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Maritime Aircraft
19. The CAF now has five sea planes, and these may be the fore-runners of others. However, judging by the lack of expansion in recent years of the medium bomber foroe, the sea-plano force is unlikely to expand before 1958 to such an extent as to poso a serious threat to naval forces supporting Hong Kong.
Airborne Operations
20. Chinese Communist airborne forces are few and lack operational experience; their transport aircraft are also limited in number and in war are likely to be heavily committed in their normal role. Furthermore, the topography of the Colony is unsuitable for such operations. Airborne operations against the Colony are therefore considered to be unlikely.
Land Forces
21. The Chinese Communist Army (CCA) consists of thirty-five armies oach of strength 50,000. The major contres for these armies are Korea with seven armies, Manchuria with nine armies, the mainland opposite Formosa with nine armies and the provinces of Kwangtung and Hunan containing six armies. In addition cach of these areas has special artillery formations of field, coast and anti-aircraft guns. The deployment of these armies is now very much more flexible following on the devolopment of road and rail communications through- out China and this flexibility will increase with the continuing improvement to communications. During the next two years the re-equipping and training
of the CCA on Soviet lines are likely to continue and those arms at present weak, for example armour and mechanical transport generally, are likely to become fully effective. Tactical training for nuclear warfare may influence tho mass assault but whilst dispersion may be practised it is not considered the overall numbers likely to be employed to obtain the necessary superiority will be affected.
Communications
22.
A study has already been made of gun and concentration areas likely to be used initially in an attack against the Colony across the land frontier. Recent communication developments are significant in that these areas are now accessible to wheeled vehicles, as now are also the beaches at Bias and Mirs Bays, which could be used for embarking initial assault and follow up amphibious forces respectively. Details of these developments and a sketch
map are at Appendix B and Map P.
Landing Beaches
23.
Whilst there are numerous small beaches both on the mainland and the island where raiding parties could be put ashore, there are only a few locations where a sizeable invasion force could be landed and effectively controlled.
24.
On the East the most likely landing areas for an attack from Mirs Bay or Bias Bay are between Sha Tin Hoc and Tai Po in Tolo Harbour, and the Western coast of Port Shelter. Both areas have stretches of beach sutiable for landings and routes inland to Kowloon. The narrow entrance to Tolo Harbour is easily defendable and an attack would be extremely vulnerable. Port Shelter, however, has the advantage of an easy, open approach with a number of good beaches and casy exits. It appears therefore that a landing at Port Shelter would offer the best opportunities in the East to a largo onomy landing force.
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