OBSERVATIONS
ON OUR
CHINESE COMMERCE ;
INCLUDING
REMARKS
ON
THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF THE TEA DUTIES,
OUR NEW SETTLEMENT AT HONG KONG,
AND THE OPIUM TRADE .
BY
SIR GEORGE THOMAS STAUNTON , BART., M.P.
LONDON :
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1850 .
JO
/ 22/
S
ITI
PR
SE
NOTICE .
THESE Observations were written to illus
trate the Miscellaneous Notices on China
published in 1822, and intended to be bound
up with the remaining copies of that work ;
but as the first edition and part of the second
are already in the hands of the Public, this
separate publication has been issued for the
convenience of the possessors of the original
work.
LONDON, Jan. 1 , 1850.
OBSERVATIONS ,
ETC.
Propose to trace the progress of events in China since
the original publication of this work . – State of the Trade
under the East India Company .-- Trade thrown open in
1833.-War commenced with China in 1839.-Peace re
stored in 1842, and its consequences .--Appointment in
1847 of a Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry.-- Its Con
stitution, Labours, and Recommendations. — Advantages
that may be expected to result from a reduction of the Tea
Duties.- Parliamentary Debate on the opening of the Trade
in 1833.-- Omission of precautionary Measures in China,
and consequent melancholy fate of Lord Napier. - Regrets
universally expressed at this omission when the China
War was subsequently discussed in Parliament in 1840.
Character of the policy recommended in our intercourse
with the Chinese, illustrated by a reference to Lord Am
herst's Mission to Pekin in 1816.-Condition and Pros
pects of our New Settlement at Hong- Kong.-Character
and Consequences of the Opium Trade.-- Recent enlarged
cultivation of the Tea Plant in India.-- Encouragements
held out since the Peace with China, for the diffusion of
Christianity in that country .
This little work , having been originally pub
lished in 1822, and a considerable portion of it
written in 1813, it may not prove uninteresting
at the present period ( 1850), to point out the
connection between the circumstances here
recorded , and the events that have since
occurred .
<p><p><p> <span></span></p><!--more--><p></p> 6
With respect to the literary notices con
tained in this volume, I have not much to say.
If they were at any time interesting, as illus
trative of the character, manners, and institu
tions of a very singular people, that interest
will not be much affected by the lapse of
years. The views and speculations which I
have hazarded upon these topics are not likely
to be less correct and appropriate now than
they were thirty years ago. But , in respect
to political and commercial questions, the case
is altogether different. During this interval
an entire revolution has taken place in our
political and commercial relations with China ;
first, through the abolition of the East India
Company's exclusive privileges, and, secondly,
by the fortune of war ; under such circum
stances the political and commercial reminis
cences contained in this volume might, at first
sight, seem quite out of date. Yet, if it be a
fact, as I shall endeavour to show, that the
course of events, since these pages were written,
has substantially confirmed all the leading prin
ciples which have been advocated in them ,
they may not prove altogether unworthy of
a second perusal .
Our present position in China is generally
felt to be a critical one. The next few
7
months may decide whether it be practicable
to maintain a mutually beneficial understand
ing with that country upon a solid basis, or
whether the force of circumstances may not
involve us in another sanguinary and protracted
conflict with the Chinese race,
It was one of my leading objects in this
volume to record the firm and honourable, and
at the same time consistent and conciliating
course, by which, during the latter years of their
administration , the servants of the East India
Company preserved the trade committed to
their charge in the midst of all its difficulties
and perils. Within a few months after the
trade was thrown open, an opposite course, to
which both vacillation and temerity have been
imputed, brought the unfortunate Lord Napier
to a premature grave ; and, after a few years
of feverish intercourse , led to an open rup
ture between the two countries, and a three
years' war. It is true we at length extorted
from the Chinese, by means of a series
of formidable naval and military operations
(which it would be very inconvenient to have
now to repeat), a favourable treaty of peace .
Nevertheless, at the port of Canton, which is
still the chief mart of British commerce , our
position is represented to be, both socially
8
and commercially, considerably worse than it
was previous to the war, and while the Trade
was subject to the rule of the Company !
