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British Post-lar "Commercial" Interests
At a private meeting specially arranged for the purpose at his request, Mr. 1.0.14, Chinese Adviser to the Rangkong Shanghai Tank set forth his views on the three following matters!-
Hondram
Mr, Ti, shile apparently realising that Chim has neither historiesl nor ethical grounds for desanding the return of B ̧ngkong, nevertheless feels very strongly that this is a cuestion moon which t the fuo Min Tang have consistently taken up so definite a position that no Chinese Government would be able to recede from it. Mr. Li's suggestion is based on the generally accepted portulate that Hongkong is strategic lly sad sconesieslly untenable without the lensed territ- ory, and that even with possession of the leaned territory the Chinese authorities could very easily anos vore render our position in "pagkong İnssasible by means of strikes and boycotts, as they did in 1925. That being so he recommends that Great Pritain shuvald offer to return Fong Fong to Chinese jurisdlotion, but that we should do so coupled with an offer also to to return the leased territory, the joint offer being nade mab jeet to the greviso that the renditim should only take place after we have had sufficient time to clser no the damage of war and make aquitable adjustsents as to property rights, compensation and Kritish nationala, Tactically his suggestion is that we should come out as soon as possible with an offer, before any desand is made by the Ginese to rendite the Celosy and the leased territory without waiting for the termination of the lesse of 1997, sa soon as the necessary Arrangements sold be unde, Mr. C feels that such an offer would aut the ground from under the feet of the Chauvenistic and anti-foreign elesents in the Government, would put the whole question in storage for an indefinite length of time and woŋld in fact leave us no worse off than wa night very likely find ourselves to be if kno such offer wara medo.
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/... Shanghai.
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