school were (with few exceptions) illiterate . Table 159 of the 196 1 Report furthe r showed how illiteracy, except among the boat people, was chiefly a problem of the higher age groups, especially among women. Appendix 15 [Table 6.4] now contains the comparison between 1961 and 1966, showing that for those aged 10 to 34 some progress has been made, even in rural areas; but for those aged 35 and up there has been no improvement.
d. Industrializatio n in the 1950 s
Hong Kong not only survived the 1950s and early 1960s, its economy thrived. Associated wit h th e opportunities that were brough t about b y economi c growth was upward mobilit y for the new migrants from China . The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by weak trade unions but strong motivation for those who had found wor k to advance. One might detect i n the ne w immigrant the stubborn determination to succeed knowin g well that there was no alternative. A section of the population given economic opportunities and willing to learn professionalize d quickly . The rewards were hig h fo r those who succeeded i n advancing, but a gap in the social structure was soon noticeable .
DOCUMENT Vl.dl: Recollections of a Hong Kong industrialist (source: H.C. Ting, Truth and Pacts, Recollections of aHongKong Industrialist, Hong Kong, 1974, pp. 72-73, 76-77, 79-85)
For more than a hundred years after its founding, Hong Kong was mainly known as a free port and an entrepot. In the past, few had ever thought that Hong Kong would one day become a world renown industrial city. In terms of natural endowments, Hong Kong neither had the land needed for industrial development, nor the natural resources for raw materials supply, and still less a domestic market to absorb what its own factories would produce.
Lacking in all these basic requirements for industrial development, Hong Kong, in fact, had no foundation whatsoever before World War II in the area of large-scale manufacturing. Whatever rudimentary industrial processes which were carried on in Hong Kong prior to World War II were limited to the manufacture of flashlights, storm lanterns, me tai-wares, a few small weaving mills and dockyards for ship repairs and the building of small boats.
Manufacturing then was not an important social and economic factor in Hong Kong's overall existence nor did the city's industrial output have any economic impact on overseas market.
This situation began to change after V J Day, and the main reason which brought about the transformation was the influx into Hong Kong of a large number of Chinese from the mainland who were unwilling to submit to the rule of Chinese Communism.
When the Communists took over the mainland, Hong Kong's population quickly rose to more than 2.5 million people.
Forced to flee in an endless stream into Hong Kong, these refugees had to find a means of livelihood on a barren island. They thus provided Hong Kong with the first essential ingredient of industrial development: skilled and inexpensive labour.
At the same time, among the people who came from th e mainland, there were many who were successful an d experienced i n operating industrie s i n China. The y brought alon g with them not onl y their money but also their technical skil l and a tremendous store of varied manufacturing experience. They immediately set to work and established spinning mills, plastics factories and other industrial enterprises which never before had operated in Hong Kong. They had planted the first seeds of Hong Kong's industrial growth.. ..
Kader Industrial Company Ltd was formally established in Hong Kong in 1947. Immediately thereafter , w e built ou r own factory i n North Point . With intensiv e preparation, we opened our cold storage and ice-making plant in 1948 . The plasti c plant started production i n 1949 . In 1948 I made a brief visit to Hong Kong, but returned shortly to Shanghai.
It was then my intention to make periodic visits to Hong Kong, perhaps as business-cum-pleasure trips after Kader's business got under way. I thought that I would be able to stay alternately i n Shanghai an d Hon g Kong , with m y principal enterpris e stil l concentrated in Shanghai. At that time I never had the intention of leaving Shanghai permanently.
Toward the end of 1948, however, I heard unexpectedly that the situation in Kader was far from satisfactory.I felt that it was imperative for me to come to Hong Kong to look into the matter personally and to help solve the problems if necessary. I flew from Shanghai to Hong Kong on December 22, 1948 and found that our new enterprise was indeed faced with many problems. I stayed for several months and returned to Shanghai on March 17, 1949. But on April 28, 1949 I returned to Hong Kong again. By that time, the situation in Shanghai was already in a state of great chaos, and not long afterwards events took a rapid turn for the worse, with the Communists taking over Shanghai and the rest of the Mainland.
This sudden political change caused me to remain in Hong Kong, and I have not returned since. In the 21 years of my stay in Hong Kong, I was able to take part in the early struggle to establish Hong Kong's new industrial complex.. ..
When I came to Hong Kong in December 1948 , I could already see that th e situation on the Mainland was in the process of a cataclysmic change. No one could foretell at that stage what would happen to the business and the personnel left behind in Shanghai. Having spent my life in building up a manufacturing enterprise, I was perplexed and disillusioned.
I was not particularly interested i n starting anew in Hong Kong.I had earlie r established Kader Industrial Company in Hong Kong, but that was merely in an effort to help some friends to set up a business, although I owned some 90 per cent of the shares of the concern. Part of the other money invested in the company came fro m loans I made to friends.
I had th e titl e of Chairman o f the Company, an d accordin g t o th e customar y practice in China at that time, the Company Chairman too k no actual part in th e operation of the firm nor did he deal directly with the company's affairs .
Although I had heard prior to my arrival that the handling of various affairs at Kader was by no means satisfactory, I had not wanted to play a personal part in the company's management.I had hoped that those originally responsible would in time be able to assume proper control over crucial matters and spare me from concern and personal participation.
However, I discovered after m y arrival that although the company occupied a modern, streamline d plant , whic h gav e an impressiv e appearanc e o f prosperity, it s internal administratio n wa s by no means i n a state of robust health . Its monthly expenditures were in the region of $40,000 to $50,000, but its income was extremely limited.
I found that the ice-making department produced about 200 to 300 blocks of ice per month, and the revenue derived from sales was not sufficient t o cover wages and the cost of electricity. The cold storage plant was cramped in space and rental derived from the storage was in the region of $8,000 to $9,000, a sum too insignificant to make the operation worthwhile.
The plastics department had already started operation, but it was only equipped with tw o eight-ounc e machine s an d tw o smal l two-ounc e machines . Whateve r production in progress was, in fact, token in nature.
From a purely theoretical point of view, all the departments were in operation and there were some 100 to 200 workers. But in actual practice, one could not really appraise the entire operation in terms of efficiency and productivity. Even proper accounts and invoices were lacking.
There were quite a number of workers but the pay was extremely low and th e morale among the employees was usually poor. There were, for instance, three watchmen on the payroll, working on three shifts, each one of them getting only $90 a month. This was not enough for a man to live on, and it was impossible to expect such low pay to stimulate his interest in his job or encourage him to work with great enthusiasm and efficiency.
I found that by 5 p.m., the plant was emptied of all employees, and at that hour it was not a n easy task to find eve n one single staff member who had stayed behind . Under these circumstances, the company certainly did not appear to be a booming, properly-run business, endowed with a promising future.
I realized, of course, that it was by no means the intention of those in charge to cause the company to deteriorate. The situation was brought about by their lack of experience in handling the affairs of the company properly.
I knew tha t th e company would run int o grave jeopardy i f the decline wa s t o continue and if I did not seek to correct the situation by providing the proper advice drawn from my long experience in running industrial management. But I found that it was difficult to make the employees fully understand my ideas and my methods during a short period of time, and the results achieved were therefore negligible.
By June 1949, the company was faced with demands from Banque de PIndochine to settle its outstanding loan by a certain time limit. If it was not able to make good the loan, the only alternative was foreclosure, and the company's assets must then be sold at auction.
All those who were then responsible for running the company were at a loss as to what to do. They repeatedly asked me to take personal charge of what was in fact a desperate situation. In order to save the business and also to insure my own survival in Hong Kong, I had little choice but to abandon my original intention of staying out of active business. On the 1st of July that year, I assumed actual management and full responsibility of the Company as Chairman and Managing Director.
Under my personal direction, I began, as my first task, an internal reorganisation of all the Company's various departments, correcting some of the irrational errors of the past. In terms of personnel, I did not bring in any new employees who were in any way personnally connected with me. Nor did I reduce the number of employees or slash wages.
Instead, by appraising job requirements and capabilities of individual employees, I managed t o increase the efficiency o f every individual and ever y department . Furthermore, I succeeded in bringing about an increased interest of each employee in his job by paying him a better wage and giving him better treatment.
Take the case of the watchman as an example. I reduced the original number from three to one, doubling the salary of the single watchman. The other two were transferred to other departments.I took similar steps with other departments, thus bringing about overall improvement .
I was a novice in the plastics and ice-making industries, but I spared neither time nor effort in studying the basic problems and techniques. In time, I gradually grasped the fundamental points involved in the manufacturing processes.
In ice-making, for instance, I went to work in the plant for a while and found that by adding some minor equipment, I could increase the output and improve the quality with a substantial reduction of both manpower and time. The result was an increase in production from a total of 200 to 300 blocks of ice per month to a daily output of more than 10 0 blocks.
I made a practice of holding discussion sessions with the staff. During these meetings I would explai n clearly th e principles on which w e based our actions and ou r management policies. I especially pointed out that in dealing with our employees we entertained no personal prejudices nor did we allow provincial distinctions to influence us in our treatment of each individual employee. I urged that all employees, regardless of their position, should work with a sense of unity, that they should understand the meaning and significance of their work, and that improved productivity and efficienc y were in their own interest as well as in the interest of the Company.
The Company never restrained its workers from forming or joining unions. And as a result of my handling of all matters in a democratic manner, the workers, on their own, all did not wish to form or join a union. This holds true even today. The number of workers in Kader has grown to more than 1,700, but they have continued to maintain this spirit of cooperation.
Speaking now of wages, I recall that in 1949, the usual wage scale for a female worker for a 10-hour day was from $1.90 to $2.1 thought that this was very low since the average cost for food per person was in the region of $40 to $50. When I took over control of Kader, I stipulated that the lowest pay for a female worker for a nine-hour day was to be $3 to $3.50.
Although thi s wag e leve l o f 194 9 would appea r extremel y lo w today , i t wa s considered rare in those days. I recall during a visit paid to Kader by the then Governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, h e told me that h e had ofte n heard fro m th e Labou r Department about the exceptionally high wage level at Kader.. . .
I waited for a gradual psychological improvement of the workers' attitude and a betterment of their morale before I took active steps to increase productivity, raise the quality and open up new markets. Starting from 1953 , the quality of Kader products was beginning to be recognised by customers in remote markets abroad. There was a steady increase of orders from such industrially advanced countries as Great Britain , the United States and European countries.
In dealing with all my customers, whether big or small, I persisted in my principle of sincerity and good faith, always supplying them with a high quality product at a reasonable price. But I also insisted on equality and reciprocal reasonableness. Before long this was recognised and understood by all my customers, bringing satisfactor y results to all parties.
At this moment, there is seldom any firm anywhere in the world which deals in plastics, especially in toys, which does not know the high quality of Kader products and the confidence we command.
Over the years, our product range has increased to some 600 separate items, with a total work force of more 1,700. We now rank as first or the second among all the plastics manufacturers in the Far East. This, of course, was the result of the cooperative efforts of all our personnel.
e. Socia l Mobility
DOCUMENT VT.el : Education , self-help an d social advancement (source : Hon g Kong Chinese Civil Servants' Association, Submissions to the Salaries Commission, 1965, pp. 81-84)
The case s hereunder state d ar e factual. Thes e information s wer e supplie d b y members of the H.K.C.C.S.A. who have brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, cousins, spouses, in-laws, and othe r clos e relatives working i n Hong Kong as employees outside th e Public Service. They were supplied accurately but in confidence. For obvious reasons, the identities of the individual employers or employees have to remain anonymous. It is submitted that those information [sic ] are relevant, and that they should be taken into consideration in determining the levels of salaries for civil servants in the Public Service.
1.A junior executive who did not even pass the School Certificate Examination was promoted from an apprentice salesman in 1949 to salesman one year after, then to sales-manager in 1963 in a leading European Import and Export Firm, is now being paid a nominal salary of $750 p.m. His remuneration is mainly on commission basis. He gets 1/2% to 2% for every thing sold, which are attributable to his (the provisions) department. His gross income during 1964 was $70,000.
2.
Anothe r j unior executive without a School Certificate in the same firm selling building material, rose from salesman to sales manager after 10 years' service, was paid a nominal salary of $1,200 a month, but the commission he received at rates varying between 1/2% to 1%, came up to a total of $70,000 to$90,000 a year.
3.
A 3rd executive with School Certificate in a Chinese firm is paid$ 1,000 p.m. as his salary. On top of this, he gets 1/2% to 3% for every thing sold by his department. His monthly commission amounts averagely to $1,200 per month at his 6th year with the firm.
4.
A n assistant with Form 4 standard of education in the catering department of a local airline receives $1,800 p.m. as salary. He receives 13 months salary in a year instead of 12. He is given a free trip once every 2-1/2 years, and if he were to bring his wife or parents along for the trip, he would need only to pay 10% of the fare. He is provided with free medical treatment for himself and his family.
5.A married woman of Form 2 standard works as cashier in a tourist service firm is paid $780 for 14 months in a year. She is entitled to 20% of the tips received which averaged out to about $10 a day. She is given 3 meals a day, besides free quarters.
6.A graduate from St. John's University, Shanghai, works as an assistant in the general department of a plastic factory, started off at $1,300 p.m. His salary was raised to $1,500, three months after joining the firm. By the end of the year, which was 7 months after he joined the firm, he was paid a bonus of $6,000. As from the 2nd year, he was provided with quarters of 760 sq.ft. at a nominal rental of $50 per month, besides with meals charged at the nominal price of 70c a meal, besides a promise of even a higher bonus at the end of the year.
7.A married woman who plays the piano for the entertainment of customers in a hotel is earning $6,000 p.m. with free accommodation and free food. She holds no diploma nor certificate of competency and her knowledge of music is no way superior to an ordinary school music teacher in a Government or private school.
8.A former university student from Shanghai (did not graduate) started off asa clerk in an American Insurance Company 8 years ago at a salary of $680 p.m. He has now reached th e rank o f Accident Insuranc e Produce r earning both a salary and commission amounting to over $5,000 p.m. He himself and his family are covered by a provident fund scheme which will entitle him to no less than $100,000 on retirement (no age limit for retirement). Besides he is entitled to free medical treatment by 1st rate private practitioners. He is also entitled to 24 days' 'local leave'.
9.A graduate of St. John's University, Shanghai, works as a secretary and export manager in a woollen yarn and carpet factory, receives $3,400 p.m. plus a 25% bonus of his yearly total at the end of the year. He is further provided rent free with a flat which cost the firm$ 120,000 to buy.
10.A former graduate of Peking University works in a factory which produces steel cutleries as the chief engineer for less than 3 years, is paid, on a 5-year contract, at $1,800 plus a flat which cost the firm $38,000. In addition, he will receive annual gratuities (averaged between $8,000 to $10,000 over the past 3 years). He is additionally privileged to travel aboard to Europe and America at the firm's expense according to costs.
11. A former middle school student from Shanghai, who learnt his English from an evening school, started off as a clerk in a foreign bank at the humble salary of $400
p.m.
12 years ago. By now he is promoted to head of the Inward Bills Department. His salary has been revised several times (and always timely). He is now receiving $2,350
p.m.
with double pay at the year. He is allowed to operate private business of his own through the facilities and business connections he established through his service with the bank. He now owns a flat which cost him $60,000 to buy and can afford to send 2 of his elder children abroad for education.
12.
A woman, graduated from a Chinese university, works as an accountant in a jewellery shop. She is entrusted to the safe custody of all the jewels after the closing time of every day. She is paid $1,240 p.m. plus an annual bonus of 8% of the profits of the shop. The bonus she received last year (1964) amounted to $24,000. She holds $10,000 worth of shares out of a total initial capital of $250,000.
f.
Professionalizatio n
DOCUMENT Vl. f 1: Hong Kong managers (source: The Hong Kong Manager, vol.1 no. 1, January/February 1965 )
Today is not yesterday; we ourselves change; how can our work and thoughts, if they are always to be the fittest, continue the same?' asked Carlyle. This is a question which our managers must constantly ask themselves.
Tremendous strides are being made in science and technology, and the pace of change is faster and more rapid now than at any time in the history of mankind. Our managers must keep up with these changes and developments and adapt them to fit the conditions of Hong Kong. As the Hon. Sir Sik-nin Chau puts it in his article in this isssue, the managers of Hong Kong must cast off the shackles of traditional thinking, and if Hong Kong is to maintain its hard earned position as an industrial centre they must be inspired with dynamic and creative thinking.
The Hong Kong Management Association has been formed to promote scientifi c management and to assist managers to keep pace with developments and progress in this field. 'Newsletter' first published two years ago was one of the tools to further thi s objective.
But as J.R. Lowell once wrote, 'new time demands new measures' and so we feel it is appropriate to start off the New Year with a new publication�X 'The Hong Kong Manager' t o replac e 'Newsletter' , whic h ha s serve d ou r membershi p capabl y an d enjoyably during the past two years.
'The Hong Kong Manager' will be issued bi-monthly i n the first instance. It is designed to serve the needs, to reflect the views and to stimulate the thinking of the large and growing force of managers in Hong Kong, whether their activities are within the industrial, commercial or governmental sphere. It is the hope of those who have been concerned in the planning of this journal that, from the modest beginning we see today and with the support and contributions of our members, its voice will find real meaning and influence i n management circles and will thus contribute towards th e economic well-being of the community.
It is our intention that 'The Hong Kong Manager' fulfils its role as a medium of information an d education, and a s the reporter and watchdog of our progress. The publication wil l contai n article s b y leadin g loca l manager s an d managemen t educationists an d abstract s and condensation s o f articles of interst from oversea s management publications. One section of'Newsletter' which was of particular interest to readers�X Aids to Management Efficiency�X will continue in 'The Hong Kong Manager', as well as the sections on news items and information on courses. To enable readers to air their views on management needs and trends the publication will include a 'Readers' Forum', and readers are invited to send in their comments for publication.
We take this opportunity with our first issue to extend to all our members an d readers the traditional Chinese salutation for prosperity and good fortune in the New Year, by wishing them 'Kung Hei Fat Choy'.
DOCUMENT VI.f2 : Th e Accountants ' Golde n Jubilie e (source :The Chinese Accountant, Golden Jubilee 1913-1963, Th e Society of Chinese Accountants an d Auditors, Hong Kong, n.d.)
Although the celebration of the Golden Jubilee of the Society is now over, the jubilant atmospher e tha t prevaile d a t th e dinne r part y given o n tha t occasio n o n November 1 , 1963 at Wing On Life Building, top floor, had indelibly impressed upon the mind s of those who did honour t o the Institution, particularly th e member s themselves.
There were over one hundred guests and members in attendance. Prior to dinner, the Chairman, Mr Charles Mar Fan, extended the Society's welcome to all participants and thanked them for their presence. He gratefully acknowledge d the greetings and congratulations received fro m friend s overseas , and gav e a brief resum e o f th e circumstances leading to the birth of the Society. In his discourse into the matter, he said, in part, as follows:
Prior to the First World War, as a result of the steady increase in number of Chinese owned limited companies, most of which kept their accounts in Chinese, the Hon g Kong Government was contemplating a revision of the existing Companies Ordinance, 1911, with a view to stipulating that their books be kept in the English language . Because of the many latent difficulties to be involved, a representation headed by the late Honourable Chau Shiu Kee (father o f our Honorary Permanent President, Si r
T.N. Chau ) wa s made t o th e Authoritie s t o reconsider thei r proposal . After du e consideration, the proposed law was altered, whereby, inter alia, a daily summarised cash book in English was required (Section 121 of the Companies Ordinance refers). This led to the birth of Chinese auditors, the qualification o f whom must be a pass through examination. The first Board of Examiners appointed by the Governmen t composed o f Messrs. Lau Chu Pa k (grandfathe r o f Mr Lau Chun Kwok , Managin g Director of the Hong Kong 6k Yaumati Ferry Co., Ltd.), Ho Fook (brother of the late Sir Robert Ho Tung), the late Honourable Chau Shiu Kee, and Mr. Yuen Ying San, with the Secretary for Chinese Affairs to act as ex officio member and chairman.
The ver y first examinatio n o f auditors was held i n 1913 , in which about 1 7 candidates wer e successful . On e o f them , name d Fun g Loc k Yuen , immediatel y convened a meeting of the qualified auditors and, as a result, an association known as 'Hong Kong Chinese Auditors Research Society' was formed. Mr J.M. Wong was elected the first chairman, while Mr Fung Lock Yuen, the first honorary secretary. This was in 1913.
Before introducin g th e Guest Speake r for th e evening , Mr Mar Fan paid hig h tribute t o Mr J.M. Wong, J.P., the founder-chairma n o f the Society 50 years ago, complimented him for his long life to witness the Golden Jubilee, and asked him t o rise and receive the applause of the admiring gathering.
The Chairman also extolled the good work done to the Society by his predecessors, Messrs. J.M. Wong, W.S. Wong, W.S. Tam and CO Tso , and their colleagues, and looked forward to their continued guidance and co-operation in the years to come. He expressed gratitude to all who have helped to make the celebration a success.
Continuing, he pointed out that it was very fortunate for the Society to have the consent o f Mr W.K . Thomson, Registra r General an d currently Chairman o f th e Authorised Auditors Board, to address the gathering on this memorable occasion, and said that 'Mr Thomson has been very helpful to our profession as a whole, and to our Society, in particular.' In his few words to introduce the Guest Speaker, he incorporated the message: 'we also wish to take this opportunity to convey our gratefulness to him for his support and assistance.'
Rising amidst thunderous applause, Mr Thomson began his address commending lavishly th e constan t an d creditabl e effort s o f the Societ y t o raise the standar d o f accountancy and auditing and its contributions to the business community. The ful l text of his address is as follows:
One of the advantages of being Chairman of the Authorised Auditors Board is that from time to time I am invited to attend your functions; one of the disadvantages of being Chairman, that I am invited to speak at them. Now this is a very important function, a landmark in the Society's history, for its purpose is to celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the Society, and when I look around I see many people better qualified t o address you than I , for instanc e Mr Duffy, ou r able new Commissioner o f Inland Revenue, who I am sure knows most of you much better than I. But he's a young man yet, and perhaps you are saving him for your Centenary dinner, since you don't think I'll last that long. But just as we are happy to see here tonight Mr J.M. Wong, wh o witnessed the foundation of the Society fifty years ago, so I am sure that many of your younger members will be around fifty years hence to hear what Mr Duffy has to say.
As Mr Mar Fan has outlined the early history of your Society there is no need for me to go into that.I do, however, wish to pay tribute to your seventeen or eighteen founder members who in 1913 had the forethought and the initiative to get together and lay the foundations of the thriving Society whose fiftieth birthday we are celebrating tonight.I think it is quite remarkable that the Society was founded immediately after the first examination for Chinese auditors in 1913. Unfortunately, th e Society's pre-war records were lost during the occupation, but it is clear that in the pre-war years the Society steadil y gre w i n strengt h an d stature , havin g o n th e outbrea k o f wa r a membership of over 40. The Society was re-established shortly after the war, and since then, thanks to the enthusiasm and leadership of successive Chairmen, Vice Chairmen and Committee members, it can justly lay claim to a record of astonishing activity and progress for so small a body. Not that it is so small nowadays, for its membership has grown to 80. Progress has I think been most notable i n the last decade: you have established you r regular monthly meetings and discussion groups, and have latterl y succeeded in producing your Handbook 'The Chinese Accountant' every two years, a really notable achievement .
Notwithstanding the marked increase in the number of companies and firms who keep their accounts in English�X and with these too you have, of course, a great deal to do�X it is still true to say that the vast majority of small businesses continue to keep their accounts in Chinese, and it is in relation to these that you have a special and most responsible role. You are a Society of Chinese Accountants and Auditors, and by the nature o f things are in a position to give the most valuable assistance to your Chinese clients , and a t th e sam e time by converting th e mysterie s o f Chines e accountants into forms that are familiar to Western eyes, and that are certified by you as professiona l men , yo u greatl y simplif y th e tas k o f your natura l enemy , th e Commissioner of Inland Revenue. You are therefore making a very real contribution to the community, and your Society by its constant efforts t o raise the standards of accountancy an d auditin g amon g you r member s i s indee d worth y o f ever y commendation and encouragement .
But apart from your professional activities there is another side to your Society, the social side, and I must say it is evidence of a very nice spirit among you, competitors though you are, that you meet so often in such a friendly fashion, not merely to discuss matters of common interest, but also for the pleasure of a friendly chat and of each other's company. Your Society is, if I may say so, an extremely happy blend of youth and experience, and it is my earnest hope that in the next fifty years it will continue to exhibit that same friendly spirit and active, go-ahead management that have brought it so successfully to this Golden Jubilee. (Applause)
After Mr M.W. Kwan, Vice Chairman of the Society, has given a vote of thanks to Mr Thomson, Sir Tsun-Nin Chau toasted to the continued prosperity of the Society, while Mr J.M. Wong suitably reciprocated the best wishes to the guests on behalf of the Society.
CHAPTER SEVE N
CRISIS AND CONSOLIDATION , 1966- 1981
The signs were probably there even in the 1950s, that the simple formula of a colonia l governmen t assiste d b y appointe d member s an d supporte d b y loosely organize d traditiona l communa l organization s woul d no t hold . Housing estates being built by the Hong Kong government were to house hundreds of thousands of people who not only had no representation in the government, bu t als o n o effectiv e communa l organizatio n amon g themselves. The trade unions of the 1950s, tied to the remnants of political hostility that had developed from before 1949, did not address Hong Kong's labour issues . While the working population was made up essentially of first-generation migrants �X refugees �X whose aspirations did not go beyond survival, and while the political situation remained in balance so that the Hong Kong government was under no threat to strengthen its social support, Hong Kong society continued through the 1950s and the early 1960s very much as it was in the 1930s. The first signs that the present constitutional arrangements were unacceptable came with the riots of 1966, that broke out over the unlikely cause of a 5 cent rise on the cross-harbour fare of the Star Ferry . The commissio n o f enquir y tha t wa s established t o investigat e into the cause of the riots returned with a report that described the participants in the riot as young, under-privileged, low-paid workers who were ignorant but not criminally bent. From that point on, the 'youth problem7 came to be recognized as an issue that Hong Kong must deal with. The 'youth problem ' was, of course, much more than a problem of young people looking for outlets for their energy: it was no less than a recognition of the gap between the have s an d th e have-nots , th e middle-age d first-generatio n immigran t and the generation that had grown up in Hong Kong within the 1950s, the government and what it might think of as its people.
The Hong Kong government would probably have been less pushed to
re-think it s relationship with Hon g Kon g society ha d i t not been fo r th e need to organize support for itself when its authority was challenged by the riots of 1967. Unlike the 196 6 riots, the 1967 riots were inspire d b y the Cultural Revolution that was taking place in the People's Republic of China, and were organized b y pro-PRC organizations i n Hong Kong. The rioting was supported b y stoppages of work and high tension on the Hong Kong-China border. They were also supported by political terrorism: home-made bombs were laid in public places and a radio announcer was murdered for his pro-Hong Kong government broadcasts. Some of the feelings expressed in these incidents were no doubt genuine, especially hostility towards the police, dissatisfaction with a competitive educational environmen t that favoured teaching in English, and frustration at working and living conditions. The terrorism, however, found littl e rapport in the Hong Kong population.
a. Riot s
A noticeable section o f the report of the Commission o f Inquiry into the 1966 rio t dealt with a n allegatio n mad e b y Urba n Councillo r Mr s Elsi e Elliot that part of the riotin g migh t hav e bee n police-instigate d wit h th e view of framing her. Mrs Elliot refused to disclose her source of information for the allegation an d the Commission found he r of contempt. When th e Commission wen t on to argue that the riot s i n 1966 ha d bee n relativel y spontaneous, that participants in the riots had included principally disaffected young people rather than criminal elements, it avoided the issue that Mrs Elliot's allegation focused on. In the early 1960s, the poorer sectors of Hong Kong's population were probably quite disgruntled with portions of the Hong Kong government that they were in touch with, in particular the Police. The traditional communa l organization s that the Hong Kong government ha d relied upon to reflect public opinion had by the 1960s become inadequate. In other words, government itself was out of touch with a substantial section of the Hong Kong population.
DOCUMENT Vll.al: Kowloon riot, 1966 (source: Kowbon Disturbances, 1966, Report of Commission of Inquiry, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1967, pp. 103-107)
The background and motives of participants
There was a practical limit on the numbers of witnesses we could call. These demonstrators and rioters who gave evidence were selected by our counsel as the most significant, mainly from the prisoners at Chi Ma Wan Prison, which housed those who were older or had received heavier sentences.
Data on all persons arrested
We had, however, three other sources of information throwing some light on the type and kind of individuals involved in the disturbances and, in some cases, on th e reasons they gave for involvement. It will be seen [from an appendix] that 905 were arrested and charged, whilst 560 were arrested but released without charge; presumably because they had been caught up inadvertently i n the curfew etc. Amongst thos e charged, the predominant age group is that of 16 to 20 years but amongst those released the ag e groups ar e mor e evenl y balanced . Th e proportio n o f those wit h previou s convictions is higher as the age groups get older which gives the impression that these groups were rougher an d toughe r tha n th e youngsters. But this impressio n ma y b e misleading because, given the same propensities, the older age group is inevitably liable to have more previous convictions. Those involved in offences more serious than just curfew breaking tended, as one might expect, to have a higher proportion of previous convictions but, in this category, there appears to have been no clear tendency towards a higher proportion of convictions for the older offenders, largely because the figures for the 21 to 25 year group seem to be so much out of line with those of the categories on either side of them.
The most significant feature of this appendix is the comparatively high proportion of those in the 1 6 to 20 years category who were involved in offences mor e serious than curfew breaking. This would seem to point to this age group as the main source of the violence.
Analysis of Chi Ma Wan prisoners
A more ambitious document was the analysis of the 313 prisoners held in Chi Ma Wan for offences arising out of the disturbances; more ambitious because, in addition to the facts about age etc., some details of their background were included and the y were asked to state their reasons for becoming involved in these offences. Of the curfew breakers, 102 (40%) claimed they did not know that a curfew had been imposed whilst 81 (31.8%) said they did not realise the seriousness of the curfew or had insufficien t time to go home. 68 (26.7%) said they committed the offence in the excitement of the moment, which was also the reason given by the majority for the commission of other offences. 194 offenders had received only a primary education, 102 had been to junior or senior middle schools, five had attended a post secondary college and 12 had never been to school at all. 146 (46.6%) had been in Hong Kong for less than ten years and only 11 % were married. Only six were unemployed and 15 were students. The average number of hours worked per day was nine and the income earned ranged from nil to $2,000 per month. 170 (54.3%) were receiving under $300 a month whilst 106 (33.9%) were receiving between $400 and $600 a month.
Survey of detainees at Begonia Road
At our request, a group of social workers made a survey of those younger prisoners who were held at Begonia Road Boys Home for offences arising out of the disturbances.
As only 24 boys were interviewed, thes e workers stressed that they could not b e considered as sufficiently representativ e of the hundreds of youths who actually took part in the riots. A further reason for not regarding them as representative is mentioned in the next paragraph. The workers also expressed some reservations as to the scientific validity of their survey, because of limitations of time and doubts as to whether thei r questionnaire was properly balanced and sufficient full y t o support their somewhat ambitious aim of building up a reasonably accurate picture o f the background and certain relevant attitudes of these youngsters.
Whilst accepting these reservations, we think the answers received are of sufficient interest to merit quoting some of them. They are given for their qualitative rathe r than quantitative value, all the more so as we were in no position to assess the rea l veracity of these answers or the extent to which they may have been coloured by the fact that the boys at the time of the interviews were actually paying the penalty fo r their recent clash with authority. Moreover the 24 came from those who had received comparatively heavie r punishments , thos e wit h shor t sentence s ha d alread y bee n released at the time of the survey and many of those convicted were never imprisoned at all.