A state of things so disappointing to the
hopes and expectations of the country, natu
rally led to the appointment, in 1847; of a Par
liamentary Committee, for the special purpose
of inquiring into the Condition of our Commer
cial Relations with China, and particularly the
state of the Tea Trade. The Committee con
sisted of several gentlemen of commercial
eminence, representing constituencies more or
less interested in our Eastern traffic ; one or
two individuals holding official situations under
Government ; and a few others, including my
self, who were supposed to possess more or less
local knowledge and experience upon the pro
bable subjects of inquiry . The Committee thus
constituted sat about three months, and ex
amined a great number of witnesses from
various quarters, upon the subject of the ac
tual working and condition of the Tea Trade,
both at home and abroad . In July, 1847,
they made their report, and accompanied it
with the minutes of the evidence, consisting
of nearly five thousand questions and answers,
followed by a copious appendix of official and
other illustrative documents, forming altogether
9
a Blue Book of somewhat formidable dimen
sions. In this Blue Book we have indoubt
edly a very useful and valuable collection of
facts and opinions, for future reference upon all
questions connected with Chinese commerce.
At the same time it must be confessed that a
viva voce examination of this kind, in the
presence of a Parliamentary Committee, is at
tended with some disadvantages . It burthens
the subject with much irrelevant matter, and
much tedious circumlocution and repetition ;
and whenever, as is often the case, questions
are proposed of too complicated a nature safely
to admit of such off-hand replies, it is liable to
become, occasionally, a record of hasty and ill
considered opinions. In cases also of conflict
ing evidence and contradictory statements on
matters of fact, it is difficult for those who
possess no previous familiarity with the sub
ject, or personal acquaintance with the wit
nesses, so to estimate the relative weight of
their adverse testimonies, as to draw any
very positive conclusions. The noble chair
man , Lord Sandon (now Earl of Harrowby ),
certainly showed much tact and judgment, as
well as ability, in summing up the evidence ;
and the Report, of which the following are
10
the opening paragraphs, was unanimously ap
proved by the Committee.
“ In reporting on the Condition of our Com
mercial Relation with China, your Committee
regret to state, on undoubted evidence, that
the trade with that country has been for some
time in a very unsatisfactory position , and that
the result of our extended intercourse has by
no means realized the just expectations which
had been naturally founded on a freer access
to so magnificent a market.
" Whether we look to the tables of exports,
which mark a declension of exports in nearly
every branch of manufacture, or listen to the
statements of experienced merchants and ma
nufacturers, we are brought to the same con
clusion .” Report, p. iii .
The Committee conclude this branch of
their inquiries with the following recommenda
tion of aa remedy, the commercial advantage of
which is sufficiently obvious, but which, in a
financial point of view, has not yet met with
much favour.
“ For these reasons your Committee think
themselves warranted in recommending to the
House a considerable reduction in the Duty on
Tea, at the earliest period which in its wisdom
11
it may see fit, as most desirable in itself, with a
view to the comforts and social habits of the
people, as involving but a temporary loss to
the Revenue, and as essential to the extension
of our trade with China ; nay, even to its
maintenance at the point which it has al
ready reached .” Report, p . vii .
