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TOR 242221Z
SEACOS 65.
24th March, 1956.
From FEDSEC for Chiefs of Staff Committee from B.D.C.C.(F.Z.).
(100) Reference SEACOS 60.
The report by General Sugden referred to in para 1 does not mention the reduction in forces re- cently authorised. In view of these reductions, although we consider it would be desirable to approach the U.S. to obtain their reactions to the principle of bilateral talks on the defence of Hong Kong, we suggest that before the se talks take place the J.I.C. London should assess the like- lihood and circumstances of an attack on the Colony to- gether with the resultant threat in the event of nuclear counter action. On the receipt of this assessment the B.D.C.C.(F.E.) should then study the capability of the reduced garrison to defend the Colony.
2. We conclude, therefore, that it would not be profitable to approach the U.S. on the lines of paragraph 4 and 5 of SEACOS 60 until these two studies have been completed. Further, in view of the divided U.S. air command in the Pacific theatre, we consider that any approach on this matter would more properly be made in Washington, rather than to Admiral Stump.
3.
In the meantime, we consider Commander British Forces Hong Kong should have a new directive consistent with his capabilities, and are forwarding a paper on this subject.
CIRCULATION
War Registry, Admiralty
Message Control, War Office
Registry Telegrams, Air Ministry Mr. P.H. Dean
Mr. W.D. Allen
Mr. F.S. Tomlinson
Major General W.H.A. Bishop
Mr. Armitage Smith
Director J.I.B.
Director General Security Service
Major General Sir John Sinclair
Mr. C.Y. Carstairs
D.C.O.R. 'B'
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