S. Baldwin (Con)
1925
1929 J. R. MacDonald (Lab)
1930
1931
(Nov.) (coalition)
193S (June) S. Baldwin
(coalition)
(Nov.)
E.oGrey
A.oBalfouro
Lord Curzono
J. R. MacDonaldo
A.oChamberlaino
A.oHendersono
Lord Reading
J. Simono
S.oHoareo
A.oEdeno
A.oLytteltono
M.oNathano
Lord Elgin
F.oLugardo
Lord Crewe Emperor Pu-Yi
L.oHarcourto
F. H. May
Bonar Law
Lord Milner R.oStubbso
W. S. Churchill
Duke of Devonshire
J. H. Thomas Chiang Kai-she!.
L.oS. Ameryo
C.oClementio
Lord Passfield
W.oPccio
J. H. Thomas
P.oCunliffe-Listero
M.oMacDonaldo A.oCaldecotto
J. H. Thomas
APPENDIX A-Ctmtt!.
PRIM!:: FORl::IGN COLONIAL Pl.t::1'11'OTt::N"IHR\"/ t::\IPt:RORS .-\1'U
MINISTl::R St:C:Rt::TARY St::CRl::TAR\" ClO\'t::RNOR PRO\111'1::1'T Cl IIM.St:
1936 N. Chamberlain (Con) W. Ormsby-Gore
(coalition)
1937 G.oNorthcote
1938 Lord Halifax M.oMacDonaldo
1940 W. S. Churchill A. Edeno Lord Lloyd
(War Cabinet)
1941 Lord Moyne M.oYoungo
1942 0.oStanley
1945 C. Attlee (lab) E.oBevin G.oH.oHall
1946 A.oCreech Joneso
1947 A.oGranthamo
1950 J. Griffithso l\tao Tse-lung
195 1 H. Morrison
(Oct.) W. S. Churchill A.oEdeno t0.oLytehon
(Con) (Lord Avon) (Lord Chandos)o
1954 . A. T. Lennox-Boyd
(Lord Boyd)
1955 A. Eden (Con.) H.oMacmillano
S.oLloyd
1957 H. Macmillan (Con)
1958 R.Black
1959 I. McLeod
196o A. Douglas-Home
1961 R. Maudling
1962 D. Sandys
1g63 A. Douglas-Home (Con) R. Butler
1g64 H. Wilson (Lab) P. Gordon Walker D. Trench
M. Stewart
1g66 G. Brown
1g68 M. Stewart (FOREIGN AND COJ\IMONWEALTII OFt'ICES NOW AMALGAMATED)
1970 E. Heath (Con) A. Douglas-Home
1971 M. Maclehose
1974 H. Wilson (Lab) J. Callaghan
J. Callaghan (Lab) A. Crosland
1977 D. Owen
1978 Asccndanl-V of
Deng Xiaoping
1979 M. Thatcher (Con) Lord Carrington
1982 F.Pym E. Youde
1983 G. Howe
D. Wilson
1990 J. Major
(Nov.)J. Major (Con.) D. Hurd
1992 C. Patten
1995 M.sRifkind
APPENDIX B
Governors of the Colony of Hong Kong
Januaryt-August 1841 August 1841 -May 1844
May 1844 -March 1848
March 1848t-April 1854
April 1854t-May 1859
September 1859t-March 1865 March 1865 -March 1866
March 1866t-April 1872
April 1872t-March 1877
April 1877t-March 1882
March 1882t-March 1883
March 1883t-Dccember 1885
December 1885 -April 1887
Aprilt-October 1887
October 1887t-May 18g1
May-December 18g1
December 18g1 -January 18g8
February-November 18g8
November 18g8t-July 1903
November 1903t-July 1904 July 1904-April 1907 July 1907t-March 1912
July 1912 -February 1919 September 1919 -October 1925 November 1925 -February 1930 May 1930 -May 1935 December 1935 -April 1937 November 1937 -May 1940 September 11).41 -May 1947 July 1947 -December 1957 January 1958 -March 19'>. April 11)6.t-October 1971 November 1971 -May 1982 May 1982 -April 1987
April 1987 -July 1992
July 1992t-Captain Charles Elliot (Administrator)
Sir Henry Pottinger (Administrator August
1841 -June 1843); (Governor June 1843 -May 1844)
Sir John F. Davis Sir George Bonham Sir John Bowring
Sir Hercules Robinson (administnrtl) William T. Mercer Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell Sir Arthur E. Kennedy
Sir John Pope Hennessy (administnrtl) Sir William H. Marsh Sir George F. Bowen
(administnetl) Sir William H. Marsh (administtml) Major-General N. G. Cameron Sir William Des Voeux
(administtrttl) Major-General Digby Barker Sir William Robinson
(administnrtl) Major-General W. Black Sir Henry A. Blake
(administtml) Sir Francis H. May Sir Matthew Nathan
Sir Frederick Lugard
Sir Francis H. May
Sir Reginald E. Stubbs
Sir Cecil Clementi
Sir William Peel
Sir Alexander Caldecon Sir Geoffiy Northcote Sir Marl Young
Sir Alexander Grantham
Sir Robert Black
Sir David Trench
Sir Murray Maclehole Sir Edward Youde
Sir David Wilson Christopher Patten
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. Palmerston, private letter to Charles Elliot 21 April 1841. Queen Victoria, letter of 13 April 1841, Queen Victoria, Letters, vol. i, pp. 261 ff. Tao-kuang Emperor; R. Pelissier,
The Awakening of China 1793-1949,
p.t90.t
2.t
United Nations DemographictAnalyses; US Government reports;tHong Kong GovernmenttInformation Department.t
3.t
A remarkable analysis of thetdifficulties Chinese writers have had, and continue to have, in deciding whether they are 'first atChinese or first a scholar' is giventintJia Qing-guo's essay 'BetweentSentiment and Reason' in Robens,t
Sino-American Relations Since
1900.