Social background. The boys ranged from 1 3 to 17 years of age. The majority (18 ) had been born in Hong Kong. Most had left school at the time of the riots and th e majority (14 ) had been away from school from two to three years. Ten gave 'lack of interest' as their reasons for leaving school and six 'financial difficulty'. Fiftee n ha d both parents in the family. One had no parents in Hong Kong. Four had father onl y and four had mothers only. Three of the boys did not know their parents' income. The others gave figures between $101 and $1,000 per month; four between $101 and $200, five between $201 and $300, the remainder being above $400 a month. Twenty-one of the boys were working at the time of the riots in the following capacities:
Kitchen hand 7 Apprentice 5 Delivery boy 4 Bar boy 1 Hawker 2 Unskilled labourer 1 No information 1
Ten claimed they had chosen their jobs themselves. More than half claimed that they worked very long hours. Including the apprentices, their monthly salary ranged fro m
-$50 2 $51-$100 3 $1014150 6 $151-$200 7 $201-$250 3
Seven of the boys did not have to give any of their earnings to their parents and four had to give all. Six of them felt that their working conditions were good, seven fel t that theirs were passable, and another seven, poor. Twelve slept at their place of work, in bunks, camp beds etc. One slept on a board over a sewing machine.
Regarding prospects, half of them did not feel that they had very much future i n their present job, while six felt a bit more hopeful. Seven of them aspired to be motor or electrical mechanics, four to catering and restaurant work. Others would like to be seamen (two), clerk (one), radio-worker (one), carpenter (one), construction worker (one) and hotel boy (one). One hoped to have his own garage and be his own boss. Five had no plans.
The majority, 20 out of 24, claimed to be in good health. Eighteen felt recreation was essential an d importan t whils t thre e felt i t was unnecessary an d thre e ha d n o opinion. Going to the cinema, loafing in the streets, swimming, ball-games and gambling were the major activities apart from work.
Attitudes to Government and public utilities. Four of them were unable to make any comments about the Government. Six were indifferent. Two felt the Government was good. Six felt it was satisfactory. Six felt it was bad. Eighteen of the boys felt there was no equal treatment for people in Hong Kong and sixteen of them that there was no justice in the Courts. Others had no opinion on these topics. Sixteen of them considered the police force bad. One said it was very bad. Five were indifferent an d two were unable to make any comments.
Twenty-one of the boys had no knowledge of who owned the public utilities such as the Star Ferry Co., etc. Only two knew the correct answers. One was indifferent. I n spite of their lack of knowledge, eleven of them positively stated that it was unfair to raise fares; twelve of them were indifferent an d only one said that it was fair to raise fares and then salaries, in general, should be raised. To illustrate their lack of knowledge about public affairs, two boys said that the Star Ferry belonged to Mrs. Elliot.*
Reasons for participation. Twelve claimed they were not actually involved in th e riots but happened to be passing by in the streets where the riots occurred. Of these, one said he was wandering along the street after a movie and was probing with a stick inside an already broken parking meter when he was arrested and charged with breaking it. Of the remaining twelve, four admitted yelling, four admitted throwing things, one said that he and his fellow apprentices thought it was a good chance to take revenge on the police and to let off steam, so he attacked a police van. Two said they joined the crowds for the fun of it and to get first hand experience of being in a riot. Eight of the boys said they joined i n out of curiosity and eight said they joined i n for fun. Tw o stated that the reason for their doing so was to reject the fare increase. One said his motive was 'anti-bad-government'. The rest could give no reason.
Eight of the boys felt the others were all fighting for a cause. Three felt the others were doing it for fun and three felt there was something wrong with these people. Two
Mrs. Elsie Elliot, Urban Councillor.
felt these people were 'heroes'. One felt they were 'mad'. The rest had no idea on this matter. Seven out of the twenty-four said that they had no idea why they were arrested. Twelve said the reason for their being arrested was 'breach of curfew order'. Four felt it was because of their throwing things and one said he was accused of having damaged public property.
Seventeen out of the total of twenty-four felt that the main cause of the riots was the raising of fares. One said it was because of feelings against the 'bad-government' . One said it was because of hostility of the public towards the police. One said that the riot was stimulated by excitement over the police's brutality towards a five-year old child in Tsim Sha Tsui district. Four were unable to express any opinion.
Twelve of the boys thought So Sau Chung, Lo Kei, etc/ were 'good people', 'brave men', 'a hero,' and fighting for a good cause. Four were indifferent or could not express any opinion. Eight had never heard of them.
Summary by socia l worker s
The interviewers expressed their general conclusions on these boys as follows:
It seems obvious that the boys interviewed were for the most part employed, had reasonably stable personalities and came from ordinary hard-working families. The y were not social misfits anxious for political or other reasons to cause unrest and trouble in Hong Kong.
The interviewers felt that the type of employment many of the boys were in held little for them by way of future securit y or advancement an d this, coupled with th e long unorthodox hours they worked, as well as the low pay they received, contributed to the feeling of aimlessness and boredom which was part of the motivation behin d their involvement i n the riots . Because of the demands of their employment the y lacked opportunity for normal teenage fun, so used the riots as one outlet for this need.
Conclusions
It seems tolerably clear from all this that, whilst the more prominent of the leaders in the early stages could be described as misfits or cranks like Lo Kei or So Sau Chung, the main body of these who joined in the demonstrations and subsequently in the riots were more or less ordinary youngsters and people no more disposed of crime than any average group of the less privileged in the streets of Hong Kong.
It would be foolish for Hong Kong society to comfort itself with the thought tha t it was only the severel y under-privileged an d discontente d wh o participated in , o r passively supported, the disturbances. The great majority of the participants came from the poore r section s o f the communit y bu t the y wer e not destitut e no r wer e the y identified with what are frequently called the criminal classes.
Messrs. So and Lo were prominent participants in the Star Ferry incident in 1966.
Inspired by the Cultural Revolution in China, the riots of 1967 made use of propaganda and slogan campaigns that were by then commonplace all over China.I n May and June , daily demonstrations , some o f which wer e transformed readily into clashes with the police, the propaganda campaign, attempts to incite work strikes, bombs in the street, the obvious connection of some China-related organizations to these activities and the uncertainty of the Chinese government's stand on them added to considerable tension that was felt throughout Hon g Kon g society. Most of the tension passe d rather quickly when i t became clear that the government of the People' s Republic had no t been i n support of drastic actions that might topple the Hong Kong government. The propaganda campaign, however, continue d for some years before i t slowly faded out .
DOCUMENT VILa2: Propaganda during the Kowloon not, 1967 (source: HongKong Disturbances, 1967, Hong Kong: The Government Printer, n.d., pp. 48-52)
In May the communists had under their control all the machinery required for a full-scale propagand a campaign . But whereas from th e start of confrontation th e communist newspapers at once slavishly followed the party line, the remainder, which included a number of vigorous and by no means sycophantic publications, preserved their independence. They have continued to criticize the Government when they thought criticism was justified but none of them at any time expressed any agreement with the objects and method of the communist confrontation in spite of the volume of propaganda they produced.
In May the communists had under their control all the machinery required for a full-scale propaganda campaign. Their three newspapers, the Ta Kung Pao, the Wen Wai Pao and the New Evening Post, were well established and had a good circulation; and they were backed up by about six other papers which not only followed their lead but at times ran to excesses of wild invention of their own. They had ample printing facilities for other propaganda material and the men and the equipment for newsreel production.
They also enjoyed considerable encouragement and assistance from the local office of the New China News Agency (Hsinhua) which is owned and directed by the Peking Government. This agency was largely responsible for directing the propaganda campaign in the Colony as could be seen from the identical reports of incidents that regularly appeared in communist newspapers, all attributed to the agency's reporters. It was also responsible for producing distorted accounts of the events in Hong Kong for th e consumption of the authorities in Peking. Its highly-coloured and wildly exaggerated reports undoubtedly played a large part in inflaming opinion in China against the Government of the Colony.
In their campaign the communists employed every theme and every weapon, from deliberate distortion of facts and falsification of photographs to the spreading of rumour and the fabrication o f non-existent incidents . Rumours put about by them ranged
from the possible but untrue�X rice shortages, power or water stoppages�X to the wildly improbable�X as for example the stories which appeared in minor communist newspapers, complete with photographs and maps, of Chinese gunboats approachin g the Colony. Communist reporters and photographers were present at every incident to produce thei r version of events; and i n many cases demonstrations wer e organize d solely fo r publicit y purposes . Durin g th e phas e o f stree t demonstration s i n Ma y communist newspapers produced special editions which were distributed free to th e crowds and which were designed to incite them to further violence. The same presses produced leaflets and booklets giving lurid accounts of Police 'brutality'.. .
In the campaign of rumour-mongering, considerable use was made of loudspeakers mounted on communist owned buildings from which were broadcast threats and abuse against the authorities and encouragement to their supporters. The loudest and bes t known of these was at the Bank of China, the focal point for the disorders at the end of May. To meet this attack the Government set up its own loudspeakers on adjacen t buildings whos e combine d outpu t mad e th e communis t tirad e unintelligible . Th e Government programm e chose n consiste d o f selections from Cantones e oper a an d the resulting din made the area of Statue Square almost uninhabitable for the thre e days that the contest lasted. In the end the communists gave in and their loudspeakers were not used again. Broadcasts continued intermittently from other buildings, while communist rive r boats arriving i n the Colony with goods from China , adde d thei r contribution while they were in port. These broadcasts tended to attract crowds and led on several occasions to clashes with the Police. There was a further addition to the communist propaganda armoury on 24th June when the Macau broadcasting station, Radio Villa Verde, passed completely into communist control and was used to direct more propaganda at Hong Kong.
The third medium of propaganda was posters. These appeared from th e start of confrontation an d continued sporadically throughout, reaching their height at th e end of May and the beginning of June. Posters and slogans appeared everywhere, both ashore and afloat. They were pasted or written on every available wall, on ships in the harbour, and on the trains arriving at Lo Wu from China. Slogans were painted on the pavements and on the sides of cattle, while on one occasion a couple of unfortunate dogs were hung about with communist placards. These demonstrations had none of the subtlety of the newspaper campaign, the message mostly consisting of simple, and crude slogans. But the cumulative effect of such objurgations as 'Blood for blood', and 'Death to the Running Dogs' was considerable. They were reinforced on occasions by straw effigies hung on traffi c light s or other convenient place s and purporting t o represent the Governor and other leading members of the community. To discourage removal, these effigies were often decorated with bombs, real and simulated.. .
Communist propagand a reache d it s peak i n Ma y an d June. One o f it s mai n objectives ha d bee n to enlist the activ e support o f the Peking Government i n th e struggle in Hong Kong and the exaggerated reports of the strength of the support for confrontation as well as of the 'brutal persecution' by the authorities were designed to that end. Any statement or protest from the Peking Government or any article in the
People's Daily that seemed, or could be made to seem, to support this possibility was given prominent treatment, with banner headlines and extra editions. By the end of July, the tone of the communist press was changing. Its shrill abuse of the Government continued and its exhortations to violence^ were, if anything, more extreme. But it began to speak increasingly of a long hard struggle ahead and pronouncements from Peking were given only routine treatment. While the protest after the events of 8th July at Sha Tau Kok was followed, a t the prompting o f the communist press , by widespread violence in the Colony, the ultimatum issued by Peking on 20th August and the subsequent attack on the office of the Charge d'Affaires passed almost unnoticed in Hong Kong. After the suspension of the three newspapers, a mosquito newsheet campaign began. The newsheets were poorly produced but highly inflammatory and subversive. At first the y were distributed widely but the campaign quickly lost its momentum and had died out completely by the end of the year, without achieving anything significant.
h. Languag e
After the riots of 1966 and 1967 , the Hong Kong government, and Hon g Kong society, becam e mor e consciou s o f the anomal y o f Hon g Kong' s colonial status . The word 'colony ' disappeared fro m th e Hong Kong
1 government' s description of Hong Kong from the 1970s. But, Hong Kong, of course, was a colony, and nowhere was that point more clearly made in Hong Kong daily life than in the use of English in all official documents .
It should perhaps not be surprising that language should surface as the issue that universit y student s focused o n fo r action . I t was a n affron t t o Hong Kong's Chineseness. Moreover, as English had since the 1950s become the principal language of teaching in Hong Kong's secondary schools, as a result, what for the majority o f Hong Kong students would b e a second-language skill determined t o a large extent educational success. I n the aftermath o f 1967, even if changes were not forthcoming, the Hong Kong government showe d tha t i t was willing to listen . Hence , whether or no t Chinese was made an official languag e did not lead to Hong Kong's law being published i n Chinese, or even mor e Chinese being use d i n th e classroom, but there was at least a commission, headed by well-respected community leader Sir Kenneth Ping-fan Fung .
In Document VII. bl below , Hong Kong University psychologist Eric Kvan discusses the difficulties faced by many Hong Kong secondary school students whose native language was Chinese but who had to confront English as a medium of school instruction . In Document VII. b2, the commission appoinited b y the Governor o f Hong Kon g to examine the issu e o f recognizing Chinese as an official language reported on the practicalities of this proposal.
DOCUMENT VILbl : The cost of bilingual education (source: E. Kvan, 'Problem s of bilingual milieu in Hong Kong: strains of the two-language system', in I.C. Jarive, ed. Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, Contributions to the Study of Hong Kong Society, London: Routledge 6k Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 333-337)
Following a suggestion by Saer, I have tried to establish a situation where it would be directly possible to compare the strength, as it were, of the two languages in th e individual* The task is verbally to produce the first association coming to mind upon seeing a visually presented word in Chinese or English. The reaction time is registered electrically and the response itself is noted. The words are 50 words in both languages
�X the one set being the equivalent of the other; all the words should be present in the vocabulary of a 3-year-old. The presentation is randomized both with regard to language used and to particular words. From the investigation s made so far it appears that i t should be possible to place all the bilingual readers of the two languages on a continuum between monolingual Chinese and monolingual English individuals. But not only the relative reaction times are of interest, also the number of translations among the answers, of replies using the same or the other language and of course the nature of the answers when they are true associations, are very revealing.
In yet anothe r attempt t o penetrate furthe r int o the results of the bilingua l education I obtained two sets of essays, on the same subject but in the two languages, from a group of students who had just completed their annual examination in their respective groups. Of the 10 0 participants some had come up through the Anglo-Chinese System, others through the Chinese, i.e. using English and Chinese a s the medium of instruction, respectively .I asked several competent judges to assess the (anonymous) essay s with regard to maturity and as far as possible disregarding th e linguistic expression of detail. It seems clear that the students who had used Chinese as a medium of instruction but had studied English as a subject, were showing greater originality of thought and greater maturity in general than those who had used English as a medium and had Chinese as a subject only. This was very obvious in the English essays, in spite of the limitations on the English of the second group, and my Chinese judges said it was even more obvious in the Chinese essays. This result correspond s closely with the impressions of experienced educators that the pupils in the Chinese-medium classes are more responsive, more interested in their surroundings both in and outside of the school.
A possible explanation of this difference seem s to be the change of language i n Form I of the secondary school when the pupils are about 12-13 years old. If we assume that the possibility of 'being able to convey' is one of the most characteristic huma n traits�X to establish a relationship with the persons around us rather than to convey 'information'�X then it does seem more than likely that this sudden reduction of the
* H. Saer, Experimental Inquiry into the Education of Bilingual People. Ne w Educationa l Fellowship, Education in a changing Commonwealth, London 1931.
possibilities for expression would cause a neurosis fully as severe as the one we find in children backward in reading and writing for reasons which can be counteracted b y special training.I think the picture will be complete if I just add that one is not likely anywhere in the world to find 'better pupils' than those in the Anglo-Chinese schools
�X better with regard to discipline, obedience, and ability to work steadily throug h well-prepared material .
To the difficulties create d by the change of language in the school must be added the peculiar difficulties springing from the many languages which are involved: for the Matriculation examination these pupils work mainly with texts in the classical language written in the classical period which is as different from the modern spoken language as Latin is from French or Italian, or Chaucer is from modern English. It would therefore appear that their language used for the description of the phenomena of everyday life, including scientific phenomena, does not develop on a par with their interests and general academi c progress . Here w e must remembe r tha t th e character s i n an d b y themselves giv e onl y ver y vagu e instructio n wit h regar d t o ho w the y shoul d b e pronounced an d only little information wit h regard to their special meaning in this particular context. Unless a character has been learned in a formal learning situation it requires great expenditure of energy for the individual to acquire this character�X leading to a high degree o f compartmentahsation between the common an d th e specialised vocabularies, with a rather small number of characters being allotted to the first group.
This means in practice that the spoken language of these pupils stagnates at the level of the 12-13-years-old, the age at which they last used it as their only real medium of instruction and expression. What this means for the possibilities of expression and controlling the emotional forces released at about the same time as the language change will require much further study .
Furthermore, at this stage a new conflict develops�X the conflict between the Chinese traditiona l approac h t o scholasti c wor k an d th e les s traditional wester n approach. The immediat e conflict i s undoubtedly made much less acute by the fac t that most of the teachers are themselves trained in the Chinese traditional way and tend to transfer this method from the Chinese literary studies to the whole curriculum.
The ultimate conflict, however, is increased rather than decreased by this approach. So far as our students go it can with advantage be summarised in the following anecdote: a couple of years ago all Faculties and Departments were at one in their report on the Matriculation examination: 'The candidates rely by far too much on learning by heart instead of working in an independent and original way with the questions'�X all except the Departmen t o f Chinese whic h wrote : 'it i s clear tha t th e candidate s hav e no t memorised a sufficient amount of material'
But before we attempt to draw conclusions with regard to the difficulties involve d in the two systems of education, th e Vernacular an d the Anglo-Chinese, i t will be necessary to consider the instruction provided in the primary school�X and even before. Here an inspection of two samples of Chinese handwriting would be useful to illustrate my point. Before the division takes place at age 12-13 the two groups have been in the primary school for 6 years and very many in the kindergarten before that. At all stages, when the child leaves the kindergarten (at 5-6 years of age), the primary school, th e secondary (Middle ) school , eve n th e University, th e Chines e languag e use s th e expression: bi yeh (graduated)�X and at all stages the child will receive diplomas and certificates. This is characteristic. The formal instruction begins as soon as the child enters kindergarten, most frequently at about the age of 3, counting age in the western fashion. The kindergarten lasts for two years and even if there are many activitie s (which is far from the case in the majority of kindergartens) the most important activity is the instruction i n reading and writing. When th e children sit for 'the entranc e examination'(sic) to the primary school, most of them can read, write and take dictation in about 100 to 160 characters. Some are very complex, 20 or more individual strokes are necessary to construct them, to write them. Compare them with the school maturity tests common in the west, e.g. the test published by Charlotte Buehler. The test demands that the 5-year-old shal l be able tocopy a circle�X 'the test has been successfully completed if the two ends of the circle meet!'�X or note in the same test the table and chair (in profile) which the child should be able to copy to the extent of making them basically recognisable. Compare such a test with the details of the Chinese characters which the child in the Hong Kong kindergartenmust lear n by heart and be able to reproduce �X not just copy or recognise�X at the same age of 5. This result is obtained only by daily practice during the years from 3 to 5, both in school and at home. They practise at least a half-hour daily in the kindergarten�X and in Primary I at least one hour must be spent at home practising handwriting. Further it must be remembered that the pencil (or soon the brush) must be very carefully controlled in a way much more elaborate than the way it must be controlled in the writing of English letters. Learning to write has always been regarded as much more than just learning to form the characters. It is at the same time an instruction in the ability to control one' s temper, and to develop personal harmony.
Looking around for ways and means first to express and then assess the results of this very strictly formal instruction�X a system which is so much older than anything found outside China�X I noticed that among the more than 2,000 schoolchildren and the several hundred University students whom I tested with the reading tests hardly any were left-handed, writing or playing. This contrasts very markedly with the position in England. Assuming that the generally accepted views on the subject are meaningful, it seems likely that many children must have been forced to change from left to right hand and the absence of stammer and similar symptoms of particular stress would then be an expression of the general uniformity of this society and of the force wherewit h the individual personality is formed and socialised.
DOCUMENT VII.b2: Chinese as an official language (source: The Eirst Report of the Chinese Language Committee, Hon g Kong: Government Printer, 1971, pp. 1-6)
From time to time over the years, there has been comment on the wider use of Chinese in public administration. In 1969, and more particularly in the summer of 1970, there was a determined 'campaign' for the adoption of Chines e as' *&%JfejC (Fat Ting U Man) which has been interpreted as 'official language' in English in some quarters. There ha s bee n suppor t fo r thi s movemen t fro m variou s individuals , organisations and student groups. There were indications that many people felt there was considerable justification for a wider use by Government o f Chinese for the convenience of the public.
We decided to examine to what extent Chinese can have equal status with English under the following 3 broad aspects:
(a)In oral and written communications between Government and the public.
(b)
At meetings of the Legislative Council, Urban Council and Government Boards and Committees.
(c)
In Court proceedings and as a language of the law. In order to seek the view s of the community, w e sent out 1,58 0 letter s t o organisations which fall in the various categories.
We have also had discussions with individuals and organisations both in relation to the general matters we are examining and in relation to simultaneous interpretation facilities specifically .
From the representations received, we have come to the conclusion that Chinese as' ^^M-xJ (Fa t Ting U Man) is intended by many to mean 'officially prescribed ' or 'officially recognised ' language having equal status with English. In general there would be satisfaction if Chinese is given, as far as practicable, equal status with English. We are generally in sympathy with public opinion in this regard.
Our first recommendations deal with the use of Chinese in Legislative Council, Urban Council and Government Boards and Committees. These will be followed by recommendations on the use of Chinese in oral and written communications between Government an d the public and the use of Chinese in Court proceedings and as a language of the Law in that order, the latter being by far the most complex of the three.
Legislative Council and Urban Council
Standing Order No.2 of the Legislative Council stipulates that the proceedings and debates of the Council shall be in the English language. The views of the Unofficials , as conveyed t o us by the Senio r Unofficial Membe r ar e in favour o f introducin g simultaneous interpretation (English to Cantonese and vice versa) in the open meetings so that non-English speaking members of the public can comprehend the proceedings of these meetings; at the same time, they consider all Council papers which are to be published for public information should be translated into Chinese. As regards closed meetings and papers for such meetings, the opinion was expressed to us that it would be desirable to provide interpretation and translation facilities so as to enable non -English speaking members of the community to be appointed to the Council in future.
Section 45 of the Urban Council Ordinance stipulates that the proceedings of the Council shall be conducted in English and this is repeated in Urban Council Standing Order No. 1; in addition, Section 7 of the same Ordinance requires a Councillor to possess an adequate knowledge of the English language.
In the Urban Council Meeting held on 6th October, 1970, a resolution was moved that Government be urged to consider the necessary amendments to Section 45 of the Urban Council Ordinance so that Council proceedings could be conducted in bot h English and Chinese. This motion was carried but the official members abstained from voting because they felt that the resolution should also have included a proposal to amend Section 7 of the Ordinance to enable non-English speaking members of the community to be eligible for election or appointment to the Council. Subsequently, we wrote individually to all the twenty Unofficial Member s of the Council seekin g answers specifically on the following two questions:
(a)
To allow those not fluent in English to be eligible for the Council, and for the public to take a greater interest in the proceedings, do you consider it desirable that simultaneous interpretation (fro m English to Cantonese and vice versa) should b e made availabl e i n both public and closed meetings o f the Council i n view of your resolution?
(b)
Do you consider it necessary for papers associated with your meetings to be translated into Chinese?
Of the fourteen replies received to date, all are in favour of introducing simultaneous interpretation (English to Chinese and vice versa) for public meetings: five furthe r suggested that consideration should be given to extending this facility to Mandarin at a later stage.
As regards the second question, the views expressed by the majority are that all papers would have to be translated into Chinese if Section 7 of the Ordinance were amended to enable non-English speaking members of the community to be elected or appointed to the Counci l
In th e representations which we have received from variou s organisations an d individuals, two relevant though not necessarily related arguments have been advanced for the introduction of bilingualism in these Councils, namely:
(a)
that the general public should be able to follow meaningfully the proceedings of the open meetings;
(b)
that non-English speaking but capable members of the community should be eligible for election or appointment.
Seen in the light of the desire to encourage the community to be more aware of the affairs of Hong Kong, we consider that interpretation facilities should be provided at the open meetings of these two Councils for the convenience of the general public and t o enable them t o listen to speeches and debate s i n these Councils. Thi s recommendation i s based on the principle that the whole community ought to have complete access to the proceedings of the Councils either by personal attendance or through radio and television and that the value of such an innovation should not be measured by the number of spectators in the public gallery at any particular time.
In considering this particular aspect, we have to examine whether Cantones e alone (as advocated by the vast majority of the representations received), Cantonese and Mandarin , o r Mandarin alon e should be adopted. In this connection, w e not e from the statistical figures in the Report of the Census, 1961, that Cantonese was the
usual language of 79% of the Hong Kong population and it was understood by 95% of the population. We have no further information on these figures. Consequently, we have no doubt that Cantonese would at the present moment have more relevance and reality for the population as a whole and accordingly conclude that interpretatio n facilities for the open meetings of the Legislative Council and Urban Council should be confined t o English and Cantonese only . This does not, however, rule out the possibility of introducing Mandarin in years to come and this should be kept under review.
As it is essential that the efficiency of the proceedings of the Councils should be maintained, we believe that simultaneous interpretation facilities should be introduced, as oppose d t o consecutiv e interpretatio n whic h i s bot h tediou s an d time -consuming . . .
Our examination of bilingualism in these two Councils would not be complete without mentioning the proposition that bilingualism could make non-English speaking members of the public eligible to serve on them. A change in this direction would render it necessary not only to provide simultaneous interpretation facilities for all closed meetings of the Councils' Sub-Committees and Select Committees but also to prepare papers and to keep minutes, etc. in both languages efficiently and effectively. This, we feel, would impose for the time being too heavy a strain on local resources relating to interpreters and translators, particularly when there are other areas in which the wider use of Chinese in official business should be given priority.
c. Th e Populatio n Transitio n
But Hong Kon g society was changing. One of the clearest indication s of that was the decline i n fertility i n the 1970s. The traditional famil y pu t a premium o n havin g man y children , especiall y sons . Mos t Hon g Kon g families, packed into small shared flats and seeing upward mobility within reach (see DOCUMENT VII.e2 below) opted for few births. The Hong Kong population transitio n wa s a quie t movement . Socia l service s provide d reached their willing targets without much ado, as fertility dropped fro m
3.4births per woman i n 1971 to 2.00 in 1981.
DOCUMENT VILcl: Fertility declines (source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, Demographic Trends in Hong Kong, 1971-82, An Analysis Based on Vital Registration Statistics of Births, Marriages, and Deaths and on Census Results, n.d., Hong Kong, p. 41)
The TFR* , defined as the sum of the age-specific fertility rates in a given year, represents the number of children that a woman would bear (ignoring mortality) if she
Total fertility rate
Table 7. 1 Total Fertility Rates and Net Reproduction Rates Per Woman, 1971-81
1971 197 2 197 3 197 4 197 5 197 6 197 7 197 8 197 9 198 0 198 1
Total 3.4 1 3.2 9 3.1 7 2.9 9 2.7 0 2.5 2 2.4 2 2.3 2 2.1 6 2.0 8 1.9 7 fertility rate
Net 1.6 3 1.5 5 1.5 0 1.4 2 1.2 6 1.1 8 1.1 4 1.0 9 1.0 1 0.9 8 0.9 3 repro-duction rate
were subject throughout her reproductive ages to the fertility rates prevailing in that year. This measure represents a hypothetical completed average family size if fertility were to remain constant at a given level. For a generation of women to replace itself each woman must produce on average one daughter who will survive to the end of childbearing age. This generally corresponds to an average completed family size of approximately 2.1 children in conditions of low mortality and allowing for such factors as the differential i n the sex ratio at birth and infant and childhood mortality . As shown in the table the TFR fell from 3.4 in 1971 to just below 2.00 in 1981�X a level which would be insufficient for a generation to replace itself.
The NRR*, defined as the sum of the products of the age-specific fertility rates for female births and the female survival rates in a given year, represents the number of daughters who, according to the fertility rates prevailing in that year, would be born to a woman (allowin g for mortality). If the NRR i s one, women are exactly replacin g themselves; if it is less than one, they are failing to do so. In 198 1 women i n Hon g Kong were producing 7 per cent too few daughters to replace themselves.
cL Ne w Hopes and Bold Beginning
In April 1966 , even before the riots, the Hong Kon g governmen t ha d appointed a working party made up entirely of civil servants to consider the question of local administration. " The working party advised that change s should be implemented, but that they should consist primarily of introducin g
Net reproduction rat e
** This the government probably did i n response to initiative i n the Urban Council t o appoint its own ad hoc committee to advise on the future scope and functioning of the council. For details see Government and Politics pp . 129 to 136.
local councils of an advisory nature that were made up of both appointe d and elected members . Minority opinion s expressed i n the repor t cas t considerable doubt on the relevance of popular elections as a basis for representation. The riots that followed clos e upon th e completion o f the report quite changed the tone of the argument at high levels in government if not it s content. Throughout th e riot s o f 1967 , many communa l organizations ha d openly expressed thei r support fo r the Hong Kon g government and their condemnation of violence and disruption. The Hong Kong government had possibly also come round to the view that the gap that had apparentl y been lef t unfilled b y the ineffectiveness o f traditional communal organizations had to be closed. The immediate answer was not an electoral reform , but the implementation o f the City District Officer s Scheme, and th e extension fro m there , a s Sir Murray Maclehos e wa s appointed Governor i n 1971, of making representation available to Hong Kong's 'grassroots' population. The reforms of the 1970s changed the tenor of communal representatio n i n Hong Kong society . The Hong Kon g
;i government , having found traditional communa l organization s wanting , dismantled it s representational structure , revamped th e Hong Kon g community so that voluntary associations formed on a wider basis �X the 'mutual aid committees' in resettlement estates were the pride of the Hong Kong government in this programme �X might, in ways that seemed unclear to observers outside the Hong Kong government, to reflect the view of the Hong Kong population without the implementation of democracy.
DOCUMENT VILdl: A programme for the 1970s (source: HE the Governor, in the Legislative Council, 18 October 1972, Hong Hong Hansard, Reports of the Sittings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1973)
Though it has been a busy year it has been a fascinating one. I have come back to a Hong Kong which is more developed and prosperous and of far greater stature than the one I knew 10 years ago. But also I find it more expectant of its Government.
In this first year I have been conscious of the need on the one hand to learn as much about everything as possible, and on the other to be selective on proposals for action. I have therefore concentrated on defining broad objectives in three fields where this seemed particularly necessary at this juncture �X housing, education and social welfare.
I now turn to housing. There is no field in which Hong Kong's pressure of people has produced acuter problems or one in which the Government's response has been so vigorous or received such international acclaim. 1.6 million people have been housed at low rents in housing estates. Many of the later estates provide good examples of a solution to Hong Kong's particular problem of living at densities higher than anywhere else in the world. Most of the larger squatter colonies have disappeared. Much of the
aging and dilapidated pre-war tenement property has been replaced in the process of private development . Ther e ha s been som e thinnin g ou t o f over-crowding i n ol d properties, and the rise in population i n Kowloon an d Hong Kong Island has bee n halted and slightly reversed.
But in spite of all this effort th e problem remains.300,000 peopl e still live i n squatter hut s o r temporar y housing . Many unit s i n resettlement estate s ar e badl y overcrowded, or have no separate wash places or lavatories. It is estimated that a further 310,000 people would need rehousing if all of those in shared private flats and tenements were to have a self-contained home, and few of these can afford th e rents asked by private landlords. It is my conclusion that the inadequacy and scarcity of housing and all that this implies, and the harsh situations that result from it, is one of the major and most constant sources of friction and unhappiness between the Government and th e population. It offends alike our humanity, our civic pride and our political good sense. Honourable Members might agre e that i n this city of rising standards and risin g expectations it is not a situation we can accept indefinitely. Nevertheless it exists and will continue t o exist unless we are prepared t o take determined actio n over a considerable period.
