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43.
As regards air forces, also, obsolescent aircraft might in the main be used to support an attack on the Colony, and the grouping of such aircraft in South East China, whilst indicating aggressive intent would therefore not necessarily indicate the imminence of attack.
44.
On the other hand, some indication of impending attack might be obtained from oporations at sea. There are certain logistic problems in maintaining amphibious and supporting forces, of the type indicated, for any length of time,
There is also the risk of a loss of surprise in holding such a concentration in the vicinity of intended operations, and it is considered unlikely that the craft would be held in their preliminary position for more than 10 days. The movement of the amphibious and supporting forces from thoir usual locations to their priliminary positions might take about 3 days, but we could not be sure of this move until one day had elapsed. It is possible, therefore, that we might have a minimum of 2 days warning of imminent attack. On the other hand such a build up might NOT be considered by the Communists as a pre-requisite of an attack on the Colony, and in thet event NO warning would be available from this source either.
45. While therefore we should have an indication that some action against the Colony may be contemplated we are unlikely to have warning of its exact timing.
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