22.
Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900�V49 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 142.
23.
See, for example, Beverley Hooper, China Stands Up: Ending the Western Presence, 1948�V50 (London and New York: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Thomas N. Thompson, China��s Nationalisation of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949�V 57 (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, Occasional papers, 1979).
24.
Saki Dockrill, Britain��s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
25.
Zhou, History of left-wing struggle in Hong Kong, pp. 231�V2.
26.
FCO 40/114 Hong Kong Police Special Branch Report, Ref. GEN/14/368/138, 24 October 1967.
27.
New evidence has been sketchily emerging of People��s Liberation Army (PLA) threats to the colony in 1967: ��Revealed: The Hong Kong invasion plan��, Sunday Times, 24 June 2007, although the accepted view is that the PLA acted to prevent any incursions, although not as blatantly as it did in Macao; Allen S. Whiting, ��The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People��s Republic of China��, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 402:1 (1972), pp. 61�V3.
28.
Trench interview, 1987.
29.
TNA, CO 1030/1107, ��The Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies��, ref: CR 14/2041/57, Telegram No. 1712, 12 August 1960.
30.
See, for example, C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912�V1949 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990).
31.
TNA, FCO 40/88, ��The Confrontation with Communists in Schools��, ref. T. S., 1/3/1168/47, 7 December 1967.
32.
TNA, FCO 40/88, Hong Kong to Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 1779, 28 November 1967.
33.
TNA, FCO 40/88, Hong Kong to Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 1785, 29 November 1967.
34.
John Cooper, Colony in Con.ict, p. 97.
35.
Richard Clutterbuck, Riots and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945�V1963 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1972); David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain��s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005).
36. TNA, FCO 40/105, 24 September 1967.
37.
Gregor Benton, ��Chinatown UK v. Colonial Hong Kong: An Early Exercise in Transnational Militancy and Manipulation, 1967�V1969��, Ethnic and Racial Studies 28:2 (2005), p. 337.
38.
Heaton, ��Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism��, p. 846.
39.
Richard Ross and Phillip Davies, Inheritance in Public Policy: Change without Choice in Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
40.
Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 39.
41.
Leo Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Con.ict Between Public Interest and Private Pro.t in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 20.
42.
Benton, ��Chinatown UK v. Colonial Hong Kong��.
43.
Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, p. 81.
44.
Robert Bickers, ��The Colony��s Shifting Position in the British Informal Empire in China,�� in Judith Brown and Rosemary Foot (eds.), Hong Kong��s Transitions (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 33�V61.
45.
Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners.
46.
Heaton, ��Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism��, p. 840.
47.
Benton��s work also draws clear links between the ��legacy in the New Territories of radical nationalism�� dating from the Paci.c War, and radicalism in 1967 in Britain��s Chinese community, many of whom had come from the New Territories; see Benton, ��Chinatown UK v. Colonial Hong Kong��, p. 335. See also his The Chinese in Britain: Economy, Transnationalism, Identity (with Edmund Terence Gomez) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
48.
Oxford, Rhodes House Library, Mss.Ind.Ocn.s.340, ��Transcript of interview, 10 February 1988, given by Arthur Frederick Maddocks, Political Advisor to the Government of Hong Kong (1968�V72), to Dr Steve Tsang��; Trench interview, 1987.
Chapter 2
1.
Zhou Yi, Xianggang zuopai douzhengshi (History of left-wing struggle in Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Leeman Press, 2002), pp. 231�V3.
2.
TNA, FCO 40/45, Hong Kong to the Commonwealth Of.ce, 7 May 1967, Telegram No. 553.
3.
TNA, FCO 40/45, Hong Kong to Secretary of State of Commonwealth Affairs, 11 May 1967, Telegram No. 947.
4.
TNA, FCO 40/49, Hong Kong Government Report on ��Current Communist Disturbances in Hong Kong��, 3 August 1967.
5.
Jin Yiuru, Xianggang wushinian yiwang (50 Years in Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Jin Yiuru Memorial Foundation, 2005), p. 122.
6.
Qi Pengfei, Deng Xiaoping yu Xianggang huigui (Deng Xiaoping and the Return of Hong Kong) (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 19�V52.
7.
TNA, FCO 21/204, Ref. FDI/6 W51, 15 June 1967.
8.
TNA, CAB 191/17 L.I.C. (Hong Kong) Assessment of the External Threat to Hong Kong, 23 August 1967.
9.
S. R. Ashton, ��Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain��s China Policy, 1945�V50��, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 15:1 (2004), pp. 79�V94, and James Tang, ��World War to Cold War: Hong Kong��s Future and Anglo-Chinese Interactions, 1941�V55��, in Ming K. Chan (ed.), Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842�V1992 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 107�V30.
10.
Zhang Xichang et al., Fengluan dieqi: gongheguo de sanci jianjiao gaochao (Twists and turns: The third wave of diplomacy of the Republic) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 95�V120.
11.
K. A. Hamilton, �� ��A Week that Changed the World��: Britain and Nixon��s China Visit of 21�V28 February 1972��, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 15:1 (2004), pp. 117�V35.
12
. TNA, FCO 21/204, Despatch No. 12, Of.ce of the British Charge D��affaires to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Telegram, 6 June 1967.
13.
Ibid.
14
. TNA, FCO 40/45, Telegram from Beijing Charge D��affaires to the Foreign Of.ce, No. 480, 15 May 1967.
15.
Ibid.
16.
Ibid.
17.
TNA, CAB 134/2945, K(69)1, 28 March 1969, Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Long Term Study.
18.
Ibid.
19.
Saki Dockrill, Britain��s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
20.
James Lilley, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage and Diplomacy in Asia (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). However, one should also note the tension on covert activities in Hong Kong between the Americans and the colonial administration. For details, see Steve Tsang, ��Strategy for Survival: The Cold War and Hong Kong��s Policy towards Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Activities in the 1950s��, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 25: 2 (1997), pp. 294�V317.
21.
Chi Kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations 1949�V1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); David Reynolds, ��A ��Special Relationship��? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War��, International Affairs, 1 (1986), pp. 1�V20.
22.
Diary Entry, 25 October 1957, Papers of Harold Macmillan, Manuscript Diaries, 1950�V 66, Mss. Macmillan dep. D.30, Bodlelain Library, Oxford: quoted in Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, p. 125.
23.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.), China Con.dential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945�V1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 196�V7.
24.
TNA, FCO 40/47, David Trench to the Commonwealth Of.ce, 10 June 1967.
25.
FRUS, 1964�V68, XXX, China, document no. 263.
