TOP SECRET
BRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE
DEFENCE COMITTEL: FEB. 5th
ARTILLERY UNITS LONG LOG
Page 221
BACKGROUND.
The need for an early decision about the two extra artillery units for Hong kong arises because the present artillery regiment (the 74th Light Anti-Aircraft)"is surplus to the long-term garrison of six major units (1.e., 4 infantry battalions, 1 artillery regiment and 1 armoured regiment) and finishes its tour of duty in Merch of this year. We cannot prevent it going (indeed, as is clear from paragraph 5 of 7. (58) 1, Its departure in arch has already been authorised), and our objective must be that at the time of its departure we shall be in a position to announce that it is being replaced by one or two other units. Although it will take five months for the replacement to arrive, the blow to local confidence involved in its withdrawal without prospect of replacement would thereby be lessened. And local confidence is the basis of the maintenance of our position in Hong Kong.
2. The six major units contemplated are not adequate to fulfil the directive of the Commander, British Forces. (Annex A). After the 1956 riots he assessed his requirement at 9 major units plus a Venom squadron (the Governor's support of this requirement was brought out at the meeting of Defence Committee on 30th May 1957, referred to in paragraph 1 of D. (58) 1). This was at a time when the naval forces in Hong Kong were much stronger than they are now. In the meantime, moreover, the Venom squadron has been withdrawn, and replaced by 3 Venom aircraft and one trainer. Except in periods of tension or special activity it is not possible now to maintain even one aircraft" at readiness or to continue the reconnaissance sorties hitherto flown by a pair of aircraft each morning and afternoon.
3. C.B. F. 's directive does not include the defence of Hong Kong against overt external attack, and there is no question of doing this with the present garrison. Because of its exposed position and the racial composition of the population, internal security in Hong Kong depends on external factors. The fomentation of internal disorder, which might be represented as justifying physical intervention, would be a chosen weapon if the Chinese wanted to secure llong Kong. The six units Page 2 provided were assessed by the Chiefs of Staff 2 as the
/minimum