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Course D A frontal assault in strength across the Sino-British
frontier coinciding with strong subsidiary sea-borne attacks against Hong Kong Island, the New Territories or both.
30. In spite of continued training by the CCA in amphibious operations their forces still lack operational experience and this, coupled with the potential Allied Naval superiority would deter them from adopting Course B. This is likely to be applicable in the future too, since beaches suitable for landing forces of the necessary strength are limited and widely dispersed. Control of such an operation is difficult and little suitable training is likely to be obtained.
31.
The strength of our defences in the New Territories is likely to be known by the Chinese Communists. Courses C and D are easier to control than Course B, and must therefore be attractive to them, particularly since their predominant land and air forces are involved. It is only a matter of degree as to the extent naval and amphibious forces would participate.
Course D
is likely to be the most dangerous for the defence, but dependent on the opposition expected it may be considered unneccessarily wasteful.
32. The simplest operation would be provided by Course A. This in spite of the preponderance of their round forces is unlikely to be acceptable since the defence can choose the position most favourable to them on the narrowest front, and the all important seaward flanks are neglected.
Most Probable Course
33. On balance, therefore, since it offers the greatest prospect of success, with the minimum of deployment, Course C is considered to be the most likely. Nuclear Interdiction.
34. A massed frontal or sca-borne assault requires forces to be concentrated at some stage of the operation. Such concentrations as well as the likely gun areas would be excellent nuclear targets. To be of any use, however, nuclear weapons (air or ground delivered) would have to be immediately available for use, a delay of 4 8 days would probably allow such necessary enemy concentrations to disperse.
SCALE AND NATURE OF ATTACK
Land
35.
The Chinese in accord with Soviet tactical doctrine are likely to aim at superiority of at least four to one. Any run down in the strength of the Hong Kong Garrison would be known and a proportionately smaller Chinese Communist assault force may then be employed. The smallest operational field unit is at present an army (strength - 50,000). Any diminution in the strength of the attack across the land frontier would mean that the CCA would offer fewer opportunities for nuclear attack against, for example, troop concentrations. There are available within miles of the frontier some 262,000 troops comprising a balanced force of infantry, artillery, engineers and some armour. A force of this strength could be employed against the Colony without in any way restricting the Chinese Communist capability for operations elsewhere.
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