26.
TNA, DEFE 13/857, Galsworthy to Saville Garner, ref. C/165/5.
27.
TNA, CAB 134/2945, K(67)5, 20 September 1967.
28
. TNA, FCO 21/191, Note by E. Bolland, Head of Far Eastern Department, Foreign Of.ce, 20 February 1967.
29. ��The Hong Kong University Students�� Union Council on the Recent Riot�� (17 May 1967), in Ma Ming (ed.), The Riot in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Sky Horse Book Company, 1967), p. 30, and Jack Cater, ��The 1967 Riots��, in Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon (eds.), Hong Kong Remembers (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 107.
30. Hong Kong Hansard, 1967, p. 326.
31. Hong Kong Urban Council, Of.cial Record of Proceedings, Meeting of 4 July 1967, pp. 131�V2.
32. Hong Kong Hansard 1967, p. 390.
33. Interview with Edward Eates, Exeter, 28 May 2006.
34. Hong Kong Federation of Hong Kong Industries, Annual Report 1967, p. 6.
35. Ming Pao, 7 July 1967.
36. TNA, FCO 40/114 Hong Kong Police Special Branch Report, Ref. GEN/14/368/138, 24 October 1967.
37. TNA, FCO 21/192 Hong Kong Police Special Branch Report, Ref. GEN/14/368/3 (3), 15 May 1967.
38. TNA, FCO 40/45, the Commonwealth Of.ce to the Hong Kong Governor, Telegram No. 910, 13 May 1967.
39. TNA, FCO 40/54, the Commonwealth Of.ce to the Hong Kong Governor, Telegram No. 944, 17 May 1967.
40. TNA, FCO 40/54 Hong Kong Governor to the Commonwealth of.ce, Telegram No. 641, 19 May 1967.
41. TNA, FCO 40/45 Peking Charge D��affaires to the Foreign Of.ce, Telegram No. 483, 15 May 1967.
42. TNA, FCO 40/46, the Commonwealth Of.ce to Hong Kong, Telegram No. 1038, 25 May 1967.
43. TNA, FCO 40/54, Extract from C.O.S. (67) 55th Meeting held on 11 July 1967.
44. TNA, FCO 40/113, from the Of.cer Administering Hong Kong to the Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 1151, 2 August 1967.
45. TNA, FCO 40/46, Peking to Foreign Of.ce, Telegram No. 560, 24 May 1967; TNA, FCO 40/46, Hong Kong Governor to the Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 682, 24 May 1967; and TNA, FCO 40/113 Hong Kong to the Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 1276, 21 August 1967.
46. TNA, FCO 40/113, Hong Kong to Commonwealth Of.ce, unnumbered telegram, 29 August 1967.
47. Quoted in Edward Rice, Mao��s Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 377.
48. TNA, FCO 40/52, Hong Kong to Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 1876, 18 December 1967, and Telegram No. 1854, 11 December 1967.
49. TNA, FCO 40/51 From JIC London to Hong Kong, 2 November 1967.
50. TNA, FCO 40/114, paper prepared by the Colonial Secretariat, 22 November 1967.
51. In August 1958, Parker Tu, headmaster of the Pui Kiu Middle School, a hard-core communist school in Hong Kong, was deported because of the school��s active political indoctrination of students. Hon Wah Middle School, another .agship institution in the communist camp, was ordered to close down for safety reasons in the same month. Zhou Yi, Xianggang zuopai douzhengshi, pp. 170�V80.
52. TNA, FCO 40/88, ��The Confrontation with Communists in Schools��, ref. T. S, 1/3/1168/47, 7 December 1967.
53. Ibid.
54.
TNA, FCO 40/88, Hong Kong to Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 1779, 28 November 1967.
55
. TNA, FCO 40/88, Hong Kong to Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 1785, 29 November 1967.
56.
TNA, FCO 40/88, Hong Kong to Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 831, 29 June 1968.
57.
TNA, FCO 40/88, Peking to Foreign Of.ce, Telegram No. 648, 8 July 1968.
58.
TNA, FCO 40/88, Peking to Foreign Of.ce, Telegram No. 620, 2 July 1968.
59.
Ibid.
60.
TNA, FCO 40/88 Hong Kong Commonwealth Of.ce, Telegram No. 855, 5 July 1968.
61.
TNA, FCO 40/88, James Murray to Wilkinson, 8 August 1968.
62.
TNA, FCO 40/217, ��The Requisition of Ships Order 1955��, Hong Kong Department, 5 December 1968; ��The Requisition of Ships Order 1969��, Hong Kong Department, 9 October 1969.
63.
TNA, FCO 40/114, Hall to Carter, 4 December 1967.
64.
Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai in twilight years) (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2003), p. 232.
Chapter 3
1.
For a fuller exposition see Cheuk-yin Wong, ��The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong, 1967: A Multi-Actors Approach�� (Unpublished MPhil thesis, the University of Hong Kong, 2001).
2.
Jack Cater was special assistant to the governor between May and June 1967 and deputy colonial secretary (special duties) between June 1967 and February 1968. He was stationed in the colony during the entire period of the riots. Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
3.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
4.
According to Cater, Denis Bray was the ��number two�� person in the Special Group. Locking was at that time a district of.cer in the New Territories West. During the riots, Locking was responsible for the situations in the New Territories. He had ��very good attitudes at work.�� David Ford joined the group at the end of July. Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
5.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
6.
Legislative Council, Hong Kong. Reports of the Meeting of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, sessions 1968, 24 January 1968 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968).
7.
Stephen Edward Waldron, ��Fire on the Rim: A Study in Contradictions in Left-Wing Mobilization�� (Unpublished PhD thesis, Syracuse University, 1976), p. 240.
8.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
9.
Waldron, ��Fire on the Rim��, p. 235.
10.
Denis Bray, who joined the Hong Kong government as a cadet of.cer class II in 1950, and retired in 1985 as secretary for home affairs, acting occasionally as chief secretary and governor. Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
11.
However, the water came through as contracted, so all the arrangements made for alternative supplies were immediately cancelled. Personal communication with Professor Norman Miners, dated 14 April 1999.
12.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
13.
Waldron, ��Fire on the Rim��, p. 236.
14.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
15.
John Cooper, Colony in Con.ict: The Hong Kong Disturbances May 1967�VJanuary 1968 (Hong Kong: Swindon Book Company, 1970).
16.
��Government Workers Suspended: Action Taken Following Marine Department Stoppage��, South China Morning Post, 2 June 1967.
17.
Personal communication from Professor Norman Miners, 12 September 2000.