4.t
See Appendix A, which lists Britishtgovernments from 1830 to 1996.t
5.t
Colonial Oilice (CO) 121)13, 3 Junet1843
6. Peyrefitte, The Collision of Tll)O Civilisations: The British Expedition to China r792-4 (published in thetUnited States as The Immobile Empire: The First Great Collision of East and West), pp.xx-xxit
7.t
Teng and Fairbank, Chinaa's Response to the West, p. 2t
8.t
Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China,a,;,. 67
9.
Matheson, The Present Position and Prospects of the British Traae with China, p. 3t
CHAPTER I
It is not easy to find a satisfactory shon history of China. Those published in Beijing (e.g. Bai Shouyi and Jian Bozan) have inescapably Marxist views, complicated by an only slight acquaintance with British history. Rodzinski, in two volumes and a one-Yolume version, has to be taken with a similar pinch of pro-colonial salt, but if this is applied it is a good deal better than the Chinese histories. For the period from the eighteenth century to recent times two larger works, Hsii's The Rise of Modern China i.nd Jonathan
Spence's The Search for Mod..-m China are
excellent, as is one shoner book, F. Wakeman's Fall of Imperial China. Wakeman's The Great Enterprise is the best work on the Ch'ing Empire as a whole. Needham's first volume of Science and Civilization in China has a
good precis, and for an understanding of Chinese history and civilization the whole of that massive work is unparalleled. On a similar scale is the Cambridge History of China, with the relevant volumes edited by John King Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar. The Canton trade is well documented, with Michael Greenberg's British Tratk and the Opening of China covering the subject succinctly and authoritatively to 1842, and extended to 1852 by John King Fairbank's Tratk and DiplQ1TIQCJ on the China Coast. The two great names are Fairbank, one of the finest modem historians, and Morse, on "'hom all subsequent writers rely. There are also good and entertaining accounts of Canton in Maurice Collis's Foreign
Mud, Peter Fay's Opium War, and Christopher Hibbert's The Dragon
Wakes. C.H. Philips' standard work on the East India Company has been supplemented by John Keay's The Honourahle Company, but this does not extend to the Canton trade. Jack Gray, in Rebellions and Revolutions, is knowledgeable about British attitudes towards China.
1.
See Blue Book, 1840, vol. viii, Select Committee of the House of Commons Minutes, 23 November 1829
2.o
Receuil dt3 lettres Edifantes dt3oMissionaires Jesuites, 1702. Early European visitors mistook the name of the province for that of the town, and the error has survived, Canton only recently being given its proper transliteration -Guangzhou.o
3.oH.D. Talbot, in Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Ruyal Asiatic
Society (JHKBRAS), vol. 10, 1970:o
'Hong Kong is to be known
officially as Xianggang; this is
putonghua, or Mandarin, and will
have a stiff fight with the Cantonese.'o
4.o
Although Ch'ien-lung abdicated ino1796, he actu:tlly retained power untilohis death in 1799.o
5.o
Quoted in Michael, Origins of Manchu Rule, p. 106. On accession to the throne Chinese Emperors abandoned their personal name for names by which their reigns shouldobe known; thus Abahai became eitheroEmperor T'ai-tsung or the T'ai-tsung Emperor, and all events were dated from the year of his accession.o
6.o
John Nievhoff, quoted in Collis, The Great Within, pp. 1 10, 1 19o
7.
