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a bombing accuracy of 50 per cent circular error of 600 feet.
Alfields.
14. Within jet light-bomber range of Hong Kong, there are 17 modern jet airfields, some of which are not yet fully operational. It is probable that at present not more than
2 of these would be fully suitable for jet light-bombers, although in an emergency such aircraft might be operated from the other 15 all of which are of jet-fighter type. Only 4 are within jet fighter-bomber range of Hong Kong.
There
15. The airfield development, which has been underway in South China during 1955 and 1956 and which has contributed to the total of 17 modern jet airfields mentioned above, may con- tinue and similar construction work may begin clsewhere. are, in fact, about a dozen other airfields with runs of about 2,000 yds or more within light-bomber range which would offer possibilities for bringing up to full modern jet standards. However, it is impossible to forecast what now construction work the Chinese may wish to undertake in the general area.
16. Successful nuclear attacks on existing airfields would, we estimate, do the following damage:-
(a)
(b)
aircraft and buildings - 90 per cent would
sustain severe damage on 95 per cent of occasions.
runways would be rendered unusable on 30 per cent of occasions.
Land battle tactical torte
17. There are no suitable targets along the lines of comm- unication in the area to the immediate north of Hong Kong the loss of which would constitute an immediate reduction in Chinese logistic capability: the distances are short, cross- country movement is practicable and large scale logistic backing would be unnecessary. We think therefore that the likely targets for nuclear attack would be concentrations of troops within the area. Those targets could only be located by reconnaissance. The effectiveness of these attacks would depend primarily on the degree to which Chinese troops could be forced to concentrate before launching their attacks and therefore present themselves as worthwhile nuclear targets. However, in view of the narrow front and the lack of room for manoeuvre.. the Chinese forces must be forced to concentrate
the extent of at some points before launching their attack; these concentrations would be further influenced by the degree of resistance offered by the defenders.
18. We therefore consider that the use of nuclear weapons within the immediate battle area against targets of opportunity
The would reduce considerably the Chinese scale of attack. amount of reduction will depend upon the availability and development of specialised nuclear weapons for use by Allied forces and the degree to which the Chinese concentrate their forces. If our forces in position at the outbreak of war included a number of small and highly mobile land force units equipped with light weapons which had a nuclear capability, we consider that the amphibious and land force threats could be reduced to manageable proportions.
Naval Targets
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vessels might present a worthwhile target..
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