The Housing Board and the Government departments concerned have therefor e drawn up a plan. For planning purposes a target time is necessary, if only because any such plan must also provide for the annual natural growth of population. The targe t taken, which I repeat is as a basis for calculation, is 10 years and has as its objective to build on such a scale that, with the contribution of the private sector, there will be sufficient permanent self-contained accommodation in a reasonable environment for every inhabitant of Hong Kong. Such a target, if achieved, would lead to the virtual disappearance of squatter areas, eliminate overcrowding and sharing in both privat e and public housing, and in addition provide accommodation for those who have to be rehoused in consequence of development schemes and other situations where housing is offered t o the homeless or unfortunate, and would also keep pace with the natural expansion of the population.
For such a programme to succeed and to be acceptable to the potential inhabitants, three things seem to me essential.
First, good communications with the old urban areas. For Sha Tin this means a four-lane highway and tunnel and double tracking the railway to provide a ten-minute service. For Castle Peak it means a completely new motor road from Tsuen Wan.
Secondly, the housing in the new towns must be accompanied by a full ration of what is essential to modern life: medical, and secondary as well as primary educational facilities, parks and playgrounds, police stations, markets, fire and ambulance stations, community centres and much else.
Thirdly, there must be work, and so sites for private commercial and residentia l development. These towns in fact must be built as a whole. We have taken the first steps in this direction in the Lek Yuen estate at Sha Tin and in the third stage of the Lei Muk Shue estate at Kwai Chung.
Quite apart from th e expansion of the main new towns in the New Territories, housing is also required for the rural areas and smaller New Territories townships, and also for boat squatter areas and for those who wish to live ashore. Plans are therefore in hand to provide a number of estates in these more remote areas. Although the number to be housed is only30,000, i t is a significant step that public housing is to be provided in places such as Tai O where nothing has ever been done in this respect before.
I now turn to education. The objective of making free primary education available to all has been achieved. Your Government appreciates that what is now needed is to improve quality, and will exert itself in this respect.
But I think honourable Members will agree with the proposition that during the rest of the '70 s the main thrust o f our educational effor t mus t be in secondary an d technical education, not of course forgetting that increased secondary education carries with it the necessity for increasing correspondingly facilities in the tertiary field.
We are well on the way to achieving the present interim target of 3 years post-primary education for 50% of all children in the 12-14 year age group. Partial objectives, however necessary initially, make for distortion unless replaced by absolute objectives as soon as practicable. Our absolute objective o f course is the provision of 3 years secondary education for all in the 12-14 year age group, and your Government proposes that we should address ourselves to this objective forthwith .
In recent month s th e Education Departmen t an d the Secretaria t hav e worke d hard on the practicalities and implications of such a change in objectives.
One must not under-rate the size of the operation involved, which requires th e provision of 184,000 assisted places in forms 1-3 additiona l to those now available . About20,000 o f these extra places would be in pre-vocational schools. Some would be in government secondar y technical schools, where numbers would be substantiall y increased.
A furthe r recommendatio n i s to double the percentage o f places in secondary schools for the full 5-year courses leading to a Certificate of Education examination. This would require 55,000 places in forms 4 and 5 additional to those now available, and a substantial increase in the number of places in Government secondary technical schools is also planned.
In addition to these proposals for increased secondary education it is also hoped to provide 5 additional technical institutes by 1980 of which 2 should open in 1975.
To staff thi s expansion with teacher s the output o f the 3 existing colleges of education would be increased by 2,000 by 1976, and thereafter the construction of a fourth college or other means would be necessary.
As honourable Member s will appreciate, an expansion o f the exten t propose d carries with i t financial implication s which the Government an d the y will wish t o examine closely in due course. But it also implies the possibilities which are as exciting as they are far-reaching for our whole educational system. This hitherto has been based on the regrettable but inescapable assumption that there will be far fewer places available in secondary schools than students wishing to fill them. It has been this disproportion of places between primary and secondary schools that has lain at the root of the intensity of competition for the present Secondary Schools Entrance Examination with all that this implies for students, teachers and parents alike. It is arguable that it has also distorted both the curricula and teaching methods.
If therefore th e proposals t o increas e th e provision o f secondary schoo l place s commend themselves to honourable Members, I think we should seize the opportunity to bring professional an d public , as well as official, opinio n t o bear o n th e typ e o f secondary education we should aim at in the new and less restricted circumstances , including th e questio n o f what examinatio n syste m would be apropriate an d wha t curricula. I suggest that the right time to do this is now at the start of the new programme.
I therefore propose to ask the Board of Education to advise me on these important issues as soon as possible and as a basis for its deliberations to submit to it the detailed plans which the Education Department has already drawn up. Amongst other things it would be valuable to have its advice on the speed at which it is practicable to plan to achieve thi s target. Connected wit h thi s i s the extent t o which the y conside r bisessionalism* appropriate as a permanent or interim measure.I might add that it is the view of the Government tha t a n element o f bisessionalism i s essential i f rapid progress is to be made.
Their view would also be valuable on the extent to which it is necessary to extend assisted places to all in the 12-14 year group. Clearly those must be assisted who could not otherwise afford to attend school, or the object of the reform would be frustrated; but what of those who could and would pay?
I said earlier that an expansion of secondary education carried with it the necessity for an increase in the tertiary field. The demand for tertiary education in Hong Kong far outstrips existing facilities, and steps to increase these have been taken. This i s both because a wider provision of tertiary education is good in itself, and because our society stands in urgent need of substantially increasing numbers of well qualified young people who can be trained for professional, technical , administrative an d executiv e roles.
By 1974 the number of places in our two Universities will be some 6,000. This will mean that the Universities will have the capability of turning out about 1,60 0 graduates each year.
Plans are now in hand to raise the number of university places from6,000 to 8,400 by 1978. The University and Polytechnic Grants Committee believes that an expansion of this order could be achieved without dilution of quality.
The term 'bisessionalism7 refers to the arrangement whereby students attend school in either the morning or the afternoon, so that school buildings may be used for two 'sessions' during the day.
This total is unlikely to be sufficient fo r our needs beyond the late seventies and in the eighties, and we are therefore already considering ways in which universit y education in Hong Kong can be further extended .
But the major expansion in tertiary education will be achieved by the new Hong Kong Polytechnic. It has had a slow start�X perhaps inevitable in a wholly new venture
�X but under a dynamic Board I have every hope that it will achieve its target of 8,000 full-time and20,000 part-tim e students by 1978. Together with the expansion of the universities this will mean that by 1978 tertiary education i n Hong Kong will have been at least trebled.
So to sum up, we envisage education facilities along the following lines: free primary education for all followed by secondary education for all to the age of 14; the latter to include an expanded pre-vocational or technical stream. At that point there will be on the one hand greatly expanded facilities for further secondary education leading to the Certificate of Education; on the other, young people will be able to choose between going into industry, or acquiring a qualification in a technical institute. Even if they go into industry , the y wil l b e abl e t o benefi t fro m th e technica l institute s throug h apprenticeship courses. In the post-secondary field we envisage a substantial expansion of tertiary education in the existing Universities and in the new Polytechnic.I might add that we hope that some young people who do not go through forms IV and V may nevertheless benefit from facilities for part-time instructio n i n the places of tertiary education.
This brings me to social welfare. Inevitably I look back at the scene as it was 10 years ago when social welfare work was just emerging from the stage of an emergency operation to give assistance to the new influx of population in the 1950s.
I note tha t th e economi c and social progress achieved i n the las t 1 0 years has enabled a substantial advance to be made. For instance, a Government system of public assistance in cash has been introduced. In the community development field there is now a system of estate welfare buildings bringing together under one roof the welfare services for people living in resettlement estates. Family welfare services have been re-organized on a regional basi s and thei r services integrated and mad e more comprehensive. Progress has been made in helping the disabled�X some training centres have been opened, and a range of vocational and pre-vocational training facilitie s now exist. The probation and correctional services have been expanded and refined .
These are notable advances. While no one will claim that they measure up to the requirements o f Hong Kong in either size or scope, they nevertheless d o provide a sound base of carefully thought out and increasingly professional activity over a wide field. What I suggest is now required is firstly a comprehensive plan for orderly expansion, and secondly a corps of trained professionals to carry it out.
Let me take the second point first: the corps of professionals.I have found general agreement that the days are over when social welfare in Hong Kong was an emergency service where primary requirement was for enthusiasm, energy and devotion. Thes e qualities are still called for and always will be, but now expertise and professionalis m will be increasingly necessary.
Hong Kon g has been wel l served b y the socia l welfare department s o f its tw o universities, but ther e i s great need fo r training belo w the university level . Th e Government therefor e propose s t o establish an Institut e for Social Work Training , providing two-year courses leading to a diploma or certificate. The institute will be open alike to those proposing to enter Government service or to work in the voluntary agencies. . .
So much for the people; now for the philosophy and the plan. In order to formulate these th e Governmen t se t u p ne w plannin g machinery , an d i n concer t wit h representatives of the Hong Kong Council of Social Service and the voluntary social welfare agencies a white paper has been drafted. It is entitled: 'Social Welfare in Hong Kong: the way ahead', and will in its final form incorporate a complementary, detailed 5-year plan. I consider it a most valuable contribution. Its proposals represent a practical consensus of informed and experienced social welfare opinion on both the philosophy and the details of a carefully phased expansion programme.
The proposals envisage 4 main areas for development of which the first two are concerned with help in cash and the second two with help by service.
The first area covers assistance to those who through causes outside their control have not adequate means of support. This is the area in which the public assistanc e scheme alread y i n existence i s progressively provin g it s value. The secon d are a i s assistance in cash to what the paper describes as vulnerable. Groups which might be singled out as beneficiaries are the severely disabled and elderly infirm. But there are other groups, for instance the chronically sick or widowed mothers with young children, which might eventually be included in the scheme.
In respect of this area the paper makes the interesting proposal that financia l support should be given to such groups regardless of their means�X that is to say on proof of disability, just as people are eligible for public assistance on proof of poverty. It is maintained that in practice such a principle would not be abused and it would vastly simplify administrative procedures and costs.I am sure that honourable Members will wish to look closely at this aspect of the proposal, and I will be interested to hear their comments. While there is much to be said on either side, I hope that there will be general agreement firstly that extension of assistance to the disabled and infirm i s a commendable objective to which we should now address ourselves; and secondly that the important thing is to get such a scheme going, and to learn from practical experience what administrative arrangements are ultimately most appropriate. The third area is provision of facilities for the disabled, so that there may be comprehensive services to meet their known needs in the field of training, employment and housing, particularly so as to help them to be independent and self-supporting members of the community. Here clearly employers will have a vital role to play. In this area the problem of providing for the elderly also bulks large. This i s now being examined by a working party of members from the Government and the voluntary sector. The elderly should of course benefit both from public assistance and from the disability scheme I have already referred to. But the objective of the further services we have in mind would be to enable them to remain in the community as long as possible. The objective for the elderly might be described as care within the community . Finally the plan contains comprehensiv e proposals for extending the existing limited network of community and social centres operated by the Social Welfare Departmen t t o cover the whole o f Hong Kong . Considerable expansion o f social and recreational facilities, primarily through th e voluntary agencies, is also envisaged.
I would like at this point to say a word about social security. It is an emotiv e phrase, and means different things in different countries. But basically it should mean that provision by the state enables people to live secure in the knowledge that the y and their children will be protected from the worst effects of adversity. In some countries it has been codified i n a comprehensive unified system . Though this has not bee n done in Hong Kong we are nevertheless in a fair way to having such provision by the state. I have just referred to what is already being done and what it is proposed will be done in the field of what we call social welfare. But to this should be added our medical services, as no one need now pay more than a small fee for treatment either at a clinic or in hospital�X and fees ar e remitted fo r the needy . Added als o should b e ou r educational system which provides free primary education, and i n which nobody i s deprived of secondary or tertiary education because of lack of means. Add als o th e provision of low rent Government housing on a scale unknown elsewhere in the world for those with low incomes. I find this a very extensive system of social security based on the principle o f assistance for those i n need. There i s nothing els e quite like i t anywhere in the world. It is something characteristic of and unique to Hong Kong, something we may be proud of and something on which we may build with confidence as our resources allow.
I wish here to add another general point about the Government's attitude t o payment for services provided by the tax payer such as housing, secondary and tertiary education, and so on. We are all agreed that these needs should be provided as cheaply as possible, as our means allow. But if, and I repeat if, we are ever faced with a choice between having the means to provide the infrastructure, that is to say the houses, the schools, the universities and the staff to work them on the one hand, and of providing them free or almost free on the other, I am sure that honourable Members, and indeed the people of Hong Kong, would agree that at this stage of our development, while we have a population that is predominantly young and active, the first call on Government should always be to provide the physical infrastructure leaving for later�X and as our resources are available�X the lowering of payments by those benefiting who are able to pay.
DOCUMENT VILd2: Rebuilding grassroot society (source: HE the Governor, Address in the Legislative Council, 16 October 1974, Hong Hong Hansard, Reports of the Sittings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1974)
But I would like to speak about what the public�X those at the receiving end of crime�X hav e done . Th e creatio n o f 1,50 0 mutua l ai d committees , wit h th e accompanying superstructur e o f area committees, i s not only a considerable administrative achievement, but indicates the great need that these organizations fil l There was indeed, a void: a void which was as danagerous for the Government as it was unwelcome t o the ordinary citizen, who was left without mean s of influencin g conditions outside his own front door . Some of these committees are more effectiv e than others, but they have done much to discourage crime in their own areas. In many cases they have installed alarm systems, and engaged watchmen to patrol the premises, and they constitute a new deterrent to criminals that can be made increasingly effective and is very welcome to police and public alike.
I always leave meetings with mutual aid committees encouraged by the knowledge that in this field attitudes are changing fast. We have many good citizens willing to give a lead on how the people of a neighbourhood may help each other and help the community by making their own areas safer, cleaner and better to live in.
DOCUMENT VII.d3: The new Hong Kong Society (source: Mr Denis Bray, Secretary for Home Affairs, Address in the Legislative Council, 29 November 1973, Hong Kong Hansard, Reports of the sittings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1973)
Sir, in a review of any sort the dominant theme is change and in Hong Kong there is seldom a lack of change to contemplate. The physical environment changes with startling rapidity, and judging from the speeches earlier this afternoon this will continue, but my theme to-day is social change. Social change seems to be emerging as one of the most dramatic developments of the early seventies.
Our older society, prized loos e from it s stable clan structure, was made up o f individuals more concerned with material well being than social awareness. Publi c services of a makeshift sor t were accepted with gratitude for security was what they wanted. As the children of the post-war settlers have grown up we have been reminded that they expect more�X that the makeshift services good enough for their parents are not good enough in the more prosperous society their parents have created. Services have been improved and long term plans drawn up.
But it has only recently become clear that the most important change in society is not its increasing wealth nor its increasing expectations of Government performanc e but its new sense of purpose.
The new society no longer expects everything to be done for it by a paternalistic Government. It is a society on the move, prepared to act on social issues with the same vigour that the old refugee society displayed in the pursuit of private prosperity.
How els e can on e explai n th e public response t o the tw o campaigns o f socia l awakening�X Clean Hong Kong and Fight Violent Crime? Litter strewn streets are an obvious manifestation of social indifference. Before the 'Clean Hong Kong' campaign we were four million lap sap chungs*. The publicity and the strengthening of cleansing services were indispensibl e part s o f the campaig n bu t eve n th e cleanes t stree t ca n become litter strewn in a few hours. The effort required of each person was only a little restraint but it involved restraint by everybody, all the time. This was forthcoming.
Violent crime posed a completely different problem. We were not a society of four million criminals. Indeed only a very small fraction of the population has ever seen a violent crime being committed. Reporting crime, dialling 999, raising a hue and cry all required a more positive effort tha n refraining fro m throwing litter about. Nobody knew when they might be expected to make this effort .
I should like to be able to parade a table of reliable statistics about the state of crime illustrating the success of the campaign but I cannot. The trouble about crime statistics i s that criminal s do not send in accurate statistical returns . Over a short period when there is likely to be a steady proportion of unreported crime we can draw conclusions about trends from figures of reported crime. But if an extensive publicity campaign i s mounted t o encourage reports of crime, i f four o r more new reportin g centres are set up, if reporting procedures are simplified, and if the public responds in this as it has shown itself willing to do in other social causes then the one thing we can be sure of is that the proportion of unreported crime will decline. There was even a drop in reported crime during the intensive part of the campaign when the police did everything they could to put men on the beat. But this drop has not been maintained partly, we suspect, because crimes are reported instead of being shrugged off . Th e statistics show, for instance a disproportionate increase in the number of small robberies reported�X robberie s which woul d no t hav e bee n reporte d had th e campaig n no t taken place . It i s also happening tha t whe n criminal s ar e caught an d found t o b e responsible for a string of other crimes many of these other crimes were discovered only after th e crimina l had bee n caught. Caches of stolen goods used to be foun d which could not be returned because their theft had not been reported. There is less of this now.
When we get a longer series of monthly figures reflecting the new higher rate of crime reporting we shall be surer of our conclusions on the underlying figures of actual crime. In the meantime I believe we should be encouraged by greater public confidence. Last winter people were beginning to stay off the streets at night, to keep their children at home an d walk in fear o f attack. This i s not the case to-day. Reports from Cit y District Offices, opinio n surveys, and police contacts all reflect a strengthening of public confidence in law and order. Just as the cleaner streets we can see for ourselves are a sign of the success of the 'Clean Hong Kong' campaign so a strengthening of confidence which we know of ourselves is the true measure of the success of the 'Fight Violent Crime' campaign.
Literally, litter bugs', reference to people who litter.
Even so we still have far too many robberies and other violent crimes. The police must be given the men to deal with them. The immediate current object of the 'Fight Violent Crime' campaign is to recruit more men and women into the regular police. The first two weeks of the current recruitment campaign produced 1,649 young people who wished to join the Police. On past performance we would expect one out of seven applicants to measure up to police standards. Many more are needed and I am most grateful that honourable Members have expressed a desire to help find the people who can do this work which is of such vital importance to our community.
I said that I believed a fundamental change was taking place in society�X that the community was developing a new sense of purpose. If this is so what should our reaction be?
Three main initiatives seem to be required: first we must let people know what we are thinking; second we must make it easier for people to formulate and present their views; and third we must make sure that these expressions of opinion are taken int o account.
On the first point my honourable Friend, MR LOBO, asks that the green paper system be more widely used. Having come recently from the New Territories where all sorts of policy issues are freely discussed with rural leaders I do not find the proposal new or alarming. Green papers, reports of advisory bodies and findings of consultants are frequently published before decisions are taken. More informal methods of arising [sic] ideas and proposals could be developed (for instance a good many ideas have been aired this afternoon) and I should like to give further thought to this. There are obviously limits- my honourable Friend, the Financial Secretary would in all probability not really wish to air his budget proposals before presenting them to honourable Members in the Finance Bill Nevertheless I would like to think that we can air more proposals involving a choice of courses open to us so that there is an opportunity to shape policy more closely to public aspirations.
On the second point we do start with a basic structure which enables people to formulate and present their views. At the centre we have a broad range of advisory bodies which ar e no doubt capabl e o f further sophistication.I am however mor e concerned with the very much more widespread network of committees that has been reinforced durin g the 'Clean Hong Kong' and 'Fight Violent Crime' campaigns. My honourable Friend, Mr CHEONG-LEEN, proposed District Consultative Committees but thes e were first se t up informally fiv e year s ago when the CDO schem e wa s introduced. As a part of the two campaigns these informal committee s have been established as more formal City District Committees. In addition there are the Area Committees and the grass roots organizations of over 1,000 Mutual Aid Committees.
In the New Territories the Rural Committees and village organizations are quite new and were set up in support of these major campaigns. But I certainly hope they will provide the means whereby people can put forward their views of anything they like.I hope these institutions will develop further before we look for yet more new types of organization. In addition we do hope to improve our own opinion gathering methods. Proposals to strengthen the system are now being drawn up.
On the third point, the responsibility for taking public opinion into account rests on all officials and unofficials concerne d with policy decisions. In addition a special responsibility rests on the holder of my post to ensure that public opinion is presented and considered at all levels.
DOCUMENT VILd4: The ideology, goals and structure of the CDO scheme (source: Ambrose Yeo-chi King, Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level', in Ambrose Y.C. King and Ranee PL. Lee, eds. Social Life and Development in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981, pp. 138-142)
The CDO [Cit y District Office] schem e was launched with great fanfare an d publicity in mid-1968, immediately after the climax of the 1967 riots. A government -sponsored intensive image-building campaign was successfully carried out to convince the public that the CDO Scheme is something which is genuinely of and for the people. The ideology of the CDO Scheme is a 'service ideology': service for the Government ; service for the community; and service for the individuals. These are explicitly stated in the Directive to City District Officers .
The explici t goals of the CDO Schem e ar e many-sided. I t i s designed t o be a political communication agent, a community organizer, a trouble-shooter for the people. To put it in more general terms, the CDO Scheme is aiming to counteract the tendency of the metropolitan Government toward centralization and departmentalization. The establishment o f the CDO Schem e i s to make one person or one office whic h th e residents could recognize as 'the government' in their district.
The CDO scheme was approved by the Hong Kong Government in early 1968. It was decided that ten CDOs would be established in the whole metropolitan area. By the end of the same year five CDOs had been established: Eastern, Western, Wanchai, Mong Kok, and Yau Ma Tei. The other five, subsequently opened by the end of 1969, were Central, Kwun Tong, Sham Shui Po, Kowloon City, and Wong Tai Sin.
The CDO Scheme is under the general supervision of the Secretariat for Home Affairs. Directl y under th e Secretar y for Home Affairs ar e two deputies. One i s in charge of the traditional duties of the former Secretariat for Chinese Affairs- newspaper registration, trust fund, liquor licensing, tenancy matters, etc. The other is responsible for the CDO Scheme. Under him are two City District Commissioners, one responsible for the four CDOs on Hong Kong Island, and the other for the six CDOs in Kowloon.
The organizations of the ten CDOs are the same. The City District Officer i s the head of the office. Under him are two sections: Internal and External, each headed by an Assistant City District Officer. The Internal Section deals mainly with administrative matters, and the External Section with field or 'liaison' duties. The number of other staff varies with individual offices . There ar e usually five to eight Liaison Officer s assigned to each office. One is invariably assigned to the Public Enquiry Counter, and a greater part of the rest to the External Section. There are two to four Liaison Assistants in each office to assist the LOs [Liaison Officers].
The CDO at Work in Kwun Tong Community
How has the CDO Scheme actually performed at the district level? How has the idea of the CDO Schem e been transformed int o action? We have selected Kwun Tong District for our study. Kwun Tong District, one of the ten City Districts of metropolitan Hong Kong, is one of the most rapidly developed urban communities in Hong Kong.
The CDO i s not an ordinary functionally-specific administrativ e organization ; rather, it is a multifunctional political structure. What are the functions of the CDO in the Kwun Tong District? According to our findings, during the three-month period of June to August 1971 , the CDO's activities involve such things as commenting o n the District's development planning; helping to clear out huts and hawkers; building a playground fo r children; helping i n relief of typhoon victims; organizing festiva l celebration: administering the Fat Choy Special Aid Fund; handling 'individual an d family cases'; answering public enquiries; and administering statutory declarations, etc. The CDO's activities are indeed highly functionally-diffuse. The y involve just about everything occurring in any local community, ranging from political to very mundane affairs.
One o f the CDO's major functions i s to facilitate communicatio n between th e governors and the governed, including the input of intelligence about 'public opinion' to the decision-makers in the government. The CDO is required to produce a report entitled 'The Anatomy' of his District within six months of his appointment. In th e 'Anatomy' thorough information abou t the peculiarities of the social and economi c structure of the district as well as its personalities is expected to be included. The CDO is often asked by various departments to give comments on intended actions, such as the Development Town Plan of the Public Works Department, and other Government organizations as k it to gather informatio n o n social needs for decision-making. Fo r example, the CDO has conducted a 'survey' on the needs of the ferry service on behalf of the UMELCO (Unofficial Member s of the Executive and Legislative Councils). The methods used to gather intelligence, besides 'survey' conducting, are the District Monthly Meeting, the Study Group and 'Town Talk'.
The CDO holds regular Monthly Meetings which involve a fairly stable group of local leaders , leaders o f Kaifong Associations , Multi-Store y Buildin g Association s (MSB), District Associations, the business and industrial sector, etc.; the representatives of field agencies of Government departments are also present. The Monthly Meetin g is the primary mechanism of the CDO for collecting the opinions of local leaders on any issue concerning the Government and the public. From the minutes of the meetings, we find that members present voice their opinions on the procedure of reporting crime
Crisis and Consolidation, 1966- 1981
to the police, on the improvement o f recreational facilities i n the district, etc. Th e CDO i s designed to extend the Government's consultation circle at the centre to a much wider circle at the peripheral and district level.
The Study Group is rather ad hoc in nature. The people invited to discuss in the Study Group vary from one occasion to another, depending on the topics discussed. The discussants include industrialists, school principals, hawkers, shop owners, taxi-drivers, factory workers, students and others. Sometimes the subjects discussed might include not only matters of a specific nature but also matters of common concern such as traffic problems, corruption, petty crimes, smoke from restaurants, clearance of refuse, Chinese as an official language, etc.
The 'Town Talk' mechanism is not officially included in the CDO Scheme, but it is believed to be one of the most important channels for soliciting public opinion by the CDO. It is probably true that the Monthly Meeting or the Study Group are, in practice if not in theory, geared primarily to reach local leaders rather than the ordinary man. The Town Talk is in a sense more oriented toward the 'man in the street'. The CDO has no specific instructions on whom to consult. As one respondent reported , comments were noted down from casual conversation with whomsoever they happened to talk to, on official o r private terms . It emphasizes not th e quantitative but th e qualitative aspect of the opinions expressed by the people. The key word is 'people'; several officers interviewed repeatedly and separately asserted that the present 'trend' was contacting the 'man-in-the-street' .
A second function of the CDO is to articulate the demands made known to them through the Monthly Meeting, the Study Group and Town Talk by people from differen t walks of life, as well as demands channelled through newspapers and outside 'requests'. Moreover, interest s ar e articulate d b y th e CDO' s self-initiative , base d upo n it s knowledge of the needs and attitudes of the residents of the community. The interest s articulated by the CDO are both minor in nature and all-embracing. According to our findings in the period under analysis, the CDO made comments on multi-storey building car parks, cooked food stalls, hawker bazaars, a mini-bus station, a refuse collectio n centre, and a clinic with regard to the Kowloon Bay Development Plan. The CDO's interest articulation is limited in the sense that it has only a recommendation function .
With respect to the redressing of grievances, it has been expressly denied by the Chairman of the Urban Council that the CDOs are ombudsmen. The CDO is certainly not a n ombudsma n i n th e origina l Scandinavia n sens e whic h guarantee s hi s independence as an instrumental officer of the legislature. The CDO is not independent. However, th e publi c imag e o f the CD O a s an ombudsma n i s prevailing, an d i t is, furthermore, clearly stated in the Report of the CDO Scheme. The CDO's grievance redressing activities can be classified into two major types: redressing of grievances for groups and for individuals. The first type arises out of events affecting a large number of people, such as a clearance operation. This type of grievance redressing is relatively rare; in Kwun Tong District there were only two instances. One wa s the Shun Le e Chuen Clearance in which villagers whose huts were due to be demolished demanded compensation from th e Government throug h the CDO; the other was the Typhoon Rose case in which the victims of Sam Ka Chuen demanded a reassessment of the decisions of the Resettlement Department . B y contrast, the individua l cases in th e same period were very large in number, totalling 256. Of these, family disputes accounted for 152, housing 37, and traffic accidents and compensation 24. In all cases it was the clients who took their complaints to the CDO for assistance.
The CDO referred th e tw o group cases for consideratio n by the department s responsible but they were not favourably reviewed because the departments concerned thought their demands were not in compliance with government policies. In this respect, the CDO could do very little, but it did 'explain' the government policies to the two groups in a more personal way. As for the individual cases, 204 out of 256 cases received were recorded to have been settled. In handling individual cases, the CDO acted as a middleman between parties i n deputes . When individua l grievances aros e from a Government decision, the CDO could not reverse the original decision, but it had the 'power' to bring the case to the responsible departments for a second look, although often all that the CDO could do was 'talk things over', and 'give advice'.
Another function of the CDO is a special set-up called the Public Enquiry Service Counter, usually manned by an Executive Officer, a clerk, and clerical assistants. The PES set-up is designed to familiarize people with the government bureaucracy. Th e Hong Kon g metropolita n Governmen t ha s becom e mor e an d mor e technical , complicated, and fragmented; the ordinary people are often bewildered by the intricacy of governmental operation . There exist s a kind o f 'information gap ' between the Government and the people. The PES is apparently a useful mechanism to bridge this 'information gap', and this is evinced in its enormous use by the people. The number of enquiries received pe r month b y the CDO's PE S counter increase d from 99 1 i n September 1970 to 5,472 in April 1971. The enquiries cover a wide range of information concerning personal documents, land and housing, employment, taxes, duties and fees, family welfare, education, traffic, medical, and other miscellaneous things.
Another importan t politica l functio n o f the CDO ma y b e called politica l socialization an d recruitment . The CDO, i n this regard, provides a framework fo r participation by 'responsible' local sectors. Most of the CDO's effort s ar e geared t o structuring the channels of participation of two major categories of people- youth and 'local leaders'. Different institutiona l mechanisms have been created to co-opt and socialize them in CDO-sponsored community activities. The Monthly Meeting is the most formal forum . During the three months under study, other mechanisms an d activities relating to socialization and recruitment were used. For example, with th e help of the Lion's Club and the Army, student volunteers were mobilized to assist in constructing a playground and jetty at Kowloon Bay; they initiated and sponsored , with the support of local prominent people from Kaifongs, schools, and business firms, district-wide sports activities; they worked through voluntary associations in organizing and promoting recreational and festival activities. All these activities were apolitical in terms of their manifest functions; they were primarily recreational in nature. However, these activities were not sheer structuring of leisure time for the local leaders and the youth; they served to channel participation in a 'right' way, to develop community -oriented civic consciousness, to transform th e young people into 'good citizens' and future community leaders, and to create a political culture which is supportive of the political structure of Hong Kong.
DOCUMENT VILd5: Mutual Aid Committee offices (source: Janet Lee Scott,Action and Meaning: Women ,Participation in the Mutual Aid Committees, Kowloon. Cornell , Ph.D. 1980, pp. 4145)
The establishment of an office for the M.A.C. [Mutual Aid Committee] is a big event, for most members consider it important to have one. There are many reasons for this. First, the settin g up of an office proclaim s to all that a n M.A.C. has bee n established for the building or the block and that the residents have worked hard and have cooperated to reach this goal. Also, the office indicates a strong and successful committee, one that is thriving and should be noticed by the M.A.C.s of other blocks or units. This can be seen more clearly where there are connected blocks sharing a common entrance on the ground level If each block has an M.A.C. but only one has an office, the other committees will spare no effort trying to establish one, too.
Most of the M.A.C. offices that1 visited were found in the public housing estates. Private housing M.A.C.s are less likely to have offices, a point to return to later. These offices are usually located on the ground floor, or occasionally, a vacant room on an upper floor will be turned over to the M.A.C. by the Housing Department. Committee members will not let the lack of a room stop them from having an office. If necessary, they will collect the materials and build one themselves in odd spaces: the air space in the center of the block, the area near or under the stairs, an unused storage room.