Arguing upon general principles , it certainly
cannot be denied that the advantages which
our new position in China may be capable of
yielding, have not yet been fairly tested, while
we continue to impose a duty, averaging 200
per cent ., upon the chief article of import from
that country, a burthen altogether dispropor
tionate to that to which most other articles of
such extensive consumption are subjected . If
it could be assumed that our peaceful relations
with China would not be again interrupted ,
there would be little doubt that the proposed
reduction of the Tea Duty to a uniform rate of
one shilling per pound upon all descriptions of
tea, would soon lead to a very great increase to
our importations from that country ; and there
are also fair grounds for calculating that the
Chinese would take off additional quantities
of our manufactures and productions to a con
siderable extent, in return . We should, how
ever, be on our guard against indulging in too
12
sanguine expectations on this head . I fear
that the notion that what has been called a
taste for British goods can be expected to
spread to any great extent amongst the vast
population of the interior of China , must not
be confidently relied upon . The Chinese are
already in possession, from their own resources,
of all the necessaries , and of most of the luxu
ries and conveniences of life , at a very mode
rate cost. The Chinese Empire, exceeding in
extent and population the entire of Europe,
and comprising within its limits a no less great
variety of soil and climate, enjoys within itself,
by means of its Home Trade which subsists
between its several provinces, almost all those
advantages which in smaller states are derived
from foreign commerce. Though the Chinese
have little or no science, and possess but very
clumsy machinery, they have considerable ar
tistic and manufacturing skill ; and these they
apply with the most enduring patience and
industry. They are an eminently -practical
people. They are not likely to accept from
us any new and beautiful articles, even of the
greatest refinement and perfection, as long as
such articles are at the same time extremely
costly , or not adapted for use, in their present
state of civilization and social condition. But,
13
in all cases in which we are able, by means of
our scientific machinery and manufacturing
skill , to produce articles adapted to the same
purposes as those they have now in use, but
cheaper in price, or better in quality for the
same price, I am persuaded that neither popu
lar prejudices nor Government prohibitions will
ever stand in the way of their introduction
to an almost unlimited extent. This has al
ready been remarkably instanced in the recent
increasing export to China of cotton yarns, and
I doubt not, will be progressively experienced
in many other articles.
Whatever opinions, however, may be enter
tained of the policy of an extensive reduction
of the Tea Duties, as a remedy for the present
depression of the Trade, the fact of the depres
sion itself, as stated in the Report of the Com
mittee, is fully borne out by the evidence.
The state of the Trade at Canton is described
as “ unsatisfactory,” “ unprofitable,” “ very dis
astrous," pp. 16, 28. And in a petition to the
House of Commons in the same year, signed
by almost all the British residents at Canton ,
their social position is described in the follow
ing terms :
“ It is in many respects worse than it was
before any treaties between the two countries
14
existed . Residents at Canton cannot now visit
with safety even those places to which they
formerly had free access, attacks upon them
being now frequently made where heretofore
they did not experience molestation ; and there
is too much reason for believing that these acts
of aggression are connived at, if not encouraged ,
by the Chinese authorities. ” Appendix, p. 505.
Our commercial progress at the newly -ac
quired Port of Shang-hai no doubt offers an
agreeable contrast with the above description
of the state of things at Canton ; but even
at Shang-bai , the symptoms of jealousy and
distrust are said to be very apparent , and to
require constant vigilance. And the advan
tages we derive from our admission to that
port, whatever they may be, are obviously the
direct result of our success in arms, and in no
manner derived from our commercial policy.
If the East India Company had possessed as
fair a field for commercial enterprise at Can
ton as our private merchants now enjoy at
Shang -hai, there are no just grounds for as
suming that they would have neglected it.
The present condition of the China Trade, in
spite of the above- noticed representations of
our merchants , is undoubtedly , in appearance ,
a gainful one to the public. The prices of
15
Teas are considerably lower than they were
under the Company's monopoly, though it is
generally believed at a considerable sacrifice
in the standard of quality ; and the consump
tion throughout the United Kingdom has
progressively increased in proportion . This
change is no doubt to be partly ascribed to
the reduction of freights, consequent upon the
abandonment of that large and expensive
class of ships heretofore employed by the
Company, and which, being readily converti
ble into ships of war in a season of pressure ,
rendered a most important service to the coun
try on the sudden breaking out of the war after
the peace of Amiens. But, however this may
be, it is quite obvious that, unless our commerce
can be carried on in such a manner as to render
the position of our merchants permanently se
cure and remunerative, all indications of pros
perity derived from a temporary lowering of
prices must be transitory and delusive.
