3.
Let me say at the outset that we entirely agree
that the first step must be the acceptance by United Kingdom
Ministers of political assumptions for planning purposes.
Indeed it is the intention of the U.K. Preparatory Working
Party to submit proposals to U.K. Ministers on the
political objectives to be pursued in discussion with
the Americans. These political objectives will in
effect constitute planning assumptions on which we will
be seeking American concurrence. We agree also that
ideally the acceptance by the U.S. Government of these
assumptions should be obtained before we embark (or
re-embark) on detailed joint planning on the defence of
Hong Kong; and that such planning must take place in
the Far East. But neither the Foreign Office nor
ourselves think that we will succeed in securing that
acceptance without there being a fairly frank and full
discussion in the Anglo/U.S. Working Group of our
position in Hong Kong and an indication of what we
ourselves are doing on both the subversive and the
military fronts to keep our end up. It must be remembered
that our main objective will, if accepted, represent a
considerable step for the United States to take. They
are unlikely to take it without a good deal of encouragement.
They may even be unwilling to take it without knowing
in advance what joint military plans could be made and
what the timing and cost, etc., will be. We hope that
they won't want to go into great detail at this stage and
that they would, at the most, be satisfied with an outline
plan or concept of defence on the basis of which they would
be prepared to consider acceptance of the political
commitments involved in our assumptions.
If that stage
is reached detailed planning can be transferred to the Far
East.
But 189 do feel that at the least the U.S. Government
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