Once established, the room is nicely decorated. A partial description of one estate office will give some idea of typical arrangement:
The roo m itself , in an upper floor, seeme d newly opened. Tiled with ne w brown ceramic tile, it was encircled along the walls with wooden foldin g chairs with red padded seats. The walls themselves were hung with brigh t banners, formal paintings of Chinese horses, and a new blackboard. Two fans, one overhead an d one floor fa n attached t o the wall, keep the room cool . Walls painted green . At one end , a folding tabl e covered with coloured oilcloth, and behind it, a new cream-coloured metal desk with vases and pots of flowers. On the wall behind the desk, framed souvenirs and mementoes, a new wall clock. Near the window, a new television set sits on a stand also holding an array of drinking glasses, cups and thermos bottles.
The decoration of the office may be meager, the size may be small; no matter, the important thing is to have one. Still, not all of the estate-based M.A.C.s have them, but there are more there than in private buildings. A major reason for this is the lack of space. Private contractors rarely include extra rooms in their designs, so few buildings have spaces that could be rented or used.I once visited one office in a private building that had been converted from a storage room. Two ladies there showed how they had decorated the room with crepe paper, put up pictures, gathered tables and chairs, and had a telephone installed. They were quite pleased and proud of the result. Another committee, feeling th e lack , took over part of the roof of their building to set up a recreation area . While no t a n offic e i n the strictes t sense, it was intended t o be a gathering spot for committee members , and was furnished wit h item s donated b y members. This lack of space is keenly felt and mentioned, together with the problem of few social activities, as a major reason for residents not getting together more often, or even for not becoming acquainted .
When the time comes to open the office formally , a special celebration and ceremony may be held to mark the occasion. If possible, it is good to have an important figure officiate and give the main speech; the City District Officer of the Wong Tai Sin District, has performed this task for some of the M.A.C.s in the Tze Wan Shan Estate. Other dignitaries, officials, an d officers o f nearby M.A.C.s are also invited. In mor e than one office ar e framed photograph s of its opening ceremony, attended by many public figures. One chairman showed me, with some pride, a clipping from an overseas Chinese newspaper describing the opening ceremony for her M.A.C office. She the n insisted that my assistant and I add our signatures to the red commemorative banner that was to hang in the room.
The activities centreing around these offices are informal, yet recognized by the residents. The offices are especially busy in the estates and more so if they are located on the ground floor, where they are conveniently placed for the constant stream of passers-by. It is at the office that the patrol teams gather and the officers meet to plan activities. Depending on room size, the subcommittees may also use it for their meetings and the yearly elections are held there. It is a clearing area for announcements; notices from the District Office an d other organizations are placed there for people to read. The offic e i s staffed b y at least one person, often a n older gentleman, while one o r more of the officers are usually present. These office helpers (it is unclear whether they are paid) answer the phone, take messages, give out information, and make themselves generally useful.
Telephone numbers and addresses of the residents are usually kept in the office, a practice which makes it easier to contact someone. A good percentage of the offic e traffic is accounted for by people coming in to use the telephone, or to leave messages or packages for someone in the building. Older residents of the building, mostly th e old men, congregate around the office t o watch television (which many committee s buy for their offices) an d relax*. There is always a group of them there, spending the day with their friends, chatting and nibbling. Younger residents, teenagers, are found less frequently, but they do come in just to see 'what is going on.' The M.A.C. uses the
The section on old people congregating at the M.A.C. Office should really read, both old men and old women congregate there .... Great numbers of ah paus [old women] sit there all day gossiping and watching the residents go by/ �X Author's communication t o Ed.
office to store its equipment (patrol team helmets and sticks, party decorations, extra cups and materials) an d display its memorabilia; banners , trophies, letters an d photographs are all displayed with pride.
Given all this, it is not surprising that the committees will not only strive to obtain an office, but to keep one. At the time of this study, numerous committees in Wong Tai Sin and Tze Wan Shan Estates were angry over increased rents for these offices by the Housing Department. Some of these committees felt that the increase was too much and that they could not pay. Moreover, such a facility should not, they felt, be taxed at all as it was part of an officially established programme and backed by the District Office. With evident frustration some committee members told me that such a move would jeopardize the committee itself. At that point, possession of an office is more than a point of pride; it is part of the existence of the committee.
e. Hon g Kon g Worker s
r Hon g Kong's people did not seek change by putting pressure on the Hong Kong government. Hong Kong families looked inwards as they made their bid to improve themselves in the very competitive Hong Kong economy.* Hong Kong workers did not join trade unions, seldom went on strike, had few ideas about how their jobs might improve, but they seemed agreed in one aim, and that was that their children should mov e out of the poverty trap. They expected better education for their children to be an answer to upward mobility, and, if education for all their children together was beyond reach, then a family strategy should come into play so that the daughters might work to contribute to family income that would allow the sons to be
' educated . For many families, in the industrious Hong Kong of the 1970s, this strategy paid off, bu t it also implied that upward mobility tended to be associated with the natural family cycle and that, at least, among the poorer majority, it was the long-time resident, rather than the fresh immigrant, who would see its benefits.
DOCUMENT VILel : Employees' expectations for themselves and their children (source: H.A. Turner, The Last Cobny, But Whose? A Study in the Labour Movement, Labour Market and Labour Relations in Hong Kong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 195-197)
The Hong Kong workers in the sample did not, in general, appear to have high aspirations for themselves, or resemble the aggressively ambitious petty-capitalists so
*S.K. Lau calls this 'utilitarianistic familism' in his Society and Politics in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982.
frequently described by writers such as England and Rear*. When asked what kind of work they hoped to be doing in five years' time, the sample displayed a low level of personal aspirations. Over half of the sample (55%) wished to keep their present job, and of those that named another type of work (276 respondents), 83 chose some kind that would involve a sideways or downwards move. A further 39 respondents replied that they hoped to be out of the labour market by that tim e and 14 7 did not kno w what kind of work they would like to do. Only 123 respondents out of the total sample (13%) hope d t o have improve d themselve s i n five years' time by either securing a more prestigious job or by going into business on their own account.
The respondents' replies to a follow-up question specifically on whether they had considered starting a business within the next five years confirms the previous finding. Less than a third (31%) of the sample had seriously considered this, a surprisingly low figure considering the great number of small businesses in Hong Kong and their rapid turnover. Finally, the respondents' modest level of personal aspirations*i s furthe r confirmed by their replies to the question on attendance at vocational classes (night school). The 21% of the sample attending such classes seemed to be definitely on the low side considering the age distribution of the sample, the pressing shortage of places in full-tim e post-secondar y educatio n institution s i n Hon g Kon g an d th e pre -occupation, s o commonly found i n developing societies, with formal educationa l qualifications.
There was little difference withi n the sample on the question of respondents ' hopes for five years ahead, with the exception (t o a limited extent) of government employees. Thus 24% of government employees aspired to jobs with higher prestige than thei r present job , compared t o 9% o f Cantonese fir m employees , 9% o f Shanghainese firm employees and 13% of UK firm employees. On the specific question of starting in business, there was a perceptible difference this time by skill level, with 37% o f white-collar worker s having considered this , compared t o 18 % of unskilled workers.
There was more variation within the sample in the case of further education. The proportions o f white-colla r worker s (36%) , governmen t employee s (34% ) an d employees of very large firms (32% ) attending vocational classes of some kind were higher than the average (21%). Respondents in the 20-29 years group (32%) were also more likely to attend, together with, as might be expected, a larger proportion of the under-20 group (40%).
Despite their tendency to have limited aspirations for themselves, the workers in the sample had high aspirations for their children. When asked if they would like a son of theirs to do a job similar to their own when he grew up, the vast majority of the workers in the sample (89%) replied that they would not. When asked what job instead they would like a son of theirs to get, 80% of the white-collar workers with a definite
J. England and J. Rear, Chinese Labour Under British Rule: A Critical Study of Labour Relations and Law in Hong Kong, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
preference opted for a technologist, professional or managerial type job and a further 6% for their son's running a business. Only 14% named a job that was at their own lower white-collar/technician leve l The blue-collar workers were equally ambitiou s in relative terms. Thus, 56% of the blue-collar workers with a definite preference named either a technologist, professional or managerial type job, 30% named a lower white-collar/technician typ e job and a further 4% opted for having a business. Only 10% named a manual job.
The workers were prepared, moreover, to financially support a son through th e educational process so that he could obtain the type of job either they hoped he would get, or the job the son himself preferred. Ninety-six percent of the sample would support a son for three years of secondary school and 94% for five years; 80% would support a son for a full-time three year university or polytechnic course. While equal proportions of all groups would financially support a son for three or five years of secondary school, there were some differences when it came to supporting a son for a university-style education. White-colla r worker s (96% ) wer e more willing to do so than unskille d workers (72%) and respondents in the 20-29 years age group (93%) were considerably more willing to do so than those in the 50 years and over group (58%), thus showing that these workers were again more ambitious�X this time on their son's behalf.
DOCUMENT VILe2 : Dutifu l secon d daughte r (source : Janet W . Salaff,Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family? New York : Columbi a University, 1995 , pp. 48-70; this book was first published by Cambridge Universit y Press in 1981 )
Mae Goh was 22 in 1973. Her solid build, her hair fixed in an outdated ear-length coif, tightly curled, her broad face with its calm, serious demeanour, an d the plain , conservative gaberdine pants and knit skirts and tops she wore gave her the look of a hardworking, no-frills woman . This impression was appropriate, because Mae was a pivotal contributor to her family economy. Mae singlemindedly devoted herself to her family, and she derived her self-esteem from this care and attention.
The Goh household consiste d of Father, Mother, and six siblings. Father was a low-paid clerk and First Brother was a delivery boy for a well-known retail comprador firm in Hong Kong. Mae and First Sister, Hua, were factory workers. The three youngest children, al l sons, were students i n 1973 . The Go h famil y aspire d to upgrade itsel f economically by drawing upon the wages of the three eldest children, and in so doing advance the education and hence the careers of the three youngest. Although ambitious for a working-class family, those plans were attainable as long as no unforeseen crisis occurred to weaken the family earning power. All family members had become keenly aware of the importance o f coordinating thei r working effort s an d pooling thei r individual earnings. Self-upgrading th e household by multiple wage earning was the Goh family's strategy that had long guided Mae's behaviour.
Home
Mae was a Ch'iu-chaonese born in a village near the port city Swatow, northeast of Hong Kong in Kwangtung province. Father brought his mother and younger brother along with Hua and Mae with him to Hong Kong on a fishing boat in 1951. The Hong Kong government lacked the facilities to receive the incoming wave of refugees fro m the newly founded People's Republic, and families like the Gohs initially had to manage with rudimentary, makeshift accommodations. Upon their arrival, the Gohs purchased an overpriced, ramshackle squatter's hut from a petty entrepreneur who had nailed it together from old crates. The squatter huts were crammed together on a Kowloon mountainside whic h teeme d wit h impoverishe d refugees . Withi n month s thei r hu t was badly burned by a fire that swept the squatter complex, and although the Goh family escaped unscathed, they had no other recourse but construction of a second shack similar to the one they had evacuated. Eventually the community was provided with a pump with running water, one communal outhouse for every 100 families, and cement walkways . Primary school s were built i n the neighbourhoo d b y missionar y societies, but few other community services were available in the squatter area, which the government considered temporary .
In fact, the Gohs remained in this squatter area for nearly a decade, during which three sons were born, before the family was finally resettled in two rooms in Lok Fu resettlement estate , where the sixth, and last , child wa s born. Government-buil t resettlement estates were a relatively inexpensive form of housing for the Goh family, but their facilities were rudimentary. Their two 10' by 12' rooms, standard for the time, were allotted on the basis of 24 square feet per adult (6' by 4'), and they had a nine-member household . Childre n wer e allocate d onl y one-half o f the 'adult ' space , s o resettlement estate families had to curtail the physical movement and indoor play of their youngsters. Simple home industries like plastic flower assembling and piecework sewing were permitted in the rooms. Shops, schools, churches, a playground, and even factories were contained in the basements and on the rooftops of the Gohs' block of flats. This older estate in which Mae lived lacked indoor plumbing and water taps and private kitchens. The outdoor balcony was the sole walkway on each floor. Here th e Goh family cooked, stored water, hung clothes, washed children, and socialized with the neighbours. There was a common stall-type toilet on every floor, laundering and bathing areas, as well as a common water spigot, where the family filled its water jars.
One of the Gohs' rooms was partitioned into three sleeping areas: the first for the two elder girls and Grandmother, th e second for the three eldest brothers, and th e third for the parents and youngest child. The other room served as their living room and contained a long side-board that held a matching tea service, a large Kewpie doll, and a telephone. A wall of the room was dominated by the 23-inch television set.A refrigerator was placed against the second wall, and the sewing machine took up yet another wall. The dining table, which filled th e central floor space, doubled a s the evening study area for the boys. Calendars advertising the fishing gear sold at Father's workplace adorned the walls.
By the 1970s, the Goh family could afford a more spacious flat and was put on a waiting list for a government-built low-cost housing unit. But Mae was relatively satisfied with her estate apartment, despite its obvious shortcomings, because of its proximity to her place of work. She explained, 'Living here is quite convenient. We have th e market just downstairs, and transportation to work is easy. The only bad thing abou t this place is security. Just the other day a restaurant on the next block was robbed of sixteen hundred dollars, and not long before that a fellow was robbed in the staircase. Also, there are a lot of peeping toms here. The management installed doors on the toilet stalls only a few months ago. Before that, it was really horrible. There was no privacy at all. And the y still haven't don e anythin g abou t the bathing are a yet.A friend of mine had to scream for help not long ago when she was bathing�X someone was peeping at her. Now I have to go early to bathe, when there aren't too man y people hanging around the bathing area. Also, it's very dangerous to walk around the estate very late, and so I usually try to get back before eleven. If I come home afte r that, then I ask Mother to be my guard.'
The Goh family tolerated these cramped, difficult accommodations because they were a decided improvement ove r the squatter shacks in which they had lived fo r many years . Also, this future-focused famil y concentrated it s meager funds on th e younger children's education an d preferre d no t t o squander it s money o n housing , which apart from short-term comfort promised few returns of the family investment . Nevertheless, th e nee d fo r spac e and physical securit y wer e increasingl y pervasiv e concerns, and by this time the Gohs could afford to search the private housing market for a modest alternative to the older resettlement estate apartment. While waiting for a government-financed low-cos t housing apartment, the Gohs rented an inexpensive two-room flat in the Kowloon Walled City, a district not far from their estate home. Several of the Goh family members moved to the Walled City and others remained in the estate rooms, which began to seem comparatively spacious.
Parents
Mrs. Goh was a large-boned, rather stout woman, broad shouldered and easygoing . Her childhood was spent in a village near the city of Swatow, and like all of the mothers in my sample she matured during the economic depression and the turbulent years of China's war with Japan and the civil war. Mrs. Goh never attended school and at age 18 entered an arranged marriage with a neighbouring villager whose father was a trader in small wares. After tw o children were born, the Gohs emigrated by sea to Hon g Kong. At first, Mrs. Goh's mother shared a squatter home with the family, but she and Mrs. Goh were continually at loggerheads, and the older woman finally moved to a one-half room resettlement estate apartment nearby.
Mrs. Goh was required to cook, sew clothes, shop daily for food bargains in the open-air marker, and take the youngest child to and from the nearby kindergarten, so she never had time to undertake employment outside the home. Her main diversions were chatting with her neighbours and watching television, and she gained pleasure from being with her family. Mrs. Goh never attended the cinema because she was not able to understand either the Mandarin dialect of contemporary Hong Kong films or the Chinese subtitles. At home, however, Mr. Goh cleared away the table and washed the supper dinner dishes so that Mother could view her favorite television soap opera after dinner .
Observing her children develop and doing her best for them was a source of fulfillment fo r this dedicated mother . Mrs. Goh mad e it clear to me that sh e was distressed by the large size of her family and revealed that she originally had wished to have fewer children. She had taken herbal contraceptive formulas in an effort to prevent her sixth birth. Later she blamed herself for the consequences: 'My youngest son has been in the hospital several times, and as you see he has no appetite. Mother-in-la w says that the child is sickly because of the herbal medicines that I drank.' Mother's attempt at rudimentary birth control indicated that she never ceased attempting t o control her life, although the action she took was not effective .
A slightly built man, Mr. Goh had a broad face, and Mae proudly pointed out their physical resemblances: 'Many times I've been walking down the street and people have stopped me to ask, 'Are you Goh's daughter?' We look so much alike!' Father clerked behind the counter in a small Ch'iu-chao trading firm that exported Chinese fishing nets to Ch'iu-chao traders in Thailand and Singapore. He dressed neatly in a white shirt and gray slacks, in contrast to the blue and black garb of the manual workers. Father's status on the job was low, and as jack-of-all-trades (or , as he put it, a 'many-kick-foot') he was required to toil long hours and sometimes all night as counterman, stockboy, and watchman.
This was Father's first steady work in Hong Kong, and he had remained a t th e same firm fo r ove r 20 years. The manage r spok e the sam e Ch'iu-chao dialect , an d Father felt loyal to the firm. When Father first obtained this position he earned only $40 a month*, and after 20 years (with annual raises of $4), his income reached $120, a probable ceiling. Father's earning would soon be topped by the wages of his sons, who would, he fervently hoped , do much better tha n he i n the world o f work. B y 'better' he meant higher wages and shorter hours in a steady white-collar position.A modest man, Father had never complained to his manager about his low pay. Hua and Mae both wished that Father could find a position with improved wages and hours, but they realized that it was impossible for a man his age to change his line of work. The girl s loyally insisted that th e fir m did not pay Fathe r hi s worth, and the y endeavoured to make up for it by contributing their earnings to the family. Although Eldest Son had already taken a job as a delivery boy in a grocery store, paying somewhat less than Father's job but with shorter hours, hopes were pinned on Second Son, who would be promoted through technical college by dint of the family's efforts and who would vindicate Father's expectations.
All dollar values in this entry have been converted by the author to the U.S. dollar at approximately HK$ 5 to US1.
Education
Such an expectation was realistic because neighbourhood schools were accessible to working-class children residing in the resettlement estate. The Gohs obtained smal l sums of money from missionary societies to pay the school fees and sent all six children to school. Each successive child attended a bit longer, paving the way psychologically and socially for the improved schooling of the next-younger sibling.
The primar y schoo l tha t th e sister s an d brother s attende d enjoye d a modes t reputation. It was a private missionary school, with a curriculum oriented toward the Secondary School Entrance Examination taken by all Hong Kong primary graduates. The pupils were taught in vernacular Cantonese, but Mandarin was the medium of written exercises, which the pupils rarely learned to proficiency. Mae's parents chose the school because of its proximity to home, low tuition fees, and the fair-minde d reputation of its principal, a missionary who was outspokenly critical of the political and economic conditions that Hong Kong working-class people endured. 'It's a good school. It's close, too. The headmistress is a good person who's done a lot for people like us,' commented Mae.
Hua left school after primary 2 to work in a light bulb factory at 20c per day, but Mae completed primary 6 before going out to work. Mae proudly included her graduation from primary school among her major accomplishments. First Brother, the third child, obtained 3 years of secondary schooling, after which he held several jobs, including factory worker and delivery boy. The family pinned its economic hopes upon the fourth child, who was studying to enter a postsecondary technical institute, and the fifth, a form I I pupil (th e second year of secondary school). The sixt h was still in primar y school.
The two sisters deeply regretted their inadequate education, which they attempted to remedy by attending night school after work. At great physical cost and with few tangible results, Mae sat in a crowded classroom every night vainly attempting to absorb the rudiments of English grammar and a few facts of European history. She recalled 'Hua and I rushed right to school from work. We never had time to eat dinner.I used to buy a bread roll and eat it when the teacher turned hi s head t o write on the blackboard. It was really tiring! But I enjoyed it because that's where I met my best friend 1-ling, as well as A-li and some other friends. Although we have all dropped out of class by now, we still keep up our friendships.'
Mae then enrolled in part-time English lessons at the Caritas (Catholic) Yout h Centre, where we first met in 1973, and various other classes as well�X folk singing, European cooking, and social dancing. At the end of 1974 she re-enrolled in nightly classes, favoured by Mother as a means to improve her job opportunities. However, Mae candidly admitted that such an evening school, which provided no recognized certificate for its graduates, would not greatly elevate her job options, and she continued mainly to make more friends and for the contact with organized knowledge.
Mae and Hua ended their formal schooling for self-proclaimed 'economic reasons', but the reasons for which their parents sent them to work were based on conventional definitions of the elder daughters' obligations. The family's undoubted need for cash, coupled with norms limiting women's education and the ease of factory employmen t for young girls, made inevitable the sacrifice of their further education in favour of the family's economic needs. Nevertheless, the girls' education as far as primary level should be viewed as an assertion of a woman's right to learn. Hua and Mae themselves saw it that way . Secondary educatio n wa s psychologically and sociologically remot e fo r working-class girls of their age at the time. The sisters learned to read whereas thei r mother ha d not , an d thei r formal education , howeve r limited , distinctly increase d their employment and social opportunities.
Because school provided extrafamilial experiences, it had a lasting value beyond the formal curriculum. Mae and Hua came into contact with other women their age, and their participation i n the age-graded classes stimulated a consciousness of th e common bond that unites youth. They also became aware of their ability to achieve on their own apart from thei r family, which paved the way for their assumption o f continued responsibility for their own friendships, leisure-time activities, and jobs after leaving school.
Mae at work
In both large factories an d small workshops, all of Mae's jobs consisted of repetitive operations: electronics assembling, seaming garments, and fusing the seams of plastic bags. Mae found small workshops preferable t o larger factories because the persona l proximity of the workshop owner meant he was aware of and could appreciate Mae's hard work on his behalf. Mae responded best to such personal calls upon her effort .
Mae invited me to visit one place of work, a small plastic bag factory in a narrow, two-floor tenement building within earshot of the busy Kai Tak Airport, with neither heating for the damp winter air nor air conditioning for the intense summer hear. The plastic bags were printed on the first floor, and Mae and three other women cut th e bags to size and seamed three edges in the loft. They worked from a fifty-pound roll of plastic, unwinding it by hand, pulling one end under the ar m of a machine that resembled an electric paper cutter; then the electrified arm dropped and seamed a bag. These actions took a few seconds but could not be mechanized because one machine could not handle the many sizes and shapes of bags, and as Mae further remarked, 'We girls are cheaper than machines.' Mae was paid on a piecework basis, $1 for 1,00 0 plastic bags, which represented 2 hours of seaming at a fast pace. She preferred piecework because of the flexible working hours and the lure of higher earnings than on a fixed wage. However, Mae earned at most $19-$20 for a 6-day week in 1973.
Before joining this workshop in 1973 , Mae had tried her hand at several othe r jobs typically performed by women. In 1970 she left a relatively low-paying electronics factory for a slightly better wage in a plastic bag factory, where she learned the shortcuts from her sister Hua, who was already employed there. Mae quit that factory because a defective automati c machine sh e had been using to seam the bags emitted electri c shocks and she burned her hand. The management refused to repair it, blaming Mae for handling the machine poorly. Mae commented, 'AfterI left, my replacement received such a serious shock that she was sent to the hospital, and only then did the management send someone t o fix the machine.' Soon afte r that , Ma e attended a n evening clas s where she learned wig assembly. She paid $18 for the class, but shortly after she had acquired the skill, the artificial hair industry collapsed.
In 197 3 alone, Mae worked i n three separate establishments. Attracted b y th e promise of 2c more per 1,000 plastic bags (for 2 hours of work), Mae phoned in 'sick' to the shop I visited and tried out another workshop that offered higher pay. However, the manager of the new workshop broke his word and reduced the wage to the cheaper rate prevailing on the labour market. Conceding that they had lost the dispute with the management, almost all of the women who worked there left for other shops, and Mae joined them, returning to the first plastic bag plant. But she was soon laid off due to a shortage of plastic materials, which the manufacturers imported from Japan but whose local supply was temporarily being hoarded by larger factories. For several weeks Mae worked only a few hours a day in her workshop, supplementing that with work in a larger factory with an adequate supply of materials. A few months later, the small workshop suddenly closed its door when the owner absconded with the funds. Ma e turned to another type of work altogether: seaming garments.
Mae did not undertake these job changes lightly, because they were costly in time and money lost. On her first day in the plastic bag workshop that I visited Mae earned only$ 1.60 because she had not yet learned how to use that particular seaming machine. On her second day there she earned $2.40. 'Still too low!' she complained- she was aiming for the $3.50-per-day wage that was her usual ceiling. Mae did not find th e transportation to the new shop convenient either, and she walked a round trip of 70 minutes between home and work to save 8c bus fare each way.
Mae attributed her poor and irregular working conditions, the frequent layoffs , and lack of work security t o the personalities o f the employer s operating i n th e competitive economic situation in Hong Kong. Her naivete of the local employment situation was grounded i n a basic incomprehension o f the international capitalis t division o f labou r an d Hon g Kong' s dependen t rol e i n thi s divisio n o f labour . Accordingly Mae stated the reason that the manager would not pay her the extra 2c per 1,000 bags was his 'stinginess,' whereas the next manager was 'all right.' Thoug h he laid off the workers without pay or warning when he ran out of materials, this was 'not his fault,' but was due to the 'competition among workshops for plastics.' Mae was not critical of the government, an d she rarely read newspapers. Regarding a then-current teachers' strike, Mae said vaguely, 'It's hard to know who is right, the government or the teachers.'
Mae wa s unaware o f the locatio n o f the expor t market s fo r th e product s sh e manufactured. She showed me a large yellow plastic bag she had finished on which was written, 'Have a safe Hallowe'en, from your Esso dealer,' embossed with a picture of a witch riding a broomstick. She did not know what Hallowe'en was. I thought it ironic that Mae had lost one of her jobs in a dispute over 2c for 2 hours of work, and yet the bags she seamed had so little value that they were to be given away with th e purchase of a tank of gas. Mae thought her firm also finished bags for Mexico, 'because the word s look like Spanish.' (I t seemed more likel y to me that th e bag s bore th e emblem of a chic boutique in New Haven or Chicago.)
Despite he r shallo w understandin g o f Hong Kon g exportin g practices , Ma e manifested a n undirected but vital response to her poor working conditions in the willingness to change jobs. Although her frequent job shifts were reflex responses to work problems, from which Mae fled instead of altering, she at least demonstrated a n active rather than passive stance. Hua, in contrast, was considerably less resourcefu l and remained in one factory for over 10 years. T have considered changing jobs,' Hua said, 'but I don't know any other trade. Also, I'm different from Mae, who changes jobs frequently. It's not worth it! You'll just have to change again later.'
Mae felt responsible for her family's economic station. Very close to her parents emotionally, Ma e willingly subordinate d he r personal goals to thei r vie w o f famil y needs. She saw very few contradictions between her personal work ambitions and the economic needs of the family. Mae had no personal work goals, but she would labour as hard on their behalf as she could. For that reason, it was not easy to discuss with Mae her 'future career ambitions,'a somewhat abstract concept that suggested a freedom of choice between work and marriage or between careers that she did not feel empowered to make. Whenever I raised this topic, Mae responded that she intended to do 'the usual thing' expected of young women- to work, see her brothers through school, then marry and continue until her own children arrived.
In this context, Mae' s work goals were limited t o the realistically attainabl e paycheck, friendly coworkers , and time for leisure. Elder sisters worked not only t o improve their family' s economic situation but als o to attain a greater sens e o f independence and to spend small sums of money on themselves. They were relatively satisfied with their paychecks because they were an improvement over the recent past. Hua recalled that at age ten she earned only 20c daily in a light bulb factory, and even then the employer did not even pay all of her pitifully low wages. 'The managemen t sometimes delayed paying me because I was under age and too afraid t o complain , until Mother would go and raise hell' Although consumer prices were considerabl y lower then (Hua paid only 10c for a meal and 2c for bus fare), the Goh family considered itself worse off in those days. On the contrary, Mae's 1973 daily wage of close to $3.50 was a decided improvement, even with the rise in prices. This decade-long gradual wage increase committed workers like these two women to tedious factory jobs because they helped alleviate family poverty and want.
The widenin g of the family's horizon's that followed it s solution of the critica l problems of shelter and hunger committed the offspring t o work even longer for th e common good. The stagnation of real wages from 1972 to 1974 further strengthene d the girls' commitment to work, because they were still expected to elevate their family's living standards.
Improvement of the young women's work situations was discouraged by the family, the international divisio n of labour (with Hong Kong workers performing labour -intensive, low-skilled manufacturing work) , and the educational system . The Go h family encouraged daughters to study only when the training did not interfer e wit h their current earning power. Although some of Mae's friends preferred jobs in which they learned ne w skills, few such jobs were available, and since most women wer e enjoined to remit their wages weekly, they invariably abandoned ideas of job training and upgrading in favor of higher-paying piecework machining. As a result, these two sisters and their friends were fixed in a work routine at an early age, and they could acquire other skills only at the fringe o f their working routines, in evening school . Their brothers, however, who were expected to contribute significantly to their parents' support, even after marriage, were more likely to undertake low-paying apprenticeships for several years or to remain in school longer, to ensure themselves better prospects for the future. Although an employed married daughter still contributes small sums from her wage packet to her own parents, she is not obliged to do so. This gives rise to the relative lack of concern for the daughter's future career opportunities, a carry-over from the patriarchal traditions of Chinese culture, which severely restricted those young women's chances for remunerative work after marriage.
Mae disliked her work but had no future job plans. Mae believed that the onl y kind of job advancement for a woman was to study sewing and tailoring skills in evening class and then leave the factory to become a tailor. Her friend I-ling did just that, but Mae rejected that idea. 'What other kind of job could I have?' she asked rhetorically.T don't know how to do anything else, and I don't like to sew!' Mae held a conventional notion o f women's proper sphere. Pointing to the man who ran the machine tha t painted the logo on the plastic bags, Mae said, 'Only men do that. Of course it's better paying than seaming work, but your hands get dirty when you handle that equipment.' After the small plastics workshop closed its doors, Mae turned to garment manufacturing despite her distaste for sewing.
The truncation of Mae's ambitions was consistent with the limited employmen t opportunities available in Hong Kong. For example, in the electronics industry, Mae's first job setting, the transnational corporations assign only a narrow spectrum of labour-intensive assembly jobs to their Hong Kong plants. But the reasons for the limite d career mobility i n factories and shops were little fathomed b y Mae or Hua. Th e educational system encouraged neither an understanding of the international political economy in which Hong Kong was situated nor the necessary technical training for women in those highly skilled factory jobs that did exist. Nor did the factory ever train Mae for its supervisory or management posts, which were filled by male graduates of technical institutes, and these technical colleges would not accept students like Mae and her friends wit h only primary school education. Som e of Mae's peers attende d private evening school in English, hoping to improve their service girls' qualifications, but the classes were for the most part poorly taught.
However, a few factory women were selected as 'lead girls'. Two of Mae' friends, A-li and Kitty , advance d t o such positions. At firs t bot h hesitated, doubtin g thei r ability to direct others, but ultimately A-li took the job. The second firmly rejecte d the position of section leader, stating, T was afraid that when I had 'm.c.' [menstrual cramps] I would not be able to work or give orders,' thereby revealing her agreement with the prevailing dictum that 'anatomy is destiny'. Thus, feelings of self-limitation and lack of social support, rooted i n their subordinate position i n the family, th e workplace, and the educational system, undermined th e determination o f Mae an d other women to compete for the few opportunities for advancement open to factor y hands.
Neither Mae nor her elder sister Hua compared their jobs unfavourably with those of their brothers, since they felt that men and women 'naturally' held different types of jobs. Instead, the y contrasted thei r work experiences with those of women of thei r social class in earlier generations. In so doing they realized that opportunities to work had broadened considerably compared to even the recent past. The speed of economic change was exemplified b y the fact that Mae's mother had never worked outside the home whereas her daughters held semiskilled factory jobs. Hua had remained for years at an unsatisfying job in the plastic bag workshop, whereas Mae, 2 years her junior, more easily transferred from one factory to another. The generational comparison that Mae mad e wa s thus rooted i n reality. The increase d importanc e o f single-sex pee r groups further underline d th e young woman's identification wit h other women lik e herself and suggested the inevitable contrast with women older and younger than herself.
