SPE 320 ET
Page 31
approaches. The dangers of a declining economy and an
increasingly ungovernable society seem obvious. A
crucial difficulty for the timing of an approach to
China is that meaningful discussion presupposes the
existence of an ordered, well-established Government in
Peking. It seemed likely that the present Chinese
leadership had reached agreement on the handling of the
succession to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai but the
unexpected appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Acting Prime
Minister demonstrates the uncertainties which are likely
to continue at least until Mao's death and probably beyond;
and there remains the question of whether the successor
Government can impose itself on China as a whole which
may well not be apparent for some years. We will also
need time to assess its political stability and the
character of its policies both internal and external (not
least towards Taiwan) before we can determine the best
negotiating posture. These considerations point to
negotiations in the mid-1980s; but obviously the question
will need to be kept under constant review in the light
of the evolving situation in China and in the Colony.
Delay is not without risk eg of a crisis in the Colony
as a result of instability in China similar to 1967;
but our experience of events then provides us with some
guide as to the signs of approaching trouble and we need
not be as unprepared (Annex A). And delay has
advantages in permitting the possible evolution of a less
Page 31
Page 31
Page 31
י
{
i