Cranmer-Byng, Embassy to China, p.o237o
8.o
Journal entry, 10 July 1637. Peter Mundyt'sJoumal, edited by R.C.oTemple (Hakluyt Society), is aofascinating account ofo
.eventeenth-century travel. Anointeresting account of the tea trade is found in Hobhouse, Seeds of Change.
9.oPhilips, The East India Company, p.o73o
I o. ibid., p. 308
1 1. Peter Mundy gives a lively account of the expedition, complaining of 'having been for these 6 Monthes variously Crosed in our Designe, our lives, shipping, goodes etts., Molested, endaungered, Dammified, Our Principalls with Much Meanes Deteyned an Canton' (p. 300).
12.o
Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China (Chronicles), vol. i, p. 32o
13.o
Bn'ce's Topographical Diaionary, 'Macao'o
14.oCranmer-Byng, op. cit, p. 211o
15.oMorse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire (/nt. ReL), vol. i,
p.o34. All provinces of the ChineseoEmpire were headed by officialsoknown to the British as 'Governors';osome 'twin' provinces, such aso
NOTES 577
Kwangtung/Kwangsi, came under
the administration of more senior
mandarins, commonly referred to as
either 'Governor-General' or 'Viceroy'.
16. Morse, Guilds of China, p. 17
17.rFairbank, Tra;k and Diplomacy on the
China Coast, p. 5 Ir
18.rMorse, Chronicles, vol. ii, p. 104r
19.r
Greenberg, British Tra;k and the Opening of China, pp. 6o-1r
20.r
Hunter, The Fan-kwae in Canton, pp. 40, 26r
CHAPTER 2
Apart from the essential Morse, the debate leading up to the end of the East India Company's commercial activities, which cleared the way for the private traders, the real founders of Hong Kong, . has not been well covered. Much reliance is here placed on primary sources, of which the most important are the
Jardine Matheson archives in the
Cambridge University Library, and the Parliamentary Papers -Blue Books -
issued for each session. These collate papers often several years after their original issue: thus the 1829 Select
Committee Minutes only surface in
1840. Chinaas Response to the West, a
collection of Chinese documents
2.rWorking through the relevant boxesrin the First Historical Archives inrBeijing the Deputy Director, Mr Wu,rdiscovered a note which turned outrto have been made by GeorgerThomas Staunton, later Sir George,rwho became President of the SelectrCommittee at Canton, a member ofrthe Amherst embassy, and a founderrof the Royal Asiatic Society.r
3.rTeng and Fairbank, Chinaas Response to the West, p. 19r
4.rFor opium see D. Latimer and J.r
Goldberg, FM1Pm in the Blood, andr
M.rBooth, Opium.
5.rCaledonian Society Journal, 1820r
6.r
Morse, Chronicles, vol. ii, p. 3 16r
7.r
Spence, in Wakeman et al., Conflict and Control, p. 149r
8.r
Morse, Chronicles, vol. ii, p. 325r
9.rMacartney's instructions are quotedrin Morse, Chronicles, vol. ii, p. 239:r' ... if it [the importation of opium]rshall be made a positive requisition,ror any article of any proposedrCommercial Treaty ... you mustraccede to it ... in which case thersale of our opium in Bengal must berleft to take its chance in an openrmarket, or to find a consumption inrthe dispersed & circuitous traffic ofrthe Eastern Seas'.r
translated and edited by S.Y. Teng and
J.K. Fairbank, is invaluable to
monoglots.
10.rIngram, Two Views of British India,
11. Source: East India Company
1. For Macartney's embassy see Cranmer-Byng, op. cit., and Alain Peyrefitte, The Collision of Two Civilisations (US title The Immobile Empire). Collis, The Great Within and Nigel Cameron, Barbarians and Mandarins are good on early contacts between China and the West. Jonathan Spence in The China He/pm (US title To Change China) continues the subject into the twentieth century.
consolidated returns. The
Company's annual returns and
accounts were published with the
Proceedings of the House of
Commons.
12. Greenberg, op. cit., points out (pp. 67-9) that the effect of the squeezes was exacerbated by the fact that legal trading was increasingly unprofitable, and that losses were almost always incurred by the Hong merchants when payment was taken
NOTES
in kind, by way of imports, rather than in cash.
13.r
Colonel Sweny Toone, quoted in Philips, op. cit., p. 190r
14.r
Morse, Chronicks, vol. ii, p. 158r
15.r
Amherst was known to be somethingrof a bumbler, 'as good a barrenrchoice as could be made' accordingrto Canning at a later date (Philips,rop. cit., p. 239).r
16.