As far back as the first opening of the trade,
on the expiration of the East India Company's
Charter, in 1833, I submitted to the House of
Commons nine resolutions, embodying gene
rally the principles set forth in this volume, but
applying them specially to the new circum
stances then for the first time coming into
16
operation . Although I did not abandon my
original opinion as expressed in this volume
( p. 158), that “ while we are confined to one
port, and to eight or ten merchants, who,
although they are permitted to deal with
foreigners individually , are nevertheless for
many purposes incorporated together, and ob
liged to act as a body, it was a hazardous
experiment to throw open the Trade to all
British subjects indiscriminately,” - yetthis ex
periment having been irrevocably determined
upon by the Legislature, I thought I could
not do my duty to my country better than
by offering such suggestions as my experience
in China had dictated, for diminishing as
much as possible that hazard, and carrying
out the experiment with the best prospect of
success. These resolutions met with little at.
tention at the time. In the ardour of our zeal
for the establishment of an unshackled com
merce with China, no practical difficulties in
carrying out this great change amongst a peo
ple and Government so peculiar as those of
China were suspected or even thought possi.
ble. The President of the India Board, Mr.
Grant, now Lord Glenelg, after some per
sonal compliments to myself, and an expres
sion of his regret at differing from an authority,
17
he was good enough to say , was “ entitled to
the highest respect,”, disposed of my resolutions
in a summary manner, and concluded with the
following declaration of his opinion--an opi
nion which the unhappy fate of Lord Napier
contradicted in a most signal manner only a
few months after :
“ To enter into a negotiation as preparatory
to the change which it is proposed to effect,
would, I think , have a tendency to create
much embarrassment and great difficulty in
the way of carrying that change into opera
tion . I think if we do not ourselves sound the
note of alarm , the Chinese will receive any
functionary whom we may appoint as the re
presentative of the British nation at Canton ,
without any of the suspicion and distrust which
the formal process of a negotiation would be
sure to awaken in the minds of a people so
sensitive and so jealous ; and that the ordinary
transactions of business between them and us,
would proceed with little or no interruption.
Upon these grounds I am decidedly
of opinion that it would be anything but ad
visable to preface the proposed change of sys
tem by negotiation .” Mirror of Parliament,
June 13, 1833. P. 2294.
Conformably to this decided opinion, it
B
18
was determined that Lord Napier should
not be entrusted with any kind of official
document whatever by his Government, ad
dressed to the authorities in China, for the
purpose of explaining and authenticating bis
appointment. He was simply instructed to
make the best of his way to Canton, and to
assume there at once the official character that
had been conferred upon him . Strictly speak
ing, however, as far as the Chinese were con
cerned, he never really possessed any public
character at all . It is a well-understood prin
ciple of international law, that no public
functionary sent to another state can claim the
rights and privileges of his appointment till
he is recognised. As a captain in the British
service, though without a command , and as a
British nobleman , he was undoubtedly entitled
to every degree of respect and courtesy, as long
as he complied with the laws and regulations
of the country ; but, owing to the unfortunate
omission of our Government to apply for, and
obtain from the Chinese authorities , in due time,
his formal recognition , he had no official sta
tion , or public privilege, in China whatever.
Lord Napier was, in consequence, ordered
away forthwith by the Chinese authorities.
He resisted for a time, and even applied for
19
the assistance and protection of two of our
frigates then upon the coast . A smart en
gagement ensued , in which several individuals
were killed and wounded on both sides . But
he soon gave up the fruitless contest ; and ,
having been detained some time afterwards
in the river (apparently as a hostage for the
departure of the frigates ), his sufferings on
that occasion during an unhealthy season , and
while labouring under a previous indisposition ,
certainly hastened , if they did not cause , his
death . Under all the circumstances, however ,
of this lamentable affair, it was difficult to
sustain any very effectual claim for reparation ;
and yet, on the other hand , it cannot be doubted
that our silent acquiescence in the expulsion
in so degrading a manner of our first royal
superintendent of trade , lowered our character
in China, and contributed to encourage the
Chinese to venture afterwards upon other
outrages of a much more unequivocal descrip
tion .
In the year 1840, on the first occasion in
which the war with China, then recently com
menced, came under discussion in the House
of Commons, I had the gratification of hearing
the Resolutions, which I had proposed with so
little effect in 1833, quoted by the speakers on
B 2
20
both sides of the House, with strong expressions
of regret that they had not met with a better
reception , Sir James Graham said that “ jt
was impossible for him to refer to any authority
more entitled to weight and respect than that of
the hon . Baronet the Member for Portsmouth .