Family relationship s
Mae's paid labour input to the family economy was a continuation of her earlier unpaid work at home. I t was assumed that th e elder children i n large families woul d tak e responsibility for everyday tasks, and Mae and Hua fulfilled thi s expectation. Many jobs fell t o them befor e the y wer e adolescents, becaus e o f their mother's bus y involvement with toddlers and infants. Hua and Mae hauled water daily and cooked, cleaned house, and washed clothes.
After the y joined the paid labour force, the two sisters continued t o view thei r primary goal in working as the elevation of their family's living standard. Even though Mae's earnings varied with her frequent change s of employer and the length of her work week, she generally contributed close to three-quarters of her wages to her family. Mae and Hua accounted for over two-fifths o f the family income in 1973, a relatively high proportion, because their father earned so little.
Hua and Mae clearly understood the centrality of their earnings, which helpe d the family purchase essentials: rent and food for the entire family, medical expenses, and education for the younger children. Rent for public housing was low, but utilities (including telephone) were expensive. Food comprised a substantial portion of their budget. Sociologists usually interpret a high proportion of family budget spent upon food as a trait of poverty, but there was little doubt that the Goh's meals improved in substance and appeal as their income enlarged. They could afford meat or fish daily, to eat out as a group in restaurants one or more Sundays a month, and occasionally to bring cooked food from stalls to eat at home.
Mae and Hua visited private physicians for minor ailments and they purchase d Chinese herbal medicines when ill. The two sisters' income also enabled the Gohs to pay for Second Brother' s education when he failed t o qualify fo r a government scholarship. As the family income rose with several members working, more consumer
Crisis and Consolidation, 1966- 1981
goods wer e purchased. Th e televisio n set , electri c ric e cooker , electri c fan , smal l refrigerator, an d sewing machine were all considered necessities in Hong Kong an d could normally only be purchased by means of the children's additions to the famil y wage. Thus, according t o Mae, her family came to enjoy a relatively comfortabl e existence only when there were more workers than dependents. 'Then,' Mae said with obvious satisfaction, 'our family was finally on its feet!'
For a family of daughters, this relatively comfortable life was necessarily of limited duration. Several years before Hua became engaged to Lan Bing in 1973, some of her income had been put aside for her dowry, and when Hua married at age 25, she could no longer contribute to the family budget. Mae's earnings became even more important than before.
Mother and Father took the daughters' income for granted, and the two sisters had little say about how their earnings were spent. Mae recommended that her younger brother attend her old primary school, and since her parents had little experience with educational institutions, they followed her advice. This did not signify their acceptance of a decision-making role for Mae. Nevertheless, Mae felt that her income contribution to the family did not go totally unrecognized, because she gained more freedom in her personal life. As long as she made the expected contribution to the family budget, Mae was freed for peer relationships of her own choosing, and thus she attained her goals in work: time to spend in activities with her friends. Mae legitimately withheld a part of her earnings for her own clothes and for outings with friends, such as Sunday tea and movies, which she could afford only when she was employed full-time .
Mae shared her mother's opinions about the importance of enlarging the family wage, and hence there were few conflicts over the money Mae spent on herself. She gave an example: 'I had to go to a wedding banquet and had to pay night school fees at the same time. So I talked it over with my mother. I said, To be a person, which, after all, reflects upon the family, I must give money a t the banquet. Furthermore, m y schooling might be beneficial to me in getting jobs in the future.' Mother agreed that both expenses were reasonable, and so we agreed that I would give less money to the family for several weeks.' Indeed, Mae could recall only one recent conflict with Mother over expenses. She wished to consult a Chinese herbal doctor about her cold, and her mother protested at the extra cost. But because Mae herself considered it a reasonable use of her earnings, she saw the herbalist anyway and paid for it herself.
Although Ma e remitted most of her money to her family, she spent her leisur e time as she wished. After she entered the labour force she performed little housework. Her mother di d most of it, and even her younger brothers helped out . Mae was at liberty to spend her spare time visiting friends, attending courses, and going on outings. But Mother found it unthinkable that Mae might ever move away from home and rent a room by herself, if only because of the drop in family income this would entail. In agreement with her mother's viewpoint, Mae never seriously entertained such an option.
Although th e sister s gained littl e authorit y i n th e famil y throug h thei r wag e contribution, they gained considerable status as 'good daughters' from that contribution and increased their sphere of freedom. Mae valued that enlarged personal sphere highly, especially when she contrasted her position to that of women of earlier generations, who had lower status and considerably fewer personal options.
Peers
Young people form a substantial and visible part o f Hong Kong life. Adolescents comprise a large sector of the population, and organizations like schools, factories, and clubs that draw members from teenagers and young adults thereby promote interaction among youths. Consequently, Hong Kong youths have many experiences in common and are aware of their status in society. After leaving primary school, where Mae and Hua first participated in meaningful activities with others their age, the sisters entered large factories with other girls also recruited from school. Ever since, the two sisters have worked side by side with other women of their age, and they freely turne d t o peers for assistance with job-related problems.
Friends helped the sisters locate work; Mae herself was an important link in the job information network. One evening during the wage dispute with the manager of the plastics workshop, I arrived at Mae's home to find her on the phone. A friend and former coworke r had just phoned th e name of a newly opened workshop that wa s hiring women to seam plastic bags. Next, several of her current coworkers telephoned to receive that information. This situation was not unique to Mae, and her friends also kept i n touch with their former workmates at picnic reunions or on the phone t o exchange job intelligence . The expres s purpose o f such reunions wa s social bu t expanding channels of information was also important.
When I spent a day in Mae's workshop, the informal assistance she afforded he r workmates was obvious. Mae twice stopped her plastic bag seaming to help two women next to her push and lift the 50-pound roll of plastic to their benches. The cooperation of two or three workers was not only necessary to perform mechanical tasks but it was also the means of learning the job, and in fact Hua had taught Mae to seam the bags. 'Otherwise I'd go too slowly while I was learning and wouldn't earn much,' Mae explained. She did not appear to begrudge the time such cooperation cost her, all the more striking given the rapid pace at which she resumed her piecework seaming, perhaps because she anticipated a future need for the assistance of workmates herself.
Work is just one identity-forming activity, and becoming an adult in Hong Kong involves learning many more social roles. Mae and her sister, having taken on heavy obligations at an early age, lacked an opportunity to enjoy an 'irresponsible adolescence' during which they could test out adult roles. This testing is especially important in a society like Hong Kong that is undergoing rapid social change, because youths cannot learn all their expected behaviour from adults. Friends teach each other about clothes, dating, Western films, picnics, and work opportunities. And youths look to the work setting for friends.
Mae's oldest friends wer e former workmates . Her photo album contained thre e major sets of picture, of which friends from work were an important part. One group of pictures showed three girls posing in different settings. The more recent of these were wedding photos. Mae explained that the three girls had been employed in the large
Crisis and Consolidation, 1966- 1981
plastic factory where Hua and Mae worked, and all five became fast friends. She asked me excitedly, 'Do you recognize me? This is my sister, and that is a friend who married two years ago. She has a baby now. That other woman married just last year. Now we hardly meet. Actually, our 'group' has only three who are unmarried, and pretty soon my sister will marry, too. Then the only other maidens left will be me and the othe r girl in the picture.' Mae pointed to a young woman in the snapshot who she called Kitty. Mae and Kitty went out together to film shows and teahouses and visited me at my apartment for lunch. When the other women married, Mae rarely saw them, and she and Kitty became inseparable.
Mae relied upon formal recreational group s for new experiences. The yout h activities sponsored by missionary and other welfare associations enabled young workers like Mae to make the transition to a youth-oriented culture with many links to the West. The missionary societies set out to provide 'something constructive' for young Hong Kong working people with spare time and money. Their Western-originate d peer activities filled the cultural vacuum.
Mae joined those activities with enthusiasm and was a responsible leader of her peer group just as she was a leader at home or in the workshop. Whenever an outing was planned, invariably it was Mae who compiled the list of participants and collected money from them . She arranged for each person to make or purchase foo d for th e parties of my English class. When I return to Hong Kong for brief visits, it is Mae who I phone in order to contact the other former language class members, their sisters, and friends.
The Hong Kong way of life is also influenced by the mass media. A decade ago the media barely reached the working girls, but their presence has since become pervasive. Like other Hong Kong youths, Mae saw films almost once a week, watched television several hours a day, and read fashion and movie magazines frequently. What i s the message of the media for Mae and her friends? When flown across the ocean do products and behaviour that portray Western centrifugal society directly influence the centripetal Hong Kong way of life?
Studies of the media's impact upon North American viewers' behaviour find, first of all, that people are likely to be influenced personally by ads if the product or advertised behaviour counters no important social norm.A related consideration is that whe n persons who are important in the viewer's milieu (what sociologists call reference groups) use or advertise the product, the viewer will be more likely to adopt it. Advertisers, well aware of this phenomenon, deliberatel y associate consumer products i n their commercials with images of powerful people and opinion leaders to suggest that viewers can become just as powerful i f they simply buy the goods.
Accordingly, Mae and her family ar e likely eventually t o adopt the consume r goods they view on television but are not likel y to accept the human relationship s portrayed in the media, because only the former accord with the fundamental norm s of Hong Kong society. For most of the women in Mae's milieu, the purchase of goods is limited chiefly by the amount of money available. Thus the most visible impact of the media was in the areas of fashion and entertainment, to which there was little parental opposition. As long as they had some money, Mae and her friends purchased clothes or records that were advertised.
The marriage and family relationships viewed in films made and influence d b y Hollywood containe d element s o f behaviour congruent with family norms, such as dating patterns , th e weddin g dress , an d honeymoons . Hon g Kon g youth s wer e encouraged by the media to date, and those who did not know the modern custom s and codes of dating could learn from the movies or press. For several years one local magazine,Lover (Ai-lu), gained popularity by capitalizing on this phenomenon. Many of the article s an d letter s t o th e edito r concerne d th e meaning an d cultivatio n o f 'love', and local starlets depicted the new marriage style in the magazine's pages.Lover thus profitably assume d the rol e of sounding board and contemporary authorit y o n dating and boy-girl dilemmas faced by young working women.
The cinem a presente d variou s comple x datin g situation s an d solve d the m i n Western fashion. The dilemmas presented in such films surrounding the institution of romantic love captivated Mae and her friends. The favorite films were Love Story, The Graduate, The Young Ones (a Taiwan film), and a Hong Kong film from the 1960s,The Prince and the Maid. The plots of these films featured a couple in love whose marriage was opposed by their parents. The film s showed that love triumphed ove r parenta l objections based on status, but the successful romance ended in the death of the bride (except in The Graduate.) Mae and her friends identified emotionally with the celluloid couples' love affairs and thought it tragic when the brides died.
However, th e impac t o f the cinem a upon Mae' s behaviour wa s limited by th e fundamental differences between the styles of courtship and marriage portrayed on the screen and Hong Kong family norms. Hua was introduced by friends to a young man she liked well enough to marry, but their relationship was successfully opposed by her
^ parents . In this situation Mae sided with the parents and not with 'romantic love' . Thus there was no opposition to these young women's adoption of clothes, grooming styles, and consumer goods that they saw on the screen. Such consumer goods countered few fundamental famil y norms . However, when it came to matrimony, th e media -portrayed famil y drama s tha t advance d th e children' s righ t t o ac t a s independen t individuals when choosing a mate fell on hostile ground. The mass media are also especially effective when there are conflicting expectations among th e group s that compris e the viewers ' social environment . I f people with contradictory socia l role s wish t o reduc e th e discomfor t o r eve n pai n cause d b y competing demands upon them, and if a product or behaviour i s presented by th e media as the means to resolve such role dilemmas, then such media can become very persuasive. Superficial media portrayals of family life and Western marriage that omit much of the reality and portray only the gloss may possibly encourage young Hong Kon g women in their conflicts with the older generation. Asked about the discrepancy that remains, however, between their vicarious enjoyment of love matches in Western films and their reluctance to counter their parents' opinions, A-li, a friend of Me, explained, 'Oh, we think that the Western way is really the best! We really want to learn how
they do it, even i f we ourselves can't always follow tha t way just yet.' The wome n adopt Western marriage values as portrayed by the media only if their families support them. Perhaps when the conflict of social opinion regarding their expected behaviour intensifies even further, Mae, A-li, and other friends will adopt the centrifugal marriage pattern of the media programs.
Dating and marriage
Mae did not have a boyfriend and rarely met eligible bachelors at work. This did not distress her, however. She once dated a man she met through friends in the factory . She recalled, 'The fellow did not phone me after that one time, so I guess he didn't want to keep up the relationship. Anyway, I'm too young to marry!'
When the time did come to marry Mae did not want Mother to arrange the match. Mae told of the way Mother interceded in Elder Sister's marriage plans: 'The person Hua is marrying is her second boyfriend. She met the first one on her own through a factory friend. Mother didn't like him and called him a 'teddy boy'.'
'Was he really a 'teddy boy' in your opinion?' I asked Mae.
'Well, he looked a bit like one, but the main problem was that he was not Ch'iu-chao. And so Mother arranged a marriage with Lam Bing, a Ch'iu-chao like us. Mother and Hua visited someone's home to meet Lam Bing. He answered a few questions, but both he and my sister were too shy to say much.'
Lam Bing turned out to be a low income earner. 'With the baby coming they have lots of money troubles. As for me, I prefer to accept complete responsibility for my choice, otherwise later I might blame mother!'
Mae intended t o marr y a person with who m sh e was 'compatible'. Having participated i n peer activitie s for severa l years, she valued th e kin d o f marriage i n which her husband would hold similar ideas and would be as much a companion to her as her friends had been. Since Mae and her parents saw things in much the same way, however, she did not exclude the possibility that a man introduced to her would become compatible. Compatibility could develop given enough time.
Mae's accommodation to members of the older generation did not extend to living with the m afte r marriage . Ma e an d Hu a bot h recalle d Mother' s lon g dispute wit h Paternal Grandmother, which was only resolved when the old lady was provided with her own quarters. Mae explained i t this way, 'Despite the fact tha t Mothe r i s very easygoing in nature, Grandmother wa s too conservative. There was no rea l ill will between them, but they always argued over their different ideas. ' That instanc e of generational conflict was impressed deeply upon the two sisters and they swore not to live with their own future mothers-in-law .
When Hua married in late 1973, she and Lam Bing first rented a small room near her mother-in-law' s residence . Lam Bing stressed the limits of his obligation t o his mother: 'We need not live together. So long as we give my mother the first choice of living near her, as opposed to living near my wife's mother, that's enough. Neither side wishes to do more than that. We don't really get along, and Mother herself wishes to preserve her independence. '
When the Lam's first child was born, Bing's face-saving attitude could no longer be maintained. A relative was sorely needed to care for their baby so that both parents could work. Mrs. Goh was willing to take over care of the child and so the coupl e moved into the Goh's Lok Fu resettlement estate apartment with Mother. At tha t point there were too many people in the Lok Fu flat, and Mae obligingly went to live with her aun t an d uncle i n their resettlement estat e apartment. Findin g that thei r small flat was still overcrowded, Mae's parents rented a two-room apartment in a nearby tenement in a district known as Kowloon Walled City, where rents were cheap.
Domestic arrangements for the Goh family
March, 197 3
A. Mother , Father, and six children live in two rooms in Lok Fu resettlement estate, Kowloon. Hua, the eldest daughter (age 25), is engaged to Lam Bing.
B. Father' s brother and his wife and children live in another resettlement estate . Their child occasionally comes to spend the night with the Goh family, and th e Goh children often stay with them.
September, 197 3
A. Mother , Father, and five children live in the same resettlement estate.
B. N o change.
C. Hu a has married, and she and Lam Bing rent a room in an apartment on Hong Kong Island. Hua is pregnant.
D. La m Bing's mother lives near the Lams with her brother's family. Mother Lam eats
with her brother's family and assists them with child care. September, 197 5
A. Residenc e unchanged, but now Hua's baby stays with Mother Goh. Mae has moved out.
B. Ma e moves to the resettlement estate room of her aunt and uncle.
C. Hu a and Lam Bing live during the week in their rented room. On weekends the couple returns to the Gohs' Kowloon resettlement estate rooms to be with their child.
D. N o change.
September, 197 6
A. Th e Goh family (Father, Mother, Mae, and four brothers) moves into a private two-room tenement flat in Kowloon Walled City. Mother continues to care for Hua's child.
B. Ma e moves out of her uncle's place, back to her family.
C. Hua , Lam Bing, and paternal grandmother Goh live in the Lok Fu resettlement estate rooms vacated by the Goh family.
D. N o change.
After Hua married and had a child, Mae's earnings were more important tha n
Crisis and Consolidation, 1966 - 1981
ever, and Mother was apprehensive about her possible marriage. Mae had anticipated gaining such centrality in the family wage-earning unit, and so at the time of her sister's engagement she emphasized to me her plans to remain single until Second Brother completed his schooling and went to work: 'Mother said I can marry whomever I wish, but even after I find someone I must postpone the marriage for several years. With Elder Sister married, we can't afford to lose another income just now!'
Realizing that her marriage was an event that concerned the family as a whole, Mae did not worry about being without a boyfriend. At the age of 22, she was not yet considered an 'old maid.' Because her parents and peers understood that Mae was meeting family obligations, and because those obligations were equally incumben t upon Mae's friends, little pressure was exerted to find a spouse. Mae's relative unconcern over being single was also related to the eventual possibility of arranging a marriage should she approach age 30 with no prospect in sight. At our last meeting, however, she was not yet considering this eventuality. She gained status from meeting her family obligations and she enjoyed opportunities to interact with friends. Neither would be possible if she were to marry.
Summary
As second daughter in a family of six children who were growing up while the family was in straitened circumstances, Mae was trained to put her family's definition of its economic needs before her own desires. The theme of Mae's life was that she not only accommodated the needs of her family but realized her own desire to enjoy peer-group experiences. Both were possible through Mae's factory employment. Her duties to her family did not prevent Mae from enjoying peer activities, and her loyal fulfillment of her family's expectations gave her more independence to pursue friendships.
f. Transformin g th e Rural Famil y
As always in Hong Kong's history, for a substantial number of people, settling into urban lif e i n Hong Kong implied a break with the rural past . In the 1970s, the trend of urbanization was rapidly reaching many New Territories villages. Some came under its impact earlier than others, some villages had to move to make way for urban development while others remained in situ, as it were, as three-storey houses built in the style of the 'Spanish villa' took over the village landscape, but none was spared fro m th e booming city . One should not jump to the conclusion that urbanization necessarily resulted in the nuclear family. The villagers of Kwan Mun Hau, noting the changes to their lifestyle, clung on to the values of the joint family.
Kwan Mun Hau Village was originally located on the shore near what is now the town centre o f Tsue n Wan. The population accepte d
compensation fro m th e Hon g Kon g governmen t an d move d t o th e ne w Kwan Mun Hau Village on the hillside in 1965. The author of the following entry lived in the new village for eighteen months from November 1968.
DOCUMENT VII.fl
: Som e explanations o f changes in household size , structure, and process (source: Elisabeth L. Johnson, Households and Lineages in a Chinese Urban Village, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1976, pp. 296-320)
Kwan Mun Hau households are now larger, on the average, than the y were 3 0 years ago. The large joint household is almost a phenomenon of the past, however, with only one such household presently existing in the village, although a number of joint property-households exist . There ar e now more stem family households tha n there were a generation ago, and fewer nuclear family households. There has so far been little tendency to divide stem households into nuclear ones, but potentially joint households have, with one exception, divided. Households continue to be organized patrilineally for the most part, although there are a few exceptions.
The explanatory variables discussed below are those first set out in the Introduction to this thesis, which presents those hypotheses relating family change and economi c development which have been proposed by other authors.
(1)Demographi c changes. The large r siz e of contemporary Kwa n Mun Ha u households must be explained by the demographic changes resulting from the village's involvement in the urbanization and modernization process. Particularly important is the fact that Kwan Mun Hau has become part of the urban milieu without the migration of individuals o r families fro m th e village . There i s now virtuall y n o migratio n o f individuals out of the village, one couple from household 6 and three brothers of ego in household 18 being the only exceptions. A few households from each of the lineages have moved elsewhere in Hong Kong, to China, or abroad. Both lineages also have households living in Hoi Pa Village, which was adjacent t o old Kwan Mun Hau, but this is nearby, within the city. In contrast, it was a common pattern during and especially prior to the 1930 s for individual men from village households to work either in th e urban areas of Hong Kong or abroad. In most cases they still retained property an d economic tie s with thei r households, and thos e who worked i n urban Hon g Kon g could return at intervals, but those who went abroad could return only rarely, if at all The dangerous nature of the work they engaged in (mining, railroad building) mus t have meant that they often did not survive to return. Both short - and long-ter m migration must have resulted in decreased fertility because they meant the separation of married couples . With th e early development o f Tsuen Wan i n the 1930s , suc h migration became unnecessary because local employment opportunities developed . The separatio n o f married couple s because o f the demand s o f employment i s now unknown. In contrast, the large number of single-person households among outsiders in Kwan Mun Hau suggests that migration has either disrupted marriages or prevented them from being made. Likewise, the relatively small size of outsider households and their simpler structure points to the disruptive effects of migration, for in many cases relatives were either left behind in China or scattered by separate migration and th e search of employment and housing in Hong Kong. The property base of such households would also have been lost through land reform and the nationalization of businesses in China.
There is little evidence for changes in marriage patterns in Kwan Mun Hau that would result in changes in household size, structure, or process. Marriage remains nearly universal and the average age at marriage appears not to have changed in the last 30 years, althoug h wome n marryin g during th e 1920 s and befor e wer e probably mor e likely to marry in their late teens, especially those who were married as small daughters-in-law*. The fac t tha t th e husband-wif e bon d i s now mor e solidary because o f th e prevalence of introduced and self-arranged marriages among younger people, suggests that wives have more influence on the timing of household division, and that th e nuclear family may tend to be more of a separate unit in relation to the rest of the household. Some property-households are unusually large at the present time because the me n hav e mad e polygynou s marriages , bu t suc h household s ar e no t alway s coresidential Polygynous marriages have often served to increase the number of children born to a man and thus the size of the property-household. As they are apparently declining in popularity, this change should have a negative effect on household size in the future.
The mos t striking demographic chang e i n Kwan Mun Ha u during the past 3 0 years has been the decline i n mortality, due primarily to the availability of modern preventive an d curativ e medicine . Whereas before abou t 1945 , approximately hal f the children born did not survive, the death of a child is now extremely rare. The decline in the occurrence of adult deaths also means a decline in early widowhood, which has a positive effect on fertility. The number of children born has probably increased slightly due to improved fecundity (related to diet and medical care) and the decrease in widowhood. This is difficult t o discern, however, because of the fact tha t children born since the Occupation have virtually all survived, resulting in very large families for women who bore children between 1945 and 1965. The pattern has now been altered by the fact that modern means of birth control became readily available in about 1965. Before that time, one or two village women were sterilized and one used a diaphragm, but most used abortion or nothing. Since about 1965, contraception has become not only available, but also known and accepted, so that many (although not all) younger women are choosing to bear no more than about four children. This means that many households will not have the large numbers of children characteristic of those in which the children are presently reaching adulthood; but low mortality means that virtually all will be assured of having the number of children they wish. There is therefore less need to adopt children into the household than there was in the past, as the need to adopt would result only from sterility (or possibly from failure to bear sons) rather than from child mortality.
A 'small daughter-in-law' was a young girl growing up in her husband-to-be's family, having been given away in marriage by her own parents at an early age.
Demographic changes have meant that the general pattern of household change has been:
(a)
Before 1940 , most large households were joint, formed by the postponemen t of division. There were many small households, nuclear in structure, consisting only of a couple (or widow) and a small number of children. Seven of eighteen households had more adults than children, when 'children' i s defined a s unmarried people les s than 30 years of age.
(b)
By about 1955-1960, there were many households which were large because large numbers of children had been born and were surviving, and the proportion of adults was relatively low.
(c)
Many families are now limiting the number of children born, so that although there will be more children tha n i n the pre-1940 families (onl y two households of nineteen have more adults than children) there will be fewer in the stage (b) families and the proportion of adults will gradually increase.
There is now emerging the potential for the formation of many joint households in the village, as most households have more than one male in the younger generation (see Table 7.2). Whether and in which households this occurs depends on a complex of other factors.
Table 7. 2 Survival of More Than One Brother to Adulthood, by Household
Household Ag e less than 30* Ag e 30-50 Ag e 50+
1 yes no no 2 -no no 3 yes yes yes 4 -yes yes 5 yes no yes 6 yes yes no 7 no yes no 8 yes -yes 9 yes no no
10 yes no ?
11 yes no no
12 no no yes
13 no no no
14 yes -yes
15 yes yes yes
16 yes yes -
17 yes no yes
18 no yes yes
19 -yes no
(2)Changes i n Property and Economy. With th e urban development o f Tsuen Wan, th e economy of Kwan Mun Hau has changed profoundly. Befor e abou t 1960 , household subsistence derived at least in part from agriculture. Before 194 5 rice and vegetables were grown and pigs raised; the surplus of these products, and pineapple s and pine trees, provided a source of cash income. Later, rice ceased to be grown and households either switched to growing vegetables or abandoned agriculture altogether, except for the raising of pigs and chickens for subsistence and cash. The bulk of the agricultural work was done by women, who also earned cash income as labourers (ego in household 19 , who also ran small businesses), employees in shops, government, or business; or worked as managers of small businesses, or large ones. By the 1930s, men no longer went abroad to work. Most households therefore drew part of their subsistence from their commonly-held agricultural property, but also depended on cash, earned by men an d women i n outside employment. Thi s i s probably typica l o f the Hakk a i n South China.
I do not know enough about Kwan Mun Hau agriculture to be sure what kind of household structure might be most functional i n this situation. ... It may be that agricultural activities were more easily carried out by a group of women than by a woman working alone. According to one woman (age60, household 4):
Although we were three daughters-in-law in my family, it was still not enough to do all the farm work. The older one did agricultural work, one looked after the cows, and I carried pig food.
She went o n t o say that th e olde r women i n the household di d the housework. I t would have been virtually impossible for a woman at that time to manage the agricultural work without a woman in the senior generation to look after the household and children. I heard of one case in which a woman had no mother-in-law and had to lock her small son in the house all day while she farmed. Hi s deviant personality (h e i s the wife -beater described in Chapter 4*) may in part result from this treatment. Thus, from the women's point of view, the stem family household, at a minimum, was essential.
From the point o f view of men, most were so dependent o n cash income fro m outside employment that I see no functional advantage in joint household organization except i n those case s i n which famil y propert y an d th e earning s o f members wer e sufficient to form and develop large family businesses. The only example of this in the sample and, to my knowledge, in the village is household 3 (and possibly household 14). To keep such businesses undivided has a clear functional advantage; but in terms of household structure, there is no reason why the joint owners should not divide to live, as they have in fact done.
Likewise, in the present Kwan Mun Hau economy, I see no apparent functiona l value to the joint household. Many households derive their principal support fro m
* No t included here -Ed.
rents, while i n some o f these an d al l others me n wor k a s employees, labourers , o r managers o f smal l o r larg e businesses . Th e time-schedul e demand s o f outsid e employment (job s held mainl y by poorer men and highly-motivated wealth y ones ) may mean that me n are not available in the household t o handle crises or manag e affairs, (one man, household 11, mentioned this as a problem) but as they work nearby this doe s not see m to be a problem seriously affecting family unity . Women ar e accustomed t o takin g charge . Some youn g an d middl e age d wome n no w wor k i n factories; others, and older women, stay at home to manage the household. The stem family household has functional valu e in this situation. Resident grandmothers ca n readily care for the children of working mothers.
It has been argued that during the urbanization process, as households becom e dependent on outside earnings rather than on the exploitation o f their commo n property, conflicts may develop between brothers in a joint household because of their differential earnin g powe r an d contributio n t o th e household . Tw o informant s mentioned this as a problem.
In the past, we maintained joint households because we respected the senior members of the famil y wh o wanted everyon e together , an d th e incom e o f labourers was similar to that of others so there were no disputes over finances. Now incomes vary a lot, so those who earn more are not willing to benefit the others. So for selfish reasons brothers prefer to separate. So, now it means to earn a living separately but to keep the property intact. In the past, the father usually collected all the incomes and managed the finances.
(man, age 56, household 8) In the past everyone did farm work. They did the same work for the sam e income. But now they do different work. The younger generation have better education so they have many different professions and different incomes which lead to different ideas within the same generation, so sons must live separately.
(man, age 34, household 12 )
I know of no households in which this is presently a problem, but there is only one joint household. It may have been the cause of disputes which led to divisions in other households. Kwan Mun Hau households have for years been dependent on cash earned elsewhere, but there probably was less possibility in the past for large differentials amon g brothers' earnings. From my observations, I would say that differential earning capacity at present results primarily from ability and/or personal choice, rather than a choice on the part of the family t o educate one son better than another. Girls are ofte n supported less than boys in their education, but as far as I could see boys are offered fairly equal opportunities, unless they are unable or choose not to study longer. Th e norm is strong for older siblings to contribute their earnings to the household and help support the education of younger siblings.
The nature of property owned by Kwan Mun Hau households has changed, with the development o f Tsuen Wan, fro m agricultural land , house land, houses, an d
Crisis and Consolidation, 1966 - 1981 34
businesses to house s i n th e village , buildings i n th e city , urban buildin g land , an d businesses. Some families still have farm land, but it is generally unused or occupied by squatters and will yield no income until it is sold. When the village moved, agricultural and house land were exchanged for houses in the new village and, for those who had a surplus, for building lan d i n the city. Almost half the village families di d not hav e enough land to cover the full cost of their new houses, and had to take ten-year interest-free loans from th e government. In some cases, the houses obtained may have bee n sufficient for their needs and the loans taken to meet the cost of additional houses, but in most such cases the families would not only have to pay off the loans but also would have no extra houses to rent out. Those who did not take loans are at an advantage, not only because they have had no loans to pay off but also because most have extra houses to rent out or land on which to build rent-producing buildings. This process must have increased economic differentiation i n the village. Families with more than one so n and onl y the hous e i n which the y liv e as property, having given up thei r agricultural land, will have nothing to divide among their sons but that house.
Thus, certain of the wealthiest households now have a large property base which produces income for members and can be divided among the family sons. The poorest families have only their own houses, but no income-producing property, and nothing to divide.I would expect the property to be a unifying force in wealthy households, although this would not prevent the brothers from dividing to live unless used by their father as a threat or inducement to stay together, his economic power reinforcing his authority. If a division of property were desired, urban land and buildings (but not businesses) coul d probably be more easily divided amon g brothers, with less loss of efficiency, tha n could agricultural land in the past.
(3)Housing Space .A variable directly related t o property ownership i s the availability of housing space. Shortage of housing space can either force or prevent the development o f joint households. One informan t (man , age 32, household 19 ) said the latter was a problem in the old village, while another cited the former problem:
In the old village we wanted to divide to live but had no more space. We were
not allowed to build more houses or add a floor as the government planned to
move the village ... We divided to live when the village moved. Many divided
then because there is a lot of room here. For example, one brother can live
upstairs and one downstairs. Brothers live close together. In the old village,
all the family members crowded into one house.
