273
E.C. Melville, Esq.,
Colonial Office.
کھا
Foreign
Andani
for Secretary
Chiefs foStaff Committee
TOP SECRET
(37) cos(58) 5th Meeting, Minute 3.
(6720) Wt. 49810/D.1188 60m 8/56 P.I. Gp. 1144.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited..
It is issued for the personal use of.....
Leory
Mr A. J. Fairdough
TOP SECRET
on
Copy N..........
FED 82/454/01 (TE).
COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT MUST NOT BE MADE WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
63
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
GUARD
3.
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
TO
C.0.S./(58) 5TH MEETING HELD ON
THURSDAY, JANUARY 1958
16
MILITARY MEASURES TO MEET THE THREAT TO HONG KONG FROM COMMUNIST CHINA
JP(57)165(Final)
(31)
THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff recommending a certain sequence in combined planning with the United States on Military Measures to meet the Threat to Hong Kong from Communist China. A Secretary's minute, which covered a letter from the Colonial Office explaining the reservations of the Colonial Office and Foreign Office on the planning sequence proposed, was also relevant to their discussion.
MR. MELVILLE (Colonial Office) said that the Preparatory Working Party on Hong Kong, of which he was Chairman, consisted of representatives of the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Ministry of Defence and the Joint Planning Staff. The Working Party had been set up in order to provide a brief for the United Kingdom representatives on the US/UK Working Group in Washington.
In general, the Working Party agreed with the report by the Joint Planning Staff, but they had reservations on the sequence of planning proposed. The Foreign Office and Colonial Office both felt that to ask the United States Government to approve the political assumptions for planning purposes at this stage, when only the assessment of the threat to Hong Kong had been agreed, might be an unfruitful proposal. For that reason they proposed that the Working Group should first discuss with the Americans the size and capability of the purely United Kingdom defence effort available in Hong Kong. The Americans were unlikely to approve the assumptions without being convinced that their support was necessary.
NIR → COS.73/15/1/58
TOP SECRET