Wisdom après coup was of very little value,
but that foresight which anticipated the future
must be regarded with admiration , when sub
sequent events had demonstrated the accuracy
of the prediction. Sir George Staunton, be
fore · The China Trade Act ' was introduced ,
and when the question of the renewal of the
East India Company's Charter was under con
sideration , and the Government had announced
their intention of throwing open the China
Trade, took occasion to move certain resolutions.
These resolutions were not treated with much
respect or attention at the time. He did not
know whether the hon . Member for Bridport
made his usual motion for adjournment, but one
of the Sheriffs of London proposed that the
House be counted, and the resolutions of Sir
George Staunton were not at that time put on
record . Subsequently the hon . Baronet moved
them , and the prudence which dictated them
was now manifest. He would read two of the
most important, as bearing on the present state
21
of affairs . ” The right hon . Baronet then read
the sixth and seventh resolutions, as follows :
Sixth . “ That this influence being the sole ex
isting check now in operation for the control and
counteraction of the corrupt local administration
of the peculiarly arbitrary and despotic Govern
ment of China, it is indispensably necessary to
the security of our valuable commerce with that
country , that .whenever any change shall be
made in the British commercial system, having
the effect of putting an end to that influence,
an equal or greater instrument of protection be
at the same time created and substituted for it,
under the sanction of a national treaty between
the two countries, without which previous sanc
tion any attempt to appoint national func
tionaries at Canton for the protection of Trade
would, in the present state of our relations with
China, not only prove of little advantage to the
subject, but also be liable, in a serious degree,
to compromise the honour and dignity of the
Crown . ”
Seventh . “ That notwithstanding the failure
in this respect of all complimentary embassies
t
to the Court of Pekin , however otherwise
beneficial they may have been in raising, and
producing the due recognition of, the national
character, the evidence of the Treaties which
22
have been repeatedly negotiated by the Chinese
Government with that of Russia, through the
medium of the Commissioners duly appointed
on both sides, not only for the adjustment of
boundaries, but for the regulation of Trade,
prove that there is no insurmountable obstacle
to such an arrangement ."
“ Now the House would observe, that Sir
George Staunton regarded previous commu
nication with the imperial (or provincial ] au
thorities as an indispensable preliminary to the
establishment of aa Representative of the British
Governinent at Canton . With respect to the
last resolution [recommending the establishment
of a tribunal for the trial of Homicides] at
tention was paid to it in the Act which was
introduced! ; but the hon. Baronet's advice with
respect to communications with Pekin was not
followed, and had not, up to the present time ,
been acted upon .” — Hansard , vol. 53, p . 676.
On the adjourned debate on the following
day , the late Mr. Charles Buller, although op
posed to Sir James Graham's motion , expressed
similar sentiments.
He said " he should allude to the subject of
the resolutions brought forward by the hon .
Member for Portsmouth, not only in compli
ment to that hon . Baronet, but with feelings of
23
deep humiliation at the obstinacy evinced by the
House of Commons in reference to his pro
position. The hon. Baronet had produced the
several resolutions, to which the right hon.
Baronet opposite had adverted. He mentioned
all the circumstances of the case , convinced of
the impossibility of our continuing our relations
with China, without the means of a diplomatic
communication taking place with the Govern
ment of Pekin , and of the difficulties which
must arise from their law upon the subject of
homicide ; and he said , that if we threw open
the trade, we must adopt one of two alternatives
we must either send an ambassador over , with
a view to our establishing diplomatic relations
with the Government of Pekin , or we must
withdraw from the continent of China, and
must establish ourselves on some island near
the coast, and carry on the trade in such a
way as should relieve us from the difficulties
which it must be seen would inevitably arise.