18.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Cooper, Colony in Con.ict, p. 105.
21.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
22.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
23.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
24.
Chen Yangyong, Kucheng Weiju: Zhou Enlai zai 1967 (Shoring up a shaky situation: Zhou Enlai in 1967) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1999), p. 355.
25.
Yao Dengshan was originally an of.cer in the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia before he was expelled from Jakarta in April 1967. Once back in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he set about the task of providing authoritative leadership to the radical forces directed against Chen Yi, who was attempting to shield the conduct of China��s foreign relations from the rising tide of internal violence. Wang Li, on the other hand, was renowned for his August-Seventh speech, in which he claimed, ��[W]hy can��t a 20-year-old become the Minister of Foreign Affairs? We need to capture power now.�� See Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao��s Last Revolution (Cambridge MA; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), Chapter 13.
26.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
27.
Jin Yaoru, Zhonggong Xianggang zhengce miwen shilu: Jin Yaoru wushinian xiangjiang yi wang (Secret records of China��s Hong Kong policies: A memoir of Jin Yaoru, .fty years in Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Tianyuan Shuwu, 1998), p. 122.
28.
Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray, 1994), p. 64.
29.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
30.
Wu Kang-min was a member of the ��Struggle Committee�� in the 1967 riots. Wu interview, 25 May 2000.
31.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
32.
TNA, FCO 21/204, Chinese policy towards Hong Kong, internal Foreign Of.ce assessment, 16 June 1967. In fact, the only actual support from China was a gift of HK$10 million by the Chinese Trade Union Federation to the Struggle Committee.
33.
TNA, FCO 21/65, E. Bollard minute, 15 September 1967, p. 156.
34.
Records of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, 12 July 1967.
35.
��Paper Reveal Undercover Power Base during 1967 Riots��, South China Morning Post, 7 June 1992.
36.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
37.
Some of the locations raided by the police were owned and operated by of.cial commercial channels of China. Others were run in buildings leased by the Chinese side. Still others were independent of mainland interest but merely sold Chinese literature and propaganda materials. Waldron argued that the of.cial and semi-of.cial ties of such institutions made the government��s action against them potentially more serious than the raids against local leftists, since such actions may lead to Chinese protests. Waldron, ��Fire on the Rim��, p. 264.
38.
Committee of Hong Kong Kowloon Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the Struggle Against Persecution by the British Authorities in Hong Kong. The May Upheaval in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Committee of Hong Kong Kowloon Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the Struggle Against Persecution by the British Authorities in Hong Kong, 1967), p. 38.
39.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999. He responded in this way when being asked on his view towards the Hong Kong government��s anti-riot tactics.
40.
Waldron, ��Fire on the Rim��, p. 266.
41.
��Raids on Three Communists Strongholds: Longest Operation Since May��, South China Morning Post, 1 August 1967.
42.
TNA, FCO 21/202, Hong Kong to CO, 21 September 1967, Telegram No. 903. Trench sent this telegram in reply to a Foreign Of.ce telegram, giving details of the assessment of the situation in Hong Kong made by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
43.
Jin, Secret Records of China��s Hong Kong Policies, pp. 149�V52.
44.
Quoted in Jin, p. 152.
45.
TNA, FCO 21/225, E. Bollard minute, Colonial Of.ce of.cial, 19 September 1967, p. 5.
46.
TNA, FCO 21/202, Hong Kong to CO, 21 September 1967, Telegram No. 903.
47.
Waldron, ��Fire on the Rim��, p. 287.
48.
HKRS 70-1/313G, Riots 1967, Declarations of Support to Government, 15 May 1967�V 10 August 1967.
49.
The United Nations Association had very few, if any, members. It was formed and run by Ma Man-fei as a platform to publicize his own views. Personal communication with Norman Miners, 12 September 2000.
50.
��Siding with the Strength��, China Mail, 7 March 1968.
51.
��Riots Warning��, Hong Kong Standard, 7 December 1969.
52.
HKRS70-1/326, Press Library Files, Social Welfare Department, 11 January 1967�V 7 December 1970.
53.
��Elsie Agrees with Lord Rhodes��, The Star, 7 August 1967.
54.
��What Opinion Have the Elected Councilors Expressed on Behalf of the Residents��, Tin Tin Daily News, 7 September 1967.
55.
��Siding with the Strength��, the China Mail, 7 March 1968. The .rst half of the places mentioned were residential areas for the wealthy. The latter half was densely populated by the relatively poor.
56.
On the concept of legitimacy, see William Connolly, Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); James O��Connor, The Meaning of Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, Authority Revisited (New York: New York University Press, 1987); T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, Political Legitimation in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1982). However, Peter Ferdinand argued that Ian Scott had no clear idea of what the ��legitimacy might be�� and Alan P. L. Liu argued that Scott��s account of a legitimacy crisis was not very meaningful in the context of the Hong Kong government. See The American Political Science Review, 85:3�V4 (1991) (book review by Peter Ferdinand and Alan Liu), p. 330.
57.
Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 322.
58.
Ibid.
59.
The former was used by Dr Patrick Hase, who worked as an administrative of.cer of the Hong Kong government until taking early retirement in 1996, and the latter by Denis Bray.
60.
Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, pp. 36�V7.
61.
For the difference between legitimacy by performance and legitimacy by procedure, see Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 50.
62.
Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 50.
63.
Ibid.
64.
Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, p. 327.
65.
Ibid., p. 106.
66.
Hase interview, 9 May 1999.
67.
Ibid.
68.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
69.
The American Political Science Review, 85:3�V4 (1991) (book review by Alan Liu), p. 330.
70.
Personal letter from Norman Miners, 14 April 1999.
71.
Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, p. 322. Scott did not de.ne what exactly a crisis was in his 1989 work. For the theoretical discussion, see James O��Connor, The Meaning of Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). In fact, crisis can be de.ned as ��the moment when a con.ict occurred so great that the government cannot deal with it any more, or a situation where con.ict, especially political con.ict, has become so threatening or dangerous that people are afraid that there will be war or where the government is so heavily attacked that there is serious doubt whether it will continue to exist��. See Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993).
72.
Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (.fth edition) (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 32.
73.
Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, p. 104.
74.
Ibid., p. 322.
75.
Ibid.
76.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999.
77.
Sir David Akers-Jones was the chief secretary of Hong Kong from 1985 to 1987. He .rst arrived in Hong Kong as a soldier in January 1945 and began his career in the colonial government in the summer of 1957. Jones interview, 28 May 1999.
78.