(man, age 56, household 8)
Now housing space is presently a problem for some families and potentially a problem for most. It is not possible either to add on to present houses (which are built according to a common plan) or to build new houses in the village, because the village owns only the land occupied by the houses and that immediately surrounding it, i.e., the terraces and sidewalks. Those poorer families who own only one floor or one house now generally have enough space to live, although some do not. Household 1 6 did not after th e second brother married. Some are very crowded, with ten or twelve people living on one floor. If a household owns only one floor, it cannot be partitioned into more than three rooms, or four at the very most, and each nuclear family must have its own room, at a minimum, as well as allowing a common room for eating. As sons from the often numerous families i n these households marry, they must either stay together unde r extremely crowded conditions, rent adjacent housing (if they are fortunate enough to find some available) and continue to eat together, or divide to live, with one or more nuclear families renting or buying housing either in the village or in the city.I saw one family face this crisis as the oldest son married. The family owns one floor an d ha s three sons and two daughters. The mother looked desperately for nearby housing t o rent and was finally able to rent a floor in a house two doors away, so the family was able to continue to eat together. The son moved into the family home with his wife and some of his siblings moved to the rented quarters.
Wealthier families (or at least those with more property, although their cash income might be low), may have enough space to form joint households, if the houses owned are adjacent. This would mean that they have to stop renting these houses to tenants, and thus lose a source of income. Household 6, which i s not wealthy but has tw o houses, lives on three floors of two adjacent houses and thus has an adequate number of bedrooms as well as a large living room. If the houses owned are not adjacent, thi s may prevent the development of a joint household, although there is sufficient spac e for all brothers. The married sons of ego in household 3 live elsewhere in the village, although the children of one live with ego. His second house is not adjacent t o th e first. He said:
In the past the Hung lived in joint households because the houses were large.
My old house had ten rooms, with the three brothers together, but now th e
houses are small so we must separate. If so many people were together it would
be like a chicken coop or a pigeon cage.
(man, age 55, household 3)
The process of dividing to live is made relatively simple by the fact that each floor of the new houses was built with its own kitchen and bathroom. No new kitchen has to be built, as it would have been in traditional houses, although the family may decide to build a stove in the new kitchen. Thus ego in household 7 and his brother divided easily because each floor of their house was already a complete living unit.
In summary, restrictions on building new housing and shortages of housing space will make it imperative for most poorer families to divide to live as sons marry. All except perhaps one son will have to leave the parental home and possibly the village to find housing . Wealthy families may not be short of space, but the fact that th e houses they own may not be adjacent ma y necessitate dividing to live. Because th e houses readily divide into separate living units the process is facilitated.
(4)Lega l change s an d governmen t intervention . Withou t governmen t intervention, an d the village leadership's response to the government offer t o mov e the village, Kwan Mun Hau would almost certainly be dispersed by now. Its location in a rapidly-growing city means that ther e have been restrictions o n lan d use and o n building since the development plan was first made, however. Inability to expand village housing may in the not too distant future result in the dispersal of many village families, as they find housing elsewhere in the city. The villagers are unable to use their increasing wealth to build new or bigger village houses to accommodate joint families, as did ego in household 3 while in the old village.
Informants mentioned that many families divided to live at the time of the move, although I knew of only one such case. A number of divisions of property-households took place at that time, however, at the urging of the District Office, in order to simplify the problems of compensation for house and agricultural land.
Some informants asserted that Hong Kong law is at variance with village customary law, which complicate s propert y division . There i s no wa y that peopl e ca n avoi d involvement of the government in property division, as all land transactions must be registered with the District Office. According to one man:
If brothers get along well, they can negotiate a settlement themselves, asking for help from elders or the village head. Now even if it is settled that way they must go to the District Office t o register it. But British law states that eac h brother should have an equal share, so this may lead to conflict betwee n brothers, or between brothers and the law. Therefore ther e may be disputes either because the brothers are not friendly o r because they want to follo w law rather than custom. This can become very complicated, and can lead to a loss of friendship between brothers.
(man, age 32, household 1 )
If such problems are common, they may delay the division of property-households, but would not prevent brothers from dividing to live. Present Hong Kong law makes it possible to go against customary law in the inheritance or division of their property if they so wish. They are now able to write wills and designate heirs. Ego in household 3 has done so. I suspect this may be to limit or cut off the inheritance of one son, with whom he allegedly has had conflicts.
In one respect, theabsence of government intervention may foster the development of more complex households. There is no government pension plan in Hong Kong, and social security provisions for those without support are minimal Ther e are fe w nurseries for the care of the children of working mothers, and the quality of care is not uniformly good . In this situation, the ste m family provide s valuable service s fo r dependent family members.
In foreign countries there are pensions for old people but in Hong Kong there are none, so usually children are responsible for their parents. Also, the concept of the family is more important for Chinese people.
(man, age 41, household 9)
(5)Authority patterns . The maintenance o f a joint household demand s the presence of a strong authority figure in the senior generation who can command respect and obedience , accordin g t o severa l informants . Althoug h olde r peopl e ar e stil l respected, they no longer have the power within the household which they held a generation ago, and relationships are more egalitarian. One reason may be that th e household property is less important as a source of support than it was, and in some cases is nonexistent, except for the house in which the family lives. It is more difficul t for a household head to control income that is derived primarily from members' earnings, although unmarrie d members , a t least , normall y contribut e thei r income s t o th e household. Most younger men (except those who live primarily off the family property) have the potential ability to separate from the household because of their own earning power.
In the past we respected our parents and had to live with them. If not, we would be gossiped about. People would say: 'He cares only for his wife and not for his parents.' Now as people find jobs outside they may live separately, but still must support their parents.
(man, age 40, household 6) In the past the young people had to obey any decision of the old and could never reject it because the old people kept the money and the property. But now they have learned a lot and can earn a lot of money and prefer to do what they want, not what the old people like. We can't do anything about it. Times have changed. But I don't like the change.
(man, age 67, household 15 )
Not having seen the previous situation, I cannot make this comparison, but I saw no evidence of any rebelliousness among the younger men, not much desire to leave the parental household or the village. Nor was I aware of any flagrant violations of parental authority . Instead , parent s see m to have voluntaril y cede d some o f thei r authority. Few would presume to attempt to arrange a son's marriage, for example.I asked th e me n i n th e intervie w sampl e whethe r the y woul d choos e thei r sons ' occupations, and without exception they said that this choice should be made by the sons in accordance with their interests.
I wouldn't force my son. We will see what his interests are. I will wait until he is in middle school to discuss it with him.
(man, age 34, household 12 ) My sons should follow the occupations they like. They shouldn't go into my business if they don't want to.
(man, age 55, household 3)
Thus, the present relationship of the old to the young is not heavily authoritarian. The old are treated with respect but, because of changing values and the loss of much
Crisis and Consolidation, 1966- 1981
of their former control over their sons' livelihood, they neither ask nor expect complete conformity to their wishes.
(6)Attitud e change . One woul d expec t tha t traditiona l value s regardin g th e household might be undermined by the fact that villagers now receive modern education and associate with outsiders in school and at work, as well as in the village itself. They also receive heavy doses of Western values through the omnipresent television, although this is a very recent development .
There is considerable diversity of opinion as to the desirability of joint households, and as to personal preference for stem or joint households. I asked informants whether they would like to live with their sons after the y marry. Of nine men (thre e in th e interview sample are already living with sons), two would like to live with their married sons.
It's best to separate people as far apart in age as my grandmother and myself. The old learned everything in the past; the young know new things.I don't want to live with old people but I would like to live with my sons after they marry. But it depends on them. Lots of disputes can arise from age differences. I prefer three generations together, not married brothers together.
(man, age 34, household 11 )
Six men would not like to live with their married sons. I prefer that my son separate after marriage because his way of thinking will be different.I like the idea of living separately but eating together. If the father doesn't have enough houses, they must be bought or rented. I prefer to eat together, because it then seems like a better family relationship.
(man, age 34, household 12 )
We agricultura l Chinese mus t give help t o our parents an d suppor t them . The best way is to live separately, perhaps giving one or two children to the old people so it won't be so quiet. I prefer that my son live separately, although I have only one. He could perhaps return once a week to eat. The generations' ways of thinking are different. Disputes could easily arise between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, especially when the men work outside the house.
(man, age 45, household 7)
This latter informant sai d that he and his wife disagree on this issue, as his wife wants to live with their only son. Three men mentioned disputes between women as a possible source of conflict in a joint or stem household. One said that women now prefer to separate because they are better educated than in the past.
One informan t ca n see good reasons both fo r remaining with his sons and fo r living separately from them .
I never thought about whether my sons should live with me but my wife said
it is better for them to move out and be independent and learn more fro m society. Furthermore, friction s might arise .. . I really would lik e a joint household. An old person likes help from hi s descendents.I don't kno w whether to consider my sons' future or myself.
(man, age 54, household 14 )
Several informants, both men and women, suggested that it would be beneficia l to their sons to separate from the household, as they would then have to take more responsibility; or that th e fact tha t the y had separate d would prove that the y wer e capable of managing. Conversely I suspect that one reason why household 6 stays together is that two of its members seem incapable of earning a living on their own. The second son is unmarried and works irregularly at some marginal occupation, while the first has not worked for ten years, apparently because of his illness. Their mothe r complained bitterly about their incompetence. The family's only cash income, apart from rents , is that earne d by the first son's wife and by the third son, although hi s remittances are intended only to support his wife and children.
Of twelve women informants (two not asked), five are already living with married sons. Of the remainder, four would like to live with their sons, although one of these is rather uncertain.
My son could live with me or move out. It doesn't matter. When you take a daughter-in-law, you would like her to live with you, but now many Hakk a people live separately. It depends whether they like old people or not. ...I would like my sons to stay but I will have to see how they are. I don't know how they will be. If they are capable they can move away with their wives.
(woman, age 32, household 11 )
One said that this is the general Hakka custom. Two women said definitely tha t they would not like to live with their sons, one because she fears conflicts. The othe r said:
I don't prefer to live with married sons. If they move away, it shows they are capable. I prefer that they separate. Married sons will have their own families. They should care for them more than their parents.
(woman, age 44, household 16 )
One woman (age 51, household 8) has no opinion, saying it is too far in the future to say. When asked whether a joint household is good, four men said that it is not and five that it is.
I don't like a joint household. It is held together by the old people and causes disputes between brothers and between their wives. You must have a large
house, which is impossible now. Now we don't like it. (man, age 41, household 9)
I prefer a joint household. The old people can help with the children and the young people can work. Old people prefer to stay with their sons and grandsons. But now the young people after marriage want to separate.
(man, age 67, household 2) One man was apparently referring to a joint property-household rather than a residential household.
I like a joint household, i n which the families live and eat separately but come together when they wish. (man, age 45, household 7)
Interestingly, two men who expressed a preference for the joint household said they preferred not to live with their married sons. They were evidently referring to a general value favouring the joint family, rather than their personal preference.
Of nine women asked this question, two do not favour the joint household.
The joint household is not good, as lots of conflicts occur. It is very hard for the old people. Therefore ifI had several sons I would separate them. Usually the sisters-in-law don't get along well If there is work to be done, they wait for others to do it... IfI had several sons I would live with whichever daughter-in-law was best. It is customary in the village that at property division th e widow gets a share, so mine would go to whomever I live with. Without that, who would want to live with old people? (woman, aged 48, household 9)
Seven do favour the joint family household, although most qualified their answers by saying that it is good if it is harmonious or if there is a strong household head.
A joint household is good. If the relationship between the men is good, that between the women will be. Then you will have people to talk with of the same experience and age. (woman, aged 62, household 1 )
In summary, informants are divided in their expressed preferences. Opinions are far from unanimous that joint households are good, or that it is best to live with married sons. Many informants perceived a change to values favouring the stem or even nuclear family household; but most expressed the expectation or at least the hope that even if their sons live separately they would continue to give them financial support and help. This was sometimes expressed in strong normative terms , as an important Chines e value.
g. Th e New Poor
In 1980, unemployment stoo d a t 3.8 percen t of the work forc e i n Hon g Kong.* Wages were rising; wh o remaine d poo r but th e aged and th e handicapped? The case was most strongly made by photographs reprinte d in the Hong Kong newspapers of elderly men living in bed spaces fence d by meta l wire . Socia l benefit s bein g introduce d b y th e Hon g Kon g government in the 1970s went some way to alleviate their distress, but money could not buy the isolation felt by the poor and elderly who had migrate d from home into a competitive society .
DOCUMENT VILgl: The living conditions of the poor and elderly (source: Dr Ho Kam-fai, Address in the Legislative Council, 23 October 1980 , Hong Kong Hansard, Reports of the sittings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1980/81 . Hon g Kong: Government Printer )
A joint survey conducted by the Hong Kong Council of Social Service and th e Social Welfare Department estimated that by 1979, 67,500 elderly people would be living in 'substandard and often inhuman living conditions' that is, 16,200 living in bed spaces, verandahs and staircase landings; 4,500 living in roof shacks, basements and attics ; 9,500 livin g i n other non-domesti c housing ; and31,000 i n temporar y structures.
In 1978, a survey undertaken by a group of Chinese University students projected that about 10,000 people were living in boarding houses in various parts of Hong Kong and Kowloon, includin g Tsuen Wan. About 40% of the inhabitants were above60 years of age. They lived on three-decker bunks, which were fenced in by chicken wire, and the y wer e sensationall y know n a s 'caged men' . The averag e boardin g hous e measured 90 0 square feet , includin g kitche n an d toilet , an d wa s occupied b y 6 3 inhabitants, thus the average living area per person was about 1 5 square feet. Living conditions were appalling:�X over-crowded, unventilated, squalid and dark. Almost half of the elderly inhabitants suffered fro m varying degrees of physical and menta l disorder. Roughly 80% of the elderly lodgers came to Hong Kong before 1960; a great majority of them did not have relatives here and lived on public assistance. To make matters worse , thes e lodger s wer e no t protecte d b y th e Landlor d an d Tenan t (Consolidation) Ordinance , becaus e th e boarding houses were registered fo r non -domestic use. The curren t boom i n real estate might heighten thei r fears o f being evicted, becaus e th e landlord s ma y tak e procedure t o repossess th e propertie s fo r redevelopment.
Lok-sang Ho, The Hong Kong economy: a 1985 review/ in Alex Y.H. Kwan, ed.Hong Kong Society, Hong Kong: Writers and Publishers'Cooperative, 1989, p. 51, citing Hong Kong government statistics.
h. A s They Kept Coming
Gradually, but only gradually, Hong Kong had to put a limit on the number
of immigrant s fro m Chin a who would b e allowed t o stay . Locking out ] prospectiv e immigrants did not stem the flow, but it must have reduced its i size . It must also have given a new meaning to being a Hong Kong resident, , indicate d by the possession of an identity card issued by the Hong Kong
government that from 197 4 all Hong Kong residents were required by law
to carry. People continued to come, but some were now legal and other s
illegal. They could have made yet another new underclass.
DOCUMENT VILgl: Locking out illegal immigrants (source: South China Morning Post 24 October 1980)
This appears to be the first time Hong Kong has resorted to a total lock-out of all illegal immigrants from China. Until the early 1950s people were free to come and go between China and the Colony.
This tradition of free movement dated back to the Treaty of Nanjing, which secured Hong Kong for Britain in 1842.
In 1953 the Hong Kong Government reluctantly began restricting the flow of people by making it necessary for people to possess valid exit documents from China before they could enter the Colony. On the other side of the border, the authorities also exercised exit controls. But many people entered Hong Kong by clandestine means. The population increased from 1.8 million in 1949 to 2.3 million in 1957.
By the late 1950s the Government described the numbers of illegal immigrants �X mostly arriving by sea �X as a 'serious' problem.
The problem turned into a nightmare in April 1962 when there was a sudden relaxation of controls on the China side of the border. Hundreds and then thousands of people swarmed across the border each day. It was a time of widespread famine in China following the disastrous agricultural policies of 'the great leap forward.' Hunger and the search for a better life propelled the would-be settlers across the border. The influx reached its peak on May 23, 1962, when 5,620 immigrants were arrested in the frontier area.
Hong Kong's hard-pressed security forces sent back to China as many illegal entrants as they could catch, after questioning them, giving them a meal and allowing them to rest. There was strong public sympathy for the hungry captives returned by truck and train to famine-stricken Guangdong province and New Territories villagers made several attempts to set them free. At the end of May, the Chinese authorities reimposed normal border controls as suddenly as they had relaxed them six weeks earlier. In that period 62,400 people had been repatriated but an estimated 60,000 had succeeded in sneaking illegally into Hong Kong.. .
For the next 13 years if illegal immigrants successfully got past guards on China's side of the border, they were allowed to stay in Hong Kong unless they were suspect
politically. There was little or no attempt at repatriation. If people were caught entering illegally they were usually charged with an immigration offence, detained for a week or so and then set free.
By the late 1960s, however, the number of legal and illegal immigrants enterin g Hong Kong began to worry the Government once more. Among the new arrivals were former overseas Chinese who had rallied to an invitation in the 1950s to 'return to the motherland.' They were now disillusioned with life in China and wanted to get back to their old homes in Southeast Asia. China was allowing them to leave.
The numbers of legal arrivals soared from about 100 a day in the late 1960s to 500 and 600 a day in 1973-4 . It was estimated, moreover, that for every person entering legally three or four were arriving illegally�X giving a total of about 2,000 people a day.
The Government made representations to China. On December 1 , 1974, Hong Kong reversed its 'open door' policy and began sending back illegal immigrants captured while trying to enter the Colony.
For illegals, the one major loophole was that if they managed to 'touch base'�X to reach their families i n Hong Kong�X they were allowed to stay permanently. The loophole has meant, at a conservative estimate, that Hong Kong has at least200,000 extra people today.
The Government's announcement yesterday amended the six-year-old repatriation policy to close the loophole . The tid e of public sympathy so evident when hungr y illegal immigrants were rounded up and repatriated in 1962, has apparently turned.
CHAPTER EIGH T
AFFLUENCE AND BEYOND
The 1980s and 1990s wi 11 be remembered as a time of anomaly. The decision reached b y th e government s o f th e Unite d Kingdo m an d o f th e People' s Republic of China in 1982 on the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 altered th e fundamental s o f Hon g Kong' s existence . Th e economi c restructuring of China with its impact on the expansion of trade and industry, especially i n th e Pear l Rive r Delta , brough t Hon g Kon g unprecedente d prosperity. Th e impac t wa s immediate . Th e Hon g Kon g governmen t abandoned representation through appointment in favour of public elections. The number of Hong Kong people who sought to emigrate soared. But Hong Kong people became affluent, hopeful of long-term prospects in China but cautious o f th e immediat e consequenc e tha t politica l chang e migh t brin g to thei r livelihoo d an d thei r children' s caree r opportunities . Whateve r optimism they held was temporarily repelled by the Tiananmen Incident in June 1989. Nevertheless, as the wheels of history turned on, they prepared for the future.
a. Ou t of Apathy
No observe r ha d anticipate d th e event s tha t too k plac e a t Tiananme n i n Beijing an d non e th e spontaneou s reactio n o f Hon g Kon g people . Unti l then, n o inciden t i n Hon g Kong' s histor y ha d rallie d 40,00 0 peopl e ont o
1 th e street, let alone half a million. Whatever the means by which the Hong Kong governmen t migh t choos e t o reac h th e Hon g Kon g population , th e support in the rallies demonstrated that psychologically, Hong Kong's politics was neve r fa r fro m China' s politics . A t heart , Hon g Kon g peopl e wer e Chinese.
DOCUMENT VIILal : Unprecedente d mas s support (source : Emily Lau, 'Ou t o f apathy', Far Eastern Economics Review 1 June, 1989, pp. 17-18)
The Chinese government's attempted crackdown on the student pro-democracy movement has spurred Hong Kong's mass political awakening. Almost40,000 peopl e braved the winds and rain of Typhoon Brenda on 20 May to rally. . .
The 20 May demonstration which provided the first glimpse of local people's strong reaction to events across the border, took place in a city almost immobilised by a typhoon. The demonstrators attended a rally and then marched to Peking's [Beijing's] quasi-diplomatic representativ e i n Hong Kong, the Xinhua news-agency, to protes t against the crackdown. The following day, a crowd estimated by police at over half-a-million flooded the streets and a rally was held in a local race course, which is opposite the Xinhua offices .
Initially, pro-Peking group s wer e reluctant t o suppor t th e students , but a s th e situation in Peking and other parts of China deteriorated, leftist trade unions, teacher organizations, newspapers and even some staff at Xinhua, pledged their support for the students. Some local NPC [National People's Congress] delegates and members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a political advisory group, urged Peking not to use force against the students and to lift the blackout on live televised news an d o n foreig n correspondent s conductin g interview s o n th e street s o f Peking. . .
One ironical impact of China's turmoil in Hong Kong, has been the apparen t change of stance on the part of some conservative industrialists. Hong Kong businessmen such a s tycoon an d Basi c Law Drafting Committe e membe r L i Ka-shing, who ha d opposed the development of democracy locally, have voiced support for the students. Industrialist Stephen Cheong, a staunch opponent of direct elections, now called for speedier democratic changes. Businesswoman Veronica Wu of the New Hong Kon g Alliance, a newly formed political party representing business people and professionals, said if political reforms were implemented in China, the pace of political developments in Hong Kong also could accelearte. . .
The huge demonstrations in Hong Kong also have shown up the inefficacy of the pro-democracy lobby , which has been trying in vain to galvanize the masses for th e past few years. The most successful rally they organized managed to attract about 7,000 people, while the usual turnout had been about 500.
b. Ric h and Poo r
Affluent Hon g Kong lived with the luxury that the 1980s could provid e th e 'yuppie' generation the world over . As affluence was transformed int o job opportunities, the flow of immigrants from the neighbourhood continued ; the neighbourhood wa s now no longer confined t o south China, but in the 1980s it was to include noticeably the Philippines and Vietnam .
Affluence and Beyond
In the 1980s, many Filipino s were recruited to work as domestic maids in Hong Kong families. The Vietnamese came as refugees; they were confined to closed camps and most were re-patriated to Vietnam.
DOCUMENT Vlll.bl : A n affluen t generatio n (source : Censu s an d Statistic s Department, Hong Kong, Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Summary Results, Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, 1986 , pp. 15-21)
Educational attainment o f the population has improved markedly over the past 10 years. The improvement was particularly significant in the higher levels of education (matriculation and tertiary education).
Table 8.1 Educational and Economic Characteristics of the Hong Kong Population
Educational Attainment of Population
Educational Attainmen t 1976 1981 1986
No schooling/kindergarte n 18.5% 15.5% 13.8%
Primary 47.1 39.9 35.3 Secondary 29.2 36.3 39.5
Matriculation 2.0 3.7 5.4 Tertiary educatio n
Non-degree cours e 0.7 1.9 2.4
Degree cours e 2.5 2.7 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
School Attendance of Population
Age Grou p 1976 1981 1986
3-5 60 % 83 % 92 %
6-11 98 98 99
12-16 79 84 93
17-18 44 45 56
Labour Force
1976 1981 1986
Population age d 15 and above 3 07 7 70 0 3 74 9 10 0 4 14 9 100
Economically activ e populatio n 1 92 2 50 0 2 50 3 80 0 2 75 3 800
(Table 8.1 cont )
(Table 8.1 cont )
Participation of Population in Labour Force
Year Male Female
1976 80.4 % 43.6 % 1981 82.5 49.5 1986 80.9 51.2
Median Age of Labour Force
Year Male Female Overall
1976 35.5 year s 28.1 year s 33.1 year s
1981 33.3 28.8 31.8
1986 34.3 30.3 32.9
Occupational Distribution of Working Population
Occupation 1976 1981 1986
Professional, administrative and managerial workers 7.5 % 8.5 % 11.7% Clerical and related worker s 9.6 12.0 14.5 Sales worker s 11.4 10.3 11.7 Service worker s 14.8 15.6 16.4 Production and related workers, transport equipment
operators and labourers 52.2 50.7 43.4 Others 4.5 2.9 2.3
Total 00.0 100.0 100.0
Income from Main Employment
Monthly income from main employment 1976 1981 1986
Under HK$ 1,000 71.8 % 18.7% 6.4 %
HK$1,000-1,999 21.0 49.6 21.8 HK$2,000-2,999 3.8 18.2 29.8 HK$3,000-3,999 1.6 6.6 18.4 HK$4,000-4,999 0.4 2.6 8.3 HK$5,000-5,999 0.5 1.3 4.6 HK$6,000-7,999 0.4 1.1 4.4 HK$8,000-9,999 0.2 0.5 2.1 HK$ 10,000 and over 0.3 1.4 4.2
Total 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
Median monthly earnings from main employment 197 6 198 1 198 6
At current price s HK$ 742 1,516 2,573 At 197 6 price s 742 1,010 1,125
Affluence and Beyond
An increasin g proportion of children aged 3-5 were attending kindergarten an d nursery, 92 per cent in 1986 as compared with 60 per cent in 1976. The rate of school attendance for children aged 6-11 was close to 100 per cent. The attendance rate for the age group 12-16 and the age group 17-18 has risen from 79 per cent to 93 per cent and from 44 per cent to 56 per cent respectively, as a result of improvements in school attendance at the secondary level of education and matriculation. The smaller increase in the rate for these two age groups between 1976 and 1981 can be explained by the inflow of young immigrants, who had a lower tendency to attend school.
The population aged 15 and above in 1986 increased by 10.7 per cent over 1981 and the labour force increased by 10 per cent. As a result, the labour force participation rate decreased slightly from 66.8 per cent in 1981 to 66.4 per cent in 1986.
The labour force participation rate for males showed a slight increase over the years 1976-86, falling back from a peak in 1981. The high male participation rate in 1981 can largely be explained by the significant inflo w o f young male immigrant s (there was a higher tendency among these immigrants to seek work). The labour force participation rate for females, on the other hand, increased steadily during the 10-year period. The increasing trend in the female rate was partly due to the inflow of young female immigrants (again who had a higher tendency to seek work) before the change of immigration policy and partly due to increasing female participation in the labour force.
With the inflow of immigrants largely subdued, the labour force grew older again in 1986 as a result of the aging of the population.
Over the past 10 years, there was a significant change in the occupational pattern of the working population. In 1976, over half of the working population were production workers; in 1986, the figure was 43.4 per cent. The proportion of those in professional, administrative an d managerial occupations has risen from 7. 5 per cent t o 11. 7 pe r cent. Th e proportion s i n clerica l an d servic e occupation s hav e als o increase d appreciably.
Incomes from employmen t fo r workers increased substantiall y durin g the year s 1976-86. In 1976, more than nine-tenths of workers earned less than $2,000 a month; in 1986 , the figure was 28.2 per cent. The median monthly earnings , calculated a t 1976 prices, increased from $742 in 1976 to $1,010 in 1981 and to $1,125 in 1986, indicating that real income from main employment grew at an average annual rate of
7.0per cent between 1976 and 1981 and at a rate of 2.2 per cent between 1981 and 1986.
DOCUMENT VIII.b2 : When even the posh can go lean (source: Michael Taylor, 'Gloom a t th e Top , Hong Kong' s Poshes t Shop s Fac e Leane r Times' ,Far Eastern Economic Review 4 October, 1990 pp. 79-80)
Sales came early this year to some of Hong Kong's most glitzy upmarket shops , stayed longer, and ended only after dramatic discounts finally cleared the shelves of designer products. For shoppers, the bargains confirmed Hong Kong as a place to spend
money fast. But for luxury goods retailers, the prolonged sales season revealed a market in crisis. It is not easy to quantify the problem, but the anecdotal evidence is unmistakable: the sector is struggling to pay for soaring overheads out of stagnating turnover.
Gucci's general manager in Hong Kong, K. Yasui, says, 'Margins are under greater pressure than ever before. It's a survivor's game.' Upmarket department store Lane Crawford wil l be hard put to match it s earnings forecast, warn s president Frederic k Doe, though business is 'not disastrous.' The general manager of a top European prestige goods retailer, accustomed to 30% growth a year, is happy just to be wringing marginal turnover growth out of the market. The managing director of a high-class retail chain with some 40 outlets in Hong Kong just says, 'It's really bad.'
The sales season demonstrated that. Normally, Hong Kong's summer sales last for a couple of weeks in July. This year, the first sales signs went up in June, and some have yet to come down. Lane Crawford's Doe speculates that an impromptu sales season may materialise in October, though not, he stresses, at Lane Crawford .
The immediate crisis is the result of long-term trends and short-term accidents , global influences and local pressures. 'When you have so many small factors, it starts to affect people's psychology,' says a director of one of Hong Kong's largest upmarket retail chains.
Monet Schemm , genera l manage r o f Louis Vuitton i n Hong Kong , says, 'Th e slowdown started with the decline of the yen in early 1989, followed by Tiananmen Square, th e declin e o f the stockmarket , anothe r perio d o f decline i n the yen and , today, the Middle East crisis. Customers have obviously become more cautious.'
Rents in Hong Kong's prime shopping areas are the second or third most expensive in the world. Typically, rents will swallow 15-20% of a prestige shop's turnover, though they vary enormously in Central, the territory's main shopping and commercial area. Hong Kong Land's The Landmark complex commands the highest rent renewal rates, up to HK$300 (US$42.3) per sq.ft.a month; space across the road has recently been fetching just HK$120 per sq.ft.
One director at a major Landmark tenant says, 'You can't get rent reductions. But we have negotiated a reasonable increase�X last year the landlord was talking about 100% increases.'
Lane Crawford's Doe says: 'In the past shopkeepers have paid whatever rents are being asked i n orde r to get int o prime locations. Some o f the rents ar e simpl y unsupportable.'
Dickson Concepts has about 40 retail outlets in Hong Kong and has in the past paid top dollar for the locations it wants. Nevertheless, it treats each shop as a separate profit centre, closing those that lose money. This year it relocated two shops in Central to cheaper premises nearby.
It is not alone. Nicholas Brooke, partner of property consultants Levett & Bailey, says: 'We know of two retail chains at the top end which are looking at each and every outlet.'
For some retailers there is nowhere else to go. Yasui of Gucci, which is based i n
Affluence and Beyond
The Landmark, says: 'We have to be in a prime location in Central.' Gucci's rents are estimated to be among the highest in the territory at HK$300-5 00 per sq. ft.a month.
But the basic problem is stagnating demand. For some luxury retailers, the story begins and ends with the relative weakness of Hong Kong's tourist industry. Tourists account for 70-80% of Gucci's business, which the company believes is typical at the top end of the market. Louis Vuitton does not disclose its tourism dependency, bu t rivals assume it is all but total. Tourists account for half of Dickson Concepts' Hon g Kong retail business�X two-thirds of it Japanese and another 15-20% Taiwanese.
Dickson Concepts' chairman Dickson Poon once remarked that the number h e kept the closest eye on was the number of Japanese tourists.
The news from the Hong Kong Tourist Authority [Association] is not encouraging: though in the first half of the year, 3.5% more Japanese tourists arrived in Hong Kong (compared with the same period in 1989), at HK$4.9 billion, they spent 3.4% less. In the same period, the average Japanese tourist spent HK$7,706 during his stay, 6.7% less than last year. Spending per day fell 6.4% to HK$2,612. Worst of all, the average Japanese tourist cut his shopping budget by 8%.
The day s of tour coache s disgorging hungry hordes of Japanese int o the Loui s Vuitton showroom may be numbered, for as far as luxury retailing is concerned, there is a clear long-term trend of Hong Kong losing its comparative advantage over Japan.
Hong Kong's luxury retail sector has long been a major beneficiary o f Japan's byzantine distribution system, which has kept prices of luxury goods vastly higher i n Tokyo than in Hong Kong. Dunhill conservatively claims price differentials amoun t to 'about 35%, as a rule of thumb.'
However, th e Japanese distributio n syste m i s under attack , particularl y i n th e context of US-Japanese trade negotiations, and Japanese retailers have come unde r pressure from the Ministry of Trade and Industry to bring their prices more into line with the rest of the world. At the same time, European luxury goods suppliers are keen to escalate Hong Kong prices to Tokyo levels, and pocket the difference .
