TOP SECRET
GUARD
Page 95
人
with tha
trees at Free ent allotted.
ли
Annex (Continued)
At the same time United States agreement should be obtained to the proposition that the maintenance of our position in the Colony is also dependent on our holding a demonstrably impartial attitude towards the two Chinas and, whilst not presenting opportunity to the Communists, offering no avoid- able provocation to the Chinese Peoples Government.
5.
Since Hong Kong could not be defended successfully within its territorial limits if a large scale attack was launched upon it, United States support should, we consider, include the threat of a United States large scale nuclear air attack on the interior of China in the event of an overt attack on Hong Kong, In order to obtain from the United States a commitment at the political level on these lines, we feel it will be necessary in the course of discussion to disclose frankly to the United States the limitations of the forces that can be made available for the defence of Hong Kong in the period up to the end of 1962 and our present military objectives on the lines of the existing directive to the Commander British Forces. In this context the United States Service authorities are under no illusions about our strength or capabilities in the area, although they have not been told the future run- down of our forces. We believe that a frank statement of our position would probably be required by the United States Government before they would consider undertaking the commit- ment which we seek.
6. We consider that the political assumptions put forward by the BDCC(FE), which hitherto have been the basis of dis- cussions, are unlikely to be acceptable to the United States as they stand and are insufficiently precise. We suggest therefore that the political assumptions/should be as follows:-
to planning frumpoten
(a) The United Kingdom intends to resist aggression against Hong Kong in whatever form it may come.
(b) The United States is prepared to support the
United Kingdom in this policy with military action. (c) There would be continuing and close alignment of Anglo-American policies permitting co-operation · in planning for the defence of Hong Kong.
(a) The governments of both the United Kingdom and
the United States are prepared to authorise the use of nuclear weapons against the interior of China as well as locally in the event of Chinese Communist attack on the Colony and that the Chinese Government should understan9 - EiSyna -
The assumption. in pana with
(a)
have wo
effect
unless t
7.
We recommend the following sequence of planning, which provides for the essential control of policy by Ministers and by the Chiefs of Staff at each stage:
becomes known
With Chañes
a) Ministers should be invited to endorse for planning purposes the political assumptions set out at para- graph 6 above.
(b) Ministers should also be invited to endorse the
objectives in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.
3 GUARD
Page 95
Page 95
TOP SECRET
L
muletory