Cater interview, 12 October 1999. He responded in this way when being asked on his view towards Scott��s argument.
79.
Personal interviews with a police constable (who refused to disclose his name), 9 June 2000.
80.
Bray interview, 24 April 1999.
81.
Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, p. 104.
Chapter 4
1.
Some of the materials used in this chapter were collected at The National Archives by Ray Yep, to whom I am grateful for sharing copies with me.
2.
TNA, FCO 21/235, Hong Kong Tel. to CO, 6 September 1967. For Victoria��s move see The Times, 28 August 1967, pp. 1, 4.
3. TNA, FCO 21/235, E. T. Davies to I. T. M. Lucas, Central Department, FO, 8 September 1967; Hugh Davies, ��An Undiplomatic Foray: A 1967 escapade in Macau��, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch 47 (2008), pp. 115�V26.
4. This episode has attracted little attention in English. There is a short account, vague on some detail and chronology, and which is based on newspaper sources in Steve Shipp, Macau, China: A Political History of the Portuguese Colony��s Transition to Chinese Rule (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, 1997), pp. 89�V91. For a fuller treatment see Moises Silva Fernandes, ��As prostracs das instituics britanicas em Macau durante a ��revolucao cultural�� chinesa em Maio de 1967 e algumas das suas consequencias�� (��The prostration of British institutions in Macau during the Chinese ��Cultural Revolution�� in May 1967 and some of its repercussions��), in his Con.uencia de Interesses: Macau nas Relacs Luso-Chinesas Contemporaneas 1945�V2005 (Lisbon: Ministerio dos Negios Estrangeiros, Coleccao Biblioteca Diplomatica Serie A No. 9, 2008), pp. 305�V44.
5.
TNA, FCO 21/235, E. Bolland to Norman Ions, 28 July 1967.
6.
See documents in HKPRO, HKRS 935-2-14, ��China and Macau��.
7.
The Times, 18 April 1967, p. 5.
8.
Quoted in Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (London: Hurst and Company, 1989), p. 97.
9.
Quoted in Fernandes, ��As prostracs das instituics britanicas em Macau��, p. 309.
10.
C. R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550�V1770: Fact and Fancy in the History of Macao (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1948), pp. 255�V62. On images of the colony see also Jonathan Porter, Macau: The Imaginary City. Culture and Society, 1557 to the Present (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).
11.
See Chapter 5 of De Leeuw��s Cities of Sin (London: Noel Douglas, 1934; new editions in 1940 and 1953). Auden��s aside �X ��And nothing serious can happen here�� �Xoccurred in his 1938 poem, ��Macao��, .rst published in W. H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood, Journey to a War (London: Faber and Faber, 1939).
12.
Wang Zhicheng, Portuguese in Shanghai (Macau: Macau Foundation, 2004).
13.
TNA, FCO 21/235, ��H.M. Consulate, Macao Return of Consular work for the 12 months ended 31 October 1966��; TNA, FCO 47/24, ��Evacuation (Emergency Planning
�X Macao��, Hong Kong Tel. No. 93, 21 January 1967; K. MacLellan, Canadian High Commission, to E. Bolland, 26 January 1967.
14.
TNA, FCO 47/24, ��Evacuation (Emergency Planning) �X Macao��, Hong Kong Tel. No. 93, 21 January 1967.
15.
The Times, 2 December 1967, p. 11. For accounts of the 12.3 events see Anthony
R. Dicks, ��Macau: Legal Fiction and Gunboat Diplomacy,�� in Goran Aijmer (ed.), Leadership on the China Coast (London: Curzon Press, 1984), pp. 90�V128. (This is a reprint of a survey originally circulated privately in July 1967 as ��Macao: Gunboat Diplomacy��; see TNA, FCO 21/236, ��Macao: Political Affairs Internal. Foreign views on��. Dicks, then a fellow in Chinese law at the Institute of Current World Affairs, was living in Hong Kong. His various monthly reports to the Institute can be viewed at http://www.icwa.org/FormerArticles.asp?vIni=ARD&vName=Anthony%20R.%20Di cks.) Moises Silva Fernandes, Macau na Politica Externa Chinesa, 1949�V1979 (Lisboa, Imprensa de Ciencias Sociais, 2006) provides a full survey of events, and his Sinopse de Macau nas Relacs Luso-Chinesas, 1945�V1995 (Lisboa: Fundacao Oriente, 2000) provides a chronology and reprints of key documents.
16.
TNA, FCO 40/71, ��Hong Kong: Political Affairs: Bilateral Relations with Macao��, Monthly Intelligence Report, December 1966, Appendix, ��Events in Macao��; Joao De Pina-Cabral, Between China and Europe: Person, Culture and Emotion in Macao (London: Berg Publishers, 2000), pp. 72�V5.
17.
TNA, FCO 40/71, ��Hong Kong: Political Affairs: Bilateral Relations with Macao��, Hong Kong Tel. 55, 14 January 1967; CO to Hong Kong, No. 95, 15 January 1967.
18.
TNA, FCO 40/71, ��Hong Kong: Political Affairs: Bilateral Relations with Macao��, Hong Kong Tel. 68, 17 January 1967.
19.
TNA, FCO 47/24, ��Evacuation (Emergency Planning) �X Macao��, CO to Hong Kong, Tel. No. 123, 19 January 1967.
20.
TNA, FCO 40/71, ��Hong Kong: Political Affairs: Bilateral Relations with Macao��, ��Submission: Evacuation of Macao��, 17 January 1967.
21.
Copy of Hong Kong Despatch No. 1164, 23 June 1967 in TNA, DEFE 25/300.
22.
De Pina-Cabral, Between China and Europe, p. 74; Richard Louis Edmonds and Herbert S. Yee, ��Macau: From Portuguese Autonomous Territory to Chinese Special Administrative Region��, The China Quarterly, No. 160 (1999), p. 805, n. 14.
23.
Fernandes, ��As prostracs das instituics britanicas em Macau��, p. 326. In 1964 the Consulate had organized a press brie.ng to try and quell persistent press attacks on the entry permit system��s alleged inadequacies; see Hong Kong Public Record Of.ce, HKRS 41�V2�V346, ��Immigration Department: Macau Permit Of.ce, Routine Correspondence��.
24.
Much of the narrative is taken from Ions�� later draft despatch on the episode, composed in early June in London, in TNA, FCO 21/235, paper 54, hereafter Ions despatch, and from Hong Kong telegrams to London collected in the same .le. See also the Times, 13 May 1967, p. 1. This despatch has now been edited by Moises Silva Fernandes and partially published as ��A Diplomat Interrupted��, Macau Closer (15 February�V15 March 2007), pp. 40�V43.