For biographies of Chinese see
A.W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Chi'ing Period, and for Juan Yuanrsee Weh Peh-t'i in JHKBRAS, vol.r21, 1981r
17.r
C.T. Downing, The Fan-Q�gi in China, pp. 54-5r
18.r
See Blue Book 1840, vol. vii, SelectrCommittee of the House ofrCommons 1829 minute 442r
19.r
W.S. Davidson took over the opiumrbusiness of George Baring in 1807,r
Leslie, quoted Jones, Chief Officrr in China 1840-53, p. 88).
20.r
For the Canton and Hong Kong press see F.H. King, ed., Rmarch Guide to China Coast N=papm. It is an indication of the wide interestrin Canton that of the print run ofrthe Chinese Repository -one thousandr-two hundred copies were soldrlocally, 154 in the USA, the balancergoing mainly to India and Britain.r
21.
This is, of course, Longfellow's 'Excelsior':
A youth who bore through snow and ice
A banner with a strange device: 'Excelsior'.
22.rChinese Repository, vol. iv, p. 429r
23.rMorse, Chronicks, vol. iv, 23rNovember 1829r
:.+ For the Baynes episode see Morse,
Chronicles,
Saturday Magazine,
Correspondence,
Chinese Repository,
'Wmdy
Foreigna.Mud,
NOTES S79
Mandarins and Mmhants, Chapter
II.nThis is the only detailed review ofnthe earliest days of JardinenMatheson based upon the firm'snarchives.
33.n
James Matheson, Private Lettern
Book (JMPLB), 25 August 1831n
34.n
In Rhodes House, uncatalogued
35.n
Morse, Chronicles, vol. iv, p. 356n
36.n
See Cheong, op. cit., pp. 81-4 andnSelect Committee House ofnCommons 1829 minute no. 87
37�P JMPLB, I I March 1832
38.nFor Parry's escapade see ibid., 30nMay 1839. For the condemnationnof Grant see Blue Book 1840, vol.nxxx, 'Correspondence Relating to China' (CRC)n
40.nJMPLB, 31 January 1831 andnsee Blue Book 1833, vol. xxv 'Papersnrelating to the ship Amhmt'n
41.
Asiatic Journal, vol. xii, p. 212
42.n
fhuzrtmy Revimi, vol. l, p. 431n
43.n
J. Crawford, China Monopoly Examined
.�P For the debate in the East India House, an instructive example of contemporary views, see Asiatic Journal, vol. xi, Annex
45.n
J. Slater, Notices on the British Trade to the Port of Canton, p. 8n
46.n
Blue Book 1833, vol. xxv, 12nFebruary 1833n
47.n\\,JPLB, 29 February 1832n48.nibid., 16 March 1832n
CHAPTER 3
J.nJMPLB, 16 June 1833. For thenbrawl and the demon see Morse,nChronicles, vol. iv, p. 268n
2.n
For all extraats from official British documents in this chapter see BluenBook 1840, vol. xxxvi, CRCn
3.n
Asiatic Journal, 1833 Annex;n
Hansard, Commons, 26 March
1833, Lords, 5 October 1833
4.nCRC 25 January 1834. When the Orders in Council were publishedn
J.G. Ravenshaw, a director of the Company, wrote to Bentincknforecasting 'a pretty confusion'n(Bentinck, op. cit., pp. n55-6)n
5.n
See, e.g. Bell, Dictionary and Digestnof the law of St:0tland
6.
Downing, op. cit, vol. iii, p. 92n
7.n
It was not the first time Napier hadnsuggested himself for a post. In .o of his few previous contn'butions to the Lords (Jo November and 10nDecember 1830) Napier suggested that he should be appointed to ancommittee to superintend the abolition of slavery; the proposal wasnnot well-received.n
8.n
Hardinge, ldtm, p. 171; Palmmton -Sulivan ldtm, p. 141n
9.n
Blue Book 1840, Minutes of SelectnCommittee. nos. 385-420n
1 o. Although an illuminating justification of the founder of Hong Kong appears in Henry Taylor's Autobiography, the only biography of Charles Elliot is Clagette Blake's. Elliot's correspondence and that of his wife, Clara, with her sister, Lady Hislop, in the Minto Collection of the National Library of Scotland, Aces. 5534, 7287, has been made excellent use of by Susan Hoe in The Private Life ofOld Hong Kong, but neglected by other historians. Although Elliot made Hong Kong possible, he was not an empire-builder lile Raffies at Singapore, but a conscientious naval officer almost accidentally placed in a situation of great complexity, in which he exercised remarkable initiative.
