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10. Chinese Tactics. At the moment, little is known of the effect on Chinese tactics of nuclear developments. In future, they are certain to place even greater emphasis on concealment, night attacks and rapid approach marches. In accordance with current Soviet doctrine, they are likely to endeavour to keep in closest contact with the defenders, thereby hoping to prevent the employment of atomic weapons against themselves. Guns are likely to be deployed over a wider area. The accepted Chinese policy of employing troops dressed in civilian clothes would gravely handicap the defenders in a Colony with a Chinese population of over one million.
11. Warning of Attack. The excellent security discipline of the Chinese makes it difficult to obtain sufficient intelligence information. The Communist Army adjacent to Hong Kong is itself adequate to launch a major offensive. The warning of attack could therefore be very short but at least 48 hours could be expected. There is not likely therefore to be a surprise attack as such, though its weight and distribution would be difficult to anticipate.
Air Forces
of the 12. General On the outbreak of war, the main task Chinese air forces will be the reduction of the Allied nuclear air threat to the Chinese mainland. Air support for an attack on Hong Kong would therefore be limited to what could be made
The needs of available aiter this task has been provided for. other campaigns, possibly in South East Asia and Korea would probably not affect the availability of forces to attack Hong Kong.
13.
140
Surprise Attack
(a)
In the event of a global war starting by a surprise attack we estimate that the maximum forces the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) would use in support of an attack on Hong Kong would be a total of 260 aircraft, all of them jet. Of these 140 would be fighters, 60 light bombers and 60 ground attack.
(b) In addition to the CCAF thret, attacks might be
launched by a small Chinese Communist Naval Air Force (CCNAF) including jet light bombers against shipping and marttime forces defending Hong Kong.
Attack after full preparation
(a)
Because of the increased readiness of the Allies for war we do not believe that the Communists will be able to provide any additional air forces other than those shown in paragraph 22(a) above in support of an attack on Hong Kong.
(b) However, if required a maximum of 50 transport
aircraft might be made available temporarily for an airborne operation. This would theoretically enable a force of 1,000 paratroops to be carried.
the In view, however, of the difficult terrain limited force available we think it most unlikely that Chinese airborne forces would be used against Hong Kong,
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