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18.
Internal Diversion.
The se attacks would almost certainly be preceeded and combined with extensive acts of terrorism and sabotage designed to divert the resources of the defenders and to impede military preparations and operations.
THE REDUCTION OF THE THREAT
19. Study of the targets, nuclear attack on which might help to reduce to a minim m the scale of the Chinese offensive, is considered under three general headings:
airfields
land battle tactical targets naval targets.
We have assumed a bombing accuracy of 50 per cent circular error of 600 feet.
Airfields
20.
There are at present two fully operational jet light bomber and four jet fighter bomber airfields within range of Hong Kong. A further 11 jet fighter airfields are within jet light bomber range but we would only expect light bombers to operate from any of these fighter airfields in emergency.
21, Although it is impossible to forecast what furthe airfield construction work may be undertaken there are about 12 ampl] airfields within jet light bomber range of Hong Kong which might possibly be brought up to modern jet standard.
22. A successful attack on airfields with nuclear weapons will produce the following results:
(a)
(b)
-
aircraft and buildings 90 per cent would sustain severe damage on 95 per cent of occasions.
runways would be rendered unusable on 30 per cent of occasions.
Land battle tactical targets
The
23. As the initial assault would probably be maintained from stockpiles previously established south of the East River attacks on targets on the lines of communication in the area immediately North of Hong Kong would not cause a serious and immediate reduction in Chinese logistic capability. distances are short, cross-country movement is practicable and large scale logistic backing would be unnecessary. We think therefore that the likely targets for nuclear at ack would be concentrations of troops within the area. These targets could only be located by reconnaissance. The effectiveness of these attacks would depend primarily on the degree to
which Chinese troops could be forced to concentrate before launching their attacks and therefore present themselves as worthwhile nuclear targets. However, in view of the narrow front and the lack of room for manoeuvre the Chinese forces must be forced to concentrate at some points before launching their attack; the extent of these contrations would be further influenced by the degree of resistance offered by the defenders.
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A