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16. It follows that the best course to adopt now is to accept the status quo so far as Hong Kong's external position is concerned; and to wait for the successor Government to that of Mao to emerge, establish itself throughout China, and define a general foreign policy against which to judge the nature and timing of any approach on Hong Kong. Meanwhile it should suffice to avoid actions which past experience leads us to believe would be inimical to China's interests; and to represent publicly that the existing understanding with China over Hong Kong illustrates the cooperative and friendly nature of our relations which is of mutual benefit, not least of all in trade. (The recent Spey deal, for instance, proves that China counts on our relations being good for some time to come). The policy is not without risks and will, on best assumption of the continuing tranquillity of China, become increasingly difficult to defend publicly as the attention of the Hong Kong public turns to the consideration of the future. But it is the "least risk" policy and the one best suited to present circumstances.
IV.
Internal Policies
17. On the above assumptions, the Secretary of State will continue to be constitutionally responsible for Hong Kong for some time to come and it is highly likely that this responsibility will need to be exercised against a background of continuing, and perhaps increasing, criticism of the Colony in Parliament, in the Labour Party and in the TUC. Furthermore the continuing tranquillity of the Colony which will be of cardinal importance in the run-up to the proposed attempt to negotiate with the Chinese in the mid-1980s will to a large extent depend on continuing economic prosperity and social progress.
Both would also improve our bargaining
It is position and make absorption by China more difficult. thus constitutionally important, and in the national interest, that Hong Kong's internal policies should develop in ways that HMG regard as right in themselves and defensible in public.
/18.
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