When the hon . Baronet brought forward that
motion, he had not spoken five minutes before
the House was counted out. Upon a subse
quent occasion , he again moved the resolutions,
solely with a view to their being placed on the
votes of the House ; but on wbat terms was it
that he did so ? That he should not say one
24
word upon them ; that the seconder of the
motion should say nothing, and no one else was
to say anything. To these resolutions the right
bon . Baronet opposite, with all his foresight,
and all his precaution slumbering in his breast,
gave no sign or word of encouragement ; they
were read ; not a word was said upon them,
and they were negatived without a division .”
Hansard , vol . 53, p. 790.
I feel certainly some embarrassment in
quoting speeches so complimentary to myself;
but I conceive it would be a false delicacy to
withhold testimonies of such importance to the
principles which I have advocated . I am
willing to believe that the ultimate results of the
war with China will prove beneficial to both
countries ; but it can never be contended that
the war was not, in itself, a great evil , and that
it was not our bounden duty to have adopted
the course which appeared to be best calcu
lated, consistently with justice and honour, to
ward off such a calamity.
The proceedings and results of the embassy of
Lord Amherst to China, in 1816, are also dis
cussed at some length in this volume. They
are certainly very illustrative of the spirit and
character of the Government of China , and are
not undeserving the study of any person who
25
may hereafter be called upon to negotiate with
that singular people . This mission , under the
peculiar circumstances which existed at that
period , was, perhaps, not altogether a well
advised measure, and its results unquestionably
disappointed the country . The commercial
disputes at Canton which it had been sent out
to adjust, were already adjusted previous to its
arrival ; and the chief point, therefore, for the
consideration of the Commissioners of the em
bassy, when it reached the shores of China, was,
if possible, to promote, but certainly not to
weaken (which degrading concessions at Pekin
must have done) , the effect of the successful
>
settlement which had been just accomplished at
Canton . The Commissioners were unanimous
upon this point ; and although my excellent and
distinguished colleagues, Lord Amherst and Sir
Henry Ellis, did not at the time see the Chinese
ceremonial in the same objectionable light that
I did , they yielded their judgment upon the
subject to mine (supported as it was by that
of all those who had previously resided in
China) , on the score of our local knowledge
and experience. The practical result was un
doubtedly beneficial to the trade. The public
example which was given of unflinching re
sistance to menace even at head quarters,
26
strengthened our position at Canton ; زand for
many subsequent years our Trade continued
unusually free from molestation and disturb
ance.-- See Davis's China, vol . I. p. 104 ..
My vindication in this volume of the course
adopted by Lord Amherst and his colleagues,
in reply to the strictures of an Edinburgh re
viewer, may seem , atthe present day, superfluous.
There is probably no difference of opinion on
the impolicy, upon general principles, of any sub
missions, in our intercourse with Foreign Powers,
which involve a sacrifice of the national honour.
Yet there are persons who, however feelingly
alive upon all such cases, when directly con
nected with European interests, and occurring
on this side of the Cape of Good Hope, seem
to view with a degree of apathetic indifference,
cases which are equally or more objectionable,
when their locality is very remote and in the
other hemisphere.. It may,, therefore, be useful
to show that the Chinese Empire , notwithstand
ing its semi-civilized condition, and its many
strange peculiarities , cannot with justice or
with prudence be excepted from the operation
of the general rule. A national insult will be
found to be, in all cases and in all countries ,
practically , a national injury ; and the prompt
est vindication of the national honour , under
27
such circumstances, will be generally found to .
be not only the most effectual, but the most
humane. Had a higher tone been assumed
upon the death of Lord Napier, it is more than
probable that the subsequent outrages, by which
the Chinese forced us into a war, would never
have been committed ; and had that war, after
it became inevitable, been conducted with as
much vigour in the first campaign as it was in
the third and last, a vast sacrifice of life, and the
infliction of much misery to the unoffending
population of China, might have been avoided .
There are a few other points intimately con
nected with our Chinese commerce , which have
not yet been noticed in these preliminary re
marks. Amongst these is our newly-acquired
settlement at Hong Kong. No such acquisition
was, of course, in contemplation when this work
was originally published. Yet I did, to aa certain
degree, anticipate the possibility of such an
event , in one of the resolutions which I sub
mitted to the House of Commons in 1833. I then
suggested that if, when the Trade was thrown
open, it should prove impracticable to give it
the benefit of a national protection directly ema
nating from the Crown, it might become, in
that case, expedient to withdraw it altogether
from the control of the Chinese authorities , and
28
to establish it in some insular position upon
the Chinese coast ; so that it might be carried
on out of the reach of Chinese molestation
and oppression .
