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REAR ADMIRAL DREYER (representing the Vice Chief of Naval Staff) said that both the Joint Planning Staff reports made clear that the Colony could not be defended against open aggression and that therefore the only hope was to persuade the Chinese not to risk an attack. The best chance of achieving this object was by a show of force, which the United Kingdom garrison provided, plus the deterrent of the United States nuclear weapons.
AIR VICE MARSHAL STEPHENSON (representing the Vice Chief of the Air Staff) said that it seemed reasonable that, after agreement on the threat, the United Kingdom should explain in discussion with the United States tho size and limitations of our garrison forces and what they were designed to do and capable of doing. The United Kingdom team could explain that we should be unable to provide the deterrent for 3 to 4 years. Since the United States were now showing an interest in Hong Kong the object of the talks should be as stated in paragraph 4 of JP(57)165. It was more important to secure a United States commitment to pose the deterrent and thus prevent aggression in the Colony, than to obtain agreement on the use of the deterrent in its defence. The only risk under this procedure was of the United States declining to commit themselves, and of this fact leaking out, with a resultant increase of the risk of agression.
MR. DALTON (Foreign Office) said that the terms of reference for these talks had been laid down by the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Dulles in Washington last October. The Working Parties were to consider first the threat to Hong Kong, and then joint measures which might be taken to meet the threat. The threat had now been assessed as a two-fold one: open agression, which was unlikely, and the more probable one of internal subversion followed by disturbances, which might lead to intervention from Communist China, ostensibly to restore order. The Working Part would shortly be considering what military measures should jointly be taken to meet the threat. The aim of the Working Party would be to reach agreement
their primarily on how to prevent the Chinese from attacking; secondary aim would be to consider how to concert measures to meet an attack. He therefore agreed that the main objective of the United Kingdom representatives would be to obtain the promise of a posed deterrent. If the talks were successful there would be great difficulty in making known to the Chinese the existence of the United States commitment, but that would be a problem for the future.
"MR. CAMPBELL (Colonial Office) said that, as he under- stood it, the argument of the Joint Planning Staff was that there was a danger that discussion in detail on the strength of the shield forces might lead to United States pressure on the United Kingdom to reinforce their garrison. It was hoped to negotiate with the United States mainly on the commitment of the deterrent. If joint plans were to be discussed for the defence of the Colony by conventional means that would be almost bound to introduce the question of evacuation because one of the objects of such defence would be to buy time' and one of the main uses to which this could be put was evacuation. In these circumstances there was a danger to our position in Hong Kong from a possible leakage of evacuation plans and consequent loss of confidence in our will to maintain our position in the Colony."
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