25.
TNA, FCO 21/235, ��H.M. Consul in Macao��, Bolland minute, 16 May 1967.
26.
Ions despatch.
27.
TNA, FCO 21/235, Hong Kong Tel. No. 694, 24 May 1967.
28.
Daily Express report, 25 May 1967, p. 2.
29.
TNA, FCO 21/235, Hong Kong Tels. No. 692, No. 681, 24 May 1967.
30.
Ions was satis.ed that the hotel staff were spying on him, so he and the Hong Kong government of.cer with whom he discussed the situation resorted to using that standby code for subjects pas devant les Chinois: French.
31.
TNA, FCO 21/235, E. T. Davies to I. T. M. Lucas, Central Departmentt, FO, 8 September 1967; George Walden, Lucky George: Memoirs of an Anti-politician (London: Allen Lane, 1999), pp. 90�V92; Davies, ��An Undiplomatic Foray��.
32.
TNA, FCO 21/235, K. R. Welbore Ker (Lisbon) to E. Bolland, 4 October 1967, James Murray, Submission, ��Macao Consulate��, 1 December 1967.
33.
TNA, CAB 134/2945, Annex, ��The Situation in Macao��, ��Cabinet. Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong. Interim Report by Of.cials��, 21 July 1967. The evolution of this report is recorded in FCO 40/77, ��Hong Kong: Territorial (Sovereignty). Future of.��
34.
TNA, FCO 40/77, H. N. Hall, minute for Secretary of State, 28 June 1967, ��Hong Kong, Sir David Trench��.
35.
Hong Kong. Report for the Year 1967 (Hong Kong: Government Press, 1968), pp. 1�V2. The report was the subject of disagreement between Trench and the Peking embassy:
TNA, FCO 21/193, Hong Kong No. 135, 29 January 1968, and D. C. Wilson minute, 30 January 1968.
36.
TNA, FCO 21/192, ��The Communist challenge��, Special Branch, Hong Kong Police, 15 May 1967.
37.
TNA, FCO 21/204, F. Brewer, ��Hong Kong and China��, 18 May 1967. Brewer concluded that while the Chinese ��evidently intended to gain effective, though indirect, control over Macao��, their demands in Hong Kong were as yet more limited.
38.
��Probably the Communists have not yet taken the decision to launch an all-out Macau-style attack��: TNA, FCO 40/113, Hong Kong No. 600, 13 May 1967.
39.
TNA, FCO 40/77, ��The possibility of a British withdrawal from Hong Kong��, A. N. Galsworthy minute, 31 May 1967. ��National humiliation�� (guochi) is of course an important trope in PRC history making. On the subject see Paul A. Cohen, ��Remembering and Forgetting: National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China,�� in China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 148�V84.
40.
TNA, FCO 40/77, ��Extract from minutes of a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee held on 25/5/1967��.
41.
TNA, FCO 40/77, ��The possibility of a British withdrawal from Hong Kong��, A.N. Galsworthy minute, 31 May 1967, after visit to Hong Kong and discussions with Sir David Trench and General Worsley, Commander of British Forces, Hong Kong.
42.
Roderick MacFarquhar, ��China gets rough��, New Statesman, 14 July 1967, p. 40; ��Punch-up diplomacy��, New Statesman, 1 September 1967, p. 245.
43.
The Times, 12 May 1967, p. 5.
44.
The Times, 15 May 1967, p. 4.
45.
The Economist, 3 June 1967, p. 996.
46.
Ian Scott has shown, however, and the chapters in this volume reinforce the point, that in the longer term the crisis catalysed slowly evolving reform across the colonial administration and its practices and assumptions: Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, pp. 105�V26.
47.
TNA, DEFE 11/754, Commonwealth Secretary to Hong Kong, No. 944, 17 May 1967.
48.
TNA, FCO 40/77, ��The possibility of a British withdrawal from Hong Kong��, A.N. Galsworthy minute, 31 May 1967.
49.
TNA, CAB 134/2945, Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Long Term Study, 28 March 1969, para. 87.
50.
TNA, FCO 40/77, Cabinet, OPD, Defence Review Working Party, ��Minutes of a Meeting of the Working Party��, 26 June 1967.
51.
TNA, FCO 40/77, Cabinet, OPD, Defence Review Working Party, ��Minutes of a Meeting of the Working Party��, 26 June 1967.
52.
TNA, FCO 40/77, Cabinet, OPD, Defence Review Working Party, ��Minutes of a Meeting of the Working Party��, 17 July 1967.
53.
TNA, FCO 40/77, Herbert Jenkyns to Sir Arthur Galsworthy, 19 July 1967.
54.
TNA, CAB 134/2945, ��Cabinet. Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong. Interim Report by Of.cials��, 21 July 1967.
55.
TNA, CAB 134/2945, ��Cabinet. Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong��, Minutes of a meeting of the committee, 24 July 1967.
56.
TNA, CAB 134/2945, ��Cabinet. Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong��, Minutes of a meeting of the committee, 22 September July 1967 and attached paper, ��Contingency Planning. Note by the Secretaries��, 20 September 1967.
57. Draft OPD paper, ��Contingency Planning: Hong Kong. Memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary��, November 1967, copy in TNA, DEFE 25/300.
58. C. R. Schenk, ��The Empire Strikes Back: Hong Kong and the Decline of Sterling in the 1960s��, Economic History Review 57:3 (2004), pp. 551�V80.
59. TNA, T317/1228, ��Contingency planning: Hong Kong��, S. H. Wright, Treasury, minute, 7 December 1967.
60. TNA, CAB 134/2945, Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Long Term Study, 28 March 1969, para. 9.
61. TNA, FCO21/204, D.C. Hopson (Peking) Despatch No.12, 6 June 1967.
62. H.A. Turner et al., The Last Colony: But Whose? A Study of the Labour Movement, Labour Market and Labour Relations in Hong Kong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 104�V6; TNA, CAB 134/2945, ��Cabinet. Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong��, Minutes of a meeting of the committee, 22 September July 1967 and attached papers.
Chapter 5
1. Parts of this chapter draw from sections of my Concise History of Hong Kong (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Little.eld, 2007; Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007).
2. Gary Wayne Catron, ��China and Hong Kong, 1945�V1967�� (PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1971), pp. 297�V300.