For much of the year, Hong Kong's diminishing comparative advantage over Tokyo was exacerbated by a weakened yen. At the beginning of the year, the exchange rate was HK$1 :�D18.47, but by April the Japanese currency had slumped to �D20.45. Japanese tourists found their yen budget slashed by more than 10%.
In addition, Japan's April 1989 imposition of a 3% sales tax had the pervers e effect o f lowering the price of European luxury goods, as it was accompanied by the abolition or reduction of high import duties.
But if the first half of 1990 saw the comparative impoverishment of the Japanese tourist, i t also saw the dramatic emergence of the free-spending Taiwanes e shopper . Total Taiwanese spending in Hong Kong's shops shot up by 44.8% to HK$3.3 billion in that period, making the Taiwanese tourist the second-largest sourc e of shoppin g income after the Japanese. Total spending per head rose 41% to HK$5,145, and spending per day rocketed 56.7% to HK$2,404.
From the luxury goods retailers' point of view, the Taiwanese is the ideal tourist: statistics reveal him skimping on his hotel bill to conserve his spending money.
The Taiwanese visitor spends a far greater proportion of his money shopping than any other tourist, 65.8% compared with the Japanese tourist's 58.1%, and a global average o f 51.6%. The averag e Taiwanese touris t spent HK$3,385 i n Hong Kong' s shops in the first half of the year, 58% more than the corresponding period last year.
But hopes that the Taiwanese would sustain the market died with the collapse of regional stockmarkets in the wake of the Gulf crisis. The 'wealthy effect' took a swift toll. 'The August stockmarket crash has had an impact�X fro m mid-August, there has been a dearth of Taiwanese customers,' one luxury goods retailer says. His lament is echoed by Yasui of Gucci: 'Those rich people have lost a lot of money.'
The upshot is that retailers have been thrown back on demand from the wealthier ranks of Hong Kong's 5.7 million population. In theory, local demand should be buoyant. Not only have wages rocketed, but negligible real interest rates offer little incentive to Hong Kong people to leave the money in the bank. Those companies which have not previously targeted the local market have been pleasantly surprised. Dunhill says it has doubled it s sales to Hon g Kon g customers thi s year, while Loui s Vuitton claim s ' a healthy growth in sales to local clients.'
But other retailers, with a greater local market exposure, tell of local demand falling sharply after th e collapse of stockmarkets. Joyce Boutiques, which generate s about 65% of its turnover from the local market, in the prospectus for its forthcoming listing admits that 'sale s for the month o f August. . . wer e lowe r than fo r the corresponding month last year,' despite having increased its retail floorspace.
A directo r of a large Hong Kong high-end retail chain i s blunter: 'Whe n th e stockmarket went down, it affected loca l customers' psychology: people are saying 'Emigrate first, and then spend like hell'.'
Coming on top of damaged consumer psychology has been a de-Centralisation of Hong Kong shopping. This year has been a bonanza for Swire Properties' Cityplaza�X an increasingly up-market shopping mall based several miles from Central. The change in local shopping habits is precisely measurable, since Cityplaza rents are based on the level of turnover.
David Mahoney of Swire Properties says, 'We know exactly what the turnover of our clients is . Year on year, the improvement this year for Cityplaza a s a whole is approximately 40%. Last year it was 28%.'
Hong Kong's resilience is regularly astonishing, so it is too early to tell whether the luxury goods sector will recover it s profitability. Bu t the crisi s has prompte d speculation that Hong Kong might be overshopped, as far as luxury goods outlets are concerned. There are too many shops for the market to support�X a lot of firms do fairly well, and a lot go bankrupt,' Doe of Lane Crawford warns, though he is confident about his own company's expansion plans.
Asia i s now said to be the largest market for luxury goods, and, outside Tokyo, Hong Kong is the major sho p window. European suppliers' designs on the territor y have been intensified, retailers say, by the problems afflicting major US retailers. An excess supply of European goods must affect the price of prestige.
Luxury retailers are fittingly snooty about the company they keep, and segment
Affluence and Beyond
the market into divisions of prestige. 'We pretty much recognise each other,' says the general manager of one indisputably 'first division' supplier. 'When the third and fourth division firms start moving in, you know the place is getting badly overshopped.' O n this analysis, Singapore is 'definitely overshopped' while Hong Kong is only 'probably overshopped.'
Nevertheless, not al l i s gloom. First, the marke t i s buttressed b y Hong Kong' s luxury hotel infrastructure; hard-pressed hoteliers will continue to find ways to bring potential shopper s into the territory . And at the very top end o f the market, lif e continues a s normal. Rolls-Royce has sold all its 1990 Hong Kong allocation o f 36 cars, and has secured another nine for the territory this year. Luxury retailers are not expected to be among the buyers.
DOCUMENT VIILb3: At the bottom-end of the wage scale (source: Extracted from Working Part y o n New Arrivals , Communit y Developmen t Division , Hon g Kon g Council of Social Service, and Social Sciences Department, Lingnan College,Report on the Social and Economic Adaptation of the Chinese New Arrivals in Hong Kong, 1985 )
The respondents were relatively young with the median age of 29 and mean of 31. Specifically, 70.4% of the respondents ranged from 18-3 4 years of age. Concerning their sex, 67.4% of the respondents were male and 32.6% of them were female. 54.1%of the respondent s were married, 44.8% single, and 1.1 % widowed o r divorced.
Taking the distribution of sex of the respondents into account, it was found tha t there were more males in the single group (48.3%) and more females in the married group (59.5%).
The majority o f th e respondents , 65.3 % have bee n residin g i n Hon g Kon g for 3-1/2 years to less than 6-1/2 years. Most of the respondents came from rural areas in Mainland China (59.0%), 25.9% from towns, and 15.1% from cities. 68.6% of the respondents came from Guangdong Province of Mainland China , and 23.1% from Fukien [Fujian]. Among the respondents, 56.3% of them were legal immigrants from Mainlan d China and 43.7 were illegal. Almost all (98.9%) of the illegal immigrants came from Guangdong Province of Mainland China. When we take their sex into consideration, it is found that there were more male illegal immigrants and more female legal immigrants.
Findings als o indicat e tha t illega l immigrant s wer e younge r tha n th e lega l immigrants. The data shows that the proportion of illegal immigrants was higher i n the age groups of 18-24 and 25-29.
A substantial proportion of the respondents (61.5%) resided in private housing, 14.1% in public housing, 12.6 % in wood squatter, and the rest (11.9%) i n quarters, stone squatters and others.
Among those living in private housing, 58.3% were renting a room, 17.7% renting a flat, 16.9% self-owned, and the rest 7.1% were either by instalment or renting a bed. Of these living in the public housing, the majority of them were living in temporary housing (49.1%) and public estate (46.4%).
Bearing in mind that the standard per capita floor space for public estates in Hong Kong i s 50 sq.ft., a large proportion o f the respondents (57.1%) lived below that standard.
Most of the Chinese new arrivals were factory workers (38.5%) engaged in textile, electronic an d garmen t industries ; the n skille d worker s (21.7% ) e.g . carpenters , electricians an d masons ; catering worker s (8.5% ) e.g . waiters, cinema-guides; an d construction workers (6.2%). Only a few (4.7%) of them were clerical, managerial, professional workers and salesmen.
The distributio n o f the curren t monthl y salar y of the respondents i s shown i n Table 8.2. It is found that 73.2% of the working respondents' monthly salary ranged from HK$1,500 to 3,499 with the mean of HK$2,522.70 and median HK$2,400.
Table 8. 2 Distribution of Current Monthly Salary of the Respondents
Monthly salar y Number %
Less than 50 0 2 0.3
500-999 11 1.6
1,000-1,499 61 8.8
1,500-1,999 129 18.5
2,000-2,499 163 23.4
2,500-2,999 104 14.9
3,000-3,499 114 16.4
3,500-3,999 50 7.2
4,000 o r abov e 62 8.9
Total 692* 100.0
* 12 cases of 'no answer', 2 cases of 'don't know ' and 129 cases of 'not applicable ' are excluded.
Generally speaking, language is one of the areas which affects adaptation , for it influences communication between local residents and immigrants, opportunities for making friends, understandin g th e habits and customs o f the new society an d als o some life opportunities such as job-hunting and prospect of job promotion.
The focus of the following discussion on language problem is mainly on Cantonese and English. It is because Cantonese i s the major medium of communication an d is
Affluence an d Beyon d
more crucial to new arrivals' social life adaptation. On the other hand, English is more crucial to new arrivals' job-searching and promotion.
Although 68.7% of the respondents came from Guangdong Province, still 49.5% of them claimed that they did not know how to speak Cantonese, and 10% could only speak a little during their early arrival.
The effects of poor ability to speak Cantonese might lead to difficulties in making new friends . Those new arrivals who could not speak or could speak only a little Cantonese might have more difficulties in making new friends than those who could.
Non-Cantonese speakin g respondent s wer e mor e likel y t o mak e friend s wit h Chinese immigrant s than thos e Cantonese speakin g respondents. On th e contrary , those Cantonese speaking respondents were more likely to make friends with Hon g Kong local residents.
Finally, when we asked those non-Cantonese speaking respondents how they learn Cantonese after arrival in Hong Kong, we found that very few of them (0.7%) lear n Cantonese b y attending languag e courses. Most o f them lear n by just talking wit h colleagues (37.2%), watching television (27.0%) and talking with friends (20.7%) .
We asked the new arrivals if they were being discriminated against in the following aspects:
(1)
job-huntin g
(2)
salar y and fringe-benefit s
(3)
prospec t of j ob promotion
(4)
educationa l or professional qualificatio n
(5)
makin g friends with local residents
The first four aspects relate to job opportunities and the last one is concerned wit h social life.
The response of new arrivals revealed that most of them did not find themselve s being discriminated against. Only some feel being discriminated against in the aspect of job hunting (38.0%) and recognition of professional qualification (27.3%) .
DOCUMENT VIILb4: Why were people poor in Hong Kong? (source: Nelson W.S. Chow,Poverty in an Affluent Society, a Report of a Survey on Low Income Families in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Department o f Social Work, Chinese Universit y o f Hon g Kong, 1982, pp. 96-97)
We admitted that we had adopted a rather novel design to measure poverty. When we first began our research, we were not sure whether this approach would ever come up with useful information to help us establish a poverty line relevant to the situation in Hong Kong. We were indeed very much excited when our deprivation index indicated that a deprivation threshold did exist and a proportion of households could reasonably be considered to be living in poverty. If our findings were valid, the poverty line that existed in Hong Kong in mid-1981 was a monthly income (a monthly expenditur e should be more accurate as the amount denoted what the household needed to spend) of $2,000 to $2,199 for a household and $400 to $499 for a single person. A household has an average size of four members. According to the preliminary results of the 198 1 Census, 9.5 percent of the households received a monthly income of less than $1,000 while a further 19 percent received less than $2,000. Since no information had yet been released regarding the sizes of the households having less than $2,000 monthl y incomes, we had no way of calculating the actual number of families or persons who were deprived in their living styles.
Why were people poor in Hong Kong?
There is certainly no single reason which causes poverty. At the time of our survey, unemployment wa s certainly no t th e majo r caus e of poverty. Even amon g the fiv e percent of households which reported having unemployed members, few of them had only on e workin g person . Near-to-ful l employmen t situatio n i n Hon g Kon g ha d undoubtedly helped many families to live above the poverty line. Nevertheless, th e prevalence of more than on e working member i n the household indicate d tha t th e earnings of only one person was generally insufficient t o support a family. In other words, considering th e standar d o f living i n Hon g Kong , th e persona l wages wer e generally low so that many families could only lift themselves out of poverty by having more than on e member working. (I n our sample, the median monthly incom e wa s $2,609 while the median monthly earnings of employed person was $1,505.)
Thus those families having only one working member often found themselves in dire conditions an d som e even had t o be partially dependent o n public assistance . From the analysis of public assistance families in our sample, we also found that they usually had less working members and the percentage of unemployed persons was higher than that of other households. Our understanding was that these families often faile d to benefit from the near-to-full employment situation in Hong Kong as they had only aged members or members who were almost unemployable.
To summarize, though unemployment was listed as the number one threat causing hardship, its impact had very much been atttenuated by the fact tha t most familie s usually had more than one working member. Those families which had no employe d member, such as those consisting of only aged persons, were most vulnerable to poverty.
DOCUMENT VIII.b5: Immigrants for hire (source: Translated from Kenichi Ohashi, Teilubin guangchang : feiyong zai zhongqu de juhui (Filipin o Square': Meeting place of Filipino servants in Central District) in Lu Dalue and Daqiao Jianyi (Kenichi Ohashi) eds. Chengshi jiechu �X Xianggang jietou wenhua guancha (Urban touch�X observations of street culture in Hong Kong), Hong Kong: Shangwu 1989, pp. 173-197)
At the end of 1987, 39,100 Filipinos were resident in Hong Kong. This was the largest group among foreign resident s i n Hong Kong. Among these people, 34,42 2 were given permission to stay in Hong Kong as 'domestic servants.' Since 1974, when the Immigration Department formally accepted the application of overseas domestic
Affluence an d Beyon d
servants to work in Hong Kong, and with political, social and economic changes in Hong Kong and the Philippines, the number of female Filipino servants employed in Hong Kong had annuall y increased . The increas e had bee n particularly noticeabl e since 1980. Female Filipino servants became so common that it might be thought that 'all Filipinas were female servants.'
As the number of female Filipino servants increased, it became more and mor e obvious since the mid-1970s that Central District was becoming their 'meeting place.' The Filipinos in Hong Kong, unlike other immigrants, did not settle into their own residential district. Instead, they created an informal holiday meeting place.I think this development can be accounted for by their peculiar pattern of migration. Firstly, most of them are single women. Even among the small minority who are married, few have come to Hong Kong with their husbands. Secondly, they have moved to Hong Kong on what ma y be referred t o as 'contractual migration, ' fo r the y return t o th e Philippines upon the completion of their contracts. Thirdly, most of them live in the households o f their employers. Given these peculiarities i n their migration, we ca n say, looking at their meeting place from their vantage point, that their holiday meeting in Central is particularly meaningful .
In October 1986, the behaviour of Filipino people in public places in Central on holidays attracted attention as a result of the 'Statue Square problem.' The problem arose because they littered the public places in Central, and as a result, it was suggested that they should be driven out of those places. The suggestion carried a somewhat racist overtone . With th e view o f doing something about thi s problem, religiou s organizations an d Filipin o governmen t organization s reviewe d th e situation , an d suggested that a centre be set up to substitute for their current 'meeting place.' However, so far, Central has remained their 'meeting place.' Nevertheless, since this proble m has arisen, some buildings on the edg e of Central have intensified thei r securit y arrangements, an d installed 'No entry' signs or rope barriers at entrances, staircase s and open-air places. These notices are written in English and Tagalog. Obviously, they are meant for the Filipinos meeting nearby.
In a survey on Filipina servants conducted by C. French, responses received show that aside from church , public places in Central were the places they went to most frequently when they had their days off.* This pattern is confirmed by case studies on how Filipina servants spend their days off. Th e patterns is: church in the morning and the public places in the afternoon. We may conclude from this that both the church and public places are extremely meaningful to them.
Although Filipina servants use the word 'square' to refer to their 'meeting place,' this does not mean that they only meet in Statue Square. From the writer's survey, among the places where their meetings are held, aside from Statu e Square (wher e
* Caroly n French , Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong, Ph.D . thesis, Universit y o f Surrey, 1986 .
2,038 people met), are Chater Garden (where 1,149 met), the City Hall gardens (where 532 people met), and Blake Pier (where 410 people met). On the day the survey was conducted, 5,410 Filipino people met in the 'meeting places' in Central.
How do the Filipino people who meet at the 'meeting places' in Central understand and handle these 'places'? What meaning is given these places so that they may become their squares?
Carina has come to Hong Kong for six months. She works as a domestic servant for a Chinese family i n Western District . She has a 'base' in an ice-cream shop a t World Wide House on Peddar Street. Every Sunday, she spends her time from 10.00 in the morning to 6.00 in the evening around her 'base' in Central. Although she knows that Statue Square is a great meeting place for Filipino people, she says because rope barriers have been put up on the edges of the square, it is difficult for a new-comer like her to keep a place there. Moreover, the square is a complicated place. Every now and then the police come along to inspect identity cards. So, she does not go there very often. She chooses her 'base' where she can spend a day quietly by herself. Moreover, that place faces the sun; it is bright and sunny. There are shops in the Internationa l Arcade that deals in goods for Filipino people. She has her meals and does her shopping there. She spends her day off reading magazines, writing letters, and talking to he r friends. Three weeks ago, she met her friend Maria. When she was here on her own, Maria came over and said, 'Are you a Filipino?' After that, they chatted. They talked about their families in the Philippines and their lives in Hong Kong. Because she is older than Maria, Maria asks her advice on a lot of things.
Josephine has come to Hong Kong for two years. She works as a domestic servant in a Chinese family i n the New Territories . She tends to meet her friends on the eastern side of Statue Square, in front of the former Supreme Court. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank is a landmark for her, and for that reason, she knows about th e bank. She has friends who stay in Chater Garden. She often goes up to World Wide House for her shopping. She comes to Central on the Star Ferry. When she goes to the World Wide House, she goes through Prince's Building as a short cut. Occasionally, she has a snack or her lunch in the fast-food restaurants in Prince's Building. As for the washroom, she uses the ones in Chater Garden or Beaconsfield House.
Josephine wa s born o n Luzon Island . She speaks Ilokano but sh e knows som e other Filipino dialects. It is said that the Filipina servants at Statue Square are divided into little groups according to their places of origin in the Philippines. From the dialects they speak, they know where one another comes from. The ones who were born i n Luzon meet mostly in Statue Square and Chater Garden, concentrating to the north of Statue Square. Many of them were born in the middle region of Luzon. If one looks at it from th e point of view of dialect distribution, the situation is this: the ones i n Chater Garden speak Ilokano, the ones to the south of Statue Square speak Ilokan o and Ifugao, and the ones to the north speak Pampanga [Bangjiagai] and Tagalog.
Margie has come to Hong Kong for eight months. She spends most of her Sundays in the church, and so she does not have a 'meeting place' in Central. However, because she passes through Central on her way to church, she makes use of the service of a
Affluence an d Beyon d
'money changer' in Statue Square. She does it there because its rates are good. Because she changes her money there quite often, she has come to know the women who run it very well. She says they are people who have married Pakistani people in Hong Kong and so are not working as domestic servants.
The 'meeting place' of Filipina domestic servants in Central is really a colourful place. They chat, eat and drink, party, write and read letters, and they even do business
�X their clients are other Filipino people in the Central District. They sell magazines, food, ornaments; they look for boy friends, and they conduct religious worship. On a few occasions, Statue Square was also where they held political demonstrations.
Moreover, th e Centra l Distric t i s also the larges t aren a where Filipin o peopl e exchange information. The people who sell their services, entertainment and leisure magazines in 'moving newstands' contribute to this activity. Filipino people learn about their own country from these magazines, and this information becomes the most suitable topics of their casual conversation. Conversing, after all, is the most important activity for the exchange of information at the square. Besides, there is plenty of business for the 'photographers' that take pictures on the charge of two dollars. They have a picture taken there and send it home to their friends and relatives to show them how cheerfu l they look.
The square has become a part of Hong Kong that is close to the Philippines. The Filipino people enjoy their own culture there, and this aspect of Hong Kong life should be valued. They eat food they buy from the shops or that they have themselves brought, they sing Filipino songs to guitar accompaniment, their cassette recorders play Filipino music, from tapes that can be bought all over the place in the 'stalls' at the square. More important than any of this is that they can converse in their own language there, rather than in English or Cantonese.
DOCUMENT VILb6: The VMs [Vietnamese Migrants](Source: Andrew Li and David Todd, Report of Justices of the Peace on the Inquiry into the Events Surrounding the Removal of Vietnamese Migrants from the Whitehead Detention Centre on 7 April 1994 , Hong Kong, 1994. pp. 12-17 )
Whitehead i s situated at Wu Kwai Sha Tsui, Shatin, New Territories. It has a scenic view of Tolo Harbour t o its north and Ma On Shan to its south. The ne w residential development s a t Ma On Sha n characteristi c o f an affluent Hon g Kon g overlook the centre.
The centre was built as a 'closed camp' for VMs and is designated as a place of detention udner the Immigration Ordinance for them.
Whitehead consists of 10 sections and a school complex. Each section is surrounded by a 5.6 meter high mesh fence and a perimeter fence of equal height surrounds Section 1 to 8. A perimeter concrete road also surrounds Sections 1 to 8. Another road known as the Main Road (approximately 500 meters in length and 5.5 meters in width) bisects this area separating Sections 1 to 4 from Sections 5 to 8. The main CSD [Correctional Services Department] offices are on the south on a hill (or knoll) looking over Sections 1 to 8 on the north and Sections 9 and 10 on the south. In front of the offices, a road runs along the lengt h o f this hill, overlooking the sections below which house th e centre's inmates.
The dormitories vary from one or two storeys in height in Sections 1 to 8 whilst single storey Romney huts are built in Sections 9 and 10. Each dormitory is partitioned into halves. Within eac h Section, there i s office accommodation fo r the UNHC R (United Nation s High Commissio n o f Refugees) an d NGOs (Non-governmen t organizations).
Section 7 is situated in the middle of Whitehead, at the foot of the hill on which the centre's administration offices are located. From the road bisecting the centre, one enters through a Main Gate into an enclosed area which forms the common lodge for entry into Sections 7 and 8 ('the Main Gate Lodge'). From the Main Gate Lodge, there is an entrance gate to Section 7 and another entrance gate to Section 8.
From the Main Gat e Lodge , there ar e als o separate entranc e gate s to th e Administrative Block (adjacent to Section 7) and the Clinic, Immigration Block and Kitchen (adjacen t t o Section 8) . They serv e both sections but are fenced of f fro m them. Sections 7 and 8 are administered as one unit by Whitehead staff. Welfare services within the Sections 7 and 8 unit are provided by the UNHCR's Social Services Section, Hong Kong Christian Aid to Refugees, the Save the Children Fund, and International Social Services. There is also a fenced passage through the Main Gate Lodge which connects Sections 7 and 8. This provided free access during the daytime between the two sections, allowing the inmates to intercommunicate and circulate freely betwee n both sections. But this passage has been sealed off since 27 March, 1984 .
From the entrance gate into Section 7, one enters into an open courtyard. There is a row of lavatories on the right of the entrance gate. At the far end of the courtyard is a washing area for clothes. There are two rows of huts. One row consists of7 huts. Of these, 1 hut houses a single-storey recreation hall and a food issue hall; 5 huts are single-storey dormitories and 1 two-storey hut accommodates NGOs. The parallel row consists of 6 huts with 5 single-storey ones for dormitories and 1 two-storey one for NGOs.
The dormitory huts are 33.5 meters long, 12.5 meters wide, and have pitched, 'A-shaped roofs which are 4.3 meters high at the centre-ridge and 3.3 meters high at the eaves. Corrugated metal ceiling panels below the roof give a uniform ceiling height within th e dormitory huts of 3.3 meters. Bunks inside the dormitories ar e 3-tiered , with the bed board of the top tier a little less than 1 meter from the ceiling panels. Each dormitory hut is partitioned at its mid-section, thus dividing each hut into two separate dormitories each having one entrance�X i.e. at either end of the hut. The mid-section partition does not allow access between the two halves of the hut. There is a 2 meter wide lane between each row of huts, and a 1 meter wide gap overhead between the eaves of adjoining huts.
Each dormitory (i.e. half hut) has the capacity to accommodate 90 persons, in 30 triple bunks. In practice, 70 to 80 persons are accommodated in each dormitory. The 10 sections at Whitehead comprise: (a) Sections 1 to 8, housing between
Affluence and Beyond
them the main VM population; and (b) Sections 9 and 10 which house VMs who have opted for voluntary repatriation and are awaiting return to Vietnam.
As at 28 March 1994 the total VM population at Whitehead was 15,339 including 340 in Section A and 136 in Section B. The total population of Sections 1 to 8 was 14,863 of whom 4,754 (32%) were under the age of 14 years.
As far as Section 7 is concerned, it housed a total population of 1,526 (including 483 under 14 years old) comprising: (a) 750 males (including 242 under 14 years old); and (b) 776 females (including 241 under 14 years old). They are virtually all from the Northern part of Vietnam, mostly from Hai Phong.
c. Th e Local People Emigrat e
In the jittery years after the joint declaration b y the British and the Chines e ' government s o n the retur n o f Hong Kong to China i n 1997, many Hon g
Kong people emigrated. The opinion was expressed ofte n tha t Hong Kon g
was being depleted of its skilled workers and professionals . Bu t it was als o
noticed i n the 1990s that many who had emigrated returned , and man y ! more , who had obtained the right of abode abroad, remained in Hong Kong.
DOCUMENT VIII.cl: How many emigrate? (source: Legislative Council, 12 April, 1989, Hong Hong Hansard, Reports of the Sittings of the Legislative Council of HongKong, Session 1988-89)
Mrs. Chow asked: Will Government inform this Council of the basis of estimation for th e numbe r o f 42,000 Hon g Kong people emigrating i n 198 9 a s stated i n th e Government's submission to the Foreign Affairs Committe e o n emigration; what is the breakdown of the figure by countries of destination and how the figures compare with those in the last three years?
Secretary for Administrative Services and Information: Sir, in estimating the exten t of emigration, the Government relies on three main sources of information:
(a)
application s for Certificates of No Criminal Conviction (CNCC) processed by the Royal Hong Kong Police Force, which are required by most destinatio n countries;
(b)
visa s issued by the main destination countries, according to statistics provided by their Consulates or Commissions in Hong Kong; and
(c)
statistic s on the balance of movement of Hong Kong residents (other than those in and out of China) provided by the Immigration Department .
Based on these sources and allowing for the various time intervals in the emigration process, the breakdown by country of destination for the last three calendar years, and forecast for the current year, is as follows:
Year
1986 1987 1988
1989
Canada
5,615 16,254 24,588
16,400
USA
7,742 7,411 11,777 12,800
Australia
4,441 5,208 7,846
10,900
Others
1,191
1,125
1,606
1,900
Total
18,989 29,998 45,817 42,000
DOCUMENT VIII.c2 : Uncertainty and its impact (H.A. Turner, Patricia Fosh, Ng Sek Hong, Between Two Societies: Hong Kong Labour in Transition, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991, pp. 103-106)
The immediate point of this discussion is that 198 9 clearly plunged Hong Kong society�X and the future of its economy�X into a state of great uncertainty. Though here we confine ourselve s to the labour market effects. Even before the June event s and their aftermath,* evidence had accumulated that a very large proportion of Hong Kong's people would emigrate before 1997 (if only to acquire residential and working rights in other countries, from which they might perhaps return to await the outcome of Chinese sovereignty with a refuge established against disappointment). Territory surveys showed that some 30 percent of families had at least one member with overseas residential rights already, with the proportion among professional people rising to 40 percent. Even among the employees in our own first sample survey of 1985, when less than a third thought it yet time to consider the then recent Anglo-Chinese Agreement's possible personal effects seriously , about one-sixth expressed anxiety at the prospect and a similar percentage owned to specific plans to leave.
In 1988, however, 45,000 people actually emigrated, mostly from the professional and entrepreneurial classes, and this outflow accelerate d sharpl y i n '89. Surveys by professional associations of their members have shown majorities who now intend to join it, and a t time o f writing scarcities o f such qualified worker s as doctors an d accountants have already become a matter of concern. In July '89�X before the UK government's decision to give British passports with residence rights to around 250,000 Hong Kong citizens�X one of the present writers estimated that by 1997 well over a million would have established such rights in other countries (particularly in North America and Australasia), often with pleadable rights for relatives. Informed loca l agencies have estimated higher figures.
All this suggests that around a quarter of Hong Kong's population, including many of its more skilled employees, are at least affected by an active exploration of overseas prospects, if they are not alread y involve d i n plans for removal. And althoug h th e administration has increased Hong Kong's planned output from higher education, with
*Se e DOCUMENT VIILal.
Affluence and Beyond
other agencies making emergency arrangements to train their own local specialists, it is not clear how far such measures would stay the outward flow rather than adding to it: Hong Kong has already become a rewarding recruiting ground for other countries that wish to attract scarce skills�X or capital. It is this process, incidentally, that makes it rather unprofitable for us to attempt to trace the recent course of employee differentials further than we have: clearly, the upper labour market now has a new element of fluidity; fo r some scarce cadres, apparently, firms have found i t necessary to engag e expatriate workers at higher pay to replace local specialists withdrawing.
The majo r point s here , however , ar e twofold : one , tha t whateve r th e othe r economic effect s o f the approachin g chang e o f sovereignty, th e suppl y situation o f qualified, managerial and entrepreneurial skills is likely of itself to represent a growingly adverse factor as 1997 nears; and two, that the mass of lower-skilled manual workers and white collar employees, who lack both qualificatory an d personal resources fo r international mobility, are most likely to suffer from any economic deterioration ensuing from loss of such proficiencies. Moreover, other factors may aggravate these employees' exposure. In late '89, the Deputy Director of the PRC State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office expressed a common Chinese sentiment, describing Hong Kong as a 'land of treasure'. Many PRC commercial and economic agencies (not all of which, under recent devolutions, are under close Central Government control) may well find it attractiv e t o establis h delegation s an d enterprise s ther e�X an d th e presen t representation of PRC undertakings in Hong Kong does not seem to have been notable for generosity in its employment terms or in its interpretation of local labour regulations: much less, for any special regard of union opinion. Moreover, although the reported Draft Basic Law confirms Hong Kong's high ratification of ILO Conventions (high , that i s compared only to the PRC), the possibility of future move s to update Hon g Kong's standing in this respect seems unclarified. Perhaps most important, however, is the uncertainty surrounding future immigration from the PRC to Hong Kong.
In many developing countries, the great cities have been magnets to the rura l poor of their hinterlands, with consequences in terms of urban unemployment, poverty, overcrowding and social problems which are only too well known. The internationa l border between Colony and mainland, however, permitted immigration to the Territory to be controlled at figures which were�X despite a persisting minor seepage of illegal entrants�X broadly within the absorptive capacities of Hong Kong's housing and public service programmes, and particularly of its labour market. It is by no means clear that this inwards pressure will be so closely regulated under a common sovereignty; and the effects o f large admissions of workers accustomed to much lower standards of living upon the condition of Hong Kong's present labour force are readily foreseeable.
Of course, many of these things may not happen�X or may not happen on the potentially disturbing scale which in 1990 seems possible. And there could be offsetting factors: Deng Xiaoping once said that he could wish China had eight Hong Kongs, but it does not; and its current economy and directive philosophy provide no obvious basis for another seven's early creation. If the political considerations that dominated th e PRC's relations with Hong Kong afte r June '89 subside: if the Anglo-Chines e
compromise of early '90 on the development of Hong Kong's representative system, and th e subsequently-adopted Basi c Law for the Hong Kong SAR [Specia l Administrative Region], after all provide (despite the '85 Agreement's ambiguities) sufficient formal guarantee of a reasonable and stable autonomy for the Territory, and if the PRC's own treatment of the latter over the transitional decade or so indicates that Hong Kong's acquired traditions of personal and communicative freedom, honest and open administration, and commercial liberalism will in fact be preserved �X Hong Kong will at least have considerable attractions for foreign enterprises as a base for market relations with China, and for new growth of entrepot trade. Given an acceptable stability, a return migration of the qualified and enterprising is possible; and given some return to economic reformism in mainland China, it is even possible that Hong Kong may resume its recently-disturbed role as, effectively, China's main source and practical school of economic modernisation.
