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It cannot be too strongly impressed on the Local Defence Committee that vague allusions to arrangements that should be made are of little value. They must be actually made as far as this can be done in anticipation of hostilities, and definitely recorded in the Defence Scheme.
14. Page 8, second paragraph.—This paragraph, dealing with the character of attacks to which Ceylon is liable, might be expanded in somewhat the following terms :-
The views of the Naval Authorities are, that attacks by parties landed from ships are most improbable in these regions. Cruisers, and, indeed, all vessels of war, have no men to spare for such purposes, and any parties attempting to land would necessarily be small and easily repulsed. Com- bined attack by land and by sea necessitates the employment of transports and a convoying squadron, Such an attack would not be possible, unless Her Majesty's Navy had lost command of the sea. While the command of the sea is retained, the only attack on Trincomali or Colombo which may reasonably be expected, is that of two or three cruisers, which might carry a few second-class torpedo-boats. It is unlikely that these cruisers would have any ammunition to expend in attacking fortifications with the risk of being subsequently caught with depleted magazines by Her Majesty's ships. Attack by carried torpedo-boats is possible, but the action of such craft is limited by conditions of weather, which in the Ceylon seas is, for a large part of the year, unfavourable. Ceylon is beyond the range of torpedo-boats operating direct from a hostile base.
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CHAPTER II.
15. Page 13 (4).-The Commandant Ceylon Volunteers is here detailed for the command of Galle "should active defence there be necessary." On page 38 the first order to the O.C. troops, Galle, is that his rendezvous will be at the Racquet Court, Colombo, on the order to mobilize, when he is to proceed at the earliest opportunity to Galle by rail. On page 40 the tenth order to the Commandant, Ceylon Volunteers, is that, after mobilizing the volunteers for Colombo, he will proceed to Galle to take command there.
The Colonial Defence Committee consider it important to prevent any hostile cruiser coaling at Galle at the outset of war. The defence of that place should be organized immediately on mobilization. The officer told off to command should therefore proceed to his post without delay, and leave the mobilization of the volunteers for Colombo to the next Senior Officer of that force.
16. Page 13 (A).—The position of the O.C.R.A., Ceylon, in the Defence Scheme is a little doubtful. On page 13, and in the table on pages 15-18 he is shown on the staff of the G.O.C., Ceylon, with a post at the Fire Commander's station, Colombo. He is not elsewhere referred to in the Scheme, and it would seem as if, in addition to his duties as O.C.R.A., Ceylon, he is also to be O.C.R.A., Colombo, and Fire Commander at Colombo, notwithstanding that a separate O.C.R.A., Colombo, is shown in the table on pages 15-18. The point requires clearing up, and it would certainly seem advisable that the O.C.R.A. should not be a Fire Commander if this can possibly be avoided.
There is a similar doubt about the position of the C.R.E., Ceylon. Although a separate C.R.E., Colombo, appears in the table on pages 15-18, it would seem from the station of the C.R.E., Ceylon, and from the absence of any reference to his action, that he and the C.R.E., Colombo, are intended to be one and the same person.
17. Page 13 (4). The position laid down for the Fortress Commander, Trinco- mali, at the Garrison Office, Fort Frederick, does not appear to the Colonial Defence Committee the most suitable for directing the operations against the most probable form of attack, ie., by cruisers and torpedo-boats. They recommend that his command post in war should be at Regent's Battery, Fort Ostenburg, but that he should have an alternative post at the Flag-staff, Fort Frederick, to which he could go in the event of an attack on that part of the defences, leaving a staff officer at Regent's Battery, through whom communications to him could be sent. The Committee also recom- mend that the command lines of the Fortress, which they understand are now under the consideration of the W.O., should be laid so as to give effect to this arrangement.
18. Pages 20 to 22, Tables (A1) to (41).—The 6th column of these tables-" Station on Mobilization "- -is unnecessary.
19. Pages 23 and 24, (C).-Under the heading "Communications," roads and
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