3. Catron, ��China and Hong Kong��, p. 284.
4. Catron, ��China and Hong Kong��, p. 250.
5. For example, Who Is Guilty of These Atrocities? (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao, 1967), We Shall Win! British Imperialism in Hong Kong Will be Defeated! (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao, 1967), The May Upheaval in Hongkong (Hong Kong: Committee of Hongkong-Kowloon Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the Struggle against Persecution by the British Authorities in Hong Kong, 1967), Ying diguozhuyi zai wanhuo�^�Ұ�D�q�b���� [British colonialism is playing with .re] (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1967), Kongsu Gangying diguozhuyi Faxisi baoxing [Complaint against the fascist violence of British colonialism] ���D��^�Ұ�D�q�k�贵�ɦ� (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1967).
6. Robert Kotewall��s report on the strike, enclosed in TNA, CO 129/489, 24 October 1925, Stubbs to Amery, pp. 433�V4.
7. Ming K. Chan, ��Labour vs. Crown: Aspects of Society-State Interactions in the Hong Kong Labour Movement before World War II��, in Elizabeth Sinn (ed.), Between East and West: Aspects of Social and Political Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong, 1990), p. 141.
8. This correspondence is contained in the Foreign Of.ce and the Foreign and Commonwealth Of.ce, Far Eastern Department: Registered Files, F and FE Series, TNA, FCO 21/193, 1967�V68.
9. Hong Kong: Report for the Year 1967 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Press, 1968), pp. 1, 111.
10. For a brief discussion of these documents, see Gary Cheung, ��The Secret Handover��, South China Morning Post, 20 November 2006.
11. Quoted in John D. Young, ��The Building Years: Maintaining a China-Hong Kong-Britain Equilibrium, 1950�V71��, in Ming K. Chan (ed.), Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1842�V1992 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 138.
12. Cheung Ka-wai (Gary Cheung) �i�a��, Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing���䤻�C�ɰʤ��� [Inside story of the 1967 riots in Hong Kong] (Beijing: Taipingyang shiji chubanshe, 2000), pp. 16�V17.
13. John Cooper, Colony in Con.ict: The Hong Kong Disturbances, May 1967�VJanuary 1968 (Hong Kong: Swindon, 1970), p. 10.
14. Chan, ��Labour vs. Crown��, p. 139.
15. Robert Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (London: Allen Lane, 2003), p. 168.
16. For an example of leftist propaganda aimed at students, see Tongxuemen, tuanjie qilai!�P�ǭ̡A�ε��_�ӡI[Students, organize and rise up!] (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1967).
17. Chan, ��Labour vs. Crown��, p. 139.
18. Kotewall��s report, pp. 442�V3.
19. Sir Jack Cater, ��The 1967 Riots��, in Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, Hong Kong Remembers (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 108�V9.
20. TNA, CO 129/489, 10 September 1925, P. P. J. Wodehouse to Colonial Secretary, pp. 193�V6.
21. Young, ��The Building Years��, p. 140. See also John D. Young, ��Towards a Hong Kong Identity: The Riots of 1966 and 1967��, paper presented at the Twelfth Conference of the International Association of Historians, June 1991, the University of Hong Kong.
22. Henry J. Lethbridge, ��Introduction��, in Hong Kong: Stability and Change: A Collection of Essays (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 25.
23. David Faure, Colonialism and the Hong Kong Mentality (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong, 2003), pp. 75�V76.
24. Kotewall��s report, pp. 431�V2.
25. Kotewall��s report, pp. 433�V4.
26. Chan, ��Labour vs. Crown��, p. 142.
27. Cater, ��The 1967 Riots��, p. 111.
28. Quoted in Gary Cheung, ��Hong Kong��s Watershed��, South China Morning Post, 3 May 2007.
29. Stephen Edward Waldron, ��Fire on the Rim: A Study in Contradictions in Left-Wing Political Mobilization in Hong Kong 1967�� (PhD thesis, University of Syracuse, 1980), p. 21.
30. Leo F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Con.ict Between Public Interest and Private Pro.t in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 147.
31. Quoted in John Rear, ��One Brand of Politics��, in Keith Hopkins (ed.), Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 55.
32. TNA, CO 129/263, 23 August 1894, Ripon to Robinson, reprinted in Steve Tsang (ed.), Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), p. 109.
33. TNA, CO 129/268, Robinson to Chamberlain, 16 August 1895, reprinted in Tsang, Government and Politics, p. 109.
34. TNA, CO 129/274, Chamberlain to Robinson, 29 May 1896, reprinted in Tsang, Government and Politics, p. 110.
Chapter 6
1. ��Hong Kong Defeat of Rioters; High Prestige of Police��, David Bonavia, The Times, 22 June 1967.
2.
European was the imperial term given for ��white�� of.cers who were typically British but could also be drawn from other Commonwealth countries.
3.
See Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Police (London: Max Parrish, 1952), pp. 28�V34. Jeffries was the deputy under-secretary of state for the colonies at this time and made the earliest study of British colonial policing.
4.
It consisted originally of ninety-three soldiers seconded from British and Indian regiments.
5.
Kevin Sinclair and Nelson Ng Kwok-cheung, Asia��s Finest Marches On: Policing Hong Kong from 1841 into the 21st Century (Hong Kong: Kevin Sinclair Associates Ltd, 1997); Colin Crisswell and Mike Watson, The Royal Hong Kong Police, 1841�V1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982).
6.
The Auxiliary Police Force was formed in 1914 and known originally as the Hong Kong Reserve. It was disbanded in 1919 but then re-formed in the early 1920s. In 1941, a special constabulary was formed separate to the Hong Kong Reserve though both bodies were amalgamated in 1957 to form the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force.
7.
Taken from an interview with Peter Schouten (RHKP, Sen. Assist. Commissioner, Rtd., 1949�V78), 10 November 2006.
8.
Mark S. Gaylord and Harold Traver, ��Colonial Policing and the Demise of British Rule in Hong Kong��, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 23 (1995), pp. 24�V26.
9.
Taken from an interview with Michael Ko-chun (RHKP, Sup. Rtd., 1950�V75), 18 August 2003 and 15 September 2006. Ko-chun was born in Weihaiwei, arriving in Hong Kong in 1950 as a refugee.
10.
Taken from an interview with Ivan Scott (RHKP, Sup. Rtd., 1955�V1987), 21 May 2001.
11.
For detailed discussion see Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945�V1980 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), Ch. 1.
12.
This was particularly true in the late 1940s when the local population saw an in.ux of immigrants from China, many of whom were ��Nationalists and keen to support the Colonial Government��. Indeed, the ��loyalty�� of Chinese police of.cers recruited from this population was not called into question. Taken from an interview with Ted Eates (Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Nigeria RHKP, Com. Rtd., 1946�V1968), 22 October 2007.