However, these are all 'ifs' �X and meanwhile the only certain probability appears to be a great deal of uncertainty: which will take some years to resolve, and will be accompanied by disturbances to Hong Kong life and employment of which the residual employee majority will be Hong Kong's continuing recipients. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that the major public controversy on Hong Kong's future since mid-'89 should have been (in effect) between, on one side, a China now weighing economic considerations as secondary to those of political control �X and on the other side, recently-emerged groups of political liberals in Hong Kong itself who were first concerned to secure a maximum advance to elective internal government before sovereignty's transfer. How far the mass of Hong Kong workers have been touched by this controversy remains unclear; but their ow n interests i n the transition have been submerged b y the constitutional conflict (assertio n in the drafting Committee, for instance, that the Basic Law need include no right of collective bargaining because the practice was not customary in Hong Kong appears to have passed unchallenged). Plainly, this mass interest remains without adequate spokesmen.
d. Th e Surviva l o f Custom s
Traditions continued in Hong Kong. Collective values did not easily erode. It had bee n predicte d tha t the nuclear family migh t take over; but social surveys discovere d tha t man y hel d ont o traditiona l famil y values . Th e clienteles at temples i n Hong Kong saw no decline, traditional religiou s rituals continued to be practised as they had always been.
DOCUMENT VIILdl: Family values (source: Lee Ming-kwan, 'Family and social life', in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san and Wong Siu-lun eds. Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1988, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991, pp. 43-44)
Affluence and Beyond
A widel y held vie w regarding family chang e i n Hon g Kong i s that value s an d norms associated with th e traditiona l Chinese family hav e been replaced by thos e more indicative of the nuclear family. In the survey, we try to find out whether this is true. More specifically, the survey tries to establish the attitudes of Hong Kong people towards the following traditional norms and values:
a.
Newl y married couples should live with their parents;
b.
Childre n should not leave their elderly parents unsupported;
c.
Sibling s should continue to give help to one another even after they have their own families;
d.
Daughter s are different from sons because sooner or later they will be married and leave home. Sons remain ones' sons;
e.
Me n go to work; the home is the rightful place for women.
It is commonly believed that traditional norms and ideals such as these have become eclipsed by an alternate set which favour neoloca l residence for the newly married , reduced obligations to kin and relatives, equal rights for sons and daughters to descent and inheritance , and a more liberal attitud e towards husband-wife se x role differentiation.
These beliefs are not entirely confirmed by the findings. As many as 62.1% of the respondents agreed that newly married couples should live away from their parents. There are, however, nearly a quarter (23.2%) of them who were not sure if this was always right, and one-seventh (14.7%) who disagree.
There is also split response to the statement: 'Children are not necessarily obliged to support their parents.' About half (54.2% ) o f the respondents disagree with th e statement. There are, however, a quarter (26.3%) who agree and one-fifth (19.6% ) who have the attitude that the norm is relative to situations.
The attitude towards fulfilling obligation s to one's siblings is, on the other hand, unequivocal, as 93.1% of the respondents agree that married brothers and sisters should continue to give help to one another. Only 1.9% disagreed .
The majority (74.3% ) o f the respondents also disagree that sons and daughter s should have different rights and statuses.
Lastly, on husband-wife sex-rol e differentiation, ther e is a split response. Two-fifths (40.8% ) o f the respondents support the more traditional thinking about th e arrangement of sex roles, i.e. women attending to domestic matters and men to business matters. The rest either disagree (47.5%) or have second thoughts (11.8%) about this.
The picture emerging from these findings i s that although the nuclear family is very much an ongoing reality, people have not entirely given up all traditional family norms and ideals. They expect siblings to perform obligations, but are less insistent about supporting their parents. Many believe that sons and daughters should not be treated differently, bu t would think twice when asked to depart from traditional sex-roles. Under the label nuclea r family' there is therefore a complex mix of values and norms which d o not entirel y accor d with one another . Thus possibilities o f famil y conflict arise from value dissensus.
DOCUMENT VIILd2 : Cognitive play (source: Chien Chiao, 'Cognitive play: some minor rituals among Hong Kong Cantonese, (1)', East Asian Civilizations, No. 2,1983, pp. 138-140 )
In compariso n wit h other Hon g Kong Chinese rituals ,da xiaoren [beatin g th e small person] in relatively simple. Still, one has to bring food, various 'fu' [talisman] or 'credentials', paper cu t figures includin g tha t o fxiaoren [littl e person] a s well as of guiren [noble person] and mock paper money and gold or silver bullion (thick squares of rough paper bent into bowl shape). When the ritual begins, two candles and three sticks of incense are lit, food is displayed, then the small person paper figure wrapped in the 'small person paper' is fiercely beaten with a shoe or pierced into pieces with a sword while a chant is being sung. Then paper 'credentials' are rolled and waved over the recipient's body before they are burnt together with mock paper money and other paper goods. Finally two small pieces of plano-convex shaped wood which are known aslbeC (pui) or 'cup' are thrown to the ground to find out whether the ritual is a successful one.
A perso n may hold thi s ritual himself, or for three o r four Hon g Kong dollar s which is about sixty or eighty cents in the US currency, have a professional performer to perform for him. There are also individual variations in the performances. For one thing, the 'small person' paper wrapping can be either beaten with a shoe or pierced with a short sword. What is left after beating or piercing may be just left on the ground or burnt. In a still fancier way, they may be put on a small paper-folded boat and burnt together.
Cross-road is a favorite place to hold the ritual. It may also be held at a White Tiger altar. Images of the White Tiger are usually made of stone and found under altars to the major gods. Such altars only exist in small temples where the professionals who are usually men known as nan'm lao (nan-mo loa) or chanting fellow may perform the ritual at a small fee (about five to ten Hong Kong dollars). A special place for the ritual is the Lover's Stone Park in the mid-level area on Hong Kong Island. On the sixth , sixteenth and twenty-sixth days of each lunar month, many 'Beating the Small Person' rituals are held right below the Lover's Stone, a pointed stone formation which becomes a popular fetish.
e. Ho w Satisfied Have Hong Kong People Been?
Were Hong Kong people happy through their increasing affluence? Hong Kong people had had their dreams and had had to face a reality. They had had hopes as well as apprehensions. The crux to the problem, as sociologist Thomas W.P. Wong argues in the passage below, lies in the patterns of class structure and social mobility in Hong Kong. It is interesting and fitting, as Hong Kong society reaches the 1990s, for the question of class to be raised. Hitherto, the fluid population had been characterized by the inflow
Affluence an d Beyon d
and outflow of people. As the settled population and its offspring take over economic opportunities , it is fitting that internally generated social classe s should come to dominate Hong Kong's social structure.
DOCUMENT VHI.el : Discourse s and dilemma s (source: Thomas W.P . Wong, 'Discourses and dilemmas, 25 years of subjective indicator s studies', in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san and Wong Siu-lun, eds. Indicators of Social Development, Hong Kong 1990, Hon g Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992, pp. 239-268)
If there i s an impending sense of crisis in recent commentaries on the future o f Hong Kong, it could not have been more systematically formulated and pursued than in the works of I. Scott and S.L. Wong.* However, as we shall see, the two formulations differ i n their tenor and their conclusion. In his attempt to uncover the origins and implications o f the los s of autonomy, brough t i n trai n b y the signin g o f the Join t Declaration, an d the n th e promulgation o f the Basi c Law, Scott basicall y see s th e current crisis as one of legitimacy. The legitimacy of the colonial government has been much eroded , and thing s have certainly not bee n helped by its general 'resort t o subterfuge,' when it comes to matters like the speeding up of democratisation of the polity. In our view, such an argument, leaving aside the diatribes against the attempts from the colonial and th e Chinese government t o curb or frustrate constitutiona l reforms, and, thereby, causing frustration, ver y much hinges on the interpretation of the political wishes and sentiments of the populace. But obviously the matter does not stop here. For the keystone of Scott's case lies in the loss of the moral basis of th e colonial authority. To us, such a basis can only be empirically understood, and that means a systematic and longitudinal picture of the socio-political ethos is imperative. Scott interpreted traditional apathy among th e Hong Kong people a s a sign of confidence or consent, while the current apathy is one of disillusionment. Has there been such a change? Is it the case that such disillusionment is particularly felt among the young and the educated, the middle class? Elsewhere, we have raised our objections to these commentaries (for ultimately, that is what they are) on the grounds that they
I. Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press , 1989; 'Opening speech/ in J.C.Y. Lee, et.al., eds. Politics and 1991 Elections in Hong Kong, Hon g Kong : Departmen t o f Publi c an d Socia l Administration, City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, 1992; S.L.Wong, 'Prosperity and anxiety in Hong Kong reexamined/ in S.K . Lau, M.K. Lee , P.S.Wan and S.L . Wong, eds. The Development of Social Indicators Research in Chinese Societies, Hon g Kong: Hong Kong Institut e o f Asia-Pacifi c Studies , 1992 , pp . 217-238 ; Emigration and stablity in Hong Kong, Occasional Paper No. 7, Hong Kong: Social Science Research Centre and Department of Sociology , Universit y o f Hong Kong , 1992; S.L . Wong and S . Yue, 'Satisfaction i n variou s lif e domains / i n S.K . Lau , et.al . eds. , Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1988, pp. 1-24 .
are empirically unsubstantiated.* For our purpose here, the lacunae in Scott points to the need to explore various dimensions of the normative system that may underlie the fundamental political orientations, and that may help to explain the emergent, more context-bound, political wishes and sentiments of the Hong Kong people. We believe that a survey of the past subjective indicators findings on relevant themes may contribute to that purpose.
In comparison with Scott, S.L. Wong sees the current crisis in a very differen t light. Wong begin s with th e social issu e o f emigration . Contrary t o the mor e conventional view, he does not join the chorus of the alarming call brought on by the emigration wave s o f recent years . Instead , h e argue s tha t th e presen t patter n o f emigration is in fact 'part and parcel of the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong'. On the one hand, the alleged negative effects of emigration, such as brain drain and th e more intangible phenomenon o f anomie and moral hazards, are, in his view, eithe r unfounded or exaggerated. On the other hand, the emigration evinces a 'traditional' refugee mentality as well as an activation of social networks, albeit now on a global level, both of which have served to build up the successful Hong Kong experience, and which will do so in the future. We feel that Wong probably has a case in his evaluation of the negative effects of emigration. What we want to take him to task for concerns the concept of 'refugee mentality.' For it is obvious that here Wong is embarking on a discussion of the nature of the Hong Kong identity, its formation, and its relation t o the Hong Kong experience and the Hong Kong way of life. Politically, the prevalence of refugee mentality means that there is somea priori acceptance, or better, tolerance, of the colonial authority; the older generation escaped from one political regime not to endorse and trust another (alien) one, but to make a living for themselves and their offspring. As Hong Kong develops, the new generation may develop a sense of Hong Kong identity, which, in Wong's judgement, identifies more with Hong Kong as a way of life than with Hong Kong as a place of residence. When thi s is coupled with a prevalent and long-existing sense of political powerlessness, and a belief in self-help and personal liberty, refugee mentality reduces the problem of legitimacy,pace Scott (and we agree), 'into an academic issue'. The mentality immunise s the Hong Kon g people from ideological exhortations and political passions.
Economically, the refugee mentality 'creates a spirit of enterprise and engenders economic dynamism.' In Wong's judgement, this is the positive, and more important, effect th e mentality has on the stability and prosperity of the society. The essentia l precariousness of the refugee proves to be a driving force for greater diligence, better education, and worldly/cosmopolitan orientations. If Hong Kong is in crisis, emigration does not add to it; quite the reverse, the implicatio n of Wong's argument i s that i t reveals a n etho s an d force s whic h undergir d an d strengthe n th e socia l order . Ou r
T.W.P. Wong and T.T.Lui, From One Brand of Politics to One Brand of Political Culture, Occasional Pape r No. 10, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1992.
Affluence an d Beyon d
question is: can 'refugee mentality' capture all the nuances and dimensions, and, as it were, the lif e an d times , of the Hon g Kon g identity ? It i s obvious tha t Won g ha s emphasised the economistic, and economically dynamic, side of such identity. What other strands and components would a fuller conception of this identity consist of? Again, we believe that a review of past subjective indicators studies will go some way to constructing that fuller conception .
In the following review, * we have distinguished theme s for which th e finding s have revealed striking changes from the ones where there has been an equally impressive degree of continuity and persistence. We can see that, in respect to the areas of life satisfaction (or generally quality of life), perceptions of openness and opportunities in the society, and sense of improvement and confidence, ther e have been significan t and positive changes.
It i s quite eviden t tha t ther e has been a n importan t chang e i n th e degre e o f subjective well-being. In Mitchell's study, the Hong Kong people were unhappy with their social status and life in general; 32 per cent of the respondents felt economically deprived, and 57 per cent worried many times or sometimes about money. Thirty per cent said nothing in life gives satisfaction. On all these counts, the Hong Kong Chinese in the 1960s represented the worst (pessimistic, precarious) case among the other ethnic groups and societies in the study. However, recent findings show a much greater degree of satisfaction. In SI [Social Indicators Study] 88, 75 per cent of the respondents were satisfied with family life, 59 per cent satisfied with their work.
While we have little doubt that the improvement in such subjective well-bein g arose from the successful development of the society, which we, in another context ,
The following survey s are cited i n the tables to follow :
R.E. Mitchell 1967, The Urban Family Life Survey, urban Hong Kong, N=3,966, aged 18 and above (Mitchell 1967) ; J.S. Hoadley 1967, Survey of Chinese University students, N=254 (Hoadley 1967); D.C. Chaney and D. Podmore 1969, Young adults study with a sub-sample drawn from Hopkins's housing survey, urban Hong Kong, N=1,123, aged 15-29 (Chaney & Podmore 1969); A. King 1971, Life quality study, as part of S. Shively's Kwun Tong Industrial Community Research Programme, N=1,065, aged 18 and above (King 1971); S. Millar 1974 , The Biosocial Study, urban Hong Kong, N= 3,983, aged between 20 and 59 (Millar 1974); S.K.Lau 1977, urban Hong Kong, sub-sample drawn from Millar's biosocia l survey, N=550, aged between 20 and 59 (Lau 1977); S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan 1985, Ethos of Hong Kong people study, Kwun Tong area, N=792, aged 18 and above (Lau 1985); S.K. Lau 1986, Pilot study of Social Indicators Project, Kwun Tong, N=539, aged 18 and abov e (La u 1986); S.K . Lau et.al. 1988, the first Social Indicators Study , Hon g Kong-wid e survey , N=1,662 , age d 1 8 an d abov e (Soc . Indie . Stud. 1988); T.W.P. Wong and T.L . Lui 1989 , A Benchmark Study of Social Mobility , Hong Kong-wide , N=1,00 0 (mal e househol d heads) , age d 2 0 t o 6 4 (Won g an d Lu i 1989); S.K . La u et.al . 1990 , th e secon d Socia l Indicator s study , Hon g Kong-wide , N=l ,957, aged 18 and above (Soc. Indie. Stud. 1990), S.K. Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong, Hon g Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982 (Lau 1982).
Table 8.3 Life Satisfaction (%)
Mitchell 1967 Millar 1974 Lau 1986 Soc. Indie . 1988 Stud. 1990
Per cent dissatisfie d with lif e 40 10 15 3
Per cent who worried most about mone y 27 18
Per cent who worried most about wor k 20 31"
Per cent unhapp y wit h current socia l statu s 33�X 15
** This category in fact includes 'job, education, and prospects/ It would be reasonable to expect a much lower percentage for work if there is disaggregation of the category. ooMitchelLs option is 'quite or very unhappy/ while the category in Soc. Indie. Stud. 1988 is 'dissatisfied/very dissatisfied /
called the 'Hong Kong experience'*, a more specific indicator of the optimism and confidence i s the perception of openness and opportunities as the Hong Kong people took advantage of the structural changes in the society. Again, we find quite remarkable changes.
Table 8.4 Openness and Opportunities in Society (%)
Mitchell Chaney & Lau Lau
1967 Podmore 1969 1977 1982
Per cent who saw much 50** 63�X 60�D chance of upward mobilit y
Per cent who opted to stay 23 53
in Hong Kong despite opportunities elsewher e
** Chances for a working class boy to become a medical doctor are good or excellent �X Agree that Hong Kong is a land of opportunity. Like Lau 1982, the response is from young people . �DMost of the respondents are under 35 years old.
T.L. Lui and T.W.P. Wong, 'Class, inequality and moral order: a perspective on Hong Kong in transition/ (in Chinese), unpublished paper, 1992.
Affluence an d Beyon d
We think it is particularly noteworthy that there is an increasing identificatio n with Hong Kong as a land of opportunity and for career development. More than half of the respondents in 1977, in contrast to 23 per cent in 1967, opted to stay in Hong Kong, despite opportunities elsewhere. Although we do not have more recent findings on this count, the returning of emigrants to Hong Kong in the past few years, other than reflecting personal strategies and conditions in the global economy, seems to give some credence to the existence of a normative belief of openness and opportunities . And when this belief is coupled with positive evaluations of mobility experience, the result is greater confidence and a degree of personal efficacy .
Table 8. 5 Evaluation of Mobility Experience and Personal Efficacy (% )
Mitchell La 1967 198 u La 5 198 u Soc.Indie 6 Stud . . 198 8
Per cent who se e themselves 3 as having highe r statu s than parents 1 3 7 4 4
Per cent who se e themselves 3 as having lowe r statu s than parents 6 1 1 1 2
Per cent who fee l they canno t 5 control thei r lif e 3 54 *
* This is in response to the question: 'Do you agree that in face of future uncertainties, we can only adjust as best as we can?' This figure represents the proportion who agreed or strongly agreed. On the surface, it seems there is a similar fatalistic strand in the response, as in Mitchell's finding. But one should note that 80 per cent of Lau's respondents also strongly disagree or disagree with the statement that 'whether one will be successful or not is determined by fate, it is useless to make the effort'.
On the whole, we could then say that to the extent that the earlier studies captured important facet s and facts o f the, as it were, formative year s of the Hong Kon g experience, the changes since then have been towards a more satisfied, optimistic and self-assured direction. The relatively high degree of structural and exchange mobility in the society, as uncovered in a recent study, no doubt constitutes the societal reasons
�X the success and the satisfaction�X for such changes in the normative orientations and belief systems. But a more detailed examination of the past survey studies also discloses importan t area s where continuitie s an d persistenc e exis t makin g for les s complacency and optimism. We specifically refer to the areas of personal pessimism in relation to career development or prospects, strain and frustration arising from a realistic or stoic appraisal of society, and the perception of the future and meaning of life and work.
We have pointed elsewhere to the discrepancy between the optimistic belief i n social openness and th e pessimisti c appraisal o f one's work situatio n an d caree r prospects.* We can also find a similar pessimistic orientation in the 1960s .
Table 8. 6 Pessimism in Relation to Work (%)
Mitchell La u Soc . Indie. Stud . 1967 198 6 198 8 199 0
Per cent who see the chance 1 6 7 1 2 for career development as great
Per cent who are satisfied 2 5 25 * 3 7 with work
* When probe d i n details about specific aspect s of work, Lau' s respondents ha d muc h more satisfaction fro m sa y the work nature, but were much les s so when i t came to promotion prospects, welfare, etc.
The pessimistic assessment of chance for career development i s also evident i n other studies .A study of clerical workers showed that nearly 40 per cent o f th e respondents saw little or no promotion prospects in their job. And 76 per cent of the respondents in the Social Indicators Studies 1990 survey could see little or no chance of finding a better job than the one they were holding, a finding not significantly affected b y background characteristics. As for the liking for job, Mitchell titled th e relevant chapter 'No job in Work,' only one quarter of his respondents expressed that they like d thei r jo b ver y much. S o i t may be tha t th e relativel y lo w leve l o f jo b satisfaction and the pessimism in career development are related, but what concern s us is the continuity of such evaluations. Apparently upward social mobility or improved 'quality o f life ' ha s no t ameliorate d o r eliminate d suc h anxietie s an d whateve r precariousness that may be entailed by them. Could it be that there are other structural and normative strains underlying the formation of the Hong Kong identity or way of life?
In relation to the strain arising from perceptions of social divisions and political situation, again, we find a persistent trend. The sense of political powerlessness is clear and i s the subject of much discussion. We, however, feel it necessary to relate suc h sense of powerlessness to the way the Hong Kong people perceive the society and the
T.W.P. Wong, 'Inequality, stratification an d mobility,' in S.K. Lau, et.al. eds.Indicators of Social Development, pp . 145-172, and 'Social indicator s and the social mobility experience of Hong Kong,' (in Chinese) in S.K. Lau, et.al. eds., Development of Social Indicators Research, pp. 161 -174.
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Table 8. 7 Strain Arising from Perceptions of Society (% )
Mitchell Chane y & Kin g La u Wong & Podmor e Lu i
1967 196 9 197 2 197 7 198 9
Per cent who felt could 8 2 9 1 do nothing about unjust government or societ y
Per cent who felt 25 * 61 �X 31 �D employees wer e bein g taken advantage o f
* Mitchell's question was: 'Do you think that people having your qualifications and work experience should be paid more, or about the same, as you are receiving now? ' �X Chaney and Podmore's question was: 'Do you think that working people are fairly and equally treated by their employers, or that employers sometimes take advantage of them?' �DThe question in the social mobility surve y was this: 'Do you agree to the view that if bosses are to make profits, they have to exploit workers? ' It i s obviou s tha t thes e thre e question s ta p quit e differentl y th e respondents ' sens e o f distributive justice. We provide these figures to serve as general indicative signposts.
polity; in other words to the meanings, definitions, images�X and the struggles over them�X embedded in social behaviour and normative orientations. The values and beliefs involved in issues like distributive justice or moral economy are as pertinent to our understanding of political apathy (a la Lau) or political awareness (a la Scott) as a single piece o f information o n political efficacy . Thus , on the on e hand, w e coul d gauge the nature and amount of strain and frustration from Hoadley's study in which he saw significance in the fact that half of the Chinese residents he interviewed in the turbulent yea r o f 1967 expressed negativ e orientations toward s the police, th e government, etc/ Similarly, it is a noteworthy indicator of powerlessness or fatalism that 71 per cent of Mitchell's Form 5 students saw the Hong Kong government a s understanding not very well/not at all the people's needs. But, on the other hand, we should also note the implications when 66 per cent of the young workers interviewed by Lau and Ho in 1978 wanted to see their fellow workers have colour television sets before they themselves did, rather than to see unknown people earning millions/ What kind of distributive standard and meaning is involved here? And why is it that there is this apparently deep-rooted and long-standing sense of inequality and injustice ?
J.S. Hoadley, 'Hong Kong is the lifeboat: notes on political culture and socialization, ' Journal of Oriental Studies vol. 8, 1970, pp. 206-218.
Table 8. 8 Strain Arising from Perceptions of Society (%)
Mitchell La u La u Soc . Indie. Stud. 1967 198 5 198 6 199 0
Per cent who gave2 1 * 19 �X centrality to work
Per cent who felt 45 �D 33 *
it was pointless to plan ahead
* The 'centrality of work' in Mitchell's study is an index composed of scores given to three questions on work. �X Lau's question was whether one would give up one's present job if a fortune befell: the figure is the percentage of respondents who would stick with present job. �DThis refers to the proportion of people who felt they did not have the capability to plan and prepare for the future. #This refers to the proportion of people who felt it was pointless to plan ahead.
Our last area concerns th e perceptions of the future an d the meaning of work. The findings over the past two decades again reveal continuities rather than change.
The issue of meaning of work is different from the one of job satisfaction. Even if there is some indication that the latter is on the rise (see earlier table), the Hong Kong people seem to have kept an invidious view of work. We hypothesise that this is due to a basic pragmatic strand i n the work ethos of the Hong Kong people, which, mor e often tha n not, i s clouded by the debate on instrumentalism i n the local literature . While, for instance, Turner et.al. (1980) highlighted the collectivistic and non-money-driven aspect s i n the Hong Kon g workers' approach t o work (als o concerned wit h welfare, work relations, and help from workmates or supervisor in case of difficulties), in an attempt to criticise England and Rear (1975), both parties, in our view, read too much positiv e and substantiv e significanc e int o the ide a of instrumentalism (o r specifically, money-mindedness) . Chian g perhaps was closer to the mark when sh e remarked/*
Instrumentalism could be rooted in the very nature of job degradation in factories
so that money becomes the only desirable feature o f work. Instrumentalis m
could also be an expression of the need of workers to help themselves and their
families to survive in a highly competitive and rapidly changing society.
S.K.Lau and K.F. Ho, Social Accommodation of Politics: The Case of the Young Hong Kong Workers, Occasional Pape r No. 89, Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, 1980.
** C.S.N. Chiang, 'Women an d work: case studies of two Hong Kong factories,' M.Phil. dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 1984, citation from p. 19.
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Thus, not only i s there a fluid meaning t o instrumentalism (dependent on it s 'embeddedness' in various domains of life or social references), instrumentalis m i n a specific, narrow context probably signifies more a resigned, somewhat fatalistic, attitude towards work. Mitchell's Hong Kong respondents may have, in comparison with other Chinese and ethnic societies, most likely chosen the money aspect of their work, yet a sizable number o f them di d not agre e that i n their work they were just 'putting i n time.' In response to the debate on instrumentalism in the industrial relations studies, one coul d say that mone y an d meanin g ar e compatible, just a s instrumentalism i s compatible with collectivism. Much hinges on the different contextua l concerns and the different level s of relevance and primacy the ascertained orientations and values are located.
Thus the meaning of work and its bearing on industrial and work attitudes remain to be explored. But to go back to our concerns, if we could agree that the relatively low level of centrality given to work is indicative of both a specific (and thus temporal) dislike of one's present job and a more diffused (and perhaps more deep-rooted), cynical or invidious reaction to work in general, then the findings seem to suggest continuity rather than positive changes.
There i s no gainsaying that, in the above exercise, much is still found wanting . The incomparabilit y (no t to mention the problem of interpretability of the finding s itself) o f some of the questions i n the surveys is troubling, to say the least . Yet, we remain confident enough to try out various ideas on the changes the Hong Kong society has undergone, as they are reflected at the plane of the normative and belief territory of the people. Such scouting of the terrain, as it were, seems to have produced th e following paradoxes. On the one hand, there is a strong belief in the openness and opportunities in the society, and in individual effort. On the other hand, there is also a sense of low personal efficacy , o f pessimism, especiall y i n relation t o one's work , career development and politics. Similarly, while there is an unmistakable increase in satisfaction derived from life in general, with less worries about money and employment, there is also a sense of precariousness, of strain and frustration, and of injustice and inequalities in the society. We tend to see such 'contradictions' as more apparent than real. A social history of the hopes and frustrations of the Hong Kong people remains to be written, yet we believe there are structural reasons for the paradoxes. As a first step, the socia l mobility stud y i n 1989 * demonstrated tha t whil e ther e wa s truth t o th e Hong Kong dream, viz . upward mobility made possible by occupational structura l changes and the pay-offs to efforts, the reality was that there was also persistent an d emergent inequalitie s i n chances o f mobility, with th e clas s structure exhibitin g important trend s towards rigidity and closure. Once we take the coexistence o f the dream and the reality seriously, the 'contradictions' are then intelligible. Indeed, we
* Possibl y as reported in Thomas W.P Wong and Tai-lok Lui, Reinstating Class: a Structural and Developmental Study of Hong Kong Society, Occasiona l Pape r No . 10 , Socia l Sciences Research Centre and Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong, 1992.
see them as providing a useful vantage point to understand the nature and formation of the Hong Kong experience, and a pivotal area where order and unrest in the future could be examined.
We hope that it is now plain to the reader that if we are to have a dialogue with Scott and Wong, this is probably the way we would respond. There is little evidence for Scott's case. If anything, there is more support�X sense of political powerlessness, long persistence of general political concern, etc.�X for the quid pro quo mentality as being more truthful to the reality than the legitimacy argument. Through our review, we have better ideas about the various dimensions involved in the normative system that may underlie the fundamental political orientations. A further thematization of the findings in terms of'distributive justice,' 'moral economy' and some such areas will reveal that ther e are sources for both pragmatic acceptance o f life-fate an d moral/ political outrage. With regar d to Wong, the impor t o f our survey is that th e Hon g Kong identity cannot possibly be captured by the 'refugee mentality' concept alone . Both analytically and substantively, the contents break the seams of the concept, and demand to speak in multiple 'languages': pragmatism, fatalism, cynicism..., depending on the context, the domain of life, the degree of primacy of livelihood, the level of generality, and so on. Perhaps not until the full nature o f this 'polyglot' creature i s understood could one deliberate, proclaim or pontificate on the subjective territory of the Hong Kong people and its implications for unrest and crisis, for growth and survival, or the fissure and the tenacity of the society.
INDEX
accountants, 134 , 283, 368
apprentice, 77 , 78, 188, 189, 202, 263, 288, 305, 327
boat population, 31 , 50-1, 271; see also Tanka Bray, Deni s 2, 311 Burial Fund, 78,8 0
caged men, 34 8 charity, 21-2 , 128, 140-5 passim, 209 , 211, 212, 227, 234-7, 265; see also Tung-wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk. China Mad, 28 , 54, 61, 90, 91, 95,100-8 passim, 13 3 Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 122 , 141,145,192,211 Chinese Communist Party, 150 , 160 Chinese custom, 8,17,33,112,149 , 237-48, 370-2; see alsomui-tsai Chow Shou Son, 117,118-9,156,15 7 Christian missions and Christianity, 20,52,86,102,103,113,114,138, 199,233,248,371 citizenship, 4 8 City District Office, 310 , 311, 312, 313, 314
Clean Hong Kong Campaign, 3,309,31 0 cockloft, 10 , 36, 40, 181, 183, 185 Confucian Society of Hong Kong, 122 , 123 Contractors and sub-contractors, 74-8 3 passim, 120,126,188,189,194,201 -2,205,249,266,315 coolies, 10,18 , 26, 30, 42, 48,114, 129, 152, 181, 183, 187, 189, 201, 261 corpses, 131 , 181, 235 Cultural Revolution, 2 , 9, 10, 291, 296
Deng Xiaoping, 9 , 369 drains, 33,37,38,40,25 1
elderly, 141 , 177, 306, 347, 348, 371 Elliot, Elsi e 2, 286 employment of children, 196 , 197, 198, 200, 202 Eurasian, 4 , 49, 50 European Reservation, 46 , 55; see also Peak
family life, 30 , 175, 203-4, 254, 265-8, 319-35,335-47 Fight Violent Crime Campaign, 3 , 309, 310 Fung Ping-shan, 6 , 117, 133-146
General Chamber of Commerce, 117 , 119,123,127-133 grassroots, 2,4,301,30 7 guerrillas, 20 9 guilds, 61 , 73-7, 78-3, 84, 185, 186, 189, 190, 196
Hakka, 32,196,271,339,34 6 hawkers, 42,184, 201, 202,211,235,255, 261,312,313 Hennessy, Si r John Pope, 22 , 23, 55 Ho Kai, Si r Kai 4, 6, 63-9 passim, 85-8 , 90-104 passim, 12 0 Ho Tung, Si r Robert 95,110-6,117,119-121,226,282 Hoklo, 32 , 271 Hong Kong government, 1-1 3 passim, 85,118,133,146,150, educational policies, 51-2 handling of strikes in 1920s, 149-50 , 162-6, 169-74, 192-5 housing policies, 204-7 , 250-3, 255-6 policies on illegal immigrants, 349 -50, 365-7 purchase of rice 1919, 151-6 revenue 1897-1926, 159 riots of 1960s, 286-9 3 sale of women, 174-5 social programme in 1970s, 301-11 ; use of Chinese, 296-9 See also City District Office , Legislative Council, Mutua l Aid Committee, Urba n Counci l Hong Kong identity, 374 , 375, 378, 382 Hong Kong University, 55,112,123,140 , 142, 145, 188, 373 housing Chadwick report 1882, 33-46 Ho Kai's defence of Chinese houses, 87 cubicles, 183-19 0 passim overcrowding, 203-4