II. Diaionary of National Biography (DNB)
580 NOTES
1o2. Hugh Elliot was given his first diplomatic posting at the age of twenty-one. Over the next twenty years he contrived to insult Frederick the Great, fight a duel with a German nobleman, stop a war between Denmark and Sweden, and engage in a secret mission to revolutionary Paris.
I 3. Elliot Correspondence
14.oAsialicJoumal, 1837, p. 4
15. WJPLB, 10 June 1834o
16.o
Hsin-pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 53 -the bestobook on the confrontation, but doesonot use Elliot sourceso
17.
For a review of the Chinese reactions see Morse, lnt. Rei., vol. i, pp. 123-36. British comments from CRC under appropriate dates.
18.
Roben Morrison, Memoirs, vol. ii,
p. 524o
19.o
C.C.F. Greville, Memoirs
20.oibid., 8 February 1835o
21.oSee Spence, The Search for Modem China, pp. 162-3. Professor Spence also suggests that the officials and generals -such as Lu K'un -who had distinguished themselves in Sinkiang were then posted to the south-east coast, in order that the same policies might be pursued there.
22.
See Chang, op. cit., pp. 81-4 for the 'Forward' party -Jardine Matheson, Innes; etc. and the 'Moderates' -Dent, Whiteman and Brightman
23.
Elliot Correspondence
24.o
CRC
25.o
ibid.
26.o
See n.22 above
27. CRC, 21 Februacy 1837o
28.o
JMPLB, to Captain Rees
29.
WJPLBo
30.o
JMPLB
31.
Jardine Matheson Day Book, Canton, 13 August 1837
32.o
Hansard, Commons, 7 June 1840
33.o
Quoted in the Friend of China, 28 April 1842. The first issue appeared on 17 March 1842, and the often controversial but always lively publication survived until 1859.o
35.o
Bai Shouyi, Outline Hist<try of China, p.o131o
36.o
Jian Bozan et al, A Concise History of China, p. 86
37.o
Philips, op. cit., pp. 167, 178o
38.o
Hibben, The Dragon Wakes, p. 110,oechoing Chang (see n.41, below)
39.o
Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution, pp. 92ff.
40.o
Hsii, The Rise of Modem China,ep.o246
41.
Chang, op. cit., p. 15
42.o
ibid., p. 92. Pan IV is the best shon account of the Chinese debate on the opium trade. Lin's proposal is reproduced in full in Kuo, A Critical Study of the First Anglo-Chinese War
-an excellent source -Doc. 6.o
43.o
Bingham, Narrative, pp. 403ff., and Canton Press, 20 July 1839.oAccording to Matheson OMPLB, 1 May 1839), Lin had a vocabulary ofoforeign words and used to astonish listeners by dropping the odd English or Ponuguese expression into hisoconversation. For Lin see also G.oChen, Lin Tse-hsu
44.
Teng and Fairbank, op. cit., p. 25
45.o
Jardine Matheson Day Book,
Canton
46.oWJPLB, 16 December 1838o
47.o
ibid.
48.o
JMPLB, 3 May 1839: Dent had been reluctant to arrange insurance cover
49.
Morse, lnt. Rd., vol. i, p. 216o
50.o
JMPLB, 24 March I 839o
NOTES 581
51.
CRC, Select Committee Minutes, 7 May 1840
52.r
Nye, Tht Ratwnak of tht Chinese
Question, p. 37r
53.rJMPLB, 24 March 1839r
54.ribid., 25 March 1839r
55.ribid., 3 May 1839r
56.r
Queen Victoria, Letters, vol. i, p. 156,r8 May 1839r
57.r
Published in CRCr
58.r
H.T. Easton, History of a Banking House, p. 29r
59.r
Cranbrook, Diary, p. 588r
6o. Chinese Repository, vol. viii, pp. 854,r327, quoted Chang, op. cit., p. 181
61.rLin to Emperor, 6 October 1839,rquoted Chang, op. cit., p. 185r
62.rJMPLB, 24 August 1839r
63.r
The sailors were from JardinerMatheson and Dent ships. Elliot paidrthe compensation himself, and wasrrefunded readily by Jardine's butrnot by Dent's, whose captain, Aireyrof the Mangalore, refused to pay.rMatheson wrote indignantly on 2rAugust 1839: 'My dear CaptainrElliot, there is not a member of ourrcommunity who would not blush atrthe very idea of your being left torpay the piper out of your privaterpurse': except, of course, thoserdeplorable Dents.r
64.r
A. Waley, Tht Opium War through Chinese Eyes, p. 64. This account,rfrom Chinese sources, is an entertaining corrective to the British versions.r
65.r
J.A. Whitbeck, Historical Vision, p.r129r