13.
Eates interview, 23 July 2003.
14.
Gaylord and Traver, ��Colonial Policing��, p. 29.
15.
Jeffries, Colonial Police, p. 84. In 1935, Sir Herbert Dowbiggin commented that the Hong Kong Police were better equipped for crowd and riot control than many of their colonial counterparts. This included transport and weaponry available. Dowbiggin, ��Notes on Police Forces visited in 1935��, Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RHL) MSs. Ind. Oc. s. 288/f. 24.
16.
C. L. Scobell (RHKP, Sen. Assist. Com. Rtd., 1951�V78) in correspondence with the author, 22 February 2000.
17.
Anthony Annieson, The One-Eyed Dragon: The Inside Story of a Hong Kong Policeman (Moffat: Lochar Publishing Ltd, 1989), pp. 37�V64.
18.
Schouten interview, 10 November 2006.
19.
In 1956, each Police Tactical Squad (PTS) comprised some twenty-eight to thirty men divided into sections: baton; lock-up; ri.e and gas with one non-commissioned of.cer (NCO) and six men per section managed by two European or Chinese of.cers.
20.
Annieson, One-Eyed Dragon, pp. 39�V40.
21.
Sinclair and Ng Kwok-cheung, Asia��s Finest, pp. 39�V40.
22.
Schouten interview, 10 November 2006; Eates interview, 23 July 2003.
23.
Annieson, One-Eyed Dragon, p. 161.
24.
Schouten interview, 10 November 2006.
25.
Scobell interview, 22 February 2000, Eates interview 23 July 2003.
26.
Trench to Colonial Secretary, Secret, ��Hong Kong: A Review of Principal Developments��, 15 December 1966, The National Archives, London, TNA, DEFE 13/534.
27.
Michael Hogan, C. K. Lo, L. T. Ride and Maurice P. K. Wong, ��Kowloon Report�� (1966), TNA, FCO 40/39.
28.
In the event, 93 rounds of ammunition were .red and this resulted in one dead and three injured according to the report. Report Kowloon disturbances, 1967, pp. 60�V67, TNA, FCO 40/39.
29.
Eates interview, 19 September 2007.
30.
Report Kowloon disturbances, 1967, p. 65, TNA, FCO 40/39.
31.
Report Kowloon disturbances, 1967, p. 66, TNA, FCO 40/39.
32.
Trench to Commonwealth Secretary, ��Hong Kong: Principal Developments December 1966�VJune 1967��, 25 July 1967, TNA, DEFE 25/300.
33.
Eates, as deputy commissioner, replaced the commissioner of police, Edward Tyrer, in August 1967, having been acting commissioner during his six-week leave of absence in the UK. Tyrer had returned to Hong Kong in August and resumed command of the Hong Kong Police (HKP) at that time. He was said to have retired subsequently from the police for reasons of ill health; see Sinclair and Ng Kwok-cheung, Asia��s Finest,
p. 49. However, of.cial correspondence does not provide any conclusive evidence of the reasons for his premature retirement. Eates has said that Tyrer told him that the Hong Kong government had lost con.dence in him, but he did not give speci.c reasons for this. Rumours at the time suggested that Tyrer had been seen to have ��given the Communists too much elbow room and not taken a tough enough line��, although police policy at the time was keen not to provoke Beijing in terms of HKP handling of local communist supporters. Moreover, Tyrer had told Eates on several occasions that he had disagreements with the commander of the British Forces (CBF) on how police operations should be managed; Eates interview, 15 February 2008. It could be suggested here that police commissioners had been forced into early retirement during colonial emergencies as a result of a difference of opinion with the CBF. For example, Nicol Gray in Malaya in 1952, George Robbins in Cyprus in 1956 and John Biles in Zanzibar in 1963.
34.
Commissioner of Police, Annual Departmental Report, 1965 (Hong Kong, 1966), p. 1.
35.
Taken from an interview with Pedro Ching (Sen. Assist. Com., RHKP, Rtd., 1963�V98), 28 May 2007. Ching was recruited into the Inspectorate in 1963.
36.
Trench to Commonwealth Secretary, ��Hong Kong: Principal Developments December 1966�VJune 1967��, 25 July 1967, TNA, DEFE 25/300.
37.
See, for example, Sinclair and Ng Kwok-cheung, Asia��s Finest, pp. 45�V50.
38.
Eates noted that police morale ��suffered�� temporarily though there were no incidents recalled when the Hong Kong Police failed to carry out their duties and responsibilities ef.ciently, nor were there more than a handful of resignations at that time. Eates interview, 15 February 2008.
39.
Trench to Commonwealth Of.ce, Secretary of State, 24 May 1967, TNA, FCO 2/191.
40.
Hong Kong Information Of.ce to Commonwealth Of.ce, telegram, 23 May 1967, TNA, FCO 2/191.
41.
Ching interview, 28 May 2007.
42.
This was perceived as evidence that the British government were intent on remaining in Hong Kong; Eates interview, 15 February 2008 and Trench to Secretary of State, Commonwealth Of.ce, secret telegram, 22 May 1967, TNA, FCO 2/191.
43.
CINCFE to MOD UK, 22 May 1967, TNA, DEFE 25/300.
44.
Ching interview, 28 May 2007.
45.
��General Situation and Policing��, Hong Kong; Political Affairs, report, May 1967, TNA, FCO 21/191.
46.
Hong Kong government to FCO, general report on disturbances, May 1967, TNA, DEFE 11/754.
47.
��Chinese Communist Confrontation with HK Government �V Assessment of Recent Activities��, Special Branch report, 15 January 1968, TNA, FCO 21/196.
48.
Trench to Secretary of State, Commonwealth Of.ce, secret telegram, 17 May 1967, TNA, FCO 2/191.
49.
Eates interview, 4 February 2008.
50.
Press Of.ce Hong Kong to Press Chapelries, London, telegram, 17 May 1967, TNA, FCO 2/191.
51.
Cooper, ��Hong Kong Disturbances��, p. 14. Allegations were made of police violence during the 1967 disturbances, which the government then claimed to have been ��grossly exaggerated��. Five people died while in police custody. In four cases, it was claimed that these people had been arrested on ��occasions when extreme violence had been resorted to in attempts to resist the efforts of the Police to maintain law and order. The persons concerned had received injuries almost certainly incurred in the course of their arrest from which they subsequently died.�� An inquiry was held into each case: two deaths due to misadventure, one accidental and one justi.able homicide. In the .fth case, three police of.cers were charged with murder and convicted with manslaughter. The convictions were all quashed on appeal owing to incomplete evidence. Police casualties were 10 killed and 212 injured, and for civilians, 17 people killed and 43 injured as a result of the use of .rearms. Total casualties amongst the public were 39 killed and 585 injured, many as a result of bombings. TNA, FCO 40/226.
