Page 134
SECRET
Page 134
14.
It is premature to speculate on what our own attitudes, and those of the Chinese, will be at a date so far in the future. Some options are given in Annex B. Perhaps the most that could be said is that any arrangement designed to avoid the worst difficulties for us would need to offer sufficient inducements to the Chinese both political, to help them over the sovereignty issue and the 1997 difficulty, and economic. But there is no certainty that any approach, however carefully timed and however loaded with inducements for the Chinese, would lead to a clear-cut agreement. They may calculate that any agreement would place them in a weaker situation and ourselves in a stronger than at present. They may seek to put us off with the flexible but vague formulae in paragraph 8 above and expect us, as at present, to deduce their attitudes to the Colony by their actions. might point to a wish for the present status quo to continue (which is not necessarily in our interest) or a wish for a gradual evolutionary change eg by the expansion of their economic, political and cultural activities: either way we would imagine they would be ready to give confidence building signs to the business community and the population generally. Nevertheless it should remain our objective to reach some clear-cut understanding with China if this is at all achievable.
These
15. One thing seems clear however: as it is not now possible to envisage a meaningful discussion of the problem in its entirety, there is nothing to be said for discussing particular aspects of it with the present Chinese Government. Any attempt to do so, or to seek to involve them in solving any of the Colony's internal problems will almost certainly meet with a refusal to discuss a matter which they at present propose to regard as exclusively for us. Even in the unlikely event of their agreeing to do so, any agreement reached could not bind any successor Government to the present one. And finally discussion could result in their concentrating on small changes of tactical interest to them (eg the appointment of an official Chinese
representative' which has been raised in the past but which is at present a dormant issue) without commitment on the long term problem of interest to us. This could well limit our freedom of manoeuvre when the time comes to consider the problem as a whole.
/16.
Page 134
9
Page 134
SECRET
Page 134