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the most dangerous as our defences might be out-flanked by
substantial Chinese forces. It would however require considerable
amphibious concentration and there would be serious danger of
interference by warships and aircraft.
16. It is considered that either Course C or D would be the
more likely.
17. Chinese Tactics. At the moment, little is known of the
effect on Chinese tactics of nuclear developments. In future,
they are certain to place even greater emphasis on concealment,
night attacks and rapid approach marches. In accordance with
current Soviet doctrine, they are likely to endeavour to keep
in closest contact with the defenders, thereby hoping to prevent
the employment of atomic weapons against themselves. Guns are
likly to be deployed over a wider area. The accepted Chinese
policy of employing troops dressed in civilian clothes would
gravely handicap the defenders in a Colony with a Chinese
population of over one million.
18. Warning of 'Attack. The excellent security discipline of
the Chinese makes it difficult to obtain sufficient intelligence
information. The Communist Army adjacent to Hong Kong is itself
equate to launch a major offensive. The warning of attack could therefore be very short but at least 48 hours could be expected. There is not likely, therefore to be a surprise attack as such, though its weight and distribution would be difficult to anticipate.
Air Forces
19. General. On the outbreak of war, the main taks of the
Chinese air forces will be the reduction of the Allied nuclear
air threat to the Chinese mainland. Air support for an attack
on Hong Kong would therefore be limited to what could be made
available after this task has been provided for. The needs of
other campaigns, possibly in South East Asia and Korea would
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