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Page 280 The garrison in Hong Kong is now at seven major units, the addition to the long-term garrison of four infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and a Royal Artillery field regiment, being provided by an extra field regiment of Royal Artillery, which is however due to go in January 1958. In the meantime we have lost the Venom squadron and have only thres Venoms, with a life only of about another 18 months to 2 years, and a training aircraft. Furthermore the whole of the Far East station and naval forces Hong Kong are to be reduced. do not know the extent of the former reduction, but Hong Kong forces themselves are to be cut from 10 seaward defence motor launches and 6 motor minesweepers to one destroyer or frigate and 6 inshore minesweepers.
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7. When the Governor came to see the Chiefs of Staff in August of 1957, he was very concerned about the cumulative effect of the force withdrawals and the general weakening of Britain's position in the Far East on our ability to maintain ourselves in Hong Kong. He explained to the Chiefs of Staff the sequence of events which would follow if we did not maintain the minimum forces for internal security. The Chiefs of Staff concluded:-
8.
"However, to the extent that our financial position will not allow us to maintain forces at adequate levels, if anything is to be achieved in the long term, same fresh approach to the problem must be made. Our suggestions are:-
(a) Political: Urgent consideration should be
given to some sort of negotiated settlement with the Chinese Communists concerning the future of the Colony. This step must be taken at some date prior to expiry of our lease of the New Territories in 1997 and the sooner we face the issue the better.
(b) Economic: In the interim, any additional forces that are judged to be necessary to maintain the position until a settlement with the Chinese is readhed should not be borne on borne on U.K. votes, and further consideration should be given to maintaining these forces from Hong Kong financial resources."
This is the only indication that the Chiefs have given that the forces in Hong Kong are not at adequate levels, but they have made it clear that 6 major units are all that we can afford, and that if Họng Kong want more then it must pay for them. Our position here is that with the withdrawal of the jet squadron and the naval reductions the six major units of the garrison are inadequate for the maintenance of internal security including a show of force on the frontier, and we are currently engaged in trying to get some additional Artillery units which are available,
9.
But all of this is for (a) and (b) of the opening paragraph above, and at no point has it ever been pretended that we have forces in the Colony which could stop the Chinese, even for a short time. The naval force of 1 destroyer, 1 frigate and 6 inshore minesweepers has as its function the protection of British shipping, and the patrolling of coastal waters, but it could not protect or effect the evacuation of any large numbers. If, as seems highly likely, internal dissension coincided with Chinese aggression, the only forces which could be spared for the frontier would be 1 infantry battalion and an armoured regiment. If we are having discussions with the Americans on the defence of Hong Kong it
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