When we now consider the remarkable fero
city and lawlessness exhibited of late by the
Canton populace, their increasing alienation
from all foreigners, and their desperate de
termination ( announced in various published
placards) to resist to the death the admission of
foreigners within the walls of the city , although
they have freely enjoyed a similar privilege at
all the other Ports of Trade: and , finally , when
we take into the account the recent atrocious
assassination of the Portuguese Governor of
Macao, by a band of ruffians, expressly hired for
that service by a popular association, with the
knowledge and consent (it is positively asserted)
if not under the direct authority of the Govern
ment, it is difficult not to apprehend that the
hour is approaching when it may become neces
sary to place our Trade at Canton either under
the direct protection of a British military force,
or to remove it wholly to our own Colony .
As long, however, as the Port of Canton
continues accessible to our commerce , it is not
at all probable that the very sanguine expecta
tions which some persons have entertained
29
respecting the success of Hong Kong, can be
realized . No rational grounds exist for calcu
lating that it can speedily become the grand
emporium of Eastern commerce, beyond the
Ganges. If we may judge from the language
of the Nanking Treaty , Hong Kong was neither
demanded by us, nor ceded by the Chinese with
any such views. Considering the previous con
dition of the Island, and the avowed purposes for
which we have occupied it, our settlement upon
it must be admitted to have already arrived at a
greater degree of importance and prosperity
than could have been reasonably anticipated
in so short a space of time. This fact is fully
established in the clear and satisfactory Report
of the late Governor, Sir John Davis, dated
the 13th of March, 1847, and inserted at page
432 of the Appendix to the Parliamentary
Report. If, in process of time, more than
this shall be obtained,, and an extensive
carrying Trade drawn to the Colony, every
one must hail such an improvement with satis
faction ; but, in the meanwhile , I see no reason
for disappointment or despondency .
I am not , however, prepared to contend
that all the regulations under which this Colony
has been governed, from its foundation to the
present time, are the wisest that could have
30
been framed ; or that further experience in a
case so new and peculiar may not suggest
many important ameliorations. The severe
restrictions which have been imposed for the
control of the vagabond and piratical popula
tion resorting to the Colony , may, perhaps,
have been too indiscriminate, and needlessly 1
galling to the more respectable inhabitants .
The finaucial regulations of the Colony have
also , no doubt , been felt oppressive ; owing to
the premature desire of the authorities at home
to equalize the revenue with the expenditure .
The following observations , extracted from the
Report of the Parliamentary Committee, are
judicious , and I trust will be kept in view by
our Colonial Office.
“ From Hong Kong we cannot be said to
have derived directly much commercial advan
tage ; nor, indeed, does it seem to be likely , by
its position , to become the seat of an extended
commerce. It has no considerable population
of its own to feed or clothe, and has no right to
expect to draw away the established trade of
the populous town and province of Canton, to
which it is adjacent. From the only traffic for
which it is fitted, that of a depôt for the neigh
bouring coasts, it is, in a great degree, de
barred1 ; except in regard to the five ports, by
31
Treaties, which stipulate distinctly for the
observance of this restriction . In addition,
however, to these natural and necessary disad
vantages, it appears to have laboured under
others, created by a system of monopolies and
farms, and petty regulations peculiarly unsuited
to its position , and prejudicial to its progress.
These seem to have arisen partly from an
attempt to struggle with the difficulties in the
way of establishing order and security, in the
midst of the vagabond and piratical population
which frequent its waters and infest its coasts ;
and partly from a desire to raise a revenue in
the Island , in some degree adequate to the
maintenance of its civil Government. To this
latter object, however, we think it unwise to
sacrifice the real interests of the settlement,
which can only prosper under the greatest
amount of freedom of intercourse and traffic
which is consistent with the engagements of
treaties and internal order : nor do we think it
right that the burthen of maintaining that,
which is rather a Port for general influence
and the protection of the general Trade in the
China seas than a Colony in the ordinary
sense, should be thrown in any great degree on
the merchants or other persons who may be
resident upon it.
