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THE NET THREAT
10. In the light of the basic threat summarised in the precoeding paragraphs we have carried out a study of the targets which might help to reduce to a minimum, the scale of the Chinese offensive by the use of allied nuclear counter action.
11.
These targets fall into three general headings, i.0. airfields, land battle tactical targets, and naval targets. We have assumed a bombing accuracy of 50 per cent circular error of 600 feet.
Airfields
12, There are 17 modern jet airfields in China within jet light-bomber range of Hong Kong, including severnl still under construction although probably noaring completion. There is no evidence to suggest that more than 2 of these would be fully suitable for jet light-bombors, although such aircraft might be operated from the other fields, all of which are of jet-fighter type, if the need were prossing. Only 4 are within jet fighter-bombor range of Hong Kong.
13. The airfield development, which has been underway in South China during 1955 and 1956 and which has contributed to the total of 17 modern jet boses mentioned above, may continue and similar construction work may begin elsewhere. There are, in fact, about a dozen other airfields with runs of about 2,000 yds or more within light-bomber range which would offer possibilities for bringing up to full modern jet standards. However, it is impossible to forecast what new construction work the Chinese may wish to undertake in the general area.
14. Successful nuclear attacks on existing airfields would, we estimate, do the following damage :-
(a) aircraft and buildings 90 per cent would
sustain severe damage on 95 per cent of occasions.
(b) railways would be rendered unusable on 30 per cent
of occasions.
Land battle tactical targets
15.
There are no suitable targets along the lines of communication in the area to the immediate north of Hong Kong the loss of which would constitute a serious reduction in Chinese logistic capability. The distances are short and cross country movement is practicable; we think therefore that the
likely targets for nuclear attack would be concentrations of troops within the area. These targets could only be located by reconnaissance. The effectiveness of these attacks would depend largely upon whether the Chinese moved only by night and the extent to which they dispersed their forces. Korean experience shows that the Chinese are extremely adopt at these tactics. However, in view of the narrow front and the lack of room for manoeuvring the Chinese forces must be forced to concentrate at some points before launching their attack; the oxtent of these concentrations would be further influenced by the degree of resistance offered by the defenders.
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