5
11.
The fighter force is well trained but not up to Western standards. Its defensive ability is hampered by lack of modern GCI equipment; its night intercept capability is very low owing to lack of AI equipment. The bomber force lacks operational experience but is working steadily to improve its visual and blind bombing standards. The CAF have a good early warning system, but, as stated above, their intercept capability is poor.
12.
The mobility of the CAF has increased greatly in the past two years, chiefly by the construction or rehabilitation of airfields in South and East China.
13. The CAF have adequate bases from which to launch an attack on Hong Kong; the most convenient bases for such an attack are the Canton Airfields of Fatshan and White Cloud, and Hiuyang airfield. These airfields would probably be supplemented by satellite airfields, which the CAF are capable of developing rapidly.
14. The CAF strength in the Canton complex at present amounts to one MIG 15 Division (about 90 aircraft) and one Regiment of LA 9s (about 27 aircraft). This strength can, however, be rapidly and secretly ro-inforcod.
•
15. The size of the force which will be deployed against Hong Kong will be limited by the fact that the main aerial threat to China springs from allied bases in the Phillipines, Formosa, Japan, Okinawa and aircraft carriers. The main task of the CAF will therefore be to counter attacks from such basos, and only those aircraft which are unsuitable for this task are likely to be used against Hong Kong. This may well limit the aerial threat to Hong Kong to piston engined aircraft; these aircraft would however, be given protection by jet fighters, which could quickly be recalled to thoir main task.
16.
Jet bombers and fighters would be used to prevent air or sea borne ro-inforcements reaching Hong Kong. These aircraft would also be used against Hong Kong if the threat from the main allied air bases failed to materialize or was neutralized by CAF air action or sabotage.
17.
The CAF havo, at the moment, 20 oporational rogiments (each of about 30 aircraft) equipped with piston engined aircraft, and it is undoubtedly their intention to re-arm such regiments with jets as soon as possible. Whilst it is not possible to estimate the speed of re-arming it is thought that by 1953 the CAF's strength in piston engined aircraft may be as indicated below and the whole of this force, with the exception of the modium bombers would be employed against Hong Kong.
3 Regiments of Ground Attack Aircraft (IL 10)
2 Regiments of Light Bombers (TU 2)
2 Rogiments of P.. Fighters (LA 9)
and
1 Regiment of Medium Bombers (TU 4).
Future Trends
18. By 1958 the strength of the CAF is unlikely to increase considerably, but its capabilities should be improved by the introduction of improved jot fighters and the re-equipping of possibly 12 piston ongined regiments with jet aircraft, and by the more widespread use of modern GCI equipment.
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