32
" To the revision of the whole system , we
would call the early attention of the Govern
ment, as well as to that of the establishment of
the settlement ; which, we cannot but think ,
has been placed upon a footing of needless
expense .” - Report, p. ix.
I wish I could close this general view of the
present condition of our commercial intercourse
with China, without adverting to the smuggling
Trade in Opium ; which continues, unhappily ,
to form a very prominent and important part
of it . It cannot be denied that it is a moral
stain upon the character of the British inter
course with China ; and that it embarrasses
and counteracts all our efforts for its improve.
ment . I entirely adhere to the following
opinions, which I expressed upon the subject
in my place in the House of Commons, in
1840 and 1843.
With respect to the immorality and impolicy
of this opium traffic, II yield to no Member of
the House in detestation of it ; and in the
anxiety for the adoption of measures for effectu
ally putting it down altogether. But, although
I feel very strongly on this subject,-although
I entirely disapprove of the resolution of
the Select Committee of this House in 1832 ,
that it was inexpedient to relinquish the
33
revenue arising from the cultivation of opium
in India , for the supply of the market of China ,'
-although I trace from that resolution all the
evils and enormities which have occurred in
the prosecution of the opium traffic, down to
the present crisis of the total interruption of all
trade and intercourse between Great Britain
and China,-I feel it would be the height of
injustice if I were rashly to condemn Her
Majesty's Ministers for not adopting my prin
ciples ; and for not at once setting at defiance
a recorded resolution of the Select Committee
of 1832 , sanctioned by Parliament, and en
forced by the tacit approbation of the
country ! I have no hesitation
in saying I have an opinion, a decided opinion,
as to what ought to have been done. I think
the cultivation of opium, in India, for the
supply of the Chinese market, ought gradually
to have been discontinued, and the trade
proportionately discouraged. I think a better
system might have been introduced gradually ;
that the best lands in India might be safely
devoted to produce beneficial to man ; instead
of that which exercises the most baneful in
Auence, and tempts him to his destruction . I
quite agree in the opinion expressed by Captain
Elliott, even before the late crisis, that it
с
34
cannot be good that the conduct of a great
trade should be so dependent upon the steady
continuance of a vast prohibited traffic in an
article of vicious luxury, high in price , and
liable to frequent and prodigious fluctuations.'
( Parliamentary Papers .) I think with him ,
that the fact that such an article should have
grown to be by far the most important part of
our import Trade, is of itself a source of painful
reflection .' And I think , lastly, that there
are many cogent reasons for regretting the
extent to which the Indian income is depen
dent on such a source of revenue . ' But the
question, it must be confessed, is surrounded
with difficulties. It would be an act of the
utmost injustice to visit upon Her Majesty's
present Ministers the consequences of a system
which Parliament has long sanctioned ; and
which, even now, it is by no means sure that
it is prepared to abandon .” — Debates on Sir
James Graham's Motion, April 7, 1840.
On the occasion of Lord Ashley's Motion
for a Resolution against the Opium Trade, on
the 4th of April, 1843, I added, " when I ad
dressed the House in 1840, on the occasion of
the motion of the right hon . Baronet the Mem
ber for Dorchester, I certainly maintained the
abstract justice as well as the practical ex
35
pediency of the war with China, in which we
were then about to engage. I contended , that
no act of smuggling which might have been
committed by ships or individuals on the Coast
of China could justify, or even palliate, the acts
of outrage and violence committed by the
Chinese authorities upon the whole British
community at the Port ; and that, therefore,
it was absolutely necessary to maintain our
honour and interests in China, by a demand of
ample reparation, supported by an adequate
force. But I never denied the fact, that if there
had been no opium - smuggling there would have
been no war. Even if the opium traffic had
been permitted to run its natural course -- if it
bad not received an extraordinary impulse from
the measures taken by the East India Com
pany to promote its growth, which almost sud