52.
For example, a corporal and two constables were charged following an attack on a man held in custody from 24 June to 26 June. HK of.ce to FCO, telegram, 1 July 1967, TNA, FCO 21/192.
53.
Hong Kong Annual Report, 10 January 1968, TNA, FCO 21/193.
54.
Sinclair and Ng Kwok-cheung, Asia��s Finest, pp. 49�V50, Eates interview, 22 October 2007.
55.
For an in-depth overview of police/military relationship, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 1�V98.
56.
Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919�V1960 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 145.
57.
��Dormant Commission for CBF, Hong Kong��, Top Secret, 1967, TNA, FCO 40/98.
58.
��UK Policy towards Hong Kong��, secret, TNA, FCO 21/199.
59.
Police/military exercises, known as TEWT (tactical exercises without troops), were carried out yearly, but involved police and army of.cers working out joint manoeuvres from a theoretical rather than practical perspective.
60.
Eates interview, 19 September 2007.
61.
Trench to Colonial Secretary, secret telegram, 12 January 1967, TNA, DEFE 24/595.
62.
Ibid.
63.
Defence Report, ��Dormant Commission��, 1967, TNA, FCO 40/98.
64.
Secret Special Branch Report, HKP, 15 May 1967, TNA, FCO 21/192.
65.
This was also in response to the number of crimes recorded, which rose by 11.8 percent that year to 24,047, being the highest reported .gure for eleven years. Hong Kong Police Annual Report, 1 April 1967 �V 31 March 1968, pp. 4, 8, 19.
66.
Chiefs of Staff Committee Defence Planning Report, 6 October 1966, TNA, DEFE 24/519.
67.
Hong Kong defence contributions, 1967, TNA, FCO 40/99.
68.
Minutes of Defence Planning Meeting, 11 October 1966, TNA, DEFE 24/519.
69
. Secret memorandum by Colonial Secretary to Defence Planning Committee, October 1966 entitled ��Hong Kong Garrison��, TNA, DEFE 13/534.
70.
Top secret, Foreign Secretary notes taken at Defence Planning meeting, 5 September 1967, TNA, DEFE 11/756.
71.
K. M. Wilford, Colonial Secretariat, HK to FCO, 21 July 1967, TNA, FCO 21/209.
72.
Trench to Colonial Secretary, con.dential telegram, 24 June 1967, ��Bilateral Border Incidents��, TNA, FCO 21/209.
73.
Trench to Colonial Secretary, con.dential telegram, 27 June 1967, TNA, FCO 21/209.
74.
��Aspects of Recent Chinese Dealings with Hong Kong��, Special Branch Report, 10 May 1968, TNA, FCO 21/198.
75.
Eates interview, 7 September 2007 and Wilford, Colonial Secretariat, HK to FCO, 21 July 1967, TNA, FCO 21/209.
76.
FCO to Peking Of.ce, cipher, 5 July 1967, TNA, FCO 21/209.
77.
FCO to Peking Of.ce, cipher, 5 August 1967, TNA, FCO 21/209.
78.
FCO Con.dential report, ��Border Incidents��, TNA, FCO 21/193.
79.
Ching interview, 28 May 2007.
80.
Peking Of.ce to FCO, telegram, 15 August 1967, TNA, FCO 21/209.
81.
Chief of the Defence Staff to the Commonwealth Secretary, Top Secret Report, UK eyes only, 27 July 1967, TNA, DEFE 25/300.
82.
��Hong and Border Incidents��, FCO report, 16 October 1967, TNA, FCO 21/210.
83
. ��Border Agreement��, FCO report, 16 October 1967, TNA, FCO 21/198.
84.
Eates, in correspondence with the author, 13 October 2007.
85
. Signed D. W. H., Colonial Of.ce to Ministry of Defence, 9 June 1967, TNA, DEFE 11/756.
86.
Gerry Northam, Shooting in the Dark: Riot Police in Britain (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), pp. 38�V42. This visit by the Royal Hong Kong Police (RHKP) was never made public, nor was the decision to adopt colonial-style riot police tactics in Britain, although these riot control methods had been employed in Northern Ireland since the inception of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in 1922.
87.
Taken from an interview with Eric Blackburn (RHKP, Dep. Com., Rtd., 1954�V1988), 20 October 2006.
Chapter 7
1.
Part of the research for this chapter was undertaken while the author was Visiting Fellow at the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. The research was funded by an ESRC research grant RES-165-25-0004.
2.
C. R. Schenk, Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre: Emergence and Development 1945�V65 (London: Routledge, 2001).
3.
The next two sections draw on C. R. Schenk, ��The Empire Strikes Back: Hong Kong and the Decline of Sterling in the 1960s��, Economic History Review, LVII (3) August 2004, pp. 551�V80.
4.
Note by Secretary of the Cabinet (Burke Trend), the Economic Situation, 18 July 1966. The National Archives, Kew, London (hereafter TNA) CAB129/126.
5.
Hong Kong Legislative Council, 15 March 1967.
6.
P. R. Baldwin (Principal Private Secretary to Chancellor) to F. E. Figgures (HMT), 25 October 1966, TNA, T317/1067.
7.
Ministry of Defence paper, Defence Estimates 1967; draft white paper, 2 February 1967, TNA, CAB129/128.
8.
Intelligence memorandum, 11 July 1967, CIA Of.ce of Current Intelligence, ��The Situation in Hong Kong��. Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
9.
Ministry of Defence (DEI) memo, ��The Economic Value of HK to China��, 18 May 1967, TNA, T317/902.
10.
CIA Intelligence memorandum, Of.ce of Current Intelligence, ��The Outlook for Hong Kong��, 25 August 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
11.
F. E. Figgures to Sir Denis Rickett, 17 May 1967. Reporting a discussion with Sir Roger Jackling on FO opinion of HK situation, TNA, T317/902.
12.
Ministry of Defence (DEI) memo, ��The Economic Value of HK to China��, 18 May 1967, TNA, T317/902.
13.
Note for the record of a meeting between Denis Rickett and the Chancellor, by P. R. Baldwin, 16 